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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between evolutionary theory and the weird tale in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Through readings of works by two of the writers most 
closely associated with the form, Arthur Machen (1863-1947) and H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937), it 
argues that the weird tale engages consciously, even obsessively, with evolutionary theory and with 
its implications for the nature and status of the “human”. 
 
The introduction first explores the designation “weird tale”, arguing that it is perhaps less useful as 
a genre classification than as a moment in the reception of an idea, one in which the possible 
necessity of recalibrating our concept of the real is raised. In the aftermath of evolutionary theory, 
such a moment gave rise to anxieties around the nature and future of the “human” that took their life 
from its distant past. It goes on to discuss some of the studies which have considered these anxieties 
in relation to the Victorian novel and the late-nineteenth-century Gothic, and to argue that a similar 
full-length study of the weird work of Machen and Lovecraft is overdue. 
 
The first chapter considers the figure of the pre-human survival in Machen’s tales of lost races and 
pre-Christian religions, arguing that the figure of the fairy as pre-Celtic survival served as a focal 
point both for the anxieties surrounding humanity’s animal origins and for an unacknowledged 
attraction to the primitive Other. The second chapter discusses the pervasiveness of degeneration 
theory at the fin de siècle, and the ways in which works by both Machen and Lovecraft make use of 
it to depict the backsliding of both the individual human subject and of wider society, raising the 
suggestion that the degenerate is always already present within the contemporary human. In the 
third chapter, portrayals by both authors of hybridity come under consideration. The chapter places 
these tales in their historical context, with reference to the cultural anxieties surrounding the decline 
of empire, the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in the United States, and the emergence of the 
eugenics movement, and argues that these fears become tied to notions about the fitness or 
otherwise to survive of a “human” associated with Anglo-Saxon whiteness. The fourth and final 
chapter discusses Lovecraft’s portrayals of highly-advanced extraterrestrial civilisations, arguing 
that these stories partake of a Utopian impulse that nonetheless expresses itself via contemporary 
racist discourses, and that they both maintain the notion of a horrific primitive Other within the 
human and attempt to open up the possibility of a transhuman or posthuman future. The thesis 
concludes by considering these works in relation to the cyborg theory of Donna Haraway, 
suggesting that their portrayal of the necessity of inhabiting flux offers a new and less 
straightforwardly horrific way of thinking about human identity. 
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Introduction: Weird Notions 
 
We may likewise infer that fear was expressed from an extremely remote period, in 
almost the same manner as it now is by man; namely, by trembling, the erection of the 
hair, cold perspiration, pallor, widely opened eyes, the relaxation of most of the muscles, 
and by the whole body cowering downwards or held motionless.
1
 
 
 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
 
The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind 
of fear is fear of the unknown. These facts few psychologists will dispute, and their 
admitted truth must establish for all time the genuineness and dignity of the weirdly 
horrible tale as a literary form. Against it are discharged all the shafts of a materialistic 
sophistication which clings to frequently felt emotions and external events, and of a 
naively insipid idealism which deprecates the aesthetic motive and calls for a didactic 
literature to uplift the reader toward a suitable degree of smirking optimism. But in spite 
of all this opposition the weird tale has survived, developed, and attained remarkable 
heights of perfection; founded as it is on a profound and elementary principle whose 
appeal, if not always universal, must necessarily be poignant and permanent to minds of 
the requisite sensitiveness.
2
 
 
H. P. Lovecraft, ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’ 
 
Fear is, in the Victorian anthropological sense, a ‘survival’. Like certain primitive tribes, 
this primitive emotion survives into the modern world unchanged. Like them, it 
represents the primal conditions of man and allows us to observe those conditions still 
at work. Moreover, it occupies the same place in the metaphor of development as do 
‘primitive’ peoples: fear is an emotion to be controlled, suppressed, outgrown. Reason is 
cast as an adult emotion, just as western European man is an ‘adult’ on the scale of 
development. So, like primitive peoples, fear is to be kept under control. Yet like them, 
it is still there, not fully left behind, nor entirely dominated. In the arc of development, 
fear is perceived, disturbingly, as at the base. It retains its insurgent power and is 
liable—like mutiny—to break out.3 
 
Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots 
 
                                                 
1
 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872; London: Fontana, 1999), p. 356. 
2
 H. P. Lovecraft, ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’, in Collected Essays Volume 2: Literary Criticism, ed. by S. T. 
Joshi (1927, revised 1933-34; New York: Hippocampus Press, 2004), pp. 82-135 (pp. 82-83). 
3
 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 236. 
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In his ‘Notes on Writing Weird Fiction’, first published after his death in 1937, but circulated to his 
correspondents in 1933 in handwritten form, H. P. Lovecraft describes the aim of his stories as 
being ‘to achieve, momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling 
limitations of time, space, and natural law which for ever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity 
about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis’.4 The horror tale, he 
asserts, in an echo of his earlier ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’ (1927, revised 1933-1934), is 
his chosen medium because fear ‘is our deepest and strongest emotion, and the one which best 
lends itself to the creation of nature-defying illusions’.5 Lovecraft’s choice of phrase here is 
interesting. Does the phrase ‘nature-defying illusions’ refer merely to fictional representations of 
the supernatural? Tales like ‘The Outsider’ (1926), ‘The Hound’ (1924), and the various “dream-
cycle” stories derived from the work of Lord Dunsany would certainly appear to fit into this 
category. The emphasis Lovecraft places upon the unknown, both here and in ‘Supernatural Horror 
in Literature’, suggests, however, a slightly different reading. The ‘picture of shattered natural law’ 
he seeks to create will allow us to see ‘beyond the radius of our sight and analysis’;6 it will effect a 
‘defeat of those fixed laws of Nature which are our only safeguard against the assaults of chaos and 
the daemons of unplumbed space’.7 The true weird tale is not ‘one in which the horrors are finally 
explained away by natural means’,8 but nor is it simply a representation of an impossible event; 
rather, it requires a recalibration of our concept of the possible. The unknown occasions fear 
precisely because of its potential to become known. Fear, furthermore—as noted in the above quote 
from Gillian Beer—is a kind of survival; an emotion whose expression derives from the ‘oldest’ 
phase of human existence. In the words of Charles Darwin, since the emotions are often expressed 
in a similar manner in humans and in the “lower” animals, ‘some expressions, such as bristling of 
                                                 
4
 H. P. Lovecraft, ‘Notes on Writing Weird Fiction’, in Collected Essays Volume 2: Literary Criticism, ed. by S. T. Joshi 
(1937; New York: Hippocampus Press, 2004), pp. 175-178 (p. 176). 
5
 Ibid., p. 176. 
6
 Ibid., p. 176. 
7
 Lovecraft, ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’, p. 84. 
8
 Ibid., p. 84. 
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the hair under the influence of extreme terror[…]can hardly be understood, except on the belief that 
man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition’.9 As such a survival, fear does not 
only rely upon the possibility of confirmation; it is itself confirmation of a fearful fact with which 
much “weird” fiction is explicitly concerned. 
 
Lovecraft’s attempt to define the ‘true weird tale’ necessitates here a look at the term ‘weird tale’ 
itself.
10
 Whether the weird tale in fact constitutes a distinct genre seems questionable; indeed, even 
S. T. Joshi, author of The Weird Tale and perhaps the most prolific of Lovecraft critics, does not 
really attempt to so classify it. Of the six authors covered in his eponymous study, he admits that 
‘only Lovecraft appears to have been conscious of working in a weird tradition’, and that ‘[if] the 
weird tale exists now as a genre, it may only be because critics and publishers have deemed it so by 
fiat’.11 It may, he goes on to suggest, be impossible to define the weird tale as a distinct genre, since 
‘an irremediable confusion of terms such as horror, terror, the supernatural, fantasy, the fantastic, 
ghost story, Gothic fiction and others’ in the field makes it difficult to disentangle the weird tale 
from all—or, perhaps, any—of them.12 Joshi goes on to assert that he will ‘use the term “weird tale” 
more or less as Lovecraft did’, suggesting that one important aspect of Lovecraft’s use of the term is 
the emphases he places on psychological realism and the short story as a vehicle for the weird in the 
wake of Poe.
13
 Neither these nor any of Lovecraft’s previously-mentioned points serves to 
distinguish the weird tale entirely from the late-Victorian Gothic or from science fiction, however—
and indeed, Arthur Machen, one of Lovecraft’s ‘Modern Masters’,14 is often mentioned as a minor 
figure in the late-nineteenth-century Gothic. Certainly, for a contemporary reader, it is as easy to 
read some of Lovecraft’s work in particular as proto-science fiction rather than as occupying a 
distinct genre; and if the primarily novel-length works of “New Weird” writers like Ramsey 
                                                 
9
 Darwin, Expression of the Emotions, p. 19. 
10
 Lovecraft, ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’, p. 84. 
11
 S. T. Joshi, The Weird Tale (Holicong, PA: Wildside Press, 1990), p. 1. (Emphasis in original.) 
12
 Ibid., p. 2. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
14
 Lovecraft, ‘Supernatural Horror in Literature’, p. 116. 
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Campbell and China Miéville are to be counted as weird tales, the short story form does not seem to 
be an adequate requirement for classification.  
 
Perhaps ‘weird tale’ is ultimately only a term of convenience, referring to a group of writers either 
identified by Lovecraft and subsequent critics as embodying the tradition in which he wished to 
place himself, or self-identified as working in a ‘weird’ or Lovecraftian tradition. Both of the 
authors whose work I examine in this study fall into the former group, and the shared concerns of 
their fiction, as well as the already-documented influence of Machen upon Lovecraft,
15
 mean that 
they may reasonably be considered together regardless of the genre label ‘weird tale’. Nonetheless, 
it may be useful for purposes of this study to consider the ‘weird’ not as a genre or (as Joshi later 
tentatively suggests) as the product of a ‘certain [type] of world [view]’,16 but as a stage in the 
reception of an idea—a stage comparable with the ‘strange suspension[...]of time, space, and natural 
law’ identified by Lovecraft,17 and perhaps best described by Gillian Beer in her 1983 study, 
Darwin’s Plots, to which I will shortly return. China Miéville describes the weird, in terms recalling 
Lovecraft’s, as ‘a radicalized sublime backwash’, a ‘swillage of that awe and horror from “beyond” 
back into the everyday’;18 but where, for Miéville, the weird ‘impregnates the present with a bleak, 
unthinkable novum’,19 Lovecraft is explicitly concerned with the temporal, asserting that time is 
‘the most profoundly dramatic and grimly terrible thing in the universe’ and that ‘[conflict] with 
time seems to me the most potent and fruitful theme in all human expression’.20 Similar concerns 
are clearly present in Machen’s fiction, steeped as it is in the ancient.  
 
These preoccupations inform the content of the works discussed here, and necessitate placing them 
in their own cultural and intellectual context. What has been called the ‘Darwinian revolution’ has 
                                                 
15
 S. T. Joshi, H. P. Lovecraft: A Life (West Warwick, RI: Necronomicon Press), pp. 298-300, p. 450. 
16
 Joshi, The Weird Tale, p. 11. 
17
 Lovecraft, ‘Notes on Writing Weird Fiction’, p. 176. 
18
 China Miéville, ‘Weird Fiction’, in The Routledge Companion to Science Fiction, ed. Mark Bould, Andrew M. Butler, 
Adam Roberts, and Sherryl Vint (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 510-515 (p. 511). 
19
 Ibid., p. 513. 
20
 Lovecraft, ‘Notes on Writing Weird Fiction’, p. 176. (Emphasis in original.) 
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long represented for historians ‘an episode in which a new scientific theory symbolized a wholesale 
change in cultural values’, one during which ‘fundamental aspects of the traditional Christian 
worldview were replaced’.21 The previous ‘Copernican revolution’ had challenged the notion that 
the Earth was the centre of the cosmos, but it had still been possible to maintain the uniqueness of 
human beings, their ‘innate superiority over nature’.22 But if living things were developed ‘by 
natural laws rather than by divine miracles’, then ‘the human race itself became merely another 
animal species, no longer the lords of creation but only superior apes’.23 It is this implication of 
evolutionary theory for the “human” that I am primarily concerned with here. 
 
Peter J. Bowler has challenged the traditional notion of the singular ‘Darwinian revolution’, 
pointing out that ‘Darwin did not present his theory to a public that had never considered the 
possibility of evolution’,24 and that the way he presented his theory had to take account of concerns 
already raised in debates around the theory of Lamarck.
25
 (Darwin makes mention of extant works 
by Lamarck and others early in The Origin of Species (1859).
26
) A more general notion of evolution 
gained traction prior to widespread acceptance of natural selection, which established itself around 
1900,
27
 so many of the influential scientific texts whose ideas can be identified in Lovecraft’s and 
Machen’s work—including Darwin’s own writing—also entertain the idea of inheritance of 
acquired characteristics. For Bowler, Darwin’s ‘great success’ is somewhat more general: it consists 
in his precipitating ‘a change in public (and hence in scientific) opinion by persuading most 
educated people that the world was subject to natural law and, by implication, that the origin of 
species must also be a law-governed process’.28 Scientists began to feel that they ‘had the right to 
                                                 
21
 Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (3
rd
 ed.) (London: University of California Press, 2003), p. 1. 
22
 Ibid., p. 1. 
23
 Ibid., p. 2. 
24
 Ibid., p. 20. 
25
 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
26
 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life (1859; London: Penguin, 1968), pp. 54-63. 
27
 Bowler, p. 179. 
28
 Ibid., p. 178. 
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investigate this area’.29  
 
The implications of a theory of human origins rooted in natural law rather than divine will were 
wide-ranging, and, as we will see, influenced ideas about topics as diverse as folklore, marriage, 
urban living, charity, and immigration. The nature, status, and future of the “human” were 
fundamentally altered, whether the theory espoused was one of Darwinian natural selection, neo-
Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics, or some combination of the two (as in much of 
Darwin’s work following the Origin.) According to Bowler, the prospect that human beings ‘are 
part of nature, and our higher faculties cannot stem from a spiritual factor with which we alone are 
endowed’ was perhaps ‘the greatest barrier to the acceptance of Darwin’s theory, and it still horrifies 
many people today’.30 Up to and even in the present, ‘the idea that humans possess unique faculties 
has been remarkably tenacious’,31 and aversion to the loss of this notion is not tied solely to the 
undermining of religious convictions. Even the hardline atheist Lovecraft, writing well after general 
acceptance of natural selection, found horror in the loss of human uniqueness. For this reason, I 
suggest that the works of Machen and Lovecraft take part in a process of coming to terms with the 
implications of evolution—one that may be seen as still ongoing (as Bowler puts it, ‘[whatever] the 
success of evolution theory in science, the cultural phase of the Darwinian revolution has not yet 
reached its conclusion’32)—but that the immediate concerns with topics such as immigration, 
degeneration, and eugenics which inform them also gain their power from contemporary social and 
cultural issues. I therefore attempt to situate them in relation to both the implications of nineteenth-
century evolutionary ideas for the “human”, and the way in which these ideas were bound up with 
contemporary concerns about “racial” and national degeneration, immigration, and the eugenics 
movement. 
 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., p. 181. 
30
 Ibid., p. 7. 
31
 Ibid., p. 353. 
32
 Ibid., p. 2. 
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I begin each chapter, therefore, with a brief consideration of the manner in which a particular idea—
the notion of the pre-human survival derived from fairylore; the theory of degeneration; the fear of 
racial mixing and immigration; and that of the eugenic improvement of the human species—derived 
its contemporary expression at least partly from scientific and pseudoscientific ideas of the late 
nineteenth century. I then consider the works which treat it via close textual analysis, exploring the 
ways in which they use ideas from the works of evolutionists including Darwin, Spencer, and T. H. 
Huxley; eugenicists, particularly Francis Galton; and theorists of degeneration. These texts 
contribute to the process of coming to terms with evolutionary theory sometimes by expressing 
some of the cultural anxieties it engendered, sometimes by partaking in an ambivalence toward the 
notion of a human origin not resulting from divine will, and sometimes by imagining a posthuman 
future that also makes use of evolutionary ideas. Finally, I suggest that later works such as 
Lovecraft’s ‘The Shadow Out of Time’ (1936) adumbrate an embryonic version of twentieth-
century posthumanism, thus participating in discourses of human mutability that persist to the 
present day. 
 
 The time these texts engage with, then, is not only the time of the past. Beer argues that ‘“the 
future Life” is the absolute form of fiction, whether it be the idea of personal immortality or the 
hypothetical, multiple predictions of daily life, or that sense of futurity intensified by evolutionary 
theory which is preoccupied with the future of life on this earth’,33 and points out that ‘[fear] is of 
all emotions that which most takes its life from the future’.34 The ‘sense of futurity’, then, must also 
be acknowledged as embedded and pervasive in its historical context. The texts under consideration 
here, as I have suggested, engage with and contribute to the cultural anxieties engendered by the 
advent of evolutionary theory; and these anxieties rely upon a perceived future—upon possibility. 
 
Any reader familiar with the study of late-nineteenth-century literature will be aware of the post-
                                                 
33
 Beer, p. 183. 
34
 Ibid., p. 221. 
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Darwinian rise of what Virginia Richter, in her 2011 study, Literature After Darwin, calls 
‘anthropological anxiety’.35 For the purposes of this study, however, it is perhaps more accurate to 
understand “evolutionary theory”—as Bowler’s resistance to the term “Darwinian revolution” 
suggests—as a set of notions derived not only from Darwin but pervasive in scientific and literary 
writing from the late nineteenth century onward.  (Certainly, degeneration theorists such as 
Bénédict Augustin Morel often drew upon the neo-Lamarckian idea of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics—the notion that structural changes caused by disease, use or disuse, or exposure to 
new environmental conditions, could be passed on—and Darwin would himself entertain this 
possibility.
36
) These notions include an emphasis on non-teleological change; a struggle for 
existence; a recognition of the probable descent of all “races” of humans from a common, animal 
progenitor; and the concomitant dethroning of the “human” from its central position in the natural 
order. Richter neatly sums up the crisis occasioned by this ‘displacement of “Man” from the apex 
of creation’.37 At the period Darwin was writing, she argues, it was 
 
the idea of conjunction—the claim that all living beings, including man, were 
descended from the same primitive species—that was deeply disturbing. Collectively 
they [Darwin’s contemporaries] recoiled from the theory of evolution by natural 
selection, mainly for two reasons: first, because man’s singular status as a superior 
being, lifted above his animal nature by his reason, was fundamentally called into 
question, since even reason and the other higher faculties were no longer considered the 
unique, divine gift of man; secondly, because man’s dominant position was not the 
result of a divine plan or even the necessary outcome of natural laws, but the contingent 
result of a rather messy trial-and-error procedure.
38
 
                                                 
35
 Virginia Richter, Literature After Darwin: Human Beasts in Western Fiction, 1859-1939 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 8. 
36
 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871; London: John Murray, 1883), p. 32; The 
Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, 2 vols (1868; London: John Murray, 1888), I, pp. 467-468. 
37
 Richter, p. 3. 
38
 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Richter goes on to consider the ways in which literary texts after the emergence of evolutionary 
theory, and in the context of ‘social changes brought about by the industrial revolution and by the 
contact with other cultures and peoples through trade and colonisation’, wrestle with the blurring of 
boundaries between self and Other—both temporally (through the anxiety of reversion to an ape-
like, pre-human state) and geographically (‘the fear of “going native”’, losing the distinction 
between ‘European self’ and an ‘exotic Other’ identified with the primitive).39 She discusses the 
relation of these fears to various cultural and literary tropes—the missing link, the ape-like human 
or human-like ape, the lost world, and the possibility of degeneration. The relationship between 
anthropological anxiety and colonial discourse is made explicit; indeed, the temporal and 
geographical dimensions mentioned above are often difficult to separate, since ‘in colonial 
discourse, the temporal axis is projected onto the geographical axis, i.e. contemporary “primitive 
peoples” are seen as living in the evolutionary past’,40 effectively being considered—as Carole G. 
Silver has pointed out in her study of fairies in Victorian culture, Strange and Secret Peoples—as 
living missing links.
41
 Richter considers the work of authors including Arthur Conan Doyle, Henry 
Rider Haggard, Edgar Rice Burroughs, Robert Louis Stevenson, and H. G. Wells in the light of 
anthropological anxiety and ‘the wider issue of cultural pessimism that was intensified in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, and once more after the First World War’.42 
 
Richter is only one of the more recent critics to have written on the relationship between 
evolutionary theory and literature. John Glendening in 2007, though writing from a position 
informed to some degree by the “literary Darwinism” of Joseph Carroll and others, focuses upon 
the ways in which ‘Darwinism informs novels relative to a late Victorian culture that generally 
encouraged authors to stress, not objective truths illuminated by Darwinism, but rather the 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., p. 8, p. 14. 
40
 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
41
 Carole G. Silver, Strange and Secret Peoples: Fairies and Victorian Consciousness (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 130. 
42
 Richter, p. 15. 
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contingencies, uncertainties, and confusions generated by it along with other forms of evolutionary 
theory’.43 Glendening, too, emphasises the ‘decentering’ of the human accomplished by 
evolutionary theory, suggesting that while it ‘could be understood in positive terms, indicating a 
somewhat egalitarian and cooperative role for humans amidst life on earth’, it might also suggest 
that ‘other species might evolve in such a way as to dominate or extinguish humans, who have no 
sanction for continued dominance’.44 Evolutionary theory had wide-ranging implications, touching 
as it did ‘upon equally complicated cultural issues—religious, philosophical, economic, and 
political’.45  
 
The imposition of the temporal axis of evolution upon the geographical axis of colonialism is 
emphasised by Glendening, too: the Victorians, he writes, ‘applied physically distinctive 
Palaeolithic remains, which were turning up with increasing regularity, to non-Western peoples 
who thereby could be interpreted as prehistoric humans living in the present’.46 But as knowledge 
of human ancestors and contact with “primitive” cultures increased, keeping them separate from 
the self became increasingly difficult. ‘[Both] archaeology and cultural anthropology’, Glendening 
notes, ‘were showing how quickly supposedly primitive and civilized societies can change into one 
another’.47 The result was a permeability of the ‘modern/primitive divide’ similar to that noted by 
Richter,
48
 and a similar anxiety. Glendening emphasises the ‘many ideological stances to which 
Darwinian emphases could be arrogated’, and notes that it could be seen to support the idea of 
degeneration as easily as that of continued progress.
49
 Nor is adaptive change necessarily to be 
construed as ‘improvement in any ultimate sense’, since increased complexity has no inherent 
value, and ‘retrogression toward simplified and, from the human perspective, cruder forms and 
                                                 
43
 John Glendening, The Evolutionary Imagination in Late-Victorian Novels: An Entangled Bank (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007), p. 8. 
44
 Ibid., p. 14. 
45
 Ibid., p. 14. 
46
 Ibid., p. 16. 
47
 Ibid., p. 16. 
48
 Ibid., p. 16. 
49
 Ibid., p. 14. 
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behaviors’ may confer advantages in terms of survival.50 Picking up Darwin’s image of the 
‘entangled bank’ from the Origin,51 employed there as ‘a representation of law and order, and of 
progress as well[...][representing] nature as happy and harmonious, a harbinger of perfection’, 
Glendening highlights the ‘negative implications of natural selection’—the ‘struggle, disorder, and 
waste’ that the image elides, and that late-Victorian novelists re-centred.52 In H. G. Wells’ The 
Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), for example 
 
entanglement means chaos, not order or harmony: it entails the commingling of objects, 
processes, and qualities that strike the human mind as incompatible or antagonistic 
because they upset boundaries and categories; and it points to the limits of knowledge, 
since the mind, caught in the very processes it tries to understand, is continually 
confounded by contingencies, like those governing the course of Darwinian evolution, 
too complex to be anticipated or fully comprehended.
53
 
 
Kelly Hurley, upon whose concept of the ‘abhuman’ I draw in my first chapter, has also 
emphasised the demolition of ‘a comfortable anthopocentrism’ accomplished by evolutionary 
theory and by the assertions made by its supporters that ‘Nature was ethically neutral and under no 
compulsion to privilege the human species’.54 Degeneration theory, which ‘reversed the narrative of 
progress, proposing a negative telos of abhumanness and cultural disarray’, is emphasised by 
Hurley as ‘a crucial imaginative and narrative source for the fin-de-siècle Gothic’.55 She touches, 
too, upon the chaotic potential implied in Glendening’s repurposing of the entangled bank image 
from the Origin. While for Darwin, ‘the intricacy and superb functionality of biological forms 
contrasted markedly with the chaotic randomness of the processes that, accidentally, generate 
                                                 
50
 Ibid., p. 113. 
51
 Darwin, The Origin of Species, p. 125, pp. 459-460. 
52
 Glendening, p. 41. 
53
 Ibid., p. 41. 
54
 Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, materialism, and degeneration at the fin de siècle (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 56-57. 
55
 Ibid., p. 65. 
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form’,56 late-nineteenth-century Gothic writers 
 
envisioned something rather more terrible. In its plots of both parallel evolutions and 
abhuman becomings, a randomly-working Nature is figured as too imaginative, too 
prolific. Any admixture of diverse morphic traits is possible, so that even highly 
complex bodies, ingeniously specialized for their environment[...]are abominable.
57
 
 
Prior to Hurley, George Levine argued for a preoccupation in fiction with evolutionary ideas. The 
‘pervasive secularizing of nature and society’ accomplished by evolutionary science meant that 
‘nature, society, narrative, and language itself were desacralized, severed from the inherent 
significance, value, and meaning of a divinely created and designed world’.58 The privileging of the 
human could no longer be assumed to be divinely ordained; instead, its restoration required 
‘arbitrary acts of human will’ that highlighted its falsity.59 No longer privileged, the human was 
‘thrust[...]into nature and time, and subjected[...]to the same dispassionate and material 
investigations hitherto reserved for rocks and stars’.60 Fiction wrestled with this intellectual shift: 
‘[the] absorption and response to Darwinism played out in narrative’, Levine argues, ‘can suggest 
the resistance and evasiveness and submission of nonscientists to this critical development in 
Western thought and imagination’.61 More fundamentally, the ‘imaginative possibilities’ available 
to writers of Victorian fiction came to be ‘conditioned by the discourse of science, which had begun 
to assume almost exclusive responsibility for reporting on [the] real; and self-conscious speakers 
for narrative art frequently invoked science as a model or analogy for their own work’.62 Levine’s 
book, as he acknowledges, is indebted to the work of Gillian Beer, whose notions regarding plot in 
the aftermath of evolutionary theory I wish to return to here. 
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Beer argues that ‘[because] of its preoccupation with time and with change evolutionary theory has 
inherent affinities with the problems and processes of narrative’.63 The ‘new story’ told by Darwin 
had deep-seated consequences for the kinds of stories told by writers of fiction in its wake.
64
 Beer’s 
work emphasises many of the elements reiterated by the critics previously mentioned. The potential 
for multiple readings of the significance of evolution—pessimistic ones as well as optimistic 
accounts of progress—is clear: 
 
[The] ‘ascent’ or the ‘descent’ of man may follow the same route, but the terms suggest 
very diverse valuations of the experience. The optimistic ‘progressive’ reading of 
development can never expunge that other insistence that extinction is more probable 
than progress, that the individual life span is never a sufficient register for change or for 
the accomplishment of desire, an insistence which has led one recent critic to 
characterise Darwinian theory as a myth of death.
65
 
 
The absence of the human as a central focus in the Origin, as well as its content, served also to 
‘[problematise] the centrality of man to the natural order’ and to ‘subdue the hierarchical nature of 
man’s thought which places himself always at the pinnacle or centre’.66 While Darwin framed his 
marginalisation of the human in the Origin as informed by a desire to avoid controversy, the 
‘absence of any reference to man as the crowning achievement of the natural and supernatural 
order’ was a loaded one, with ‘disquieting’ implications.67 Furthermore, in a fashion similar to that 
suggested by Glendening above, evolutionary theory ‘deconstructs any formulation which 
interprets the natural world as commensurate with man’s understanding of it’; rather, this world 
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‘outgoes his powers of observation and is not co-extensive with his reasoning’.68 Human beings 
have neither a privileged place within the natural order, nor a privileged understanding of it. 
 
The pervasiveness of Darwinian ideas meant that succeeding generations ‘found themselves living 
in a Darwinian world in which old assumptions had ceased to be assumptions, could be at best 
beliefs, or myths, or, at worst, detritus of the past’.69 We now ‘pay Darwin the homage of our 
assumptions’ (though Bowler’s analysis suggests this is not quite so established as Beer would have 
it), but Beer’s concern is with the ‘process of naturalisation’ undergone by his ideas—the way in 
which they become ‘assumptions’.70 At their inception, scientific ideas are at their most ‘fictive’, 
the absence of perceptible, ‘common-sense’ proof holding them ‘within a provisional scope akin to 
that of fiction’.71 This does not mean that scientific writing is fiction, as Joseph Carroll seems to 
suggest Beer is arguing.
72
 The ‘great number of significant and various meanings’ that can be 
derived from evolutionary theory do not deprive it of meaning—or, to put it another way ‘it cannot 
be made to mean everything’.73 Rather, it ‘excludes or suppresses certain orderings of 
experience’.74 My concern here is not really with the “literary Darwinism” proposed by Carroll and 
others—what Richter calls the ‘axiomatic assumption that nature is the foundation for all cultural 
activity [leading] to the conclusion that all literary texts reflect this unvarying nature—that all 
novels are about sexual selection’75 (though I accept that this characterisation may be as unfairly 
reductive as Carroll’s own portrayal of much humanities scholarship). Judgements about the 
validity or otherwise of the literary Darwinist project are perhaps best left to those who have 
studied language and the brain—but what Carroll appears to miss when he describes Beer’s study 
as an attempt ‘to characterize Darwin, with perverse ingenuity, as a forerunner for the irrationalist 
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antirealism of such contemporary authorities as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault’76 is that the 
‘provisional scope’ she describes, and the hypothesis-plots for whose prominence in the wake of 
evolutionary theory she goes on to argue, rely upon the potential for confirmation. Lovecraft’s 
‘unknown’ can only occasion fear because of the possibility it may become known; his suspensions 
of natural law gain their power because they constitute a first step in the process of knowing, of 
fact-making or -finding. So Beer can argue that 
 
[plot] in nineteenth-century fiction is a radical form of interpretation: it fixes the 
relations between phenomena. It predicts the future and then gives real form to its own 
predictions. It is to that extent self-verifying: its solutions confirm the validity of the 
clues proposed. 
 Such plot assumes that what is hidden may be uncovered, and that what lies beyond 
the peripheries of present knowledge may be encompassed and brought within the 
account by its completion. In this particular sense it shares the nature of hypothesis, 
which by its causal narrative seeks ultimately to convert its own status from that of idea 
to truth. Plot does this by provoking in the reader multiple hypotheses.
77
 
 
Even when Beer writes that Darwin’s ‘text [the Origin] is an unusually extensive fiction—one 
which deliberately extends itself towards the boundaries of the literally unthinkable, which 
displaces the absoluteness of man’s power of reason as an instrument for measuring the world’,78 
the unthinkable—by virtue of being gestured at—cannot be unimaginable. The sense of futurity 
inherent in evolutionary fiction contains the possibility that the unthinkable may one day become 
thinkable, of the expansion of ‘reason’ (though this may well entail the opening-up of further 
uncertainties). We might think of Miéville's comment that, in ‘The Call of Cthulhu’ (1928), ‘there 
is no story, only the slow uncovering, from disjointed information and discarded papers, of the fact 
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of the Weird’.79 The ‘dysteleological abundance of possibilities’ emphasised by Darwin requires 
that they be possible, that one may move beyond the status of hypothesis and thus foreclose the 
others.
80
 Certainly, for Lovecraft, an understanding of the power of the weird tale based in ‘our 
inmost biological heritage’ does not preclude the necessity of its provisional scope.81 It seems no 
accident that Lovecraft’s protagonists are often able to retain their sanity only because of the loss or 
destruction of what would provide tangible proof of their experiences. The idea of the “weird” 
which I have suggested above does not deny the possibility of knowledge in evoking the unknown, 
but requires that it exist in potential. It asks the question, “what are we?” and can exist only in the 
possibility of an answer. If Bowler is correct in saying that the ‘Darwinian revolution’ is not yet 
culturally complete, then evolutionary theory may still be said, for some, to be “weird”. Certainly, 
for Machen and for Lovecraft, it combined with contemporary social and cultural anxieties to 
unsettling effect. 
 
In the light of the above, it is perhaps surprising that no full-length study of the relationship 
between evolutionary theory and the weird tale has yet been published—and that studies of 
evolutionary theory and fiction more generally often fail to touch upon the work of Lovecraft in 
particular. Machen, often considered as a minor fin-de-siècle Gothic or decadent writer, fares a 
little better—Hurley devotes considerable attention to ‘The Great God Pan’ (1890; revised 1894) 
and The Three Impostors (1895), while more general surveys of the Victorian Gothic by scholars 
such as Nicholas Ruddick, Fred Botting, Linda Dryden, and Victoria Margree and Bryony Randall 
mention him in brief.
82
 Although the scope of Richter’s study extends to 1939—two years after 
Lovecraft’s death, and fifteen years after the height of Machen’s fame—she mentions neither, and 
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in fact asserts that ‘the human likeness of apes is perceived as threatening’ only until around 1900, 
a remark she certainly could not have made were she familiar with Lovecraft’s ‘Facts Concerning 
the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family’, published in 1921.83 S. T. Joshi’s study, H. P. Lovecraft: 
The Decline of the West discusses notions of decline similar to those expressed in degeneration 
theory at some length, but ties them primarily to the work of Oswald Spengler, rather than the 
biological narratives of writers like Max Nordau, E. Ray Lankester, and Bénédict Augustin Morel. 
Essays by various scholars have touched upon the biological bases of horror in Machen and 
Lovecraft,
84
 and I draw upon work by Bennett Lovett-Graff, Kirsti Bohata, and others as I attempt 
a more (though by no means entirely) comprehensive study of the work of Machen and Lovecraft 
in relation to evolutionary theory and the cultural anxieties thereby engendered. 
 
My first chapter focuses solely on Machen’s work, examining his use of the idea of the pre-human 
survival and its implications for a human identity destabilised and decentred by evolutionary theory 
in the three “Little People” stories, the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ (one of the component tales of the 
episodic novel, The Three Impostors (1895)), ‘The Shining Pyramid’ (1895), and ‘The Red Hand’ 
(1895), as well as four later works that make use of fairylore (at the time firmly tied to notions of 
human ancestry and the primitive) in rather more ambiguous fashion: the prose-poems ‘The 
Turanians’ and ‘The Ceremony’ from Ornaments in Jade (1924), the short story, ‘The White People’ 
(1904), and the late novel, The Green Round (1933). My second chapter explores fictional 
manifestations of degeneration, and examines Lovecraft’s ‘The Lurking Fear’ (1923), ‘The Rats in 
the Walls’ (1924), and ‘The Mound’ (1940) (ghostwritten for Zealia Bishop Reed) alongside 
Machen’s ‘The Great God Pan’ and ‘Novel of the White Powder’, another tale from The Three 
Impostors. I return to ‘The Great God Pan’ in my third chapter, which explores the themes of 
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“miscegenation” and hybridity, and proceed to consider ‘The Dunwich Horror’ (1929)—the 
Lovecraft story which borrows most heavily from Machen, reworking as it does the basic plot of 
‘The Great God Pan’—as well as two other Lovecraft tales: the aforementioned ‘Arthur Jermyn’, 
and ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ (1936). My final chapter makes perhaps the most original 
contribution to scholarship in this study, exploring the ways in which Lovecraft draws upon 
eugenics to explore potential human futures via alien human-analogues in ‘The Whisperer in 
Darkness’ (1931), ‘The Shadow out of Time’ (1936), and in the novella one critic has described as 
‘the very summit of Lovecraft’s fictional achievement’,85 ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ (1936). 
Finally, I suggest that even Lovecraft’s often reactionary fantasy may also be read in such a way as 
to open up space for new ways of thinking about identity, similar to those attempted by late-
twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century posthumanists, ways of inhabiting the “human” and its 
Other within that require neither an assumed teleology nor wholeness. 
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Chapter One: Survivals 
 
In this chapter, I’ll be exploring the ways in which some of Arthur Machen’s weird fiction deals 
with the confirmation of evolutionary theory through encounters with humanity’s antecedents, 
particularly in the figures of pre-human survivals or throwbacks. In the Origin, Darwin had noted 
that isolation could facilitate the survival of ‘living fossils’ such as Ganoid fishes and the flora of 
Madeira, having ‘been saved from fatal competition by having inhabited a protected station’.1 
Herbert Spencer, in his Principles of Biology (1864), had similarly suggested that not all 
members of a species would necessarily evolve together. While one part of the species was being 
transformed, another might ‘escape transformation by migrating hither and thither, where the 
simple conditions needed for its existence recur in nearly the same combinations as before’.2 
Such simple conditions might easily be conjectured to include the absence of competitors, 
including the highly-evolved descendants of their transformed compatriots. Darwin’s living 
fossils often survived on mountain-tops, where the ‘tide’ of competition had not reached, and he 
makes explicit comparison between these survivals and ‘savage races of man, driven up and 
surviving in the mountain-fastnesses of almost every land, which serve as a record, full of 
interest to us, of the former inhabitants of the surrounding lowlands’.3  
 
For Machen, the figure of the survival is a focus for horror, a frame upon which to hang the 
particular set of anxieties generated by knowledge of humanity’s status as a (perhaps imperfectly) 
evolved animal. Although his body of work does feature examples of malignant human beings 
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whose actions or physical appearances seem to hark back to the prehistoric—such as the titular 
character of ‘The Bright Boy’ (1936)—much of Machen’s work makes use of those folkloric 
figures who frequently served as focal points for various Victorian cultural anxieties: the fairies. 
 
Fairies were a common fictional motif and a source of fascination for the Victorians. Newspaper 
reports of the period attest to a belief in changelings and young men, women and children being 
“taken” by the fairies. Carole G. Silver, in her study, Strange and Secret Peoples: Fairies and 
Victorian Consciousness, asserts that ‘[well]-documented cases attesting to a living belief in 
changelingism came from all over England and they did not decline as the century progressed’.4 
Edmund Jones’ account, A Relation of Apparitions of Spirits, in the County of Monmouth, and 
the Principality of Wales, printed first in 1780 and again in 1813, attests to a belief in fairies both 
on the part of the author and of those whose stories he collects,
5
 while W. Y. Evans-Wentz, 
writing in 1911, asserts that ‘the Celtic Fairy-Faith[...]has existed from prehistoric times until 
now in Ireland, Scotland, Isle of Man, Wales, Cornwall, Brittany, or other parts of the ancient 
empire of the Celts’.6 Fairy beliefs, then, appear to have existed through the nineteenth century, 
and folklorists such as Katharine Briggs have suggested that they in fact persisted well into the 
twentieth century.
7
 Briggs, early in her study, The Fairies in Tradition and Literature, also notes 
that ‘[every] now and then poets and writers draw on the [fairy] tradition, and make out of it 
something suitable to the spirit of their age’.8 Machen’s sinister Little People, certainly, embody 
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fin-de-siècle anxieties around evolution both in their bodies, and in the effects they have upon 
those of human beings. 
 
Briggs suggests that the literary fairies of the early 1900s were considerably more innocuous 
than their predecessors, illustrating ‘the dangers of whimsicality’ with several examples from 
children’s literature of the period, and arguing that ‘in the sheltered days of the early twentieth 
century every care was taken to render [the fairies] unalarming’.9 As I have already suggested, 
however, this is not the full picture. The fairies of folklore, certainly, are not the dainty, 
benevolent flower sprites of the Cottingley photographs,
10
 and Machen’s Little People stories, 
published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, draw upon fairylore to disturbing 
effect. As Silver illustrates quite extensively, the fairies most often appear as mischievous or 
malign beings, intruding into the human sphere at will but inflicting disproportionate punishment 
should a human observer, however unwitting, stumble into their world. Mercurial, amoral and 
often cruel, the fairies were believed to be ‘incapable of such human feelings as compassion’, 
and ‘lacked the civilized virtues, behaving like children[…]or like the mob’.11 The Victorian 
consciousness conflated children and “savages”, suggesting both were in need of civilising 
guidance,
12
 and in the aftermath of Darwin, this conflation of fairies, children, and savages, 
suggests that the fairies occupy a station somewhere below that of the “civilised”, adult human 
on the evolutionary scale. Stories about fairies, then, were fertile ground for the exploration of 
cultural anxieties around evolutionary progress—or its opposite. 
 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 298-300. 
11
 Silver, p. 150. 
12
 Cesare Lombroso, Criminal Man, trans. by Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter (1876, revised 1878, 1884, 1889, 
1896-97; Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 188-192; Silver, p. 5. 
22 
 
The fairies were also liminal entities, appearing and encountering the human world at boundary 
locations. The fairy wife of legend is often ensnared by her human husband on the shore of a sea 
or lake, and it is there that she returns when he breaks the terms of their marriage.
13
 Humans 
lured into fairyland, meanwhile, often encounter dead friends and relatives, and risk being 
permanently taken themselves, unwittingly crossing from the realm of life into that of death.
14
 
There is a constant crossing and re-crossing. Humans are pixie-led,
15
 entranced by fairy dances,
16
  
or carried off by fairy lovers,
17
 and meanwhile, the realm of fairy erupts into the human world in 
startling ways. The healthy baby is replaced in its cot by a wizened changeling;
18
 the miller’s lad, 
waking in the night, finds the fairies carrying out everyday human activities with the household 
utensils.
19
 Even as the Victorian imagination attempts to define and demarcate the fairy, to 
contain it within an ordered classificatory scheme, it refuses to be contained. It escapes, invading 
not only the workaday human world but the very definition of “human”. 
 
The threatening Otherness of the fairies is inextricably linked with the fact that fairy beliefs, 
during the Victorian period, were seen as indicative of a primitive backwardness and low class 
status, as well as being associated with Celtic, rather than Anglo-Saxon, areas of the country. 
Silver’s account of changeling episodes points out that they ‘usually occurred in rural areas and 
among poor or working-class Roman Catholic and Celtic rather than Saxon peoples; such groups 
were expected to believe in elves and exorcism. Not Anglo-Saxons inherently superior to all 
others in character and morality, they were weak by nature with an innate tendency to selfishness 
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and ignorance’.20 Furthermore, ‘[the] barbarous tests to which members of “inferior” groups 
subjected children were really proof of how backward and primitive they themselves still were—
evidences of their kinship to savage tribes and even to lower primates’.21 Effectively, the fairies 
and the people who preserved and passed on fairy beliefs became conflated, occupying a similar 
station somewhere below that of the civilised Anglo-Saxon.  
 
A fairly clear example of this can be found in the introduction to Evans-Wentz’s The Fairy Faith 
in Celtic Countries (1911), where he argues that the reason for the survival of fairy beliefs in 
rural Celtic areas is as follows: 
 
The Celtic peasant[...]is[...]unconventional and natural. He is normally always 
responsive to psychical influences—as much so as an Australian Arunta or an 
American Red Man, who also, like him, are fortunate enough to have escaped being 
corrupted by what we egotistically, to distinguish ourselves from them, call 
‘civilisation’. If our Celtic peasant has psychical experiences, or if he sees an 
apparition which he calls one of the ‘good people’, that is to say a fairy, it is useless 
to try to persuade him that he is under a delusion: unlike his materialistically-minded 
lord, he would not attempt nor even desire to make himself believe that what he has 
seen he has not seen. Not only has he the will to believe, but he has the right to 
believe; because his belief is not a matter of being educated and reasoning logically, 
nor a matter of faith and theology—it is a fact of his own individual experiences, as 
he will tell you. Such peasant seers have frequently argued with me to the effect that 
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‘One does not have to be educated in order to see fairies’. 
[...]Instead of Nature, men in cities (and paradoxically some conventionalized men 
in the country) have ‘civilisation’—and ‘culture’.22 
 
According to Silver, as the nineteenth century progressed, fairy beliefs became less an indication 
that the believer was lower in the evolutionary scale than civilised Anglo-Saxons than a piece of 
evidence to support the suggestion that primitive, dwarfish—perhaps pre-human—tribes had 
really existed in the pre-Celtic period in the British isles.
23
 In fact, as the above quote from 
Evans-Wentz in 1911 tells us, the progression was not quite so clear-cut. In his introduction, 
Evans-Wentz touches on the pros and cons of what he terms the ‘Pygmy Theory’ while 
maintaining the notion of the pre-civilised Celt.
24
 The since-discredited ‘Pygmy Theory’, or, as 
Silver terms it, the ‘Turanian dwarf theory’, however, is significant, and Silver provides a 
convincing case for its role in the development of malign literary fairies during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Developed by euhemerist folklorists such as David Macritchie,
25
 the theory posited that 
traditional fairy beliefs constituted a folk memory of conquered, mound-dwelling aboriginal 
peoples who had fled into remote areas. This theory seemed to find confirmation in Western 
encounters with African “pygmy” tribes during the 1880s. Victorian anthropologists viewed 
these people as missing links, ‘among the earliest, hence crudest of the human species’,26 and 
even debated whether they were fully human. The popularity and persistence of this view is 
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illustrated in the tragic case of Ota Benga, a Congolese man who was exhibited in the monkey 
house of the Bronx Zoo in New York during 1906 in order to illustrate Darwinian theory and 
“scientific racism”. At the height of his fame, Benga attracted some 40,000 visitors a day.27 
Contemporary accounts of the “pygmies” ascribed to them many of the traits commonly 
associated with supernatural dwarves and fairies, and it is worth noting that during this period, 
individuals suffering from dwarfism were sometimes thought to be representatives of or 
throwbacks to an extinct race rather than people with a distinct medical condition.
28
 (The 
eponymous antagonist of Machen’s late short story, ‘The Bright Boy’, might be read as a 
fictional iteration of this idea.) Silver attributes this view to ‘a sort of “cultural slippage”’,29 and 
it is true that anthropological accounts from the period do ascribe many typical fairy 
characteristics to “pygmy” tribes, sometimes even going so far as to make the comparison 
explicitly. Sir Harry Johnston, writing in 1902, for example, said that they reminded him ‘over 
and over again of the traits attributed to the brownies and goblins of our fairy stories’30 while 
Sidney Hinde in 1897 called them ‘gnome-like beings’.31 
 
At the same time, traits associated with “lower” or “less evolved” humans became associated 
with and ascribed to the fairies of folklore. Fin-de-siècle dwarfs and fairies lost their 
individuality, and became a faceless horde, devoid of humanising traits, ‘hunting in packs and 
skulking in shadows, threatening to destroy or to subvert the ruling race’.32 Fairies had 
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traditionally been considered devoid of souls and incapable of feeling true emotion; now, even 
distinct personalities and faces were denied them. They came to be described in terms more 
commonly associated with animals, Darwinian human ancestors, and supposedly “primitive” 
groups. As Silver puts it, 
 
the Rumpelstiltskins of the world grew fangs, developed the prognathous jaw, and 
sprouted body hair. Changing their colours—to red, yellow, brown, or black—they 
took to murder, rape, and cannibalism. As the distorted image of the Pygmy 
conjoined with a devalued image of the dwarf, post-Darwinian science and belief 
raised and played on cultural anxieties, confirmed racial prejudices, and fortified the 
rhetoric and practices of imperialism.
33
 
 
The existence of the “pygmies” appeared to confirm both evolutionary theory and the reality of 
the fairies—or, at least, that of their primitive originals. Darwin had asserted in the Descent that 
‘man is constructed on the same general type or model as other mammals’,34 and encounters with 
a group of people who were interpreted as occupying an intermediate station seemed to confirm 
the statement, with its disturbing implications for the “human”. When the fairies became real, 
then, they became frightening. We find in Machen’s short stories several portrayals of a malign 
or ambiguous surviving prehistoric race, as well as suggestions of the persistence of an 
associated pre-Christian spirituality or ritual in the areas where the fairies survive. 
 
Machen’s stories retain some traditional aspects of fairylore—the notion of people, particularly 
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the young, being “pixie-led” or abducted, and the idea that prehistoric weapons or “elf-shot” are 
the property of the fairies—but their racialised portrayal is new. In the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ 
(1895), even magical abilities are reinterpreted as evidence of the Little People’s low 
evolutionary status. Where for Jones in 1780, the preternatural abilities of fairies (which he 
considers to be ‘Spirits’) are neutral—he informs us that ‘[the] power of Spirits, both good and 
bad, is very great, not having the weight of bodies to incumber and hinder their agility’35—by 
Machen’s time, they are atavistic remnants, something modern humans have evolved past or 
grown out of. Silver argues that fairies lost the high status conferred by their magical abilities 
when their non-white, and therefore ‘clearly “less evolved”’ descendants—for that is what the 
“pygmies” were thought to be—were discovered.36 In her words, ‘as the discovery of the 
Pygmies rendered the fairies actual, it caused them to lose much of their stature and 
“superiority”’.37 Machen’s fairies, accordingly, were malign, grotesque, bestial, even predatory, 
seizing on unwary humans to use for their own purposes. But the simple physical threat they 
posed to those unlucky enough to encounter them was not the primary source of horror. Rather, it 
was the evidence of human descent from lower primates and the suggestion of chaotic 
evolutionary possibility constituted by their very existence that truly terrified the Victorian mind.  
 
Darwin had noted a number of ‘small unimportant points of resemblance between man and the 
Quadrumana’ that, he believed, ‘when numerous[…]clearly reveal our relationship’.38 He 
suggested that, ‘in a series of forms graduating insensibly from some ape-like creature to man as 
he now exists, it would be impossible to fix on any definite point when the term “man” ought to 
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be used’.39 The existence of such an intermediate form illustrated the difficulty of definitively 
separating the “human” from the “lower” animals. In a similar fashion to the ‘man-like apes’ 
studied by T. H. Huxley, their existence helped puncture the myth of human uniqueness; they 
provided one more link in the ‘extraordinary[…]series of gradations’ that constituted the order of 
primates, leading ‘from the crown and summit of the animal creation down to creatures, from 
which there is but a step, as it seems, to the lowest, smallest, and least intelligent of the placental 
Mammalia’.40 Huxley, though elsewhere less pessimistic about the implications of his 
observations, here notes explicitly their dire implications for the idea of anthropocentrism: ‘[it] 
is’, he writes, ‘as if nature herself had foreseen the arrogance of Man, and with Roman severity 
had provided that his intellect, by its very triumphs, should call into prominence the slaves, 
admonishing the conqueror that he is but dust’.41  
 
But the gradation here is not as straightforward as Huxley’s phrasing suggests. Rather, it calls to 
mind Spencer’s argument that ‘the classification of animals that has now been arrived at, is one 
in which the linear order is completely broken up’.42 Spencer suggests that linear classificatory 
diagrams should be replaced with one showing different orders radiating out from a common 
centre, and that ‘the degree of difference which warrants each further elevation in the hierarchy 
of class’ is impossible to define.43 For Darwin in the Origin, the connections between organisms 
were similarly far from straightforward: he wrote that ‘the several members of each class are 
connected together by the most complex and radiating lines of affinities’,44 and variation was 
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‘governed by many unknown laws’, rendering its final results ‘infinitely complex’.45 The 
difficulty of classifying varieties and species, and the disagreement that such attempts occasioned 
among naturalists, illustrated this.
46
 Pre-human survivals such as these had refused to die in their 
turn, and they thereby upset the notion of linear hierarchy. They were ‘outcasts from nature, 
reminders that she could miscarry’,47 and served as constant reminders of what we might become 
again. 
 
The non-linear nature of evolutionary development meant that degeneration and atavism were 
seen as very real possibilities, and Kelly Hurley, in The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and 
Degeneration at the Fin de Siècle, describes the endemic cultural anxieties engendered by such 
felt threats. If the human was the product of a random and unfinished process, then humanity’s 
continuing supremacy and progress was by no means assured, and a number of horrific 
possibilities suggested themselves. Perhaps the human species was not yet fully evolved in itself, 
not yet ‘fully human’; perhaps other animal species might continue to evolve and eventually 
overtake us, destabilising human centrality; or perhaps evolution itself was reversible. In the end, 
we might ‘retrogress into a sordid animalism rather than progress towards a telos of intellectual 
and moral perfection’.48 
 
Hurley, discussing the fin-de-siècle Gothic (of which Machen is sometimes considered a 
proponent; indeed, she does briefly consider his work
49
), develops a concept useful in discussing 
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Machen’s Little People stories: that of the ‘abhuman’. It is worth expanding on the concept a 
little here. Focusing upon ‘the ruination of traditional constructs of human identity that 
accompanied the modeling of new ones at the turn of the century’, Hurley asserts that the late 
Victorian Gothic offers, ‘[in] place of a human body stable and integral[...]the spectacle of a 
body metamorphic and undifferentiated; in place of the possibility of human transcendence, the 
prospect of an existence circumscribed within the realities of gross corporeality; in place of a 
unitary and securely bounded human subjectivity, one that is both fragmented and permeable’.50 
Informed by these fears, fin-de-siècle Gothic fiction dramatizes ‘the relentless destruction of “the 
human” and the unfolding in its stead of what I will call, to borrow an evocative term from 
supernaturalist author William Hope Hodgson, the “abhuman”’.51 Abhumanness consists in 
breaching the boundaries of the human: the abhuman subject 
 
is a not-quite human subject, characterized by its morphic variability, continually in 
danger of becoming not-itself, becoming other. The prefix ‘ab-’ signals a movement 
away from a site or condition, and thus a loss. But a movement away from is also a 
movement towards—towards a site or condition as yet unspecified—and thus entails 
both a threat and a promise.
52
 
 
Hurley’s abhuman ‘resonates with’ Kristeva’s abject, rather than being identical with it—
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but the concept of abjection is nonetheless useful here, comprising as it does ‘emphatic, 
sometimes violent, denial’ and also attraction towards events that ‘[breach] the boundaries of the 
ego’.53 Attraction is important. The fin-de-siècle Gothic is both 
 
convulsed by nostalgia for the ‘fully human’ subject whose undoing it accomplishes 
so resolutely, and yet aroused by the prospect of a monstrous becoming. One may 
read its obsessive staging and restaging of the spectacle of abhumanness as a 
paralysis, a species of trauma, but one must also note the variety and sheer 
exuberance of the spectacle.
54
 
 
The human subject is fascinated by its own dissolution; indeed, one might posit that this 
fascination signals the embryonic ever-presence of that dissolution within the human itself. A 
necessary part of its integrity is the possibility of disintegration. 
 
It is this blurring of the boundaries of humanity, the liminal space the fairies occupy somewhere 
between human and other, that renders them both fascinating and repellent. Their abhumanness 
consists in their ability to remind us of ourselves while displaying grotesque differences in other 
aspects. They suggest that the differences between so-called evolved humans and our ancestors 
are not as clear-cut as we might like to think, that perhaps each of us has a “little man”—or, like 
the unfortunate Jervase Cradock in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ , something worse—lurking 
beneath the veneer of civilisation. In the recent aftermath of Darwin, who speculated that the 
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embryo might actually pass through each phase of evolution while still in the womb,
55
 of 
Haeckel, whose recapitulation theory had not then been refuted,
56
 and of Spencer, who suggested 
that human embryos would gradually ‘[diverge][…] more and more’ from those of “lower” 
forms of life as they developed and that this offered proof of the ‘primordial kinship of all 
organisms’,57 this notion must have had particular resonance. It also chimes neatly with the folk 
belief that fairies were the spirits of unbaptised children,
58
 although the notion does not come up 
in Machen’s fiction. The notion that the pre- or abhuman exists in the recent past not only of the 
species as a whole, but of each individual, adds immediacy to the possibility of retrogression. 
Silver notes that ‘Victorian intellectuals saw even “normal” children as primitive or undeveloped 
adults’, and links this to the prevalence of changeling beliefs in the Victorian period.  She states 
that ‘[children] (like savage peoples) were supposed to develop; the changeling was a child or 
individual who would not or could not do so. Hence[...]it was a throwback to earlier stages of 
human development’.59 Changeling beliefs emphasised the closeness of the human child to the 
fairy, the abhuman, and, since the changeling usually replaces a healthy, normal human child, 
played into more general fears about the stability of human supremacy and the potential for 
“civilised” humanity’s replacement by other—and perhaps not even superior—forms of life. 
Darwin had, after all, written that ‘which groups will ultimately prevail, no man can predict; for 
we well know that many groups, formerly most extensively developed, have now become 
extinct’.60 
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Dangerous knowledge is a common theme in traditional fairylore, and it is another which is 
given a new spin in Machen’s fairy stories. In traditional tales, the unfortunate human who 
comes across the fairies during one of their excursions into the human world or who enters or 
interferes with the fairy realm, whether by accident or design, may be poisoned or cursed.
61
 In 
these fin-de-siècle fairy stories, however, the curse is not a supernatural one but consists in the 
irrevocable and unforgettable proof that humanity is not what we thought it to be. The seeker 
after knowledge ends up haunted by his dreadful discovery, like Selby in ‘The Red Hand’ (1895), 
or himself transformed into something other than human, as we are led to believe has happened 
to Professor Gregg in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’. In effect, the pursuit of intellectual progress, 
that trait so characteristic of “civilised” humanity, leads the pursuer towards his own 
retrogression. In discovering that humanity is neither as perfect nor as central to the universe as 
he once thought, he loses a portion of his own humanity. The protagonist who is physically 
transformed, or who can respond to his discoveries only by going mad, is a common feature of 
the weird tale, and is particularly prevalent in the fiction of Lovecraft, whose reliance on Machen 
as an influence has been previously documented.
62
 To give but two examples, the protagonist of 
‘Dagon’ (1919) becomes suicidal after discovering the existence of monstrous sentient beings 
living on the ocean floor,
63
 while the unfortunate Henry Akeley in ‘The Whisperer In Darkness’ 
(1931) is literally removed from his human body by the alien beings he encounters.
64
 Lovecraft’s 
protagonists, like Machen’s are often left in fear of, or actively trying to discourage, further 
investigation. Much weird fiction expresses anxieties about progress and scientific experiment, 
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and it is interesting that this forward march of civilisation so often becomes the instrument of 
mankind’s retrogression and degeneration. Perhaps this reflects, once again, fears about the 
random and non-teleological nature of evolution as suggested by Hurley; what Silver calls ‘the 
widespread fear of “reeling back into the beast”’.65 
 
Traditional fairies also have their seductive aspects, and—in accordance with the fascination that 
the abhuman is capable of exerting—Machen’s fiction does not entirely dispense with these. 
While fairies were traditionally dangerous, they were also playful and charming, and could 
entrance mortals into remaining in their realm for decades. They were also seen as representative 
of an older, more authentic identity, often a British one, and as representing a closeness to nature 
that was being lost with the advent of industrialisation. Lord Dunsany picks up the theme, albeit 
a little later, in his 1908 story, ‘The Kith of the Elf-Folk’, whose protagonist, a small fairy 
creature ‘somewhat human in appearance, only all brown of skin and barely two feet high’,66 
eventually accepts her wild life upon a deserted marsh as preferable to human existence and 
possession of a soul. This story takes as its central theme the impact of industrial development 
upon the natural world, rather than concentrating on human identity in the context of evolution, 
so I do not look at it in detail here. However, the more appealing aspects of fairies who may 
nonetheless be unsettling or threatening are evident in later pieces by Machen: the prose-poems 
‘The Ceremony’ and ‘The Turanians’, from Ornaments in Jade (1924); the short story, ‘The 
White People’ (1904); and the late novel, The Green Round (1933). These texts, particularly ‘The 
White People’, explore the boundaries of human identity in subtler and more ambiguous ways 
than the earlier Little People stories, and I will look at them in further detail later in the chapter. 
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Turanians, Troglodytes, and the Tylwyth Têg: The Little People Stories 
 
Perhaps the best-known of Machen’s Little People stories is the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, one of 
the component tales of his 1895 novel, The Three Impostors. It touches on many of the above-
mentioned themes, and suggests the terrifying possibility of reversion, as well as raising the 
abhuman Little People as a source of revulsion in themselves. However, Machen repeated the 
theme several times in his short fiction, and I will also consider two other stories composed 
during the same period, whose treatment of the same subject matter is also quite 
straightforwardly horrific. These are ‘The Shining Pyramid’ (1895) and ‘The Red Hand’ (1895). 
 
All three stories feature the amateur sleuth Mr. Dyson, a recurring Machen character, and each 
features one of his two sceptical friends, Phillipps and Vaughan, in a supporting role. All the 
stories are rooted in the premise that British folklore, specifically fairylore, consists of a folk 
memory of “primitive” aboriginal Britons who resemble the prehistoric ancestors of homo 
sapiens; in other words, the Turanian dwarf theory. That Machen was familiar with this notion is 
clear. His article, ‘The Little People’, in Dreads and Drolls (1926) lays it out concisely, 
suggesting that the similarity between British fairylore and Congolese tales of small, human-like 
beings is the result of a common descent: 
 
The substratum in both cases is the same: an aboriginal people of small stature 
overcome and sent into the dark by invaders. In Britain and Ireland the dark meant 
36 
 
subterranean dwellings made under the hills in the wildest and most remote parts of 
the country; they will point you out the place of these dwellings in Antrim to this day, 
and tell you that they are Fairy Raths. And in nine cases out of ten you may accept 
the statement with entire confidence; so long as you define ‘fairies’ or ‘the People’  
as small, dark aborigines who hid from the invading Celt somewhere about 1500-
1000 B. C.
67
 
 
Machen even reiterates the theory in a later piece on Caradoc Evans, published in 1946. With 
tongue firmly in cheek, Machen declares that he has been bewitched by ‘Caradoc Evans, of the 
race of the People under the Hills’, and that he has ‘never[...]come into so wild and dark a 
country as that shown in [Evans’ short story collection] My People’.68 The theory itself, however, 
remains the same: ‘The Celts’, he writes, ‘found the Little People here when they ended in the 
West their long march from the Land of Summer. They drove them under the hills, where they 
became the Fairies; and the Dwarfs of the romances of chivalry’.69 In his fiction, Machen posits 
that these people in fact survive to the present day in remote locations in the British Isles, 
particularly hilly or wooded regions like that surrounding his birthplace, Caerleon. And their 
continued existence retains the capacity to adversely affect the human. 
 
These Little People appear in liminal areas, remote tracts of countryside reminiscent of 
traditional fairy-spotting locations, where human habitation begins to disappear amid a perceived 
rural wildness. Both ‘The Shining Pyramid’, and the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ are set in the 
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Caerleon area, which Machen describes in his autobiography as an ‘enchanted land’, referring to 
nearby Twm Barlwm as ‘the memorial of peoples that dwelt in [the] region before the Celts left 
the Land of Summer’.70 The fairy inhabitants are racialised and compared to children, being 
around the same height as a ten-year-old and of ‘Mongolian’ appearance,71 (use of the term 
‘Mongol’ to refer to people of East Asian origin having been popularized by T. H. Huxley72) and 
are secretive and dangerous. (Machen suggests that the traditional practice of referring to the 
fairies in complimentary fashion—as the “good people”, “good neighbours”, or tylwyth têg—is 
not a reflection of their true nature, but a fiction designed either to sweeten the unpalatable 
reality or to avoid incurring their displeasure.
73
) 
 
Each of the three tales is framed as a mystery or detective story, and both ‘The Shining Pyramid’ 
and ‘The Red Hand’ begin with the establishment of an opposition between Dyson, an 
imaginative literary man inclined towards investigations into the fantastic, and the sceptics, who 
seek out prosaic, plausible explanations for the events they encounter. It is Dyson, however, who 
invariably uncovers the truth, and the narrative tacitly encourages us to sympathise with him. 
Phillipps and Vaughan’s explanations, though based in the everyday, often seem faintly 
ridiculous in hindsight. For example, in ‘The Shining Pyramid’, Vaughan assumes that the signs 
left in prehistoric flint by the Little People are the communications of a group of burglars intent 
on stealing his punch-bowl.
74
 In the light of the horrific events they witness, this explanation is 
comically inappropriate, and its firm centring in mundane human affairs suggests the blindness 
                                                 
70
 Arthur Machen, The Autobiography of Arthur Machen, (London: Richards Press, 1951), p. 18. 
71
 Arthur Machen, ‘The Shining Pyramid’, in The Great God Pan (1895; Cardigan: Parthian, 2010), pp. 77-110 (p. 
91). 
72
 Donald J. Childs, Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats, and the Culture of Degeneration  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 48. 
73
 Arthur Machen, ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, in The White People and Other Weird Stories, ed. by S. T. Joshi (1895; 
London: Penguin, 2011), pp. 29-66 (p. 56). 
74
 Machen, ‘The Shining Pyramid’, p. 86. 
38 
 
that is necessary to the “civilised” mindset. Phillipps comes up with a similarly human-centred 
explanation for the murder of Sir Thomas Vivian in ‘The Red Hand’, and sticks to it with 
tenacity until proved wrong. Dyson, meanwhile, investigates these possibilities, but abandons 
them when they are shown to be untenable. In this sense, Machen manages to suggest that 
Dyson’s mindset is the more scientific; that the seeker after truth must question accepted ideas 
and use his imagination. The knowledge thus acquired is, of course, not always palatable, 
bringing humans into contact with, or at the very least awareness of, the embodiment of their 
abhuman potential, the Little People. Direct contact with them may actually bring about the 
dissolution of the human body, the human condition, as is illustrated variously in all three stories. 
This is a point to which we will return later. The desire for knowledge, a desire synonymous with 
progress and with the advancement of civilisation in a fairly traditional, teleological sense, is also 
the instrument of becoming-other. This anxiety about discovery (particularly where it concerns 
the nature and origins of the “human”), and about our inability to control where it will lead us, is 
one of the central preoccupations of weird fiction, and informs perhaps its most often-quoted 
passage, the opening paragraph of H. P. Lovecraft’s ‘The Call of Cthulhu’.75 
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Location and Liminality 
 
As I have already mentioned, each of Machen’s Little People stories situates its action at a locus 
where civilisation is beginning to peter out, where the human world is represented only by small 
settlements or lone houses, and where the wild countryside surrounding it looms large and 
threatening. The ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ and ‘The Shining Pyramid’ are, as I have already 
mentioned, clearly set in the Gwent area, and the area where Selby finds the Little People in ‘The 
Red Hand’ is described in terms similar to those Machen commonly uses when talking about his 
home town. We may infer that this is intended to be the same area, despite the fact that Selby 
inaccurately refers to it as being in the west of England; Machen describes the area as part of 
England in ‘The Shining Pyramid’, although the names of the places he refers to are in Wales, 
and the mound where Selby finds his first clue as to the Little People’s whereabouts—‘a tumulus, 
the domed memorial of some forgotten people, crowning the crest of a vast mountain range’76—
may well be an exaggerated version of Twm Barlwm.
77
 This area is familiar ground to any reader 
acquainted with Machen’s work, and it is described here with the customary breathless wonder, 
and with hints that it may even be an enchanted land. For the purpose of these stories, however, 
Machen adds an aura of the sinister, a suggestion that the enchantment the landscape holds is not 
necessarily benign. 
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Miss Lally, the protagonist of the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, finds herself oppressed by it, saying, 
‘here, in this lonely house, shut in on all sides by the olden woods and the vaulted hills, terror 
seems to spring inconsequent from every covert, and the flesh is aghast at the half-heard 
murmurs of horrible things’. 78 She feels ‘imprisoned amidst the ancient woods, shut in an olden 
land of mystery and dread, and as if all was long ago and forgotten by the living outside’.79 This 
suggestion of removal from the outside world recalls those traditional fairy stories where the 
unfortunate human, entranced by fairy ‘merriment’ for what seems like a few minutes, returns 
home afterward to find that he has been absent for decades and his house is now inhabited by 
strangers, his friends and family dead and gone.
80
 The setting of ‘The Shining Pyramid’ is 
similarly bordered by an ‘ancient wood’, its environs ‘hushed and haunted’ and possessed of a 
‘desolate loneliness and strangeness’.81 ‘The Red Hand’, meanwhile, begins by giving us a false 
impression, Dyson suggesting that ‘primitive man’ may still survive amid the urban dwellers of 
London,
82
 but Selby’s childhood experiences in the area where the Little People actually survive 
recall Machen’s reminiscences of Caerleon. He says that ‘there were certain huge and rounded 
hills, certain depths of hanging wood, and secret valleys bastioned round on every side that filled 
me with fancies beyond the bourne of rational expression’.83 The rounded hills mentioned here 
                                                 
78
 Machen, ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, p. 53. 
79
 Ibid., p. 54. 
80
 Briggs, pp. 123-124. 
81
 Machen, ‘The Shining Pyramid’, pp. 88-89, p. 97. 
82
 Machen, ‘The Red Hand’, p. 83. This notion does, however, resonate with the fears of urban degeneration that 
characterised fin-de-siècle thinking: ‘J. Milner Fothergill (The Town Dweller, 1889) warned that urban degeneration 
was forming a new subspecies of cockney ‘mannikins’, a ‘race of dwarfs’, as successive generations of East-Enders 
devolved further and further back to the ‘lowlier’ and more primitive ‘racial types’ (Erse, Celto-Iberians, pre-Aryans) 
from which their rustic ancestors had sprung’. (Hurley, pp. 69-70.) 
83
 Machen, ‘The Red Hand’, p. 50. Compare this passage to Machen’s autobiographical descriptions of the effect of 
the landscape on his young imagination. For example: ‘I shall always esteem it as the greatest piece of fortune that 
has fallen to me, that I was born in that noble, fallen Caerleon-on-Usk, in the heart of Gwent[...]For the older I grow 
the more firmly am I convinced that anything I may have accomplished in literature is due to the fact that when my 
eyes were first opened in earliest childhood they had before them the vision of an enchanted land. As soon as I saw 
anything I saw Twyn [sic] Barlwm, that mystic tumulus, the memorial of peoples that dwelt in that region before the 
Celts left the Land of Summer. This guarded the southern limit of the great mountain wall in the west; a little 
41 
 
and in ‘The Shining Pyramid’ also recall the tradition of fairy mounds, recalling both the 
presence of the fairies and the possibility of a dangerous enchantment. As I mentioned earlier, 
time passes differently in fairyland, and the implicit comparison occurs again in ‘The Shining 
Pyramid’ when Dyson and Vaughan set out for the Bowl and ‘[seem] to walk on and on for 
hours’.84 
 
This wild and vaguely threatening landscape almost takes on a life of its own, and it serves to 
situate the endeavours of the human protagonists in a larger, more hostile context. Human 
settlements and houses, representative of security and of civilisation, are bordered on all sides by 
the mysterious woods, removed from the human world and in dangerous proximity to another, 
older one. The path that runs by Vaughan’s house, for example, is only feet from the threatening 
wood, and is used by the Little People for the leaving of signs. These mysterious pictograms 
themselves recall heiroglyphs or cave-paintings; an ancient form of writing, and thus a more 
ancient world, makes a sudden incursion into that occupied by modern humans, rewriting and 
even overwriting its assumed wisdom. The emphasis on the landscape’s age, meanwhile, 
highlights how ephemeral and relatively recent the human presence is, and how easily it might be 
ousted. The fitness of humans to inhabit this landscape, into parts of which we do not even dare 
venture, is implicitly questioned. Will we survive? Are we the fittest? 
 
The world of the Little People stories, then, is one to which the human is far from central, and in 
which survival and supremacy are far from assured. The anxieties thrown up by the emergence 
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of evolutionary thinking are implicit in the ancient and brooding landscape, a constant, physical 
reminder of how new, how untested, and perhaps how incomplete the human race really is. 
Hurley posits that the emergence of Darwinism in the nineteenth century 
 
was to demolish the model of human centrality in the universe, and replace it with 
one of human ephemerality, relativity and potential ‘degradation’[...]The new 
discoveries in the geological and biological sciences required a radical rethinking of 
humanity’s position relative to its environment: its intimate relation to lower species; 
the role of the mere individual within the far more important history of the human 
species; human insignificance in a world that, according to geology, had existed far 
longer than previously had been conceived and that, according to astronomy, 
occupied a place far more miniscule than previously had been conceived.
85
 
 
Long-held assumptions about the status and nature of humanity were dissolved: the human no 
longer held its default position at the centre of the universe, and the rest of that universe was no 
longer relevant only in terms of its relationship to humanity. Rather, we had to begin to view 
ourselves in terms of our relationship to a world no longer designed specifically for us, in which 
we held a position no more secure than that of the so-called lower species. In Hurley’s words, 
‘[as] “the human” loses its particularity, it also begins to be evacuated of its meaningfulness. A 
Darwinian Nature does not privilege, indeed takes no particular notice of, the human species’.86 
And if nature accords us no specific privilege, we can no longer be sure that the position the 
human species holds—or even the form it takes—will remain constant. 
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The Good People? 
 
The references to traditional fairylore in Machen’s stories are not limited to descriptions of the 
landscape. The disappearance of Annie Trevor in ‘The Shining Pyramid’ is explained by the local 
cottagers as her having been ‘taken by the fairies’,87 and fairy kidnappings of young people and 
tales of “pixie-leading” are common folkloric motifs.88 In the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, the 
strangeness of Jervase Cradock, the half-fairy child implicitly conceived by rape when his 
mother was walking in a remote area, recalls numerous folk descriptions of changelings thought 
to have replaced healthy, human babies. The changeling is often discovered through its unnatural 
speech,
89
 and during his fits, Cradock emits utterances in the inhuman, hissing language of the 
Little People and sounds like ‘the cry of a wild beast’.90 At the same time, his 
‘face[...][blackens]’, and we are reminded of the racialised nature of many changeling 
descriptions.
91
 As Silver points out, changelings ‘resembled popular stereotypes of[...]ethnic or 
racial “inferiors” with their sallow skins, dark beady eyes, large-nosed and emaciated faces, and 
diabolic “cunning”’.92 Prehistoric flints were traditionally thought to be “elf-shot”, and these, as 
well as other prehistoric stone implements, such as axes and knives, are used by the Little People. 
Selby, in ‘The Red Hand’, is led into his search by traditional accounts of fairy gold hidden 
beneath the hills, but, like traditional fairy gold, his bounty turns out to be worthless when he 
finds it—though this is because of its unutterable hideousness rather than because it simply 
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disappears. The writhing movements of the Little People around the Bowl in ‘The Shining 
Pyramid’ recall the fairy circle-dances of legend, but this particular ritual is fascinating in its 
repugnance rather than delightfully enchanting. 
 
We are constantly encouraged to be repelled by the Little People, most of all by the fact that they 
possess enough of human appearance to make their inhuman aspects fascinatingly repellent, a 
distorted mirror-image. The Little People witnessed by Dyson and Vaughan in ‘The Shining 
Pyramid’ are not merely small men but ‘things made in the form of men’ with ‘things like faces 
and human limbs’, but Vaughan is quite sure that there is ‘no fellow soul or human thing’ among 
them. Rather, they exist as an undifferentiated ‘mass of naked flesh’, animated by ‘evil and 
unspeakable lusts’ rather than by real consciousness or intelligence.93 They are able to 
communicate, but do so in a hissing, ‘venomous’ speech that mocks the human capacity for 
language.
94
 The point is expanded in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, where Jervase Cradock 
lapses into the hissing language of his father’s species during his fits, and this difference in 
speech provides Professor Gregg with one of his principal clues as to the Little People’s 
existence: 
 
I remember being struck by the phrase ‘articulate-speaking men’ in Homer, as if the 
writer knew or had heard of men whose speech was so rude that it could hardly be 
termed articulate; and on my hypothesis of a race who had lagged far behind the rest, 
I could easily conceive that such a folk would speak a jargon but little removed from 
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the inarticulate noises of brute beasts.
95
 
 
Since Cradock lapses into such a ‘jargon’ when his fits cause his humanity to weaken and his 
atavistic heritage to take hold,
96
 the existence of the Little People becomes, for Gregg, a distinct 
possibility.  
 
For T. H. Huxley, who, like Darwin, acknowledged the structural similarity between humans and 
other primates, and the likelihood of a common descent, it was humanity’s capacity for 
‘intelligible or rational speech’ that allowed its intellectual development and set it apart.97 
Darwin, however, noted continuities between the ‘convolutions of the brain’ and the 
‘fundamental intuitions’ of humans and other primates, and warned readers not to ‘underestimate 
the mental powers of the higher animals’, among whom he numbered “man”.98 It would be 
possible, he suggested, to ‘trace a perfect gradation from the mind of an utter idiot, lower than 
that of an animal low in the scale, to the mind of a Newton’.99 Where Huxley had predicated 
human intellectual development upon the capacity for articulate speech, Darwin wrote that 
‘[through] [man’s] powers of intellect, articulate language has been evolved; and on this his 
wonderful advancement has mainly depended’.100 The evolution of language from ‘the imitation 
and modification of various natural sounds’ has been ‘slow and gradual’; and letters, being 
derived from pictograms, are themselves ‘rudiments’.101 An intelligence intermediate between 
that of “civilised” humanity and the lower animals might, then, produce a similarly intermediate 
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language. The existence of these inarticulate-speaking men therefore questions the separateness 
of humanity, and removes one further claim to human uniqueness. Darwin had drawn parallels in 
the Origin between race and language, arguing that ‘a genealogical arrangement of the races of 
man would afford the best classification of the various languages now spoken throughout the 
world’, and had raised the possibility of a survival, a ‘very ancient language’ that might have 
‘altered little’.102 The Little People’s speaking such a language thereby proves their relationship 
to ‘the races of man’.  
 
Machen gives us much less direct description of the Little People in ‘The Red Hand’, telling us 
merely that they are not extinct as Selby had believed them to be. The tactic of avoiding 
description, of telling us that the story’s ultimate horror is simply unspeakable, is a common 
feature of weird fiction and may actually work in the story’s favour here. As well as removing 
the need for potentially anticlimactic description, it gives us one of the major reasons that the 
Little People engender horror. They defy classification; they exist on a borderland for which 
there are no words. 
 
It is traditional that those who have visited fairyland are never quite the same when they return 
home, having been cursed or irrevocably altered by the experience, and that the fairies possess 
preternatural powers which they use to effect this. Machen’s fairies, however, are not merely a 
race of mischievous imps. They may wreak real, physical harm on those unfortunate enough to 
encounter them—whether they are educated men like Professor Gregg (who may either have 
been killed or physically altered so as to have become unrecognisable) or unfortunate locals like 
Jervase Cradock’s mother and Annie Trevor.  Professor Gregg, in his final letter to Miss Lally, 
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informs her that by the time she reads it, he will have suffered a ‘desperate and horrible’ fate 
from which there will be no return; the missive is a ‘farewell’.103 He also warns her of the 
psychological effect knowing his fate is likely to have upon her, suggesting that she ‘will sleep 
better of nights’ if she burns the letter without reading further.104 The curse which remains with 
those who survive is permanent, and cannot be lifted by magic. It is their world-view, their self-
concept, which has been irreversibly changed. The curse is the knowledge of human origin, and 
the possibility that the abhuman has existed within us all along. 
 
It is worth reminding ourselves here of Hurley’s definition of abhumanness, and of the ‘threat 
and a promise’ it entails.105 The Little People are both origin and destination, and, as such, 
doubly repulsive. They represent the human at an earlier stage of development, but also the 
possible condition of the regressed, degenerated human. They are monstrous, blending 
recognisable features of modern man with elements of the prehistoric pre-human, and also of the 
inhuman, the wholly Other. They speak in reptilian hisses; they are able to cause slimy tentacles 
to issue forth from the seemingly human body. Their existence hints further back into the past 
even than the era of human ancestors; it strains toward the condition of the lower animals, the 
‘single prototype’ from which Darwin suggested ‘all living creatures’ were probably 
descended
106
 (or, as he put it in the Origin, the ‘one primordial form, into which life was first 
breathed’107). It recalls the origins of life in primordial slime or ‘first matter’ (a concern touched 
on by Aidan Reynolds and William Charlton in relation to ‘The Great God Pan, to which we will 
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return later
108
), and gestures at the ultimate dissolution of the human subject, the return to an un- 
or pre-differentiated state. According to Hurley, ‘to be simultaneously human and animal[...]is to 
explode crucial binarisms that lie at the foundations of human identity’,109 and this is what the 
Little People do. They blend the human with the animalistic pre-human, hinting at chaotic, non-
teleological possibility. 
 
They may place the human in an evolutionary progression, on a scale that includes us along with 
the animals, but by raising the possibility of regression they prevent us from imagining ourselves 
moving inexorably toward a higher state of civilisation, becoming ever more human. Evolution is 
arbitrary, neither designed nor bound to privilege the human, and life-forms lose their primacy 
according to the rule of an indifferent, even hostile, nature. Essentially, the abhuman posits a 
natural disorder rather than a natural order, and prevents us from clearly demarcating the 
boundaries of what is human. In her discussion of Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger, Hurley 
argues for an alternative reading of Douglas’ argument. Douglas suggests that the classificatory 
impulse serves to reinforce social order and that, for example, the abominations of Leviticus are 
forbidden because they are animals with characteristics from more than one family, because they 
defy classification, or conform imperfectly to it.
110
 The corollary of this notion, however, is that 
‘classificatory schema are merely functional, artificial rather than natural, and that anomalous 
phenomena are abominable because they throw into relief the provisionality of the categories 
they confound’.111 The boundaries of the human are exposed as shifting and potentially 
untenable, perhaps incapable of ever containing us anyway. 
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The Human Thing 
 
Hurley makes use of the concept of ‘Thing-ness’ in order to designate those beings that collapse 
the categories of human and abhuman and that are therefore otherwise uncategorisable. The 
concept ‘has no proper signified, unless this be the non-concept of amorphousness’,112 and it may 
be useful when we consider the effect of the abhuman upon the human, with what the human 
becomes, confronted with its own monstrous potential. If Things possess characteristics we have 
hitherto considered human, then are they really human characteristics at all? And are we, who 
possess them as well, fully human? Thing-ness, then, signals ‘the loss of human specificity, the 
becoming-abhuman of the human body’.113 As well as signifying the loss of human specificity, 
however, Thing-ness also calls attention to physical embodiment, to ‘the ineluctibility of matter 
that resists and exceeds form’.114 This amorphous matter is both terrible and exciting, offering 
seemingly unlimited, chaotic possibility even as it erases the human subject. It is telling that, in 
‘The Shining Pyramid’, where the Little People appear as a writhing, undifferentiated, 
constantly-shifting mass with no individual personality or ‘soul’ among them, they are repeatedly 
referred to as ‘things’.115 
 
This formless, uncontained matter also recalls the primordial slime of life’s origin, mutable and 
holding all forms in potential, occupying the border between liquid and solid, never quite one or 
the other but always threatening to change. It is matter in the process of solidifying or of 
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dissolving, suggesting the ephemerality of form, the possibility that we ourselves may easily be 
broken down and reformed into a shape quite new and different. The slimy tentacle produced by 
Cradock’s body in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, and the story’s suggestion that the Little People 
may use incantations to make the human body revert to ‘the slime from which [it] came’,116 
remind us of this fact, and suggest to us that the body itself—which, after all, contains a fair 
amount of slimy matter, incantation or none—has no real integrity, and may break down or be 
swallowed up into amorphousness.  ‘If the distinction between liquid and solid can be effaced’, 
Hurley argues, ‘then other, more crucial oppositions—between human consciousness and the 
material body, for instance—threaten to collapse as well’.117 Darwin’s suggestion that the 
tendency to reversion may occur in ‘a variety or race which[…]has lost by variation some 
character that it formerly possessed, and which afterwards reappears’ as easily as in a cross 
between two “races”,118 here gains a horrific significance. And since the range and dominance of 
a species on the earth is correlated with frequent variability, the current pre-eminence of the 
“civilised” human is no protection against mutability; rather, the numerousness of the human 
species means that some member of it, somewhere, must always be straining toward its former 
condition.
119
 A different observation with similar implications is offered by Spencer in his First 
Principles of a New System of Philosophy (1862): since higher rates of ‘molecular vibration’ are 
correlated with a higher level of evolution, organisms ‘higher in organic activity and complexity’ 
are also more mutable.
120
 
 
The physical repulsiveness of the Little People and their practices—and of the “primitive” in 
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general—elicits strong reactions from modern-day observers. In ‘The Red Hand’, Dyson talks 
about finding certain facial features ‘abhorred’ because they remind him of primitive man,121 
while the unfortunate maid who has to clean up the aftermath of Cradock’s transformation in the 
‘Novel of the Black Seal’ is repulsed by the ‘queer[...]bad smell’ left behind, and reports feeling 
‘very sick’.122 Nausea, as Julia Kristeva has famously pointed out,123 is a symptom of abjection, 
allowing the subject to affirm his or her integrity—the reader to affirm his or her humanness—
through rejection. However, nausea is an intensely physical experience, and effectively forces the 
“civilised” subject back into the body, acting as a reminder of materiality, of the subject’s 
inability to escape from a physical form that is instinctive, animal, in its responses. Darwin had 
pointed to ‘instinctive dread of serpents, and probably of other dangerous animals’ in apes as a 
sign of their relationship to humans,
124
 though instinct was held to diminish as the development 
of the brain increased.
125
 Evolutionism challenged anthropocentrism in this way, by placing 
human beings on a continuum with animals, destabilising the boundary between the two. This 
raised two horrific possibilities: 
 
If humans derived from beasts, then they might still be abhuman entities, not yet 
‘fully evolved’, not yet ‘fully human’. And worse, the evolutionary process might be 
reversible: the human race might ultimately retrogress into a sordid animalism rather 
than progress towards a telos of intellectual and moral perfection.
126
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If humans, like animals, had evolved and progressed in response to a challenging, perhaps 
unfriendly environment, then might not civilisation itself, and the artificial conditions created 
under it, eventually prove the instrument of our decline? This point is explored in detail in fiction, 
with H. G. Wells’ The Time Machine (1895) being perhaps the most obvious example,127 and is a 
worry characteristic of the Victorian era. It was thought that evolution had, perhaps, peaked, that 
urban living exposed humans to pernicious, morally and physically degenerative influences, and 
that ‘Western civilization, contaminated by the very fruits of its own progress, was sliding into a 
fatal decline, into senility, dementia, and death’.128 Some thinkers even suggested that urban 
dwellers risked devolving into a separate subspecies, dwarfed and prone to immoral behaviours, 
and that this decline would only continue in successive generations.
129
 Even if the conditions of 
life themselves did not produce backsliding, it was thought that the licentious, unhealthy 
lifestyles encouraged by big-city living could cause retrogression in the children of wayward 
parents. Civilised societies were becoming enervated, exhausted, and prone to vice, and the 
degeneration resulting from their indulgences would reduce subsequent generations to atavism. 
Degeneration is a subject that I will treat more fully in the second chapter of this thesis. Machen 
hints at its urban variant in ‘The Red Hand’, when he has Dyson mention that certain faces 
among the London crowds remind him irresistibly of ‘primitive man’,130 but the more important 
point here is that progress—the pursuit of knowledge included—may in fact lead the “civilised” 
human in a circle, back to his origins, rather than toward some future pinnacle of evolution. For 
Spencer, attempts to seek knowledge of human origins were ‘necessary products of progressing 
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intelligence’;131 but in Machen, the following of this highly-evolved tendency to its conclusion 
undermines evolution itself.  Figures like Professor Gregg, who seek to discover the origins of 
humanity, to gain recognition for themselves as great thinkers, and to advance learning more 
generally, may in fact end up reverting to atavism themselves. 
 
 
The Abhuman Within 
 
Encounters with the Little People, then, hold the power to reduce even modern, “civilised” 
humans to an atavistic state. The circumstances of this reversion vary. In the ‘Novel of the Black 
Seal’, it is the reading of an inscription under the correct circumstances that can reduce a human 
‘to the slime from which he came’ and force him to ‘put on the flesh of the reptile and the 
snake’.132 Annie Trevor, the girl kidnapped for the purpose of sacrifice in ‘The Shining Pyramid’, 
is ‘no longer fit for Earth’ by the time of her death, and, unable to summon a recognisable word, 
simply screams instead, rendered as inarticulate as her captors by her experiences in their 
midst.
133
 Even the landscape in which these two stories take place may hold a degenerative 
significance. Although he suggests that the evidence has been exaggerated, Darwin does concede 
that domesticated animals and plants which have ‘become feral or run wild’—that is, returned to 
the conditions of life of their ancestors—may have ‘some tendency to reversion to the primitive 
state’.134 In this implicitly pre-human environment, the same as that inhabited by our pre-human 
ancestors, the reversion of the species becomes the reversion of the individual. This backsliding 
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is less obvious in ‘The Red Hand’, but when Selby is finally persuaded to tell Dyson and 
Phillipps about his discovery, the physical transformation wrought upon him by what he has 
witnessed is striking. We are told that ‘[the] whole bodily frame of the wretched man visibly 
shrank and wasted; his face grew yellow as tallow[...]and when [his] voice came it sounded like 
the hissing of a snake’.135 He regresses in terms of size; his skin yellows (we know that Machen’s 
Little People are of ‘Mongolian’ appearance); and his speech approximates their hissing 
language. The sight of them actually seems to have infected the “civilised” human body with 
their appearance, and their atavistic and racialised attributes. Darwin’s description of the 
expression of terror in animals springs to mind here. In The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals (1872), Darwin notes that ‘[with] all or almost all animals[…]terror causes the body 
to tremble. The skin becomes pale, sweat breaks out[…]the surface seems bloodless and the 
strength of the muscles soon fails.[…]The mental faculties are much disturbed. Utter prostration 
soon follows, and even fainting.’136 For Darwin, the similar expression of feelings in humans and 
“lower” animals, as well as in various countries, and in both “civilised” and “savage” peoples, is 
an indicator of the animal provenance of humanity.
137
 Selby, debilitated by fear, backslides 
toward this ‘common progenitor’.138 
 
This reversion is not straightforwardly an outside imposition, then. The transformation of 
Cradock in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ illustrates this, and adds an extra dimension of horror. 
The slimy, reptilian tentacle Cradock extends when Professor Gregg recites the Little People’s 
incantation actually comes out of the body; his descent towards the reptilian is not merely a 
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transformation. The potential is already there, contained within the human, and this, indeed, is 
the ultimate horror of Machen’s Little People stories, and the horror posited by the notion of the 
pre-human survival. From Darwin’s assertion that reversion is not an anomaly, but ‘an essential 
part of the principle of inheritance’, they extrapolate the survival of beastly characteristics within 
modern more-or-less “human” bodies.139 For Darwin, it is certain that ‘[in] every living 
creature[…]a host of long-lost characters lie ready to be evolved under proper conditions’,140 and 
rudimentary structures—even those that are usually ‘wholly suppressed’—are ‘liable to 
occasional reappearance through reversion’.141 These ‘reversionary structures[…]reveal the 
descent of man from some lower form in an unmistakable manner’.142 By transferring Darwin’s 
assertion from the life of the species to that of the individual, Machen makes immediate and 
horrifying the reversion of the human form. It is not simply that we were once our predecessors, 
or that we may become them again. It is that we are in fact continuous with our beastly and 
reptilian ancestors, that human nature still holds something of the abhuman. As Hurley writes, 
‘[the] invertebrate or reptile is depicted[...]as a human ancestor whose loathsome characteristics 
still lie latent within the human body’.143 What we should fear is not that the abhuman will 
swallow up the human subject, or that the Little People may transform us into something other 
than what we are. Rather, the most awful possibility is that they will reveal what has been there 
all along. We are already them. 
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Religion and Forbidden Knowledge: ‘The Turanians’, ‘The Ceremony’, and ‘The White 
People’ 
 
As well as positing the survival of a race of people predating modern, “civilised” humans, 
Machen’s Little People stories make reference to the survival of their rituals and magics. The 
transformative spell in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, the human sacrifice in ‘The Shining 
Pyramid’, and the sacrificial practices hinted at by the image of the ‘Pain of the Goat’ in ‘The 
Red Hand’ all suggest that the Little People follow some ancient, pre-Christian religion, long 
forgotten in the human world and barbaric in its rites. The idea of a pre-Christian pagan religion 
in western Europe was a commonly accepted one during the twentieth century, and was thought 
to be the basis of stories about witches and devil-worshippers.
144
 The Church, the theory runs, 
incorporated the horned god of the old religion into its own mythology as the Devil, and 
demonised and persecuted its practitioners accordingly. This theory is elaborated in the works of 
the anthropologist Margaret Murray, who, along with Machen, was a major influence on H. P. 
Lovecraft, and who suggests it is possible—though by no means certain—that the fairies of 
British folklore may be identical with the ‘witches’ she discusses.145 The rites and practices we 
see in Machen’s Little People stories are grotesque in and of themselves, but are also linked to 
the transformative—or revelatory—power the Little People seem to hold over human identity. D. 
P. M. Michael points out that Machen sometimes ‘attempts to get his horrific effects by 
encouraging the notion that the Little People are not altogether dead, or alternatively that their 
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practices are still carried on amongst us’,146 or, in other words, that modern, civilised human 
identity has something older and darker, something predating the human, beneath its surface. 
 
Survivals of what Michael calls ‘the Old Religion’ appear in several Machen stories not focused 
on the Little People, although some of them do make reference to ‘Turanians’ or fairylike beings. 
These beings are not nearly so physically repulsive as the grotesque ‘things’ of ‘The Shining 
Pyramid’ and the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, and the rituals in which Machen’s protagonists 
become involved are not explicitly described as repugnant. Nor, however, are these tales—
among which I would number two of the short prose poems from Ornaments in Jade, ‘The 
Turanians’ and ‘The Ceremony’, as well as ‘The White People’—devoid of the sinister. In ‘The 
White People’, particularly, the narrator’s fear of a sexually threatening ‘black man’ implies that 
it is indebted to some of the same racialised discourses that inform the earlier Little People 
stories. The struggle with identity in them is, however, focused slightly differently. Although 
Ornaments in Jade was not published until 1924, it was composed two years prior to ‘The White 
People’, and the two pieces mentioned here seem like experiments toward, or at least precursors 
of, the longer story, touching on very similar themes. ‘The White People’ is the only one of these 
stories in which fairies as such actually appear (though they are referred to as ‘nymphs’ or as 
small people with ‘white faces’, not directly referenced as the tylwyth têg); the others suggest 
that groups of modern gypsies are descended from them, or that the practices of their religion are 
still being passed down. ‘The Turanians’ and ‘The Ceremony’ are short pieces, sketching 
relatively brief encounters. The central section of ‘The White People’, framed by a discussion 
between two men, Ambrose and Cotgrave, about the nature of evil, is the ‘Green Book’ narrative, 
a diary kept by a young girl who has since committed suicide, detailing her experiences with 
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various arcane rituals, fairylike beings, and enchanted areas of countryside. 
 
All three of these stories feature young, female protagonists, and ‘The Turanians’, and ‘The 
Ceremony’ are clearly coming-of-age or sexual awakening narratives. Mary, the young girl in 
‘The Turanians’, feels her ‘heart [leap]’ when a young man approaches her at the gypsy camp she 
visits, and later returns to her respectable middle-class home having been changed in some 
indefinable way.
147
 Mary’s attraction to the young man may be read in some ways to prefigure 
the ambivalence of ‘The White People’. Writing on W. B. Yeats’ On the Boiler, Donald J. Childs 
suggests that there is a ‘eugenical logic’ in the protagonist’s desire to marry a tinker, since these 
people come to represent a ‘realm of “mother wit” and “natural kindness”’ lost to mainstream 
society.
148
 A similar point might be made regarding the realm of authentic, sensual experience 
that opens itself up to Machen’s young women. The protagonist of ‘The Ceremony’, meanwhile, 
is irresistibly drawn to perform some ancient and nameless rite involving the offering of 
flowers—including red ones resembling bloodstains—to a graven image.149 The same is quite 
probably true of ‘The White People’ (though the metaphor is rather less heavy-handed here), the 
protagonist’s sensual fascination with the strange new country she discovers and her fear of the 
‘black man’ who may come to claim her for his wife representing conflicting feelings about her 
journey toward adulthood.  
 
It certainly seems significant that her experiences take place during adolescence, at a time when 
identity is still in the process of being formed. Children and young people were traditionally seen 
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as being at high risk of fairy abduction,
150
 not yet being fully integrated into the adult world, and 
Haeckel’s theory of recapitulation suggests a similar view of the young in the scientific 
community.
151
 If the organism passes through more primitive stages of development during its 
growth, then the child is an imperfectly evolved creature. Spencer, meanwhile, wrote that ‘the 
structural modifiability of a child is greater than that of an adult man’, the child not having yet 
reached its eventual degree of material integration.
152
 If we take this view, then the central 
figures in these three stories are not merely on the verge of adulthood: they are on the verge of 
becoming human. 
 
All three, however, take the step forward under the influence of the old religion, the fairies’ 
magic. Unlike the unfortunate women in ‘The Shining Pyramid’ and the ‘Novel of the Black 
Seal’, these girls are seemingly complicit in their own involvement. Whether enchanted, 
hypnotised, or simply curious, they actively seek out forbidden knowledge rather than being 
abducted or attacked by the fairies, or stumbling across them unintentionally. Rather than taking 
their assigned places in the properly socialised, respectable, human world, however, they choose 
pagan ritual and uncontained sexuality, characteristics usually associated with “primitive” tribes 
and with peoples of the distant past. 
 
It is significant that the bourgeois world they are expected to inhabit is not portrayed as 
altogether attractive by Machen. It is built upon artifice, stifling the artistic and imaginative 
impulse that Machen considered to be the defining characteristic of humanity.
153
 The mother of 
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Mary in ‘The Turanians’ represents the mannered voice of polite society, and warns her against 
‘phrases violently expressed, words of too fierce an energy’, replying to her rapturous description 
of a flame-red rose in the garden with, ‘“Yes; but is it nice to feel like that? Do you think that it’s 
quite right, even?”’.154 The protagonist of the ‘The White People’ loses her mother at a young 
age, and perhaps the absence of this civilising influence is what allows her involvement with the 
old religion to continue unchecked for so long. She learns the secrets and stories of the old 
religion from her nurse, who acts as a sort of substitute, shadow-mother, and who in turn has 
heard them from her grandmother. The protagonist of ‘The Ceremony’, too, first sees the titular 
rite performed by her nursemaid.
155
 It is unsurprising, in the light of Victorian attitudes, that 
Machen depicts the old religion as having survived among the lower classes, who were thought 
to be more credulous and superstitious—less advanced, closer to the primitive mindset—as 
mentioned earlier in reference to fairy beliefs. 
 
The rituals are learned in secret and kept secret, and any encounter with the ‘nymphs’ or the 
‘Turanians’ must not be shared. Mary is ‘afraid to say anything to her mother’ regarding her 
experience,
156
 and the protagonist of ‘The White People’ repeats that she ‘must not write down’ 
and ‘must not describe’ everything that she knows. Even when she has performed what she calls 
the ‘Comedy’ in front of other people, ‘they didn’t understand anything about it’.157 A channel of 
communication between these girls and the civilised world is thereby kept closed; they remain at 
one remove from it. The Green Book narrative of ‘The White People’ does, in fact, figure the 
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girl’s experiences as a physical journey. She literally moves away from the world she is expected 
to inhabit into an unfamiliar country. 
 
Her knowledge, however, is not entirely learned. It rather seems to have been something innate 
in her, something she has been familiar with since infancy (‘I was very little when I first knew 
about these things’158), forgetting bits and pieces of it as she grows older, and reconnecting with 
it in the amorphous, uncertain years before adulthood. Early childhood is portrayed as an 
uncivilised state, during which she is at one with the white people of the title. They watch her in 
her cradle and tell her stories; she learns the ‘Xu language’ in which they speak; and she sees 
them ‘play and dance and sing’ in a wood near her home.159 The child herself does not react to 
the white people with fear; it is her nurse who ‘[turns] quite pale’ upon learning that she has seen 
them.
160
 Her childhood interactions with them are described simply, without comment, and 
appear to flow naturally in the narrative. If anything, she recalls them with fondness. This 
seemingly harmless nostalgia for infancy contrasts vividly with the way in which the narrative is 
framed by Ambrose, as a piece of evidence for the existence of evil. 
 
Ambrose elaborates his theory of evil by asserting that it can best be defined as ‘the taking of 
heaven by storm’, the attempt to penetrate into a sphere higher than that ordained to humans.161 
The passage in which he attempts to explain this to Cotgrave is frequently quoted to illustrate 
what is meant by the “weird” in “weird fiction”, and is worth repeating here: 
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What would your feelings be, seriously, if your cat or your dog began to talk to you, 
and to dispute with you in human accents? You would be overwhelmed with horror. I 
am sure of it. And if the roses in your garden sang a weird song, you would go mad. 
And suppose the stones in the road began to swell and grow before your eyes, and if 
the pebble that you noticed at night had shot out stony blossoms in the morning?
162
 
 
These examples all show objects or life-forms behaving in ways we would expect of other, more 
complex and highly-developed, beings or organisms. Sanctity, or ultimate good, in contrast, 
consists in an endeavour to recapture Edenic bliss; in a return to origin. Fitting the Green Book 
narrative into one definition or the other, however, is not straightforward. The narrator of the 
Green Book appears to have held the knowledge she seeks, at least in part, since early childhood, 
and there are hints, in the passing-down of secrets by the nurse and her foremothers, that these 
are the last fragments of an ancient religion, something perhaps once known to all humankind. If 
this is correct, then is she not seeking to return to Eden—the unbounded, undifferentiated bliss of 
infancy—rather than to discover a knew and forbidden sphere? She is certainly no Faustian 
power-seeker. In this way, the Green Book narrative itself undercuts and queries Ambrose’s 
definitions, calling into question the whole moral system of “civilised” society. There appears 
something bloodless in morality as discussed by men like Ambrose and Cotgrave, in studies, as 
abstract concepts. Even if the events in the Green Book are largely imaginary, they are far more 
vividly realized in their evocation of nature and of emotion than the intellectual discussion into 
which they are brought as an illustration. The sensual pleasure of their descriptions harks towards 
the primal, but also the Edenic: 
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I went down among the rocks to dance with them and to sing extraordinary songs; 
and I went down through the other thicket, and drank from the bright stream in the 
close and secret valley, putting my lips down to the bubbling water; and then I went 
on till I came to the deep, brimming well among the glittering moss, and I sat 
down[...]I took off my boots and stockings, and let my feet down into the water, 
saying the words that I knew. And it was not cold at all, as I expected, but warm and 
very pleasant, and when my feet were in it I felt as if they were in silk, or as if the 
nymph were kissing them[...]I did not go down into the hollow this time, but I turned 
at the end, and made out the figures quite plainly, as it was lighter, and I had 
remembered the story I had quite forgotten before, and in the story the two figures 
are called Adam and Eve, and only those who know the story understand what they 
mean.
163
 
 
Here, the narrator does not merely mention the Genesis story, but lays claim to a special, more 
authentic knowledge of its meaning, one presumably available only to those initiated into the Old 
Religion. The natural, human sphere, as delineated  by Ambrose, starts to appear somewhat 
arbitrary. We might begin to question the naturalness of the distinction itself. 
 
The journey the girl follows on what she calls the ‘White Day’ is a long one, and is related in a 
long, unparagraphed, undifferentiated block of prose that demands the reader follow it all at once 
in order not to lose the thread of the narrative. Its events follow a repeated pattern. The narrator 
comes to a new location, is initially intimidated by its strangeness, familiarises herself with her 
surroundings, and eventually comes to embrace them. This is clearest in the passage where she 
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finds herself among a large number of unusually-shaped rocks. They are ‘dreadful’ to her at first, 
and her imagination conjures up horrors out of the stone: 
 
Some were like horrid grinning men; I could see their faces as if they would jump at 
me out of the stone, and catch hold of me, and drag me with them back into the rock, 
so that I should always be there. And there were other rocks that were like animals, 
creeping, horrible animals, putting out their tongues, and others were like words that 
I could not say, and others like dead people lying on the grass.
164
 
 
She feels as though they are influencing her thoughts, putting ‘wicked songs’ into her heart, but 
quickly enough she stops being afraid of them and almost appears to become one with them.
165
 
She ‘[makes] faces like the faces on the rocks’, ‘twist[s] [herself] about like the twisted ones’ and 
lies ‘flat on the ground like the dead ones’.166 Her face and body are distorted, but she is no 
longer repulsed by this. The human body is here altered, as by the influence of the Little People, 
but the attendant revulsion, the nausea that affirms this distortion as something exceeding the 
limits of the human, is no longer present. 
 
We also have aspects of traditional fairylore presented here, and we are reminded that humans 
who visit fairyland never return unchanged from their experiences. The fairy wife, a frequent 
motif, particularly in Welsh fairylore, appears, and the mortal who spends a night married to her 
is never able to fully experience life in the human world again. We learn that ‘he would never 
kiss any other lady because he had kissed the queen of the fairies, and he would never drink 
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common wine any more, because he had drunk enchanted wine’.167 The unwary traveller who 
takes home fairy artefacts is similarly doomed. A young girl who takes grass, flowers, and stones 
from a fairy hollow discovers that, in the human world, they appear to be expensive jewels. She 
is admitted to court in her finery, but on the day of her wedding to the king’s son, she is borne 
away by a sinister ‘black man’ who insists that she is already married to him.168 One 
interpretation of these stories would be that those who encounter the fairies lose some essential 
humanity in the experience; but one could perhaps also argue that they find a deeper, more vivid 
experience of life that is somehow more than that possible within the “civilised” world.  This 
seems particularly apt in the case of the young man who will no longer kiss mortal women or 
drink ordinary wine, and this story is echoed in the actual events of the Green Book narrative; on 
her journey, the girl drinks from a stream that tastes ‘like bright yellow wine’ and imagines that 
the ripples in the water are the kisses of a ‘nymph’.169 This vividness recalls what Gillian Beer 
calls the ‘counter-element in Darwin’s narrative and theory’, a ‘delight in material life in its 
widest diversity, [a] passion for particularity, and for individuality and plenitude’.170 Writing 
influenced by Darwin may partake of this ‘passion’ by ‘[conjuring] the intimacy of the senses by 
means of which we apprehend the material world’, and Machen certainly achieves such a 
conjuring here.
171
 Virginia Richter has also suggested a second function for the figure of the 
missing link within fiction. It may, she writes be put to effect ‘in two ways: as a threat, 
questioning man’s superior ontological status—representative of anthropological anxiety—or as 
a covenant, binding contemporary man to a less repressive, less alienated, more vital past—
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representative of the pleasure of regression’.172 Although the framing device of ‘The White 
People’ attempts to fix the first of these meanings, the Green Book narrative itself pulls 
inexorably towards the second. 
 
At the end of the Green Book narrative, the frequency of the girl’s communications with these 
‘nymphs’ or supernatural beings increases, and she withdraws almost completely into the world 
of her secrets. The final revelation, however, is only hinted at. The girl recalls the white lady she 
saw as a small child in the wood, and tells us that she ‘knew who the white lady was’ after 
looking into a well; she goes on to say that the knowledge made her ‘[tremble] all over, because 
that told [her] other things’.173 The implication here seems to be that what she sees is her own 
reflection, that the ‘White People’ of the title are not mysterious, wholly-Other beings, but 
ourselves. 
 
The story’s epilogue returns to the dangerous knowledge theme, with Ambrose suggesting that 
some of the mysteries hinted at in the Green Book will eventually be illuminated by science. 
‘Well’, he says 
 
I think there are references throughout the manuscript to certain ‘processes’ which 
have been handed down by tradition from age to age. Some of these processes are 
just beginning to come within the purview of science, which has arrived at them – or 
rather at the steps which lead to them – by quite different paths. I have interpreted the 
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reference to ‘nymphs’ as a reference to one of these processes.174 
 
Once again, progress and investigation are raised as potential catalysts of humanity’s dissolution. 
Ambrose argues, in essence, that only the correct individuals—educated, “civilised” ones, 
presumably—are qualified to seek the truth. Knowledge is as dangerous as an unlocked medicine 
cabinet to those without the proper qualifications; experimenting at random, ‘[the] child may find 
the key by chance, and drink herself dead’. The ‘child’ here, we infer, does not refer simply to 
the girl in the Green Book, but to humanity as a whole.
175
 In those too imperfectly “civilised”, 
the search may result in an awful descent into what Ambrose and Cotgrave earlier discuss as 
‘evil’.176 We learn, finally, that the girl who wrote the Green Book committed suicide a year later, 
and was found dead before a pagan image in the woods. Ambrose states that she ‘poisoned 
herself – in time’, implying that some terrible fate was about to befall her.177 Was she to be taken 
by the ‘black man’, or discovered as a witch and punished accordingly? Lost in fairyland or 
permanently isolated from humanity? Would she have become something other than human? The 
ending appears, at first glance, to reinforce Ambrose’s morality, but the Green Book narrative 
itself suggests that perhaps the old religion and the secrets of the white people are as natural, as 
essentially human, as anything—including the behaviours of “civilised” humans. How natural is 
human nature as we define it? The two narratives exist in tension with one another, and while we 
must agree with Ambrose that the girl’s death does not provide the ultimate horror of the story, it 
is not her impertinence in pursuing a hidden knowledge that gives the story its sense of unease. It 
is, rather, the suggestion that the mystery and the ‘white lady’ exist in us already. 
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Late Machen: The Green Round 
 
Machen’s late novel, The Green Round, treats the notion of the fairy as pre-human survival in 
slightly more oblique fashion, incorporating aspects both of the sinister Little People tales and 
the more ambiguous likes of ‘The White People’. Published in 1933 and written primarily for 
financial reasons, The Green Round did not rate highly in Machen’s assessment of his own 
work.
178
 Nevertheless, it continues to treat the recurring Machen themes of pre-human survival 
and degeneration, the existence of an invisible other world, and the presence of a threatening 
Other within the “civilised” human subject. In his introduction to the 2000 Tartarus Press edition, 
Mark Valentine argues that ‘we should value [the novel] for the glimpses it gives us into facets of 
the mystical philosophy that Machen worked with’,179 but within its portrait of a spiritual 
otherworld and its potential to make frightening incursions into everyday human life are shades 
of the evolutionary anxieties that have coloured Machen’s work since ‘The Great God Pan’. 
 
After an apparently rambling prologue, detailing the sighting of a newly-built dancehall near the 
fictional Welsh seaside town of Porth (not to be confused with the real Porth, in landlocked 
Rhondda Cynon Taf) by one Smith of Wimbledon, and the town clerk’s subsequent denial of the 
building’s existence, the novel picks up the story of the protagonist, Lawrence Hillyer. Hillyer, a 
reclusive scholar engaged in recherche folkloric studies, suffers an unusual mental disturbance in 
his rooms, finds himself babbling nonsense, and finally sinks into a state of pseudo-paralysis that 
lasts the rest of the day. His doctor, putting the disturbance down to his solitary lifestyle, advises 
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a holiday, and Hillyer accordingly visits Porth.  There has been a murder at a nearby farm, and 
Hillyer finds himself suspected by his fellow hotel guests of sheltering the killer; they begin to 
ostracize him, and to ask him in accusatory tones who his ‘friend’ is, though he is not particularly 
intimate with anybody and is in the habit of taking his daily walks alone.
180
 
 
Hillyer returns to London feeling that his trip has succeeded in its purpose despite his bizarre 
experience. Shortly after his homecoming, he is present or nearby at a series of bizarre accidents 
involving the destruction of property; neighbours see mysterious lights coming from the house in 
which Hillyer lodges, so that his staid landlady finds herself accused of holding gambling and 
drinking parties;
181
 and two bystanders argue as to whether or not Hillyer is accompanied by a 
dwarf. At length, Hillyer finds himself able to see the cause of the accidents. It is the grotesque 
‘friend’ described by his fellow guests at the Porth hotel, a ‘dwarfish child’ with a hideous, 
grinning face who follows him wherever he goes.
182
 
 
The novel offers no definitive solution as to the identity of Hillyer’s mysterious shadow, or the 
reason for the bizarre series of events. There are two points, however, that help elucidate their 
connection to the Little People of Machen’s earlier fiction, and to the evolutionary anxieties that 
inform so much of Machen’s work. Firstly, returning to the prologue, we find that the apparently 
tangential subject matter actually serves as a reminder that Hillyer's tale takes place in a world 
where the evolutionary “ladder” (if that is the correct metaphor) and the place that humans 
occupy upon it are still pressing concerns. Smith of Wimbledon’s experience prompts him to 
write to a London newspaper bemoaning the ‘spoiling of all the beauties of our lovely 
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country’,183 and his complaint is the catalyst for an explosion of similar letters. Writers bemoan 
the tearing-down of historic buildings and their replacement with new roads, amusements, and 
modern buildings and sculptures considered incongruent with the British landscape. One writer 
expresses disgust at the replacement of an old Town Hall with ‘a square monstrosity in white 
concrete, adorned (?) with grotesque sculptures in the manner of Easter Island’.184 Another 
criticizes the demolition of a thirteenth-century chapel to make way for a ‘pier and its cheerful 
pavilion’.185 A third is horrified by the erecting of a sculpture of ‘prehistoric beastliness’ on a 
village green, exclaiming, ‘I sometimes think I must be in Nbanga-Nbanga Land, not in 
Sussex’.186 The new dancehall apparently seen by Smith, meanwhile, boasted a jazz band and a 
fair attended by a ‘surging mass of people’.187 The fair and the seaside pier both provide 
entertainment for the ‘masses’; the jazz music and the internationally-influenced art and 
architecture (an artist who writes in defence of the village green piece has ‘a curiously exotic 
name’188) are associated with foreign, and more specifically non-white, peoples. This 
conjunction of the working-class, the racial and national Other, the ‘prehistoric’ and the 
‘grotesque’, and the fear that all of these together will somehow crowd out what is English, 
cannot help but remind us of the degenerative fears so prevalent at the end of the nineteenth 
century, and so strongly influential upon Machen’s earlier work. 
 
That Hillyer’s bizarre experience is the work of one of the fairies or Little People, used as a focus 
for anxieties centring on evolution and the possible antecedents of humanity in works like the 
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‘Novel of the Black Seal’ and ‘The Shining Pyramid’, is suggested both by the novel’s epilogue 
and by the subject of Hillyer’s own researches, which touch upon both the existence of fairyland 
and questions of evil reminiscent of those discussed by Ambrose in ‘The White People’. The 
epilogue, written by an unnamed acquaintance of Hillyer’s to whom he has sent his notebooks 
upon emigrating, suggests a similarity between Hillyer’s experiences and those of a woman 
known only as J. C. P., whose recounting of her adventure on Nephin mountain in Ireland the 
acquaintance has recently read. A member of J. C. P.’s party vanishes ‘suddenly’, feeling ‘as 
though she [has] lapsed into complete unconsciousness’, and wanders away from the rest of the 
group. She later describes the sensation of ‘some strange force[...]pulling her away’ and states 
that she ‘does not know, cannot possibly imagine, what happened to her’.189 After realizing that 
she is lost, she hears voices and the sound of a horn, and sees ‘a small person[...]possibly a child’, 
but they vanish before she is able to reach them.
190
 Other members of the party also report seeing 
disappearing figures.
191
 Pixie-leading is suggested both by the walker’s being led astray without 
realising it, and by the presence of a small, vanishing person. The pixie-led woman’s feeling ‘as 
though there were no Time’ as she is drawn away also contributes to this impression:192 the 
unwitting traveller in the power of the fairies frequently finds that time behaves quite differently 
than that in the human world. After asking a local cottager whether the incident might be the 
doing of the Little People, J. C. P. receives only the response, ‘“We do not talk about that”’.193 
The conclusion of the novel again raises the question of the Little People’s existence, though it is 
left unanswered: 
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 But as to what is, or should be, the main question: what, who are the powers or 
forces that were manifested on Mount Nephin and in the Green Round? The Little 
People, the Fairies? 
 I believe there is no answer. We had better say, with the man of the cottage: ‘We do 
not talk about that’.194 
 
Hillyer’s personal studies, meanwhile, centre upon the experiences of ‘those who find their way 
to the Queen of Fairyland’, or otherwise find themselves in another world, and upon the moral 
acceptability or unacceptability of seeking to do so.
195
 Although the narrative shies away from 
confirming that Hillyer’s experiences involve the Little People, no other explanation is offered, 
and the events of the novel bear a strong resemblance to those of earlier works featuring the 
Little People. The novel also uses Hillyer’s experience and the figure of his “shadow” to tease 
out a familiar set of anxieties: those surrounding the origins of the “civilised” human subject. 
 
I have already mentioned the degenerative anxieties introduced by the novel’s prologue. Earlier 
stories such as the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, meanwhile, use the possibility of the Little People 
as pre-human survivals as a source of horror, particularly when encounters with them prompt the 
revelation of still-extant pre-human traits within the civilised subject. Their primitive features 
render them grotesque, occasioning instinctual repulsion in humans who encounter them; they 
are abhuman, presenting human features in a state of flux and throwing the potential 
inhumanness of the human into sharp relief. Hillyer’s shadow clearly presents similar traits. 
When the being is first seen by his fellow guests at the Porth hotel, it is believed to be the ‘Ty 
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Captain murderer’,196 the killer of a local farmer’s wife whose body has been found ‘shamefully 
torn and mutilated’ in the nearby countryside.197 The murder is never solved, and so it is not 
implausible that the Little People are responsible for the woman’s death. When we remember 
their actions in earlier stories—the abduction and human sacrifice of Annie Trevor in ‘The 
Shining Pyramid’; the implied rape of Jervase Cradock’s mother in the ‘Novel of the Black 
Seal’—this begins to seem a likely enough explanation. These Little People kill senselessly; they 
are brutal and malign, presenting a very real, physical threat to the human. The hotel guests, who 
see Hillyer’s shadow, react with an automatic revulsion, exclaiming variously: 
 
‘one of the most horrible-looking fellows I’ve ever seen’, ‘made my blood run cold’, 
‘something quite ghastly about him’, ‘my notion of a murderer’, ‘a dwarf, you said?’ 
‘Yes, but those deformed creatures are often tremendously strong: looked as if 
murder would be child’s play to him’198 
 
Hillyer himself, when he gains the ability to see the creature, finds it ‘horrible’,199 and his nerve 
specialist remarks, ‘[my] patient hated the sight of him’.200 Both Hillyer and the hotel guests find 
themselves reacting involuntarily. The hotel guests assume the creature to be the murderer 
without proof; Hillyer never speaks to or interacts with the being, but nonetheless knows it to be 
‘evil’.201 The very existence of the creature overthrows civilised rationality and throws them 
back on primitive instinct (something held by Darwin to diminish ‘as the intellectual powers 
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become highly developed’202), illustrating the fragility of the boundary between human and 
abhuman Other, and the potential danger to progress contained in the knowledge of our origins. 
The abhumanness of the creature consists in its partial humanness; it embodies the intersection 
between a recognisable humanity and an atavistic, animalistic pre-humanity. Hillyer repeatedly 
compares the creature to a child: it is a ‘horrible child’; a ‘very ugly little boy’; a ‘dwarfish child’; 
and a ‘little horror’.203 The child—as we see in Ernst Haeckel’s theory of recapitulation, and in 
Cesare Lombroso’s depiction of the child as natural criminal—was frequently viewed as an 
imperfectly evolved human being, retaining some of the traits of the pre-human savage. The 
Little People, then, are not only childlike in their size (though their small stature should remind 
us of Silver’s point regarding the connections made between “pygmies”, fairies, and pre-human 
ancestors by Victorian anthropologists), but in the way that they represent the infancy of 
humanity, and the possibility that pre-human traits may persist in the species into the present day.  
 
Despite his childlike appearance, the creature has an ‘old face’.204 There is something 
indeterminate about him; his appearance cannot be pinned down, as we see in the passage where 
two old men sitting on a bench opposite Hillyer, who has paused during one of his morning 
walks, argue over the presence of his unwanted companion. One of them has seen the creature; 
the other has not. The latter demands a description, and the former can only reply, ‘I saw him, as 
I tell you as plain as I see you now. But if you ask me what he was like...’.205 He is unable to 
complete the description. The creature, existing at the boundary of the human, exceeds the 
capacity of human language. His hybridity echoes the disturbing possibility of abhumanity: that 
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the human has not fully moved past its ancestry and indeed never will; that it will always remain 
between two states, haunted by the primitive. 
 
The inseparability of the human from the pre-human is embedded in the narrative itself. The 
haunting of the scholarly Hillyer—apparently a paragon of civilised, educated humanity—by a 
dwarfish, malign double calls to mind the Victorian Gothic of Sheridan Le Fanu’s ‘Green Tea’, 
but also (and perhaps more relevantly here), Prendick’s pursuit by the hybrid Leopard-Man in in 
H. G. Wells’ The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896).206 John Glendening, in The Evolutionary 
Imagination in Late Victorian Novels, argues for an ‘eerily close connection’ between Prendick 
and the Leopard-Man: 
 
[The] leopard-man represents a primordial embodiment of Prendick’s unconscious as 
the narrator faces his own evolutionary legacy and experiences the consequent 
disarrangement of his ontological and moral identity. 
 [...]Symbolically, Prendick is stalked by an animal nature that he does not wish to 
acknowledge as his own[...]As Prendick’s double, the leopard-man incorporates 
those primitive elements in the narrator that have continually been forced upon his 
awareness since the shipwreck[...]
207
 
 
The being that haunts Hillyer, and for whose acts of destruction he must occasionally take 
responsibility,
208
 might then be seen as representative of a suppressed, primitive element in his 
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own nature. It would be possible to read the creature as a Jungian shadow; perhaps Hillyer’s 
psyche has projected its more destructive elements into the outside world, perceiving them in the 
form of this proto-human being. Hillyer, however, is not delusional. The nerve specialist whom 
he visits toward the novel’s end writes to the owner of the hotel at which Hillyer stayed in Porth, 
interviews the landlady’s daughter, and sees the injuries of a clerk hurt in one of the bizarre 
accidents. All three corroborate Hillyer’s experiences, and the nerve specialist concludes that his 
is 
 
[a] most extraordinary case; the absolute reverse of the conditions we are usually 
called on to deal with. Many mental cases think they are persecuted when they aren’t; 
this man had been persecuted in a sort of a way, and was quite sure that his 
persecution was a delusion in other words, that he was mad.
209
 
 
The creature that haunts Hillyer, despite its apparently preternatural abilities (it is invisible to 
different people at different points in the narrative, and appears to Hillyer inside the upstairs 
window of a house he passes on a bus journey, suggesting that it is able to move through 
masonry and with superhuman quickness) is a real, physical being. Its gross corporeality, then, 
helps to place the “civilised” human back within the (animalistic, potentially-abhuman) body, 
emphasising the aspects of the pre-human still extant within us. 
 
Although Hillyer is not delusional, his susceptibility to the influence of the Little People appears 
to be symptomatic of a weakness in him. Certainly, even before his visit to Porth, he is suffering 
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from a mysterious mental disturbance, and one which blurs the boundaries of his identity. He 
realises that he is talking to himself, about an event which has never actually occurred, and then 
falls into a stupor during which ‘[life seems] to have become all misty, uncertain; his own 
identity [is] blurred in his mind[...]a horrid state, summed up for common use in the familiar 
phrase, “suffering from loss of memory”, lest the true description, loss of ego, loss of true being, 
should confuse and alarm’.210 Hillyer is highly educated and a scholar, therefore civilised—but 
he is also an eccentric recluse, secreted in the heart of London, who has chosen to deprive 
himself of fresh air and human company. We might, then, also read him as an echo of the fin-de-
siècle decadent—of Huysmans’ reclusive Des Esseintes, or Machen’s own Lucian Taylor—
representative of the perceived decline of Western civilisation: a sufferer from nervous 
exhaustion, slipping toward degeneration as a result of his enervating lifestyle. An apparently 
ordinary human being may, however, experience the mischief of the little people on a less 
permanent basis without having suffered any such serious prior weakness. Smith of Wimbledon, 
whose vision of their merriment begins the novel, is implied to have been susceptible to their 
influence simply because ‘it is quite possible that he had recovered from a bad attack of 
influenza a week or two before his visit’.211 Even the most ordinary of men, then, is not immune 
to the influence of the other within. 
 
For the most part, then, the Little People as presented in The Green Round, as in the ‘Novel of 
the Black Seal’, ‘The Shining Pyramid’, and ‘The Red Hand’, function as a source of horror. 
They act as tangible proof of humanity’s primitive past and, in having survived to irrupt into the 
modern human world, they remind us that aspects of the primitive pre-human may remain latent 
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in the humans of today, hidden beneath a thin and relatively recent veneer of civilisation. In the 
threat that they are able to pose to humans—such as the unfortunate woman at Ty Captain—
moreover, they remind us of the precariousness of our dominance on Earth. The animalistic pre-
human, with its preternatural abilities and its lack of moral encumbrances, may, in the long term, 
prove more fitted for survival than the “human”; our current position as the dominant life-form 
does not, after all, render us immune to natural selection. 
 
The Green Round does, however, present a slightly different reading of the fairies as pre-human 
ancestors alongside this overtly sinister one, and this appears in Hillyer’s accounts of his own 
researches. Here, we find a moral conundrum similar to that posed by Ambrose in ‘The White 
People’, with a similar implication that a return to the prehistoric state of being represented by 
the fairies and their realm constitutes a kind of return to Eden. The following passage provides a 
clear illustration: 
 
[It] is to be enquired whether it be lawful to regain or to attempt to regain the Earthly 
Paradise; to pass, as it were, under the guard of the flaming swords; to recover a state 
which is represented as definitely ended, so far as bodily existence is concerned. In 
the Mabinogion story [of the Assembly of the Noble Head], it may be noted, there is 
a marked analogy with the Eden story of Genesis.
212
 
 
The analogy between the story from the Second Branch of the Mabinogi and that from Genesis is 
easily made. For the eighty years spanned by the Assembly of the Noble Head, the companions 
of Bendigeidfran, along with his severed-but-still-speaking head, feast in a castle at Gwales 
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without ageing. There is a closed door in the castle which they must not open. When a member 
of the company, Heilyn son of Gwyn, inevitably does so, their idyll comes to an end, and the 
consciousness of mortality falls heavily upon them.
213
 By comparing the Assembly both to the 
story of Eden and to that of a stay in fairyland, Hillyer sets up the fairies as the origin of 
humanity. A slightly later passage expands upon this idea: 
 
Of course it may he [sic] said that the Fairy Queen tales are to be taken in the same 
sense, and as referring to the same mysterious loss as the Genesis story and the 
Welsh story; they may all be understood to refer to the Parens Protoplastus, to Adam, 
the archetypal or Platonic man[...]
214
 
 
The connection between fairyland and a kind of pre-civilised Eden, the potentially seductive 
nature of reversion, is emphasised elsewhere, too. In the course of his researches, Hillyer 
discovers and becomes fascinated by a curious little book by a Reverend Thomas Hampole (a 
character who was to recur in Machen’s later short story, ‘N’). The book is titled, A London Walk: 
Meditations in the Streets of the Metropolis, and begins by describing the enchanted appearance 
of the city at dawn. We will recall that the fairies—as pointed out by Carole Silver—appear most 
frequently in liminal locations and at liminal times, on the borders between night and day, life 
and death, water and shore, underground and surface. In the passage Hillyer reads, London takes 
on the aspect of such a locus, becoming touched by ‘magic powers’, losing its ‘familiar 
appearance’ and undergoing ‘a mysterious change, into something rich and strange’.215 The 
ordinary buildings become ‘magical habitations’, and, Hampole asserts, ‘if the boughs of a tree 
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chance to extend over a garden wall, you are ready to vow that its roots must flourish in the soil 
of Paradise’.216 This image suggests a rupture in the border between binary oppositions, and the 
potential for such a rupture to send humanity tumbling back to its earliest beginnings—but its 
aspect is beguiling rather than repulsive. In a later excerpt, after speculating that the alchemists 
of the Dark Ages aimed not at ‘the transmutation of metals, but[...]the transmutation of the entire 
Universe’,217 Hampole explicitly links alchemy to the search for Eden: 
 
‘This method, or art, or science, or whatever we choose to call it (supposing that it 
really exists) is simply concerned to restore the delights of the primal Paradise, to 
enable men, if they will to inhabit a world of joy and of splendour. I have no 
authority either to affirm or to deny that there is such an experiment, and that some 
have made it. I therefore abandon the matter to the consideration and the enquiry of 
men of equal and ingenious mind’.218 
 
Again, a return to the dawn of humanity seems rather a pleasant prospect.  
 
Hampole’s reticence in confirming the existence of such a science, however, alongside his use of 
the word ‘experiment’ and his emphasis on the necessity that it be investigated by ‘equal and 
ingenious’ minds, may remind us of a slightly darker passage already discussed. Though less 
heavy with dire warning, Hampole’s language is reminiscent of that used by Ambrose at the 
conclusion of ‘The White People’, where he warns of the danger to unwary or ill-qualified 
investigators posed by the Old Religion of the fairies. ‘I am afraid’, he says to his friend, 
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Cotgrave, ‘you have neglected the study of alchemy? It is a pity, for[...]if you were acquainted 
with certain books on the subject, I could recall to your mind phrases which might explain a 
good deal in the manuscript that you have been reading’.219 He goes on, however, to warn that ‘it 
is no doubt better for the great mass of people to dismiss it all as a dream’, and to lay out in no 
uncertain terms the peril that may await unwary dwellers into the unknown, saying 
 
Powerful and sovereign medicines, which are, of necessity, virulent poisons also, are 
kept in a locked cabinet. The child may find the key by chance, and drink herself 
dead; but in most cases the search is educational, and the phials contain precious 
elixirs for him who has patiently fashioned the key for himself.
220
 
 
Apparently also due to fairy influence are the disconcerting dreams, at first apparently 
congruent with real life, that Hillyer experiences. On one occasion, he dreams of a visit from his 
friend Hawkins, with whom he discusses Thomas Hampole’s book. Hawkins relates what he 
knows of Hampole’s biography, and of the usual value of the book to a collector. So far, so 
mundane—but while Hillyer is noting down these fact, he looks up at Hawkins and is ‘struck at 
once by something strange and unfamiliar in his expression’.221 Terrified, he is convinced that his 
friend has gone mad, but finds himself unable to move or call for help. At last, he says, ‘[the] 
figure opposite me seemed to change into a dreadful and unspeakable and most detestable shape, 
and then everything was black darkness’.222 Here, as in earlier tales, we see the human form 
transmuted into something repulsive and unstable, and the human mind apparently deprived of 
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its reasoning capacity. The influence upon Hillyer’s mind is not one he can understand or control, 
and here it furnishes his mind’s eye with a dark reflection of Hampole's heavenly transformations, 
a sinister image of reversion. 
 
Elsewhere, however, his dreams are, at least superficially, attractive. In a transformation of the 
everyday akin to that described by Hampole, Hillyer finds himself in the street on which he lives, 
standing before his home—but the quiet house in which dwell Mrs Jolly and her staid lodgers is 
now ‘blazing with light; shining out radiant into the night, and resonant with music’.223 Inside the 
house, meanwhile, he finds the ‘modest’ rooms to which he is accustomed replaced by a 
‘gorgeous palace’.224 He is aware that some great change has taken place, but feels unsurprised 
by it. In the dream, the transformation appears to be something Hillyer has been expecting for a 
long time; there is a familiarity to it, and the transformation seems to be, rather than a bizarre 
alteration to the natural course of events, a revelation of a secret to which he has long been party. 
It is, in both senses of the Freudian term, heimlich, with all the attendant connotations.
225
 Hillyer 
finds that ‘the palace of golden and glorious light in which [he] stood was utterly rational and 
acceptable’, and knows himself to be ‘sharing in a great festival of ineffable joy’, the ‘cause and 
reason’ of which he understands intimately.226 The cause of this joy is, however, ‘very largely 
negative in its nature’.227 He explains further, 
 
I believe that most of us regard happiness, or joy, or well-being, or what you will, as 
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a positive thing, based on what a man has gained, or received, or possessed himself 
of in one way or another it is an affair of having. But in the dream my delight—and it 
was greater than words can utter—was founded not on what I had gained, but on 
what I had lost. What I had lost was all the burden of life.
228
 
 
In itself, this relief from worldly cares is suggestive of a return to Eden; and when, at the end of 
the dream, Hillyer wakes ‘into misery, as one who has been for the second time put out of 
Paradise’, the suggestion is made concrete.229 
 
Earlier on in the novel, discussing the distinction between dream and reality, Hillyer suggests 
that daily life is in itself a dream, and that ‘those who find their way to the Queen of Fairyland 
are liberated from these dreams and monsters and delusions, and behold with a rapture of delight 
the real world’.230 Visiting fairyland here represents a return to reality from dream; the 
implication is that the real origins of humanity lie in fairyland, and not in the everyday. Hillyer’s 
visitors to fairyland, though, are no more capable of remaining there than he himself is of 
retaining his dreamed contentment. They ‘are forced to return, and the fairy gold is dust and 
ashes in the morning’.231 The repetition of this motif—the sleeper or visitor to fairyland awaking 
or returning to a disappointing everyday world—might be interpreted in two ways. First of all, as 
an idealisation of humanity’s origins, and a suggestion that reversion offers access to some 
authentic manner of experiencing the world that is unavailable to modern, “civilised” humans. 
Secondly, however, we might read it as an affirmation of Ambrose’s warning in ‘The White 
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People’; an admonition against probing too deeply into humanity’s origins, lest we find ourselves 
seduced by them, revert, and become unable to function within civilised society. 
 
Here again, then, we find a similar ambiguity toward human origins to that displayed in ‘The 
Ceremony’, ‘The Turanians’, and ‘The White People’. The sinister is certainly present, and for 
Hillyer, the Little People represent a threat—to his reputation and personal safety, as well as to 
his “human” capacity for reason. The Little People and their world, however, also appear to 
represent an opportunity for “authentic” experience unavailable to inhabitants of the mundane 
world, here represented by the everyday bustle of London, which Hillyer is encouraged by his 
doctors to experience, and by the society of the Porth hotel guests by whom he finds himself 
ostracised. More important, however, is the familiar theme of Otherness within. The Little 
People are able to influence Hillyer and Smith of Wimbledon due to perceived weaknesses in 
their health, but other accounts of encounters with them—like that given by J. C. P.—give no 
such reason. They are, perhaps, able to influence humans to due to some susceptibility inherent 
in the human, though it may be brought closer to the surface by ill-health. The doubling between 
Hillyer and his “shadow”, too, suggests that it represents or embodies a hidden sinister, 
“primitive” side within the human, illustrating how close our pre-human origins may in fact be, 
and how precarious our supremacy on the planet—bolstered by “civilisation” and “reason”, both 
of which are destabilised by the presence of the Little People—actually is. As in earlier Machen 
texts, the real threat that they pose is not that of altering the “human”, but that of revealing what 
is already there. The ‘real world’ experienced by Hillyer’s venturers into fairyland may be 
threatening or seductive; but in either case, its existence reveals the human as something Other, 
and something far less different from our primitive origins than we may wish to believe.
85 
 
 
Chapter Two: Degeneration 
 
Machen’s Little People stories, then, make explicit our animal origins, dramatising a teleological 
evolutionary progression and raising the possibility of its opposite, implying the abhumanness of 
the human. The threat of ‘“reeling back into the beast”’1 remains, however, a largely implicit one. 
Machen’s educated, white, British investigators never appear in danger of spontaneously falling 
into atavism themselves, and those who are adversely affected by their encounters with the Little 
People are usually—though not always—marked as other in some way. The incidents forming 
the basis of the stories usually take place in poor, Celtic areas of the UK, areas already associated 
with fairy beliefs, with populations viewed as unsophisticated and, perhaps, uncivilised.  They 
are thus separated from Machen’s London-based, middle-class protagonists. 
 
Annie Trevor’s youth and her gender mark her out as less “civilised”, in nineteenth-century 
scientific discourse, than adult men. In that of traditional fairylore, she is more vulnerable to 
abduction and “pixie-leading”.2 The same can be said of the young woman of the Green Book 
narrative in ‘The White People’ (1904), as well as the protagonists of ‘The Turanians’ (1924) and 
‘The Ceremony’ (1924). Meanwhile, Jervase Cradock in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ (1895) is 
othered both by his low class status and his half-fairy heritage; in him, the biological taint irrupts 
visibly into the everyday, its presence signalled by his fits and hissing speech, and by the slimy 
tentacle that extends from his body under the influence of Professor Gregg’s incantation. Selby 
in ‘The Red Hand’ (1895) is also separated from Dyson and Phillipps by his class, and is, 
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perhaps, a member of that group of ‘primitive’ men identified by Dyson as still existing in 
London.
3
 
 
There is, of course, the case of Professor Gregg, educated and “civilised”, but still apparently 
transformed by the Little People. However, the placing of the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ within 
the narrative of The Three Impostors puts it at one remove from Dyson and Phillipps, whose 
viewpoint seems to represent that of the “civilised”—and therefore fully human—subject. While 
Gregg is presented as a real person within the world of the novel, the story ‘Miss Lally’ tells 
about what has happened to him is a fiction within a fiction, and, as such, perhaps loses some of 
its original threatening power. We are left to infer our own conclusions about Gregg’s ultimate 
fate, and this obfuscation is in marked contrast to the gruesome death of the ‘young man with 
spectacles’ at the end of the novel, the aftermath of which Dyson and Phillipps witness first-hand. 
Gregg’s end is never shown to us precisely because it never happened. The “real” Gregg may 
have been a “civilised” male subject, but the story—like the version of him that appears in it—is 
the invention of a woman and a criminal, both identities marked out by scientific discourses of 
the day as already liable to abhuman reversions. We might also recall the remarks made by 
Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, on the subject of “genius”, whose ‘painfully close relation’ to 
insanity Galton acknowledges and explains by asserting that ‘[those] who are over eager and 
extremely active in mind must often possess brains that are more excitable and peculiar than is 
consistent with soundness’.4 The following passage suggests an uneasy relationship between the 
human pursuit of knowledge and the degeneration away from human status implied by loss of 
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sanity, a relationship whose unsettling implications repeatedly make themselves felt in the weird 
tale: 
 
If genius means a sense of inspiration, or of rushes of ideas from apparently 
supernatural sources, or of an inordinate and burning desire to accomplish 
any particular end, it is perilously near to the voices heard by the insane, to 
their delirious tendencies, or to their monomanias. It cannot in such cases be 
a healthy faculty, nor can it be desirable to perpetuate it by inheritance.
5
 
 
Gregg’s ‘inordinate and burning desire’ to uncover the existence of the Little People might then 
place him as such a case, his pursuit of knowledge simultaneously cementing and undermining 
his “civilised” status. 
 
But such distancings do not mean that the weird tale shies away from dramatising the 
backsliding process elsewhere. It appears in explicit form in several of Machen’s stories, and 
occurs frequently in the work of H. P. Lovecraft—who, after all, quite openly took inspiration 
from Machen. Speculation about the possible reversion of the human subject to a prehistoric 
state was not the invention of fictioneers, and scientific writers of the period, such as Max 
Nordau, Bénédict Augustin Morel, and E. Ray Lankester, published various treatises on 
degeneration, its perceived causes, and its potential consequences. Herbert Spencer, who 
proposed a more general conception of evolution, pertaining not only to organisms but to the 
formation of physical matter and of societies, opposed evolution—which he defined as ‘the 
integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion’—to ‘dissolution’, which was its 
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opposite.
6
 For Spencer, evolution could not be said to be in the ascendency in any overarching 
sense, since these two processes are ‘everywhere in antagonism, and everywhere gaining now a 
temporary and now a more or less permanent  triumph the one over the other’.7 On the 
specifically biological level Darwin, in The Descent of Man (1871), refers to the possibility of 
individuals reverting back to the type of some earlier ancestor, referring at some length to ‘the 
arrested brain-development of microcephalous idiots’, as well as other characteristics thought to 
resemble those of animals and of ‘the lower types of mankind’—poor hygiene, hairiness, 
propensities for climbing and for going on all fours—as offering ‘a case of reversion’.8  Similar 
reversions were constituted by ‘the worst dispositions, which occasionally without any 
assignable cause make their appearance in families’; these characters may also be ‘reversions to 
a savage state, from which we are not removed by very many generations’.9 The potential for 
wider social degeneration, rather than the existence of isolated, anomalous individuals atavistic 
from birth, is also raised in the Descent. Unless high rates of mortality and failure to marry 
‘prevent the reckless, the vicious and otherwise inferior members of society from increasing at a 
quicker rate than the better class of men’, Darwin warns, ‘the nation will retrograde, as has too 
often occurred in the history of the world’.10  
 
Darwin’s use of the word ‘class’ here invokes a wider concern not only with individual 
evolutionary fitness, but with an assumed association between this and class status. Childs notes 
the ‘special concern’ afforded the differential birth-rate in the early twentieth century, the fear of 
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‘the lower classes[…]reproducing at a higher rate than the middle and upper classes—and the 
consequent depopulation of the fittest class relative to the less fit classes.’11 (A fairly 
unproblematic correlation between social success and evolutionary fitness was assumed by 
eugenists such as Galton, who suggests that ‘those persons who have honourably succeeded in 
life[…]are presumably, on the whole, the most valuable portion of our human stock’.12) Darwin’s 
work as a whole does not lean heavily towards the pessimistic, however. Dire warnings such as 
the above are counterbalanced by optimistic predictions of a probable improvement in health and 
morality.
13
 Other scientific writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were less 
moderate in their predictions of backsliding. 
 
In The Gothic Body, Kelly Hurley writes of the importance of degeneration theory as a ‘crucial 
imaginative and narrative source’ for fin-de-siècle Gothic fiction.14 Her identification of these 
scientific treatises as ‘“gothic” discourses’ is a salient one, emphasising the teleological narrative 
form taken by degeneration theory—its sense of an inevitable descent towards a conclusion 
already written in the biological makeup of the human race—and making explicit the 
relationship between the doom-laden predictions of Morel, Nordau, and others, and the horrors 
of Gothic fiction.
15
 It is hardly surprising that these dramatic stories told by scientists should, in 
their turn, have come to influence the writers of weird tales. Daniel Pick, in his study of 
European degeneration theory, Faces of Degeneration, cautions against a simplistic view of 
fiction as simply reflecting scientific theories, however—and, indeed, against any conception of 
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degeneration theory as separate from its wider social context. Rather, evolutionary theory itself 
‘was undoubtedly social, inextricably enmeshed in the language, politics, culture of a past’.16 
Nor was degeneration a monolith: 
 
Degeneration was never successfully reduced to a fixed axiom or theory in the 
nineteenth century despite the expressed desire to resolve the conceptual questions 
once and for all in definitive texts. Rather it was a shifting term produced, inflected, 
refined, and re-constituted in the movement between human sciences, fictional 
narratives and socio-political commentaries. It is not possible to trace it to one 
ideological conclusion, or to locate its identification with a single political message.
17
 
 
Rather, it was a ‘complex term’, both ‘a technical diagnosis and a racial prophecy’.18  Before 
delving into the mess of biological fears laid forth in the stories of Machen and Lovecraft, then, 
it is perhaps necessary to explore some of the different strands of thought developed by theorists 
of degeneration, to detail the imagined causes of the atavistic reversions they feared, and the 
varying degrees of inevitability attached to them. 
 
Darwin, in The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868), had suggested that 
organisms did not have any innate tendency to ‘advancement in the scale of organization’. Rather, 
‘a very simple form fitted for very simple conditions of life might remain for indefinite ages 
unaltered or unimproved’, while ‘[members] of a higher group might even become, and this 
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apparently has often occurred, fitted for simpler conditions of life; and in this case natural 
selection would tend to simplify or degrade the organization’.19 E. Ray Lankester, whose 
Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880) gives one early iteration of the theory in English, 
makes an essentially similar argument, concentrating mainly upon degeneration in simple 
organisms. Lankester argues that the continued existence of ‘low’ forms of life alongside the 
more complex is usually explained by their having ‘ceased to improve, and being happily fitted 
to the conditions of life in which they were long ago existing[...]continued down to the present 
day to exist in the same low, imperfect condition’.20 The assumption that informs this 
explanation, and that Lankester seeks to challenge, is that the elaboration of forms is a one-way 
process, always proceeding in the direction of greater complexity. Although his examples are 
primarily drawn from the animal kingdom, however, Lankester cannot resist speculating upon 
the possibility of individual human, and wider social, degeneration, as in the following passage: 
 
Any new set of conditions occurring to an animal which render its food and safety 
very easily attained, seem to lead as a rule to Degeneration; just as an active healthy 
man sometimes degenerates when he becomes suddenly possessed of a fortune; or as 
Rome degenerated when possessed of the riches of the ancient world.
21
 
 
Lankester goes on to raise the possibility of human degeneration, particularly with regard 
to white Europeans, noting that they have not visibly advanced since the time of the ancient 
Greeks, and cautioning against the dangers of complacency: 
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In accordance with a tacit assumption of universal progress—an unreasoning 
optimism—we are accustomed to regard ourselves as necessarily progressing, as 
necessarily having arrived at a higher and more elaborated condition than that which 
our ancestors reached, and as destined to progress still further. On the other hand, it is 
well to remember that we are subject to the general laws of evolution, and are as 
likely to degenerate as to progress.
22
 
 
Lankester ends his treatise with relative optimism, however, expressing a confidence in the 
human ‘power to know the causes of things’ as a powerful weapon against degeneration.23 
Knowledge is power; it can, if used correctly, give humanity (or, rather, the white, European 
branch of it, with which Lankester is primarily concerned) the power to direct its own destiny. 
‘The full and earnest cultivation of Science’, he writes ‘[...]is that to which we have to look for 
the protection of our race—even of this English branch of it—from relapse and degeneration’.24 
 
The French writer Benedict Augustin Morel, the first to develop a full theory of hereditary 
human degeneration, was less optimistic.
25
 Morel described the inherited taint not necessarily as 
fundamental to the human organism, but as something that could be acquired from the outside 
and passed on, leading, within a few generations, to idiocy, sterility and the end of the family line. 
Outside influences could begin a congenital downward spiral: the use of alcohol or addictive 
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drugs,
26
 exposure to pollution in the urban environment,
27
 poor food,
28
 famine, and infectious 
diseases
29
 could all cause brain lesions that would be passed down to the following generations. 
Morel was a believer in the idea that the various human races, descended from populations that 
had already begun to degenerate according to the terrain they occupied, had eventually, 
spreading out across the continents, become different enough to create distinct ‘races’.30   Morel’s 
notions of the inheritance of acquired characteristics based on environment would be echoed by 
Spencer, who believed that ‘physical and social conditions’ could bring about ‘modifications of 
function and structure’, and that this was most clearly illustrated by ‘morbid’ modifications.31 
Spencer uses the example of ‘consumption’, thought to be caused by ‘unfavourable conditions of 
life’ and passed on from parent to child.32 Although Darwin in the Origin had placed ‘very little 
weight on the direct action of the conditions of life’,33 he would in subsequent works entertain 
the possibility of the passing on of acquired characteristics, for example in his theory of 
pangenesis.
34
 In the Descent, he noted that ‘residence in towns and certain occupations have a 
deteriorating influence on height; and[…]the result is to a certain extent inherited’.35  
 
There appears to be a kind of dual thinking about degeneration here. It is an innate characteristic 
of the human race, and has been so since the dawn of time—but it can also be acquired, through 
exposure to the industrialised urban environment, or through the moral failings that lead to 
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intoxication, addiction, and venereal disease.
36
 Morel’s theory puts forward simultaneously a 
belief in the hopeless inevitability of degeneration, and a caution against the permissiveness and 
technological advances of contemporary urban living that may accelerate and exacerbate it. The 
city as site of degeneration is a theme that recurs in the work of various writers; Galton would 
later suggest that the ‘conditions[…]of life’ in London and other towns might be ‘too hard’ for 
the ‘mass of individuals’, and be ‘crushing them into degeneracy’.37 This echoes a notion I 
mentioned in my first chapter: precisely those elements of human civilisation regarded as the 
most progressive—the desire for knowledge; the pursuit of technological and scientific 
advancement—may, inadvertently, lead us down the path of degeneration. Paradoxically, it is 
these “higher” impulses that contain the seeds of reversion to a lower rung on the evolutionary 
ladder. However, Morel’s degenerates affect (or infect) only their own family lines, and the 
eventual sterility of the degenerate effectively cauterises this infection, preventing its spread and 
keeping the rest of the social body comparatively safe.
38
 Subsequent theorists rejected this 
limited view. The narratives of degeneration put forward by Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau, 
in comparison, were social and national or even international in scope, threatening whole 
societies or continents. Degeneration was no longer a problem of individuals, or of isolated 
families. Rather, it threatened catastrophe on a vast scale. 
 
Nordau’s Degeneration, first published in 1892 (translated into English in 1895), casts the 
degenerate as a baleful influence upon the healthy masses and paints an ominous picture of the 
spectre of degeneration bearing down upon the civilisations of modern Europe. John Glendening 
has noted the ‘fundamental dependence upon evolutionary theory’ of Nordau’s work, drawing as 
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it does upon the neo-Lamarckian idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics resurgent in 
the late nineteenth century.
39
 Neo-Lamarckism, though usually optimistic, ‘provides for a form 
of degeneration, in that physical and mental debilitation suffered in one generation was thought 
to express itself in the next’.40 The possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics had 
also been touched upon by Darwin in the Descent.
41
 The very first chapter of Nordau’s book, 
portentously entitled, ‘The Dusk of the Nations’, claims that the ‘fin-de-siècle state of mind is to-
day everywhere to be met with’, casting this enervated and ‘curiously confused’ mental state as 
an unwelcome invader, developing in France and threatening to enter and destroy all ‘civilised’ 
nations.
42
 Degeneration, for Nordau, despite all the obvious physical and mental stigmata that 
accompany it, is a social and moral contagion.
43
 Nordau, too, views degeneration as an acquired 
condition, resulting from the frenetic, exhausting pace of contemporary life, from urban living, 
and from the availability of alcohol, tobacco and drugs to a populace upon whom this increased 
pace and its attendant information overload were beginning to take their toll.
44
 The offspring of 
enfeebled, exhausted and substance-dependant parents inherited these attributes, and passed them 
on. Lacking both the strength required for adherence to traditional moral standards and the 
attention-span needed to concentrate upon and fully develop an idea, Nordau’s degenerates were 
responsible for the breakdown of morality and the development of new aesthetic movements that 
promised to shock and thrill their ennui-ridden audiences without providing any real substance.
45
 
The popularity of these degenerate artists—among whom Nordau numbers such diverse figures 
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as Wagner, Nietzsche and Ibsen, as well as the symbolists, decadents, and Pre-Raphaelites—and 
their acolytes threatened to spread the degenerate mindset throughout Europe. Like Cesare 
Lombroso, by whose work he was heavily influenced, Nordau viewed many successful artists 
and writers as ‘highly-gifted degenerates’ whose artistic ability was inseparable from their 
mental illness.
46
 However, while Lombroso considered such figures as essential to the cultural 
development of civilisations, for Nordau, they were a ‘baneful’ influence more likely to ‘corrupt 
and delude’, leading the masses to ‘abysses or waste places’, passing unnoticed at present, but 
sure to be seen for what they truly were by future historians.
47
 (We might recall Galton’s warning, 
the same year, against attempts to reproduce ‘genius’, which he viewed as dangerously close to 
madness, by selective breeding.
48
) It was the duty of the healthy, normal subject to expose and to 
denounce these degenerate tendencies wherever he saw them; if they were allowed to spread 
unchecked, a downward progression was inevitable.
49
 
 
Though he is rather more sympathetic towards the degenerate, who he sees as doomed by 
heredity, ‘born with evil inclinations’ and lacking free will,50 Lombroso also proposes measures 
for social protection against atavistic criminals. Lombroso in particular fits Hurley’s description 
of the Gothic discourse, making use of anecdata and a vivid, “storytelling” style. He devotes a 
passage in the second (1878) edition of Criminal Man to sociologist Richard L. Dugdale’s 1877 
study of the Juke family, whose progenitor, a ‘drunkard and seducer’, could allegedly number 
among his descendants 77 criminals, 128 prostitutes, and 131 ‘impotent, idiotic, or syphilitic 
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offspring’.51 With a few judicious edits, this passage could refer to Lovecraft’s Martense family, 
and it emphasises many of the same features that we shall find in ‘The Lurking Fear’, the short 
story in which they appear. The ‘immorality’ and promiscuity of the family’s women are 
foregrounded here, along with the sheer number of criminals born from a single ancestor; we are 
probably meant to be as horrified by the fecundity of the Juke family as by its crimes.
52
  The 
spread of criminality through the family line is emphasised here; though Lombroso does mention 
that their ‘numbers fell in the sixth and seventh generations because nature[...]put an end to the 
problem through sterility’, his sustained emphasis on their numbers makes them seem a wider 
threat than Morel’s single, doomed family lines.53 In some cases, whole towns may develop a 
higher than average crime rate because of one family’s inherited propensity to wrongdoing: 
Lombroso asserts that ‘[all] it takes is the survival of one family descended from a wicked 
progenitor, and the whole place will be corrupted’.54 There is, however, at least some possibility 
of a cure in Lombroso’s narrative, as in Nordau’s. Nordau advocated the curtailment of 
degenerate aesthetic tendencies, and the promotion of healthy art in order to counteract its 
influence upon otherwise normal individuals; Lombroso, while holding the born criminal 
fundamentally not responsible for his crimes, advises the imprisonment of incorrigibles for the 
protection of society at large.
55
 Removing them from the social sphere would both contain their 
illegal activities and prevent them from producing further degenerate offspring. 
 
The terms in which degeneration theorists discuss their subjects are already familiar to us from 
Machen’s Little People. Lombroso’s criminals are physically marked by their racialised atavistic 
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tendencies, with features that ‘recall the black American and Mongol races and, above all, 
prehistoric man’.56 Lombroso certainly believed non-white, non-European races to be further 
down the evolutionary scale, and we remember, of course, that Machen’s Little People are 
‘Mongolian’ in their features. The born criminal may inspire an instinctive revulsion in normal 
people, particularly women. Lombroso relates an anecdote concerning his mother, in which she 
identifies two young men as potential criminals and is eventually vindicated in her assessment 
when they are arrested for theft, and offers this as evidence for women’s especial sensitivity to 
the criminal type.
57
 Evidence of the Little People’s presence in Machen’s stories inspires a 
similar, visceral disgust, whether it is the ‘queer’, nauseating smell identified by the maid in the 
‘Novel of the Black Seal’, the writhing mass of flesh that convinces Vaughan that they are 
‘things’ rather than men in ‘The Shining Pyramid’, or the hideous piece of metalwork that 
horrifies Dyson and Phillipps on sight in ‘The Red Hand’. 
 
Born criminals are also cruel, and lack any sense of sexual morality, reproducing irresponsibly 
and, when female, often turning to prostitution. We have already witnessed both of these 
qualities, too. The Little People perform human sacrifices, as seen in ‘The Shining Pyramid’, and 
possibly animal ones, as implied in ‘The Red Hand’. They commit rape without compunction, 
and are motivated by ‘evil lusts’. Even in those stories where the Little People do not appear to 
pose a physical threat to human beings, exposure to their religion appears to instil a new sexual 
awareness in its young female followers, and to carry along with it a sexual threat: that of the 
‘black man’ who may appear to claim the unwary dabbler as his wife, or the fairy queen whose 
kiss prevents a man from ever pursuing a normal relationship with a human woman. 
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Morel’s degenerates, like Lombroso’s born criminals, lack the self-control of the civilised, giving 
in to atavistic impulses reminiscent of the ‘evil and unspeakable lusts’ that drive the Little 
People,
58
 and turning to the vices of alcohol and substance abuse to relieve their exhaustion. The 
degenerates described by Nordau, meanwhile, are childlike in their lack of moral self-control and 
their incapacity for attention or rational thought, qualities implied by the mental backwardness of 
Jervase Cradock in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’.59 In Nordau’s view, the recognisable stylistic 
tics in the writing of degenerates echoes the inarticulate speech of the savage or the madman, 
another quality of the Little People, who are contrasted with ‘articulate-speaking men’60 and who 
communicate in reptilian hisses incomprehensible to civilised humans, or in coded signs and 
cryptic, primitive drawings. Lombroso, in the fourth (1889) edition of Criminal Man, discussed 
the tendency of criminals to ‘express their thoughts through drawings, even when they could 
express them in words’, and the ‘hieroglyphics’ used as code in prisons, explaining both with 
reverence to ‘[atavism]’, similarly recalling the Little People’s codes and drawings.61 Nordau 
objected in similar terms to the writings of poets and thinkers whom he identified as higher 
degenerates. The poetry of Baudelaire or the philosophy of Nietzsche were, he argued, 
comprehensible only to other diseased minds. They did not make sense, and so, to the rational 
subject, were as opaque as secret code.
62
 
 
Theorists of degeneration, then, detailed attributes in their degenerates with which we are already 
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familiar from the portraits of pre-human survivals given to us by Machen, and in the fairylore of 
the Victorian period. They do, however, differ in the emphasis they place upon outside factors in 
their accounts of the degenerative process. This difference appears to echo that between 
Darwinian and Lamarckian evolutionary thought, and it is reasonable to assume that perhaps 
different theorists were more or less strongly influenced by one of the two. For Morel, an 
alcoholic parent was doomed to produce degenerate offspring; the intoxicant would inevitably 
and permanently damage a hitherto healthy family line. Nordau, too, suggests that degeneration 
is at least in part an acquired condition. This seems less true of Lombroso, for whom the taint 
was always a hereditary one. Degenerates might negatively influence otherwise healthy 
individuals, and might produce degenerate children with healthy partners, but the physical 
tendency towards atavism is innate rather than acquired. But for all the protective strategies that 
Nordau and Lombroso propose, both alternatives make for deeply pessimistic narratives. When 
the integrity of the human subject is not under attack from all quarters, liable to be worn out by 
the pressure of modern life or tempted by dangerous vices, it is already doomed by heredity.  
 
Glendening has pointed to wider social factors in Britain that may be viewed as contributors to 
an overarching cultural pessimism; an atmosphere in which narratives of degeneration-fear 
thrived, and to which they also contributed. Among these factors are 
 
external sources of worry in the form of colonial setbacks and the growing power of 
international rivals; patriotic pride in the preeminent status of Britain brought quick 
loss of confidence once signs of falling away became apparent. The end of the 
century and the imminent death of Queen Victoria focused doubt, and science seems 
101 
 
to justify it on theoretical bases. Physics and the concept of entropy made 
degeneration appear cosmic, while biology rendered even the immediate future 
uncertain, since all life engages in a dubious evolutionary struggle between order and 
chaos, progress and degeneration, continued existence and extinction. Although 
many were relatively untouched by such concerns, currents of unease nevertheless 
flowed through society and coalesced in fiction.
63
 
 
The narratives employed by writers of weird fiction may also be seen to evidence the above-
mentioned split. There are stories in which the emphasis is on an external influence, a toxin or 
process causing the breakdown of the subject, or an influx of inhuman blood causing the species 
to alter. The latter type of story is, as might be expected, frequently heavy with anti-immigration 
sentiment or racism. In others, the degenerative process appears to occur spontaneously, resulting 
from nothing more than the inherently mutable and fragile nature of the human organism. But the 
weird tale takes and runs with the ominous threats proposed by scientific writers, and frequently 
discards or discounts their proposed solutions to the problem. There is rarely any possibility for 
redemption. Humanity—which here usually means a particular sub-set of humanity, 
circumscribed by class, race, nationality, gender, and age—may sometimes appear to be 
reaffirmed in the weird tale, with the degenerate subject being placed as someone Other, 
separated from the protagonist and implied audience by one of these factors, but when the 
“civilised” subject is caught up in the degenerative narrative, it cannot escape. The weird tale 
takes the spiralling inevitability implied in accounts like Morel’s, and runs with it, sometimes 
generalising it to a whole society or species, as Nordau did. In a sense, then, these fictional 
narratives are often even more pessimistic than the scientific ones that inspired them, allowing 
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the “human” subject no possibility for escape. 
 
 
The ‘Novel of the White Powder’: Sex, Drugs and Degeneration 
 
Machen’s ‘Novel of the White Powder’, which appears alongside the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’ 
in The Three Impostors (1895), and is, in fact, related by the same character in another guise, 
appears to draw heavily upon Morel’s notion of the drug or toxin as a catalyst for degeneration. 
The narrator, here referring to herself as ‘Miss Leicester’, recounts the story of a horrific 
transformation undergone by her brother, Francis, after he is given out-of-date medication by a 
pharmacist. At the beginning of the tale, Francis is a determined aspiring lawyer who studies 
‘from the first light in the east to the late afternoon’ and ‘[reads] about feudal tenures when[...]in 
need of amusement’.64 There is, perhaps, the hint of something unhealthy in Francis’s 
workaholism, and we are reminded of the way in which characters such as Professor Gregg are 
led to ruin by their obsessively pursued intellectual interests; again, an attribute associated with 
human progress and civilisation eventually proves the impetus for the human subject’s 
dissolution. Indeed, Francis’s lifestyle soon begins to make him ill, resulting in ‘nervous 
irritation’ (a phrase that could have come straight from Nordau) and a ‘wrinkled and despondent’ 
aspect.
65
 The opening of the story contains another small hint of inherited weakness; we are told 
in the very first sentence of the tale that the Leicester siblings have lost their father to ‘a 
complicated liver complaint acquired in the deadly climate of India’.66 However, the genesis of 
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the illness in a non-European climate places it as an external infection, one belonging to a 
colonised country rather than something innate to the white, British version of humanity whose 
disintegration is meant to cause us horror. The story’s narrative soon moves onto the effect of the 
titular ‘White Powder’, and seems to encompass some of Morel’s notions about morality and 
Nordau’s ideas about the stress of contemporary urban life along the way. 
 
Upon first taking the drug, Francis’s health appears to improve greatly. He becomes ‘more 
cheerful than he [has] ever been’, vows to allow himself some relaxation, and proposes a trip to 
Paris with his sister.
67
 But even at this early stage, the narrative warns us that something is amiss. 
Francis does not treat his medicine as a simple necessity, but drinks it ‘with a parade of carousal 
as if it had been wine from some choicest bin’,68  the suggestion of hedonistic enjoyment entirely 
at odds with his established character. He immediately becomes restless, and describes the view 
of the city from their window in highly-coloured, imaginative, even violent terms. He sees the 
city as though ‘burning in flames’, and imagines the sky ‘raining blood’ between the houses.69 
The image serves a dual purpose, illustrating the violent interpolation of nature into the urban 
landscape, and suggesting an hallucinatory aspect to Francis’s perceptions. The medicine 
becomes a mind-altering drug, and under its influence, Francis begins to lose some of his 
capacity for rational thought, his ability to see the material world in empirically provable terms. 
 
Of course, the use of drugs and alcohol is closely associated with a lack of proper moral restraint 
(particularly in Morel’s account) and we soon begin to see evidence of this, too. The ‘carousing’ 
pleasure Francis takes in imbibing his medicine soon leads to pleasure-seeking of other kinds. He 
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becomes ‘a lover of pleasure, a careless and merry idler’, forgoing work, growing ‘fat’ at fine 
restaurants, and, it is implied, engaging in sex with prostitutes.
70
 At the same time, his family 
loyalty wanes; he forgets his promise to take his sister to Paris, preferring to spend his time 
dining and dancing with college friends. He grows secretive, and soon alienates her, becoming a 
‘stranger’.71 This disavowal of family ties is salient; he is gradually falling out of kinship with 
other, civilised humans, ceasing to share in their values, descending on the evolutionary ladder. 
He begins to inspire instinctive disgust, like Machen’s Little People and Lombroso’s born 
criminals; his sister begins to suffer an ‘icy and intolerable weight’ on her mind when she speaks 
with him, and to feel ‘unutterable horror’.72 On witnessing the first sign of her brother’s physical 
degeneration, a dark, bruise-like patch on his hand, she is seized with ‘grey horror’ that afflicts 
her in ‘an inner cell’, and faints, only coming around when he has left the room.73 Shortly after 
the appearance of the black spot, Francis begins to display other signs of a physical alteration. He 
no longer eats, appearing to gain all the sustenance he needs from the medicine, and his sister 
notices ‘a look in his eyes[...]that was scarcely human’.74 He is no longer alien just to her, but to 
the whole of the human species. 
 
Lombroso viewed born criminals as particularly likely to inspire instinctive revulsion in women 
and children, whom he viewed as less evolved, and therefore possessing stronger unconscious 
instincts. However, when Miss Leicester calls a physician, Dr. Haberden, to see her brother, he is 
equally revolted. He, too, experiences ‘unutterable horror’, he is unable to stand up steadily, and 
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his speech becomes stammering and ‘unintelligible’.75 The change in Francis is so profound—he 
has become so inhuman—that even educated, adult British men (“fully human” subjects) are able 
to sense the difference. The reader is irresistibly reminded of the changes wrought in some of 
Machen’s other characters by contact with the Little People. Like Selby in ‘The Red Hand’, Dr. 
Haberden loses some of his capacity for articulate speech, and his ability to control the outward 
show of his emotions briefly vanishes. Miss Leicester describes his lower lip as ‘[trembling] like 
a horse’s’, and this ascription to him of an animal characteristic suggests a descent on the 
evolutionary scale that, while temporary, is parallel to that of the human Thing that Francis has 
become.
76
 Indeed, Darwin had noted the similarity of the expression of fear in humans and other 
animals—including horses—as part of his argument for descent from a common progenitor.77 In 
behaving in a manner that elides the difference between himself and a “lower” animal, Haberden 
makes a temporary reversion to the status of the progenitor. The extent of the change is thereby 
emphasised, Francis having reverted to an abhumanness that calls the humanity of civilised 
subjects into question. When Dr. Haberden departs, instructing Miss Leicester not to send for 
him again, Francis’s fate is sealed. The doctor ‘can do nothing in this house’.78 This emphasis on 
the house, rather than the patient, is telling. Haberden extends the degenerative taint to the family 
as a whole, although Francis is the only one physically affected, paralleling the way in which 
knowledge of the human organism’s primitive origins may affect the self-conception of the 
species as a whole, and our sense of our own integrity, without physical alteration. 
 
Francis’s condition quickly deteriorates from this point on. His sister finds his voice near-
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unrecognisable, he ‘[struggles] to find utterance’, and his speech is difficult to understand.79  
Eventually, his capacity for language dissolves altogether. He makes a ‘choking, gurgling sound’, 
and a ‘noise like water bubbling and regurgitating’, but is unable to answer his sister’s questions 
with words. He is no longer an articulate-speaking man.
80
 When Miss Leicester glimpses his face 
through the window of his bedroom (to which he is now confined), she sees no ‘human 
likeness’,81 and his movements have become as ‘clumsy’ as those of ‘a beast’s paw’.82 He has 
become a ‘thing[...]as formless as [her] fear’, with no fixed bodily integrity.83 His physical form 
is now mutable, liable to abhuman becomings, approaching the condition of the primordial slime 
or ‘first matter’ that holds all forms of life in potential. Eventually, we discover that this is 
precisely what he has become. After several days’ worry, Miss Leicester and Dr. Haberden enter 
his room to find that he has decayed into a shapeless mass of some slimy substance. Spencer 
wrote of ‘definiteness’ as a characteristic of evolution, and distinguished ‘changes constituting 
disease’ from evolutionary advances by their lack thereof, their variability and confusion—
attributes which he also identified in ‘decomposition’.84 The organic matter Miss Leicester and 
Dr. Haberden discover has no fixed form, but is ‘seething with corruption and hideous rottenness, 
neither liquid nor solid, but melting and changing before [their] eyes’.85 Francis’s decomposing 
body has arrived at the abhuman condition, always becoming-other, forever in the process of 
reversion. 
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The Great God Pan: Internal Forces? 
 
The narrative of The Great God Pan (1890, revised 1894) leads up to a similar scene, though 
drugs and potions play no part here. The story is told through a number of disparate accounts, 
and it is only Machen’s characteristic use (some might say abuse) of coincidence that allows his 
characters to piece the whole of it together. Its central mystery is provided by a young woman 
known as Helen Vaughan, who is apparently conceived as part of a bizarre scientific experiment 
during which her mother encounters the titular god. Helen passes through a number of aliases, 
engaging in unspecified horrific practices, and causing the ruin and suicide of a number of 
respectable men along the way. A deliquescence much like Leicester’s occurs at the end of the 
novella, with Helen’s body undergoing several transformations before being reduced to a 
‘substance like to jelly’.86 This process is witnessed and described by one Dr. Matheson, whose 
account incorporates several elements already familiar to us from the ‘Novel of the White 
Powder’. 
 
On entering the room where the transformation takes place, Matheson experiences ‘horror and 
revolting nausea’, as Machen’s characters (and Lombroso’s normal subjects) are wont to do 
when in the presence of the abhuman,
87
 and as Dr. Haberden and Miss Leicester do when they 
witness the changes in Francis’s condition. Helen’s body is surrounded by an ‘odour of 
corruption’ that reminds us of the ‘bad smell’ that accompanied Jervase Cradock’s transformation 
in the ‘Novel of the Black Seal’, and is referred to as ‘that’, not ‘she’.88 Like Francis Leicester, 
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she wavers between forms, moving ‘from sex to sex’ and ‘[descending] to the beasts’.89 As 
Angelique Richardson has noted, the loss of sexual differentiation was considered ‘not only 
unnatural, but […] an evolutionary falling away from higher organization’, since ‘humans had 
left hermaphroditism behind’.90 Darwin had observed that ‘at a very early embryonic period both 
sexes possess true male and female glands’, and concurred that ‘some remote progenitor of the 
whole vertebrate kingdom appears to have been hermaphrodite or androgynous’.91 In the late 
nineteenth century, both masculinity in women and effeminacy in men were ‘expressions of 
degeneration’.92 Dr. Matheson remarks upon this inconsistency as something challenging to his 
notion of the nature of the human organism, observing that ‘the firm structure of the human body 
that [he] had thought to be unchangeable, and permanent as adamant, began to melt and 
dissolve’.93 Finally, she takes on a form that is ‘horrible and unspeakable’, ‘neither man nor 
beast’. This final shape can be referred to only in negatives, and Matheson finally asserts that he 
‘will not further describe’ it.94 Aidan Reynolds and William Charlton have stated that Helen’s 
transformation is ‘patently a reduction to first matter’,95 conceived of as a slime or jelly, but 
perhaps her final shape is less important than its indescribable nature. It defies categorisation so 
far as to defy definition. Language fails again here, but it is not the abhuman subject who loses 
her capacity for language. Rather, it is language which loses its capacity to contain the abhuman. 
 
On the strength of Matheson’s account, we might note the similarities between Helen Vaughan’s 
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physical dissolution and Francis Leicester’s, but might also note that, while Leicester’s fate is the 
result of his having consumed a foreign toxin, Helen’s has no such cause. A large part of 
Matheson’s horror at what he witnesses appears to result from this assumption, and the 
challenges it poses to his existing knowledge. He claims that he ‘should have refused to believe’ 
the evidence of his own eyes, since he ‘knew that the body may be separated into its elements by 
external agencies, but[...]here there was some internal force, of which I knew nothing, that 
caused dissolution and change’.96 
 
This suggests immediately under which type we should classify the account of Helen Vaughan’s 
physical degeneration, and the suggestion appears to be borne out by hints in the main body of 
the story, which suggest to us that the seed of degeneration has existed in her since birth; that she 
has never, in fact, been entirely human. Sometimes this is stated outright. During the period in 
which she is known in society as Mrs. Herbert, nobody is entirely sure ‘who or what’97 she is, 
and Mr. Herbert seems sure that the name by which he knew her cannot have been a real one, 
since ‘[only] human beings have names’.98 Villiers describes her not as a human being, but as a 
‘that’ which has ‘manifested under human flesh’, a usurper of the human form.99 Physically, she 
appears strange, but indefinably so; those who encounter her experience an instinctive disgust—
like that felt by ordinary humans in the presence of the Little People and the changed Francis 
Leicester—but are unable to explain it. Austin describes her as ‘very handsome’ but with 
‘something about her face which I didn’t like’.100 He is unable to define that ‘something’, saying 
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only that her expression is ‘strange’, but not how so.101 His aversion to her manifests itself on the 
level of instinct, beyond or beneath that of language and empirical proof. On looking at a portrait 
of her, Clarke also identifies a quality that causes him to ‘[shudder][...] in his inmost soul’ but is 
only able to refer to it in vague terms, as ‘something’ and ‘[whatever] it was’.102 Even after she 
has left a place, she appears to leave a taint or infection behind. Upon visiting a house in which 
she has lived, Villiers experiences a ‘queer’ feeling that eventually becomes full-blown ‘horror’ 
and finally leaves him bedridden for a week with nervous exhaustion, his self-control and ability 
to function normally temporarily impaired.
103
 
 
This revulsion, which itself debases the fully human subjects who encounter Helen, overriding 
their reason with animal instinct, is by now familiar, having appeared in every other story 
considered so far. (Reynolds and Charlton argue that the story fails insofar as ‘[one] is apt to be 
nauseated, not awestruck, by the picture of physical dissolution’, but in this reading, such a 
reaction ought perhaps to be counted as a success.
104
) But Helen appears to bring about a more 
fundamental change in those unfortunates who fall under her influence for prolonged periods of 
time. Her first husband, Herbert, describes himself as having been ‘corrupted’ and ‘ruined[...]in 
body and soul’ by her,105 and finds himself not only destitute, but involved in a public scandal 
surrounding the death of another man, apparently from fright. Villiers encounters another 
acquaintance, Crashaw, who has been involved with her and apparently witnessed the 
unspecified horrific practices in which she engages (never clearly defined, except that they 
appear to involve the summoning of other beings like her), and whose expression betrays an 
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‘infernal medley of passions’ unbefitting ‘human eyes’.106 In encountering her, Crashaw has 
himself become something quite other than human: he has a ‘devil’s face’; he ‘no longer 
[belongs] to this world’.107 
 
Crashaw eventually commits suicide, as do a number of other society gentlemen who become 
acquainted with Helen in her ‘Mrs. Beaumont’ guise. Their reasons for doing so are left to 
conjecture, but it appears that exposure to Helen and her mysterious practices have 
fundamentally altered them in some way, removing their humanity and replacing it with 
something baser, something ruled by instinct and emotion. Investigators attribute the deaths to 
‘acute suicidal mania’,108 and this itself might fit a degenerative account, the absence of reason 
being so frequently equated with the absence of humanity. Perhaps, however, Helen’s suicidal 
victims are conscious that they themselves are no longer fully human—like Annie Trevor, ‘no 
longer fit for Earth’109—and retain enough of human consciousness to wish to remove 
themselves from society and thus prevent the spread of infection. 
 
The presentation of Helen Vaughan before we see her transformed, then, appears consistent with 
Matheson’s ‘internal force’; she is repeatedly marked as something other than human in the text, 
deliberately set up as something antithetical and destructive to the civilised (white, male) human 
subject.
110
 However, if we follow Helen back to her point of origin—the experimental procedure 
with which the novella begins—we will find that the notion of an innate degenerative taint is 
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somewhat more complex, and less restricted, than this. Helen herself is clearly marked as 
abhuman, but if it were solely she that were so marked, she would constitute only a small, 
localised threat. The taint that characterizes Helen, however, is not one located within a human 
family line; rather, it is introduced from outside during the initial experiment performed upon her 
mother (named, with rather heavy-handed irony, Mary). Dr. Raymond, who carries out the 
procedure upon Mary’s brain, announces that she ‘has seen the great god Pan’,111 an experience 
which results in the loss of Mary’s reason (she suffers a fit of terror, and is left a ‘hopeless 
idiot’112) and, nine months later, the birth of Helen. We are to assume that Helen’s father is in fact 
the titular deity; her inhuman aspect comes precisely from her inhuman ancestry. The threat 
posed by Helen Vaughan herself, then, is located outside the human race. But there is another, 
more pernicious innate danger here: the passion for knowledge which drives Dr. Raymond and 
allows him to use Mary as an experimental subject with ‘cool’ indifference.113 In doing so, he 
opens the door to the notion that humanity in fact exists in continuance with the inhuman, with 
entities whose grotesqueness is enough to drive rational subjects to suicide, and who are 
animated by the ‘[furious] lust’ of prehistory.114 The pursuit of progress results in both the 
inhumane treatment of Mary, and the violent reversion to type of the human species. 
 
 
‘The Disordered Earth’: The Hereditary Threat in H. P. Lovecraft’s ‘The Lurking Fear’ 
 
So far, the texts under discussion have focused on the degenerative breakdown of the individual 
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human subject. As already mentioned, however, alongside the studies of individual cases and 
lists of individual characteristics put forward by the theorists of degeneration runs a fear of 
degeneration on a wider scale—social or national. H. P. Lovecraft’s 1923 story ‘The Lurking 
Fear’ advances this one step further, taking the traditional degenerative narrative and extending it 
globally, positing a whole world ‘verminous with millions of cannibal devils’.115 Although it was 
written considerably later than the two Machen stories we have already considered, many of their 
features—and those of the Little People stories considered in Chapter One—are still present in 
‘The Lurking Fear’ (1923). The threatening landscape against which the human, with its veneer 
of civilisation, is powerless; the degenerative effect of encounters with the abhuman upon the 
psyche of “normal” humans; the threatening and unclassifiable nature of the once-human 
degenerate beings: all of these motifs recur in ‘The Lurking Fear’. The narrative itself, as it 
gradually reveals pieces of the whole picture, expands the locus of the eponymous fear from a 
small rural community to the whole world, taking the narrator’s sanity with it as he imagines the 
possible consequences of the story’s denouement. 
 
‘The Lurking Fear’ is an episodic narrative, having been commissioned for serialisation in the 
magazine Home Brew, and each chapter revolves around a separate incident. The narrative 
begins with the nameless protagonist seeing the silhouette of a ‘nameless, shapeless abomination’ 
which has killed his two companions in the apparently deserted Martense mansion, atop Tempest 
Mountain.
116
 After this experience, the narrator resolves to pursue his investigations, losing 
another companion, Arthur Monroe, and becoming briefly convinced that the killer is the 
vengeful ghost of one Jan Martense (murdered by his relatives in the eighteenth century) before 
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uncovering the mystery. The final chapter shows the narrator’s second visit to the Martense 
mansion, after he has realised that the numerous mounds that run throughout the area are in fact 
burrows through which the horrors travel, and that there must be far more of them than he has 
previously believed. He makes his way to the cellar of the mansion, and hides behind a clump of 
vegetation when a storm—always the herald of a new horrific incident in the story—begins. 
From a hole at the base of the chimney, a multitude of creatures streams forth. The narrator 
shoots one of them and is finally able to determine its nature. Here, we learn that nameless 
horrors lurking beneath the mansion are, in fact, the missing Martense family themselves, 
degenerated—after years of isolation and indiscriminate breeding—to the level of gorillas, 
violent, cannibalistic and vastly numerous. 
 
The story is littered with descriptions of the threatening landscape around the Martense mansion, 
a landscape reminiscent of the haunting, ancient hills and woods among which Machen’s Little 
People lurk and snatch their victims. The impression of an area close to past epochs of history, 
times in which the human was not yet fully developed, or had not yet achieved dominance over 
all other species, is present here, as in Machen: the forest is described as ‘primeval’117 and 
(perhaps one of Lovecraft’s favourite words) ‘antediluvian’.118 Its threatening aspect, too, is 
immediately brought to our attention. At the very beginning of the first chapter, the narrator tells 
us that this is ‘not a wholesome landscape after dark’, and suggests that he ‘would have noticed 
its morbidity even had [he] been ignorant of the terror that stalked there’.119 There is an 
abundance of plant life in the area, but this is presented to us as unhealthy overgrowth rather than 
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evidence of a hospitably fertile landscape. The vegetation is ‘unnaturally thick and feverish’;120 
the trees have ‘morbidly large boles’ and ‘vast serpent-like roots that [twist][...]malevolently’;121 
and on his climactic trip to the Martense mansion, the narrator makes his way through ‘diseased, 
precipitous abysses of haunted hillside forest’.122 And the landscape is not merely unwholesome. 
It is personified as actively hostile. After the disappearance of his original companions, Bennett 
and Tobey, the narrator’s flight back to the village takes him past ‘wild-armed titan trees’ and is 
accompanied by ‘daemoniac mutterings of thunder’.123 The storms peculiar to the area, usually 
accompanied by an attack from the lurking fear, are particularly sinister, and this is not the only 
time the narrator refers to them in demonic terms. Evil intent is similarly attributed to the storm 
during which Arthur Munroe meets his death, ‘the wolfish wind [rising] to daemoniac 
crescendoes of ululation’ and the storm itself being described as ‘Nature’s pandemonium’.124 
Even in the absence of the storms, the landscape is hostile—offering no protection to humanity 
from the lurking fear and its implications—or even actively malicious. Having deduced the full 
extent of the horror, the narrator describes it thus: 
 
It was a peaceful Arcadian scene, but knowing what it hid I hated it. I hated the 
mocking moon, the hypocritical plain, the festering mountain, and those sinister 
mounds. Everything seemed to me tainted with a loathsome contagion, and inspired 
by a noxious alliance with distorted hidden powers.
125
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Once again, we see a predatory nature, hostile to “civilised” humanity; and it is suggested that 
the isolation of the area and its remoteness from the centres of civilisation are at least in part 
responsible for the degeneration of both the Martenses and the local ‘squatter’ population.126 We 
are told that ‘Dutch civilisation once feebly and transiently penetrated’ here, leaving behind only 
the Martenses and the ‘poor mongrels’ who inhabit the nearby hamlets, and whose degenerate 
nature is conveyed both directly, through the narrator’s commentary, and indirectly, through their 
naïve superstition.
127
 We learn that the locals ‘[fear] outsiders’, and the narrator describes them 
as ‘[simple] animals[...]gently descending the evolutionary scale because of their unfortunate 
ancestry and stultifying isolation’.128 Their belief that the lurking fear is some kind of ‘devil’129 
and that the thunder is ‘its voice’130 marks them out as primitive, attributing supernatural 
explanations to that which they are unable to fathom. The Martense family, too, seem to have 
degenerated at least partly because of their isolation from other human beings. They shun the 
English and those other settlers who become Anglicised, and lead an ‘exceedingly secluded’ life, 
eventually becoming ‘heavy of speech and comprehension’ due to their self-imposed exile from 
society.
131
 Alone in the midst of so hostile an environment, the human subject is unprotected 
from those forces that act upon it to remove its humanity, to return it to a form as primitive as its 
surroundings. 
 
The most sinister features of the landscape, however, are the ‘odd mounds and hummocks’ that 
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run throughout the region,
132
 and that can hardly fail to remind us of the tumuli beneath which 
Machen’s Little People make their home, and of the Anglo-Saxon burial mounds traditionally 
thought to mark the entrance to fairyland or the land of the dead. They are twice described as 
‘sinister’,133 and eventually we learn that they provide the means of travel through which the 
Martense-descended creatures are able to appear and commit their murders, radiating outward 
from the mansion beneath which they live: 
 
That summit [Tempest Mountain] was undeniably a centre from which the lines or 
rows of points radiated indefinitely and irregularly, as if the unwholesome Martense 
mansion had thrown visible tentacles of terror. The idea of such tentacles gave me an 
unexplained thrill, and I stopped to analyse my reason for believing these mounds 
glacial phenomena.
134
 
 
 
It is not, then, the landscape alone which has created this threatening appearance, but the 
burrowing of the creatures. The interaction between nature at its wildest and a form of humanity 
already degenerate, or possessing an innate propensity for degeneration, seems to be at fault here. 
The threat comes not only from outside, but also from within the human organism. 
 
The creatures which the Martenses have become are grotesques, reminiscent of both Machen’s 
pre-human Little People and the born criminals and degenerates identified by the theorists of 
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degeneration. The Martense family, like Lombroso’s born criminals,135 became ‘clannish and 
taciturn’ as well as ‘heavy of speech and comprehension’ after retreating from the world, and 
also began to display a heightened and irrational emotionality, exhibiting an animalistic-
sounding ‘nervous responsiveness to the frequent thunderstorms’.136 The family’s increasingly 
noticeable ‘animal aspect’ is also remarked upon by Jonathan Gifford, the friend who discovers 
Jan Martense’s murder.137 The crime itself serves to further link them with Lombroso’s criminals 
and Morel’s immoral degenerates and to suggest a state of being far removed from the social 
structures of kinship. Like animals in the wild, the Martense family kills its own. Their speech, 
too, is further deteriorated at this point; like the hissing Little People, and like the degenerates 
whose use of language Nordau dismisses as ‘echolalia’,138 they are losing their communicative 
faculties, able to speak only in ‘broken gutturals’.139 When lights cease to appear in the windows 
of the Martense mansion, the local villagers investigate and find it empty but for ‘decaying 
furniture and scattered silverware’, suggesting a way of life more similar to that of animals than 
that of humans, and evidencing how low the family’s ‘cultural level [has] fallen’.140 By the time 
of the narrator’s encounters with the creatures, they do not speak at all, but merely ‘[stare] with 
vacuous viciousness’.141 On finding what the reader must assume to be a fraction of the skull of 
one of the creatures, the narrator decides that it must ‘have belonged to a human skull at some 
time’.142 The statement acquires a vicious irony once we realise that the creatures were indeed, at 
one time, human. Beneath the surface, then, the creatures’ physical structure remains similar 
enough to that of “normal” humans to be mistaken for it, a fact which makes their existence 
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doubly horrifying; it does not require even a fundamental change to transform the human form 
into that of a ‘filthy[...]gorilla thing’.143 
 
The number of ‘improvised penthouses’ in the mansion is also noted after the family’s ostensible 
departure, and the villagers discern from this how ‘numerous’ they must eventually have 
become.
144
 There is the suggestion of a horrific fecundity here, a primitive, animal-like cycle of 
endless birthing that reduces the human to the level of breeding-stock, and that produces an 
ever-growing mass of degenerate subjects that may eventually outnumber and overwhelm 
“civilised” humans, just as Nordau feared. Witness the writhing mass of limbs made up by 
Machen’s Little People en masse,145 or Lombroso’s horrified emphasis on the sheer number of 
criminals produced by the Juke family in the space of a few generations.
146
 Lovecraft’s 
characteristic hyperbole reaches its pinnacle here, and the loathing the narrator displays for the 
multitudinous Martense offspring can perhaps only be conveyed by quoting the passage in its 
entirety: 
 
The thing came abruptly and unannounced; a daemon, rat-like scurrying from pits 
remote and unimaginable, a hellish panting and stifled grunting, and then from that 
opening beneath the chimney a burst of multitudinous and leprous life—a loathsome 
night-spawned flood of organic corruption more devastatingly hideous than the 
blackest conjurations of mortal madness and morbidity. Seething, stewing, surging, 
bubbling like serpents’ slime it rolled up and out of that yawning hole, spreading like 
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a septic contagion and streaming from the cellar at every point of egress—streaming 
out to scatter through the accursed midnight forests and strew fear, madness and 
death. 
  God knows how many there were—there must have been thousands. To see 
the stream of them in that faint, intermittent lightning was shocking. When they had 
thinned out enough to be glimpsed as separate organisms, I saw that they were 
dwarfed, deformed hairy devils or apes—monstrous and diabolic caricatures of the 
monkey tribe. They were so hideously silent; there was hardly a squeal when one of 
the last stragglers turned with the skill of long practice to make a meal in accustomed 
fashion on a weaker companion. Others snapped up what it left and ate with 
slavering relish.
147
 
 
The theme of fratricide is picked up again here, but with new layers of resonance; the ‘cannibal 
nutrition’ upon which the creatures subsist148 calls on associations with and assumptions about 
“savage” peoples, and, in the context of the life-cycle, makes it abundantly clear that humanity is 
within a few generations of falling back into an existence evacuated of meaningfulness, in which 
new generations are spawned only to provide food for the strongest, who go on to produce yet 
more ‘cannibal devils’.149 
 
As with every other abhuman life-form, the Martense ‘devils’ have a degenerative effect of their 
very own upon the human subject, here illustrated in both the physical violence they enact upon 
the human body, and the increasingly frenzied mindset of the narrator. The village massacred by 
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them is almost entirely obliterated; all that remains is ‘disordered earth[...]covered with blood 
and human debris bespeaking too vividly the ravages of daemon teeth and talons’.150 No intact 
human form remains. The Martense creatures have torn apart its integrity, leaving behind the 
imprints of their own physicality. And in doing so—in proving their ability to prey upon 
humans—they push the human a notch lower on the scale of fitness-to-survive, ousting it from 
the top of the food chain. The death of Arthur Munroe is a smaller event, but no less shocking, 
and it appears significant that the creatures eat his face.
151
 Individual subjectivity and identity 
are removed; the human becomes undifferentiated; it is pulled down into the cycle of 
reproducing, killing and eating.  
 
More compelling—and perhaps even more horrific—is the gradual slide toward madness of the 
narrator, who initially presents himself to us as a rational, impartial observer, free from 
‘foolhardiness’.152 At the beginning of his first visit to the Martense mansion, he appears calm 
and well in control of his actions, arranging with Bennett and Tobey a strategy for best observing 
and, if necessary, evading the single creature he expects to see. After the disappearance of his 
two companions and the sight of the shadow on the chimney, he is severely shaken, suffering 
‘horrible’ dreams and spending several days in a ‘nervously exhausted’ stupor.153 Enervation and 
exhaustion are, of course, common characteristics of the degenerate; even after so brief an 
encounter, the sight of one of the Martense creatures is enough to pull the narrator toward its 
level. Even at this early stage, he fears that he may ‘break down completely’ if he is unable to 
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share his story.
154
 The main reason he gives for his condition is the unclassifiable nature of the 
creature; it makes no sound by which he can identify it, but he cannot ‘cast off the instinct’ to do 
so.
155
 The authority of the human is revoked here, its ability to know and to classify “lower” 
forms of life—and thus the certainty of its place above them—called into question. 
 
After Munroe’s death, the narrator’s actions become increasingly erratic, increasingly irrational. 
He becomes temporarily convinced that the ghost of Jan Martense is responsible for the murders, 
his superstitious credulity reducing him to the level of the ‘simple’ squatters, and at the 
beginning of the third chapter we find him ‘digging alone and idiotically’ in Jan Martense’s 
grave.
156
 Even after he finds the coffin empty, its long since returned to dust, he continues to 
‘[delve] irrationally and clumsily down’ beneath its resting-place.157 Eventually, the earth gives 
way beneath him, dropping him into one of the tunnels used by the Martense creatures to travel 
from their subterranean home, and causing him to become lost and hopelessly disoriented. He is 
placed on the same level as the creatures, figuratively and mentally as well as physically, his 
rational mind and even his humanity dissolving: 
 
What language can describe the spectacle of a man lost in infinitely abysmal earth; 
pawing, twisting, wheezing; scrambling madly through sunken convolutions of 
immemorial blackness without an idea of time, safety, direction, or definite object? 
There is something hideous in it, but that is what I did. I did it for so long that life 
faded to a far memory, and I become one with the moles and grubs of nighted 
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depths.
158
 
 
 
He becomes a subterranean life-form, like the Martense creatures, and identifies himself with 
organisms even less complex than they. By the time he encounters the creature in the tunnel, the 
narrator is left without conscious thought and relies solely upon instinct. He stops ‘automatically’ 
upon seeing the creature, but ‘[lacks] the brain to retreat’, and is saved only by a lightning-strike 
that causes the tunnel to cave in upon the creature.
159
 Behaving like a rabbit hypnotised by a 
predator, he is effectively, positioned as prey, like a lower animal. The Martense creature 
actually occupies a higher place than him on the food-chain. The implications are clear: without 
rational thought, without civilisation, without ‘time, safety, direction or definite object’, a human 
being is very little removed—if at all—from the condition of these degenerate ‘devils’. After this 
incident, the narrator himself appears well aware that he is no longer the cool-headed, detached 
observer who began the narrative. He concedes that ‘[there] can be nothing normal in the mind 
of one who, knowing what I knew of the horrors of Tempest Mountain, would seek alone for the 
fear that lurked there’, and shows signs of succumbing gladly to mental degeneration, admitting 
that it may be ‘a relief and even a delight to shriek wildly and throw oneself voluntarily along 
with the hideous vortex of dream-doom into whatever bottomless gulf may yawn’.160 This shift 
in attitude, this delight in abandoning oneself to the mercies of an external chaos, may well 
remind readers of the way in which thunderstorms were said to ‘intoxicate’ the Martenses,161 and 
is later recalled by the uninhibited frenzy in which they pour forth from the mansion and 
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commence killing and eating even one another. The slippage between human and degenerate 
horror grows ever more noticeable. 
 
As is characteristic of Lovecraft’s protagonists, upon witnessing the climactic horror—the 
degenerate Martense family, in all its numerousness—the narrator finally does lapse into a 
temporary madness, able to express his thoughts only through a series of horrible images, piling 
up lurid description in a manner reminiscent of some of Nordau’s examples of degenerate art.162 
The passage is typical of Lovecraft’s style at its most verbose, and far more vivid than any other 
section of prose in the story: 
 
Shrieking, slithering, torrential shadows of red viscous madness chasing one another 
through endless, ensanguined corridors of purple fulgurous sky...formless phantasms 
and kaleidoscopic mutations of a ghoulish, remembered scene; forests of monstrous, 
overnourished oaks with serpent roots twisting and sucking unnamable juices from 
an earth verminous with millions of cannibal devils; mound-like tentacles groping 
from underground nuclei of polypous perversion...insane lightning over malignant 
ivied walls and daemon arcades choked with fungous vegetation...
163
 
 
This in itself suggests a kind of revelling in madness, a susceptibility of the human subject to 
frenzied, irrational, impulses like those that motivate the Martense creatures. The final words of 
the story are, ‘the terrible and thunder-crazed house of Martense’,164 serving to tie the narrator’s 
madness and that of the once-human Martenses together, and to raise the question of just how 
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much integrity, how much stability, the “civilised” observer possesses. 
 
The themes of the story are, in general, familiar to us already, both from the literature of 
degeneration, and from other weird tales that use biological fears of degeneration as their source 
of horror. However, those already considered have tended to question  human supremacy on an 
individual level, focusing in on a single human subject. ‘The Lurking Fear’ extends these fears 
far wider, and not only because it focuses on the degeneration of a family rather than an 
individual. The narrator is horrified by the sheer number of the Martense creatures, certainly, but 
the horrors by which he is haunted do not concern only a remote region in the Catskills. In the 
passage quoted above, he imagines ‘an earth verminous with millions of cannibal devils’, and 
even after Tempest Mountain has been destroyed and its burrows stopped, he experiences terror 
at the sight of subterranean entrances, wondering ‘who can say[...]that analogous phenomena do 
not exist all over the world?’165 The human really does appear under attack from all quarters 
here, inwardly and outwardly. Rather than being an isolated phenomenon, degeneration may be a 
worldwide one—and in the raising of this possibility, the fears of Lovecraft’s narrator echo the 
warnings of Nordau, Lombroso, and others. Without intervention, total social collapse is a real 
possibility. Perhaps the most telling detail of all is that the narrator fears that such phenomena 
may already exist. If this is the case, neither Lankester’s education nor Nordau’s censorship can 
save us. The structure may already be rotten; we may all be degenerates already. 
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‘An accursed house’: Heredity and environment in ‘The Rats in the Walls’ 
 
At first glance, ‘The Rats in the Walls’ (1924), composed by Lovecraft the year after ‘The 
Lurking Fear’, appears to be the simpler tale. Its principal narrative concerns the degeneration of 
one individual of unfortunate descent, the last survivor of a family ‘cursed of God’.166 The 
protagonist, known only as Delapore, relocates from Virginia to England after the death of his 
only son, Alfred, injured in the First World War. He purchases his family’s ancestral home, 
Exham Priory, which has fallen into the possession of a relative of one Captain Edward Norrys, a 
former comrade of Alfred’s. The house itself has fallen into disrepair, the outer walls being the 
only part of the structure to remain intact, and Delapore soon learns that both Exham Priory and 
his family are the subjects of much local superstition. The last of Delapore’s ancestors to live in 
the Priory, Walter de la Poer, fled to America after apparently murdering several of his 
relatives—but this in itself is not the source of the superstitions. Exham Priory is generally held 
to have been built on the site of a Druidic temple, and bizarre rites are rumoured to have been 
practised there right until the house’s desertion. On moving into the house, Delapore begins to 
suffer bad dreams in which he sees a swineherd with a flock of grotesque beasts in a ‘twilit 
grotto’,167 and imagines that he hears rats scuttling downwards in the old stone walls, though 
other humans are unable to hear them; the only other beings aware of their presence are the 
house cats, who attempt to chase them. He and Norrys follow the distressed cats, and eventually 
realise that there must be a still older structure beneath the sub-cellar of the house. This turns out 
to be the grotto of Delapore’s dreams, and contains skeletal evidence that the de la Poer family 
did, in fact, raise human cattle for consumption as part of the cult that centred around their home. 
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Delapore’s companions are horrified, but he follows the sound of the rats into the darkness, 
eventually becoming lost. He is found three hours later alongside Norrys’s half-eaten corpse, his 
speech gradually degenerating into incomprehensible noises, and ends the book imprisoned in a 
mental hospital, still haunted by the sound of rats scuttling in the walls. Many of the motifs here 
are familiar from ‘The Lurking Fear’: the subterranean chamber of horrors beneath the ancestral 
mansion; the family’s unsavoury reputation and isolation from its neighbours; the physical and 
mental degeneration that takes place amongst the inhabitants of the underground grotto; and the 
eventual destruction of the house in order to wipe out every trace of what took place there. 
 
Hereditary degeneration is certainly a factor here, and its consequences perhaps appear more 
frightening for being able to manifest themselves after several centuries of apparent normality. 
Delapore is the descendant of an ‘abhorred line’,168 and the horror of the circumstances 
surrounding Walter de la Poer’s departure from England, though not their nature, is made clear: 
the murders were ‘intensely hideous, though largely unexplained’,169 and the experience which 
provoked them is hinted to have been more disturbing still. We learn that ‘[this] deliberate 
slaughter[...]was largely condoned by the villagers, and so slackly treated by the law that its 
perpetrator escaped honoured, unharmed, and undisguised to Virginia; the general whispered 
sentiment being that he had purged the land of an immemorial curse’.170 Walter himself makes no 
attempt to clear his name or regain Exham Priory, fleeing the country ‘[shaken] by some horror 
greater than that of conscience or the law, and expressing only a frantic wish to exclude the 
ancient edifice from his sight and memory’.171 Some months after his departure, a huge swarm of 
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rats bursts out of the abandoned Priory, rampaging across the surrounding area and devouring 
everything in its path. The family’s name is changed to ‘Delapore’, so desperate are its 
descendants to distance themselves from the occupants of Exham Priory and their activities. The 
history is erased as far as possible, the family maintaining a ‘policy of reticence’ with regards to 
its past; Delapore himself knows only ‘the bare statistics of [his] ancestry[...]together with the 
fact that [his] first American forbear had come to the colonies under a strange cloud’.172 All 
remaining information regarding the family’s past is contained in an envelope passed down the 
generations, and the envelope is destroyed when the family’s American home, Carfax, burns 
down and Delapore’s grandfather perishes in the flames.173 The text explicitly links the burning 
of the house to the Civil War, but when we take into account the deliberate later destruction of 
Exham Priory, and the self-immolation of the titular character in one of Lovecraft’s other most 
famous stories of hereditary horror, ‘Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family’, 
it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that perhaps Delapore’s grandfather destroyed himself, 
and the letter, deliberately. And at first, this obfuscation of history appears to work; Delapore 
becomes preoccupied with business, losing ‘all interest in the mysteries which evidently [lurk] 
far back in [his] family tree’.174 
 
But, as always in Lovecraft, heredity is not so easily escaped. As if drawn back irresistibly 
through the ages, it is Alfred, the narrator’s son, who first begins to uncover the family’s 
‘colourful and perhaps sinister’ past.175  We learn that in the Anchester area, near Exham Priory, 
the family and its former home are surrounded by ‘peasant superstitions which few novelists 
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could equal for wildness and incredibility’,176 and that the locals view the house as a ‘haunt of 
fiends and werewolves’.177 Alfred finds himself ‘somewhat avoided’ in the town during his stay 
there, and when the narrator moves to England to supervise the restoration after his death, he too 
is ‘subtly ostracized’ because of his heritage.178 This avoidance does not seem entirely unfounded, 
however: according to the historical record, the de la Poer family was ‘a race of hereditary 
daemons beside whom Gilles de Retz and the Marquis de Sade would seem the veriest tyros’, 
and may have been responsible for the occasional disappearances of villagers.
179
 This emphasis 
upon heredity emphasises a degeneracy apparently innate in the de la Poer family, and capable of 
lying dormant, hidden in the family line, for generations. This seems to be borne out by the 
manner in which Delapore’s own descent into atavism takes place. The first hint of it is signalled 
by his choosing to return to the old spelling of his name, ‘de la Poer’,180 and the dreams he 
subsequently experiences showing the farming of human cattle by the de la Poer family in their 
subterranean grotto.
181
 During his climactic breakdown over Norrys’s dead body, Delapore 
references his family name four times in his ravings, as well as mentioning his son and 
grandfather, and alluding to the cousin who brought about a scandal by becoming a voodoo 
priest after the Mexican War.
182
 So far, so specific; the fear of evolution reversing itself, and of 
the horrific possibilities that may lurk in our own heredity, are well-worn themes in Lovecraft, 
and seem to appear in fairly typical form here. The markers of degeneracy are obvious: Delapore 
reverts to cannibalism, a practice traditionally associated with “primitive” racial Others; he runs 
into the darkness underground, like a cave-dweller; and he loses his capacity for language, 
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descending through various earlier forms of English (identified by Spencer as the most highly-
evolved of languages
183
) to Latin, Gaelic, and eventually, inarticulate mumbling.
184
 The de la 
Poer line is a tainted one, and its descendants risk being engulfed by atavistic madness at any 
time. 
 
But the threat here is not quite so narrow. The most obvious clue to this may be the ‘inner cult’ 
that apparently existed in the de la Poer family prior to Walter’s flight to America, and the 
members of which, presumably, engaged in these ancient rites and cannibal practices.
185
 We learn 
that ‘[temperament] rather than ancestry was evidently the basis of this cult’, and that Lady 
Margaret Trevor, one of its most infamous members, had in fact married into the family.
186
 (One 
wonders whether this maiden name is a deliberate borrowing from Machen, intended to evoke 
the orgiastic rites of ‘The Shining Pyramid’.) The propensity for degeneration to the level of the 
cannibal, then, is not exclusive to the de la Poer line; it exists in potential in others, too. And, 
interestingly, we are also informed that the history of the de la Poer family was not always one of 
depravity. There exists, in fact, ‘no evil report’ of the family before 1261, the date when it moved 
into Exham Priory, and Delapore speculates that ‘something strange must have happened 
then’.187 
 
It is tempting to read house and family as synonymous here, and the association of the two in 
local superstition,
188
 as well as the series of improbable coincidences by which it falls back into 
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Delapore’s possession (and which it is perhaps reasonable to read as more than coincidence, 
given the determinism of Lovecraft’s worldview) appear to support this. But the site of Exham 
Priory was a place of ill repute long before the de la Poer family resided there. It is apparently 
generally agreed that the Druidic temple upon the site played host to ‘indescribable rites’, and 
that the Cybele cult introduced by the Romans incorporated these older traditions into its own. 
This ‘nameless’ worship proceeded throughout the Saxon era, the Priory housing a ‘strange and 
powerful monastic order’ until at least 1000 A.D., and inspiring fear and loathing among its 
neighbours.
189
 As mentioned above, the family itself only gained its unsavoury reputation after 
moving into the Priory. There appears to be something about the house—or at least its site—
itself which contributes to this reversion to “primitive” behaviours and beliefs. 
 
The Exham Priory into which Delapore moves is substantially renovated, its interior being ‘free 
from old vermin and old ghosts alike’.190 The only remaining parts of the original structure are 
the stone outer walls—the walls in which Delapore hears the rats. The sound of the rats, in turn, 
leads him below the sub-cellar to the ‘twilit grotto’ that he has already seen in his hereditary 
dreams, and to which he refers with the exact same phrase.
191
 Here, Delapore and his 
companions encounter the evidence of his family’s compulsions, and of the human cattle they 
kept: an ‘insane tangle’ of skeletal remains, stretching out from the staircase ‘[like] a foamy sea’, 
the simile itself evoking suggestions of humanity’s marine origins.192 The bones comprise both 
‘supremely and sensitively developed types’—presumably those members of the de la Poer cult 
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unfortunate enough to have been trapped underground and devoured by the swarm of rats that 
burst forth from the house a few months after Walter de la Poer’s departure—and degraded skulls 
denoting ‘nothing short of utter idiocy, cretinism, or primitive semi-apedom’ which can only be 
described as ‘semi-human’.193 The descendants of the unfortunate villagers abducted as to serve 
as cattle for the de la Poer cult must themselves have degenerated through several stages of 
evolution, their remains displaying many of the typical signifiers of degeneration (‘cretinism’ 
was a particular obsession of Morel’s,194 while Lombroso believed that one could identify a born 
criminal from the shape of his or her head
195) and ending up somewhere ‘lower than the Piltdown 
man in the scale of evolution’.196 These bones, we must assume, belong to the ‘fungous, flabby 
beasts’ of Delapore’s dreams, and the more highly developed remains to the ‘daemon 
[swineherds]’ from whom he himself is descended.197 The threat of backsliding is extended here, 
albeit in a slightly different form. While the de la Poers (and later, Delapore himself) continue an 
ancient religion and return to the “primitive” practice of cannibalism, the descendants of their 
captives have degenerated to the level of lower animals, becoming prey or cattle.  
 
Darwin notes that ‘domestic races of animals[…]often exhibit an abnormal character, as 
compared with natural species; for they have been modified not for their own benefit, but for that 
of man’,198 and that they are ‘much more liable to[…]monstrosities than species living under 
their natural conditions’,199 and this appears to be what has happened here. The human agency 
that would, for Galton, offer an opportunity for human “improvement”, is here employed to 
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opposite effect. This blurring of the line between humans and cattle is an equally powerful 
source of horror. It is the near-human features of these beasts that most disturb Delapore in his 
dreams,
200
 while Thornton, the psychic investigator accompanying the party, faints when he is 
informed that ‘some of the skeleton things must have descended as quadrupeds through the last 
twenty or more generations’.201  
 
The horror extends beyond the de la Poer family in the story’s present, too. In his fit of madness 
before being discovered, Delapore kills and partially eats Captain Norrys, whose face he has 
previously imagined on one of the ‘fungous beasts’ of his dreams.202 All of this occurs deep 
within the earth, this grotto of horrors being the foundation of each building upon the site, from 
the Druidic temple to the renovated Exham Priory. The cavernous space itself holds a kind of 
architectural record of every epoch of history during which is has been used. It contains ‘a weird 
pattern of tumuli [harking back to the underground homes of the Little People], a savage circle of 
monoliths, a low-domed Roman ruin, a sprawling Saxon pile, and an early English edifice of 
wood’.203 The symbolism is not difficult to grasp. Every civilisation to have existed upon English 
soil has been built upon the same foundation: ‘savage’, primitive instinct. The point is underlined 
by Sir William’s observation that ‘the passage[...]must have been chiselled from beneath’.204 
Simply visiting the site of his ancestors’ crimes is enough to trigger a reversion in Delapore, and 
to drag Norrys, too, back to the level of a prey animal. Darwin’s observation that a return to 
earlier conditions of life—as in the case of animals becoming ‘feral’—may in some cases cause 
‘reversion to the primitive state’  is here recalled, and the swiftness of Delapore’s reversion 
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suggests a degenerative tendency greater even than that of the “lower” animals.205 The 
supremacy of humans, both moral and evolutionary, is revealed to be just so much window 
dressing. The real interior is little altered. 
 
Carolyn Daniel, in her study of eating in children’s literature, in which she draws parallels 
between the socialisation of children and the “civilisation” of “savages”, has argued for the 
importance of properly controlled eating for entrance into human society.
206
 The child—the 
“little savage”—must learn to eat the correct things at the correct times in order to become 
completely human. The cannibal is the ultimate ‘“bad” eater’,207 refusing the values of society 
and representing a ‘brutish, immoral, uncivilised state’ in colonial discourse.208 The cannibal 
refuses to regulate appetite and instinct appropriately; he or she also refuses to recognise the 
singularity of the human as a body that must not become meat, a life that must not be destroyed 
in the struggle for survival. The unspeakable act and the refusal of anthropocentrism are mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
The act of cannibalism is in fact more than unspeakable; it defies representation altogether. 
Richter notes the frequency with which ‘the cannibal scene is[...]approached a posteriori: the 
cooking pot and the scattered bones tell us what (supposedly) happened—but the act itself is 
never directly witnessed’.209 The act of cannibalism need not be seen to happen in order to be 
accepted; rather than being a social practice, it is a label used to mark as Other the peoples 
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oppressed by European colonialism, a ‘prefabricated part of colonial discourse’.210 The image of 
the cannibal only begins to invoke what Richter terms ‘anthropological anxiety’ ‘when it moves 
closer to home, when the European traveller really becomes involved’. Most strikingly, ‘the 
danger of eating is more threatening to his integrity then [sic] the danger of being eaten’.211 
Engaging in cannibalism is ‘the surest sign that the white man has irrevocably crossed the border 
from self to Other’.212 That Delapore is unable to represent—even to acknowledge—his own 
cannibalism gains a new significance here. No longer a self—a speaking, colonising subject—he 
loses access to the realm of representation and meaning. His words, even after he recovers the 
ability to speak English, are those of a madman. They can no longer be recognised as truth, for 
Delapore can no longer speak with the authority of the properly human subject. 
 
The human, then, seems innately prone to degeneration, and the downward spiral able to be 
triggered by simple exposure to the evidence of its past. There are arguably, however, 
suggestions that the scope of degenerative possibility is greater still, and these exist in the motif 
that marks Delapore’s madness: the rats of the title. We never see the rats, but it is the sound of 
their scurrying that leads Delapore down to the subterranean grotto, and it is that sound—
‘determined to lead [him] on even unto [the] grinning caverns of Earth’s centre’—which he 
follows before becoming lost in the darkness and attacking Norrys.
213
 We also know that, several 
months after Walter de la Poer’s flight from England, a huge number of rats swept down from the 
Priory, wreaking havoc across the countryside and destroying those who still dwelt in the 
underground cavern. Delapore sees the rats in his dreams of the place, ‘devouring beasts and man 
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alike’.214 Even the de la Poers and their human cattle are reduced to the same level here; food for 
the rats, and no better equipped than the rodents to survive. The undifferentiated multitude of rats 
seems to represent a threat from still further down the evolutionary scale, and one that envelops 
the human, the degenerate human, and the animal without discrimination. It is perhaps 
significant that Delapore, after his imprisonment in the asylum, continues to deny his part in 
Norrys’ death, insisting that it was the rats that devoured him, and attributing his descent into 
horror to their lead: 
 
When I speak of poor Norrys they accuse me of a hideous thing, but they must know 
that I did not do it. They must know it was the rats; the slithering, scurrying rats 
whose scampering will never let me sleep; the daemon rats that race behind the 
padding in this room and beckon me down to greater horrors than I have ever known; 
the rats they can never hear; the rats, the rats in the walls.
215
 
 
The phrase ‘hideous thing’ here is interesting, recalling as it does the opening lines of ‘Arthur 
Jermyn’ with their assertion that ‘[life] is a hideous thing’.216 It is this undifferentiated, 
undifferentiating mass of crawling lower life that is ultimately responsible for Delapore’s 
breakdown, and that proves to be the final leveller of all forms of humanity, reducing them to 
fodder for this ‘nauseous’ army.217 The sound of rodent scurrying continues to haunt Delapore 
well after his breakdown, and perhaps this is because it reminds him not only of the horrific acts 
committed by his own family, or the terrible history of Exham Priory, but of the nature of life 
                                                 
214
 Ibid., p. 98. 
215
 Ibid., p. 108. 
216
 H. P. Lovecraft, ‘Facts Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family’, in The Call of Cthulhu and Other 
Weird Stories, ed. by S. T. Joshi (1921; London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 14-23 (p. 14). 
217
 Lovecraft, ‘The Rats in the Walls’, p. 98. 
137 
 
itself, a cycle of breeding and eating that must be performed by all living organisms, regardless 
of their complexity or development, and that can reclaim them at any time. Any attempt to rise 
above it can be only a temporary anomaly. The human is indeed doomed. Not only is the human 
subject innately prone to atavistic reversion, but it is surrounded on all sides by that which may 
trigger such reversion—for life itself is inherently degenerate. And if life itself is degenerate, 
degeneration is unavoidable. While these narratives mirror the concerns of individual and wider 
social breakdown expressed by the theorists of degeneration, their outlook is a far more 
pessimistic one. Lombroso and Nordau focused their concerns upon particular sub-groups within 
society (the criminal, the mentally ill)—groups from which their readership would be able to 
distance itself.  The degeneration narrative of the weird tale seems to refuse this distinction. The 
threat of degenerative breakdown is everywhere, surrounding and permeating the unfortunate 
(perhaps temporarily) human subject. 
 
 
‘The Mound’ and the Decline of Civilisations 
 
A conception touched on in the figure of Machen’s Professor Gregg is that of progress as the 
agent of degeneration. Daniel Pick notes this ‘apparent paradox’ in his survey of late nineteenth-
century evolutionary thought: 
 
Evolutionary scientists, criminal anthropologists and medical psychiatrists 
confronted themselves with the apparent paradox that civilisation, science and 
economic progress might be the catalyst of, as much as the defence against, physical 
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and social pathology.
218
 
 
Here, once again, degeneration is a threat not just to racial or lower-class others, but to “civilised” 
subjects. Equally important is the image of the crowd, or of ‘crowd civilisation’.219 The crowd, 
as Pick points out, was more than just a group of people: it was 
 
the point of connection between present and past—between the individual and a vast 
array of ancestors. The crowd inverted the law of evolution and moved from present 
to past. Instead of individual development, it tended towards homogeneity; ‘personal 
characteristics vanish in the crowd’.220 
 
The degeneracy of the civilised and the fear of the crowd coalesced in the city. English 
theorists of degeneration figured the city as a site of infection which would eventually spread 
throughout the national body; they predicted a ‘process of decline in which a relative 
deterioration in the body of the city population in turn undermined the “imperial race” with 
ensuing disintegrative effects upon the nation and empire’.221 In the 1860s, Pick tells us, 
 
the question of the ‘degeneration of the race’ was entertained in [The Lancet] with 
references to Darwinian and Spencerian evolution, and with dark thoughts about the 
future of the cities and more specifically about the capital as a literal breeding ground 
                                                 
218
 Pick, p. 11. 
219
 Ibid., p. 95. 
220
 Ibid., p. 92. 
221
 Ibid., p. 184. 
139 
 
of decay.
222
 
 
The notion of a ‘coherent rational subject’223 became dissolved in the social; in a history whose 
‘subject, cause and force’ was degeneration.224 Education, position, and status afforded no 
protection; indeed, those at the pinnacle of ‘civilisation’ might be the first to succumb.225 The 
literature surrounding these fears ‘reflected back on European society in deeply unsettling 
ways’;226 indeed, Pick’s description of it might be applied with relative ease to the fin-de-siècle 
Gothic, or to the weird tale itself: 
 
Indeed social questions involving crime, moral decadence and racial pollution began 
to intersect more and more insistently around the middle of the century. Between the 
1820s and the 1840s a massive new literature had emerged charting the phenomenon 
of crime in the cities: a plethora of sensational stories fetishised, romanticised and 
reviled the criminal mysteries of a Paris, a Naples, a London. Dangerous classes and 
dangerous races multiplied in literature.
227
 
 
Machen’s London, haunted by evolutionary throwbacks, and Lovecraft’s fantastical lost cities 
with their alien inhabitants, would echo these fears in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Fears of the mob intersected with scientific conceptions of degeneration, resulting in a 
‘shift from notions of the individual degenerate (as sustained by nosological models of 
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dégénérescence) towards a bio-medical conception of crowd and mass civilisation as 
regression’.228 Biological anomaly became social destiny; civilisation was built upon ‘a whole 
subterranean world of racial inheritance’.229 The edifice of the city—an achievement of 
“civilised” humanity—held the potential for atavism at its heart, and threatened to reveal the 
precariousness of “civilised” society. The scope of degenerative potential widened, as it was no 
longer able to be isolated as something that happened in anomalous cases. 
 
This ‘subterranean world’ is dramatised, in quite literal form, in one of Lovecraft’s lesser-known 
stories, ‘The Mound’. Ghostwritten for Zealia Bishop Reed in 1929-1930, but not published until 
1940, after Lovecraft’s death (and then only in abridged form), ‘The Mound’ tells of the 
narrator’s investigation of a mysterious artificial tumulus in western Oklahoma, and the horrific 
story told in a manuscript he finds there, left by a previous traveller. The mound itself is one of 
the entrances to an underground realm whose people—the inheritors of a once-proud civilisation, 
possessed of various preternatural abilities—have physically and socially degenerated into 
incorporeal shadows, amusing themselves by acting out their ancestors’ past glories. The social 
decline dramatised in ‘The Mound’ is certainly not unique in Lovecraft’s fiction; the tales 
already discussed here show the decline of degenerate individuals and families, and the narrative 
of social degeneration appears in modified form in ‘The Nameless City’ (1921) and ‘At the 
Mountains of Madness’ (1936), whose alien civilisations appear, like that in ‘The Mound’, to 
have entered a period of decline before their demises (though, in the event, the apparent 
degeneration of the Old Ones’ art in ‘Mountains’ turns out to have another, more immediately 
dangerous, cause.) 
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S. T. Joshi, in his study, H. P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West, discusses the story at some 
length, suggesting that it may have its roots in Lovecraft’s reading of Oswald Spengler, whose 
treatise, The Decline of the West (vol. I 1918, vol. II 1922), argues that decline is inevitable, and 
civilisation the ‘old age’ of culture.230 To view Lovecraft’s treatment of the theme of decline as 
something influenced solely by Spengler would be a mistake, however. Certainly, Spengler’s 
central metaphor of culture-as-organism invokes the biological, recalling Pearson’s assertion that 
‘[permanence] and dominance in the world passes to and from nations even with their rise and 
fall in mental and bodily fitness’231 and Galton’s comparison of towns to organisms and 
individuals within them to ‘the individual cells of one of the more complex animals’.232 Herbert 
Spencer in fact employed an exact mirror of Spengler’s metaphor, suggesting in his Principles of 
Biology (1864) that ‘the general reader cannot in any other way obtain so clear a conception of 
functional development in organisms, as he can by tracing out functional development in 
societies’, and going on to compare the differentiation and interdependence of organs to that of 
different professions within society.
233
 As Richter has pointed out, however, Spengler is 
primarily concerned ‘not[...]with individual health or social disease but with a metaphysical 
desire for extinction that takes hold of the whole “organism” of a nation’.234 In contrast, the 
individual and ‘social disease’ are frequently central concerns in Lovecraft. I do not mean to 
argue that the influence is nonexistent—but to argue for a simple line of descent from one work 
to another is to ignore that both existed in a wider context in which anxieties about biological 
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degeneration had been under consideration for decades.  
 
H. P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West is a deeply flawed piece of work, relying, as it does, 
upon a naïve authorial intention approach to literature, and upon a gross mischaracterisation of 
other schools of criticism to justify this approach.
235
 Joshi wavers between the ahistorical 
(‘criticism is nothing but the confrontation of one mind with another’236) and the simplistic (‘the 
author, being a product of his cultural environment, unconsciously absorbs certain metaphysical, 
ethical, or political biases of his time and reflects them in his work’.237) A little later, Joshi 
acknowledges that ‘an author manipulates as well as being manipulated by his environment’,238 
but, for the most part, retains a limited view of literature as an expression of the worldview of 
individual ‘great intellects’ whose reception is determined ‘on the one hand by the power of the 
author to convey his message and on the other hand by the intelligence and background of the 
reader’.239 Bizarrely, despite his emphasis upon Lovecraft’s reading and intellectual background, 
the notion of the fictional text as embedded in a social context and a pervasive scientific or 
pseudo-scientific discourse is mostly absent. H. P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West is useful, 
however, in its delineation of that intellectual background, and in its attention to the 
representation of decline in the relatively little-discussed ‘The Mound’. Joshi moves from a 
discussion of Lovecraft’s eventual, qualified acceptance of the notion of entropy240 to his view of 
mechanisation as a principal contributor to social decline.
241
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Lovecraft, Joshi argues, regarded the artistic productions of the likes of Eliot, Joyce, and e. e. 
cummings as symptomatic, ‘beyond the pale of art and[…]indicative of a general state of culture 
in serious decay’.242 Nordau’s ideas about degenerate art and its dangers spring irresistibly to 
mind. Indeed, if for Lovecraft, intellectual curiosity is ‘the highest ethical purpose of man’,243 
perhaps even ‘the highest trait possible in the cosmos’,244 then the intellectual degradation 
signalled by this perceived decline in the quality of artistic production does not just bear out the 
notion identified by Pick, that those at the highest point of civilisation may be the most 
vulnerable to backsliding: it undermines the very basis of humanity, the ‘psychological 
distinction’ that separates us from the lower animals.245 The social and the biological are, once 
again, interlinked. Joshi suggests that the strongest influence of Spengler’s work on Lovecraft’s 
is this: ‘the consideration of all facets of civilisation (politics, economics, science, art) as 
interdependent’.246 Spengler talks about the decline of culture-as-organism, rather than of the 
individual organism. Cultures, for Spengler, ‘are organisms, and world-history is their collective 
biography. Morphologically, the immense history of the Chinese or of the Classical Culture is the 
exact equivalent of the petty history of the individual man, or of the animal, or the tree, or the 
flower’.247 The social and the biological are entangled once more—and the idea of degeneration 
as inescapable social force noted by Pick is reiterated. The individual degenerate may not be the 
focus of Spengler’s work, or of ‘The Mound’, but there is no escape for him. The central 
manuscript narrative of ‘The Mound’, the story of the unfortunate Pánfilo de Zamacona y Nuñez, 
illustrates this in dramatic fashion, as do the experiences of the several previous visitors to the 
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mound about whom the narrator learns. 
 
A young skeptic named Heaton visits the mound and returns ‘strangely impaired’,248 raving 
about apparently impossible things, ‘inhuman captors and grotesque tortures, and[...]other 
fantastic abnormalities too complex and chimerical even to remember’.249 The next explorer to 
visit, a veteran adventurer named Captain Lawton, vanishes for over a week upon arriving at the 
mound. When Lawton returns, he is ‘younger by as much as forty years’, having actually 
physically regressed to an earlier stage of his life-cycle.
250
 And, lest the reader think that this 
renewal of youth might not be such a bad thing after all, he has forfeited his humanity and his 
identity in the process: he is now an ‘object’ rather than a person, and is repeatedly referred to as 
‘it’.251 Although he remembers his name, it no longer really belongs to him. We are told that ‘[it] 
said it was–or had been–Capt. Lawton’, and, a little later, that ‘[it][...]kept repeating the name 
‘George Lawton, George E. Lawton’ as if trying to reassure itself of its own identity’.252 Like 
Heaton, he ‘[babbles] of incomprehensible things’.253 Lawton’s human (white, male, high-status) 
identity is effaced, and with it goes his reliability as a witness. Whether or not Lawton is mad 
(and this is certainly a possibility, despite the truth of his statements; encounters with 
Lovecraftian horrors, after all, have a tendency to induce madness), in the eyes of the world, he 
is robbed of his reason. This perceived inability to function intellectually, and an apparent 
regression to somewhere below the level of the human, go hand in hand. A third visitor, Ed Clay, 
loses not his reason, but his ability to articulate experience through language. His suicide note 
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says of the mound people, ‘what they do cant [sic] be spoke about’.254 Again, we see the erasure 
of a characteristic essential to the ‘psychological distinction’ between humans and other animals 
that Joshi suggests even nineteenth-century scientific writers were keen to preserve.
255
 
 
These instances of individual backsliding associated with the mound serve as introductory hints 
to the nature of the central manuscript narrative, giving us some idea of what the outcome of 
Zamacona’s adventure will be (though, in fact, his own fate is quite distinct from that of these 
others), if not of its content more generally. Indeed, we will later realise that Lawton’s apparently 
nonsensical exclamation, ‘that white man–oh, my God, what they did to him!’ must refer to an 
encounter with Zamacona’s reanimated corpse.256 There are early hints, too, at the nature of the 
mound people’s civilisation, whose trajectory Zamacona’s narrative will trace. 
 
The first, and most obvious, point made by the narrator—and apparently borne out by Lawton’s 
ravings and Zamacona’s manuscript—is the age of this civilisation. The story opens with the 
narrator’s observation that ‘most people have stopped thinking of the West as a new land’ and 
that, due to recent archaeological finds, ‘the idea of newness is fading out pretty rapidly’.257 The 
relatively recent date of white American civilisation is emphasised; the land has long before now 
been the home not just of Native Americans, but of ‘primitive man contemporaneous with 
extinct animals and known today only through a few fragmentary bones and artefacts’.258 And 
this great age has something sinister about it: it is ‘stupefying’, ‘almost horrible’.259 Ancient 
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civilisations and ‘primitive man’, moreover, draw to mind the horrifying pre-human survivals of 
Machen’s Little People stories and the Turanian dwarf theories. Lovecraft appears to play quite 
consciously on this association, noting that the mounds the narrator is investigating are 
‘artificial-looking’ and associated with ‘apparitions of exceedingly strange aspect and 
equipment’.260 The description might as easily apply to the fairy raths of legend. The 
‘apparitions’, meanwhile, are referred to by the local Native Americans as ‘“those people”, “the 
old people”, or “they who dwell below”’, and held in ‘too great a frightened veneration’ to be 
much discussed.
261
 As well as emphasising their age, this euphemistic form of reference recalls 
Machen’s portrayal of practice of referring to fairies as “the good people”, “the good 
neighbours”, or some other vague but complimentary epithet, in order to avoid attracting their 
wrath.
262
 But however similar their role to that played elsewhere by the fairies, and while they 
may, in a literal sense, be pre-human survivals (Lawton asserts that ‘we’re all descended from 
them in the beginning’263), the mound people are not primitive in any straightforward sense. The 
folklore surrounding the mound speaks of two apparitions—commonly assumed to be ghosts—
who appear on top of it, a man who appears by day, and a headless woman bearing a torch who 
appears by night. The narrator’s first sighting of the daytime ghost confirms that he is something 
quite different to Machen’s Little People. The Little People repel “civilised” human subjects on a 
visceral, physical level; here, the opposite appears to happen. The narrator is impressed by the 
apparition, ‘noting the kinaesthetic quality of his stride and the poised way he [carries] his 
head’.264 He acquires a ‘strong, persistent conviction that this man, whoever or whatever he 
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might be, [is] certainly not a savage’.265 Rather, he believes ‘instinctively’—on the same level 
that Machen’s human subjects are repelled by the Little People—that the apparition is ‘the 
product of a civilisation’.266 
 
That this civilisation is one highly advanced in terms of artistic accomplishment—and therefore 
in the development of its humanity—is also indicated in this early part of the tale. A local Native 
American elder, Grey Eagle, provides the narrator with a protective amulet of the mound 
people’s workmanship after failing to dissuade him from visiting the mound. This artefact 
reinforces the impression of cultivation given by the daytime “ghost”; the narrator is struck by its 
‘marvellously artistic and utterly unknown workmanship’ and the ‘exquisitely modelled’ designs 
with which it is decorated.
267
 A second look at the apparition on the mound reveals that his 
clothing and accoutrements are crafted with similar skill, ‘[bespeaking] exquisite workmanship 
and cultivation’.268 The metal cylinder containing Zamacona’s manuscript bears carvings similar 
to those on the amulet and the apparition’s outfit. Although ‘horrible’ in content, they, too, are ‘of 
the highest finish and craftsmanship’.269 The manuscript itself hints at the accomplishments of 
the mound people’s civilisation in its heyday. Zamacona witnesses the ‘monstrous extent and 
inhuman height’ of the capital city of Tsath, whose ‘great towers’ are now partially disused;270 he 
sees the extent to which the hypnotic powers of the mound people, used to control both 
reanimated corpses and specially-bred slaves, have rendered labour a thing of the past for the 
free population;
271
 and he learns that in past epochs, the mound people’s civilisation ‘held ideas 
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much like those of the classic and renaissance outer world, and[...]possessed a national character 
and art full of what Europeans regard as dignity, kindness, and nobility’.272 Though life had been 
rendered ‘extremely easy’ by mechanisation, ‘selective breeding and social evolution’ ensured 
the intellectual excellence of the ruling class.
273
 Artistic and intellectual achievements ‘had 
reached very high levels’, while science ‘had been profound and accurate, and all-embracing’.274 
The mound people had, at this point in their history, attained to the highest possible standards of 
humanity. They had even gone beyond them; their minds being powerful enough that they were 
able to communicate telepathically, coming to disregard speech as ‘crude and needless’,275 to 
dematerialise and reappear at will, to effect startling ‘human metamorphoses’276—even to 
reanimate the dead. 
 
Joshi identifies intellectual achievement as ‘the highest ethical purpose’ attainable in 
Lovecraft;
277
 it would seem curious, then, that the narrator of ‘The Mound’, even as he admires 
the exquisite craftsmanship of the apparition’s trappings, senses also an ‘infinite evil and 
decadence’ in his expression.278 The carvings on the cylinder that contains Zamacona’s 
manuscript, too, unsettle him. Despite their artistic quality, the designs are ‘fraught with 
insidious evil’.279 They ‘[glimmer] evilly’, too; they are ‘abnormal and blasphemous’.280 Even 
the artificiality of the mound itself—evidence of the mound people’s skill in manipulating their 
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environment—is suspect: there is ‘a kind of latent menace in its too regular outlines’.281 These 
technical and artistic accomplishments ought to convince us of the mound people’s humanity, to 
render our kinship to them a good. Instead, however, they are tainted. Rather than admiration, 
they inspire an unease not quite identical with, but akin to, that repulsion elicited in Machen’s 
educated human subjects by their encounters with the Little People, and in Lombroso’s sensitive 
observers by the sight of born criminals. Why is this? 
 
The fact that the apparitions who guard the mound are taken to be ghosts gives us one clue to the 
reason. They are now apparently insubstantial; incorporeal. Their ability to dematerialise has 
resulted in a permanent movement away from fleshly existence, toward ‘the borderline of 
spirit’.282 Charging Buffalo, the guide who shows Zamacona to the mound’s entrance, describes 
them as ‘half-ghost’, and tells him the lore has it that they ‘no longer [grow] old or [reproduce] 
their kind, but [flicker] eternally in a place between flesh and spirit’.283 Their longevity might 
appear a sign of progress, but that they are no longer able to reproduce suggests the sterility that 
Morel identified in the degenerate, and this oscillation between corporeal and ghostly 
existence—coupled with the mound people’s ability to effect strange transformations—suggests 
a malleability, an instability, in the human form that calls to mind the disintegrations of Helen 
Vaughan and Francis Leicester. This would be sufficient to explain the narrator’s unease at the 
sight of the daytime sentinel, a single individual whose insubstantial body bears hints of the 
human potential for reversion. But the narrator’s revulsion seems intimately tied to those things 
which mark the mound people out as civilised: their artwork; their craftsmanship. So do some of 
Zamacona’s initial premonitions of evil, adhering as they do to the mound people’s slaves and 
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beasts of burden—products of their preternatural skills—and to the ‘monstrous’ city of Tsath.284 
The degeneration of the individual body has its horrific potential, but in ‘The Mound’, 
degeneration is an inexorable social force, not sweeping civilisation before it, but inhering in its 
every achievement. 
 
The importance of the city as the site of civil degeneration returns here. On his foray into the 
region below the mound—called K’n-yan by its inhabitants—Zamacona encounters a party of 
the mound people who, after some initial communication difficulties, relay to him the history of 
the place. The prodigious mechanical inventions of the people of K’n-yan, as well as the slave-
class acquired by their conquest of neighbouring peoples and interbreeding of the prisoners with 
lower animals, rendered life easy in the extreme. The rest of the region was gradually abandoned, 
the population becoming concentrated in the great city of Tsath.
285
 And in Tsath, the intellectual 
curiosity and achievement of previous ages began gradually to be edged out. In the absence of 
necessity, the pursuit of progress stalled, entertainment, rather than intellect, becoming the 
principal social good. 
 
Religion—always a sign of intellectual backwardness for the skeptical Lovecraft—became once 
again ‘a leading interest in Tsath’, not because of any pious devotion to ‘the colourful ancestral 
faith’, but because of the ‘mystical moods and sensuous rites’ that accompanied it.286 The ‘orgies 
and sacrifices’ that these rites entail are particularly off-putting to the Catholic Zamacona, who is 
‘piously reluctant to describe them in his manuscript’.287 Accompanying the resurgence in 
                                                 
284
 Ibid., p. 187. 
285
 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
286
 Ibid., p. 180. 
287
 Ibid., p. 180. 
151 
 
religion was a resurgence in superstition, particularly that attached to the ‘Tulu-metal’ brought to 
Earth by the mound people’s ancestors.288 (‘Tulu’, it will be noted, appears to be an alternate or 
corrupted form of ‘Cthulhu’.) This recrudescence of superstition is explicitly held up as an 
example of backsliding: 
 
Now, as the neglect of science and intellect was dulling the critically analytical spirit, 
people were beginning to weave around the metal once more that same fabric of 
awestruck superstition which had existed in primitive times.
289
 
 
More horrible for Zamacona than grotesque rites and bizarre superstitions, however, is the 
emotional, rather than intellectual, nature of the mound people’s religious—and, increasingly, 
their social—practices. ‘What he liked least of all’, we learn, ‘were the emotional sounds emitted 
by the celebrants—jarring sounds in a race that had ceased to use vocal speech for ordinary 
purposes’.290 The worshippers voluntarily throw themselves back into the realm of the physical 
and the instinctual. They reject the intellectual progress of their forbears, the efforts made by 
them to distance themselves from the animal and the pre-human. Indeed, the daily pastimes of 
the inhabitants of Tsath tend in general in this direction, diversion having taken over from 
discovery as their principal object: 
 
Daily life was organised in ceremonial patterns; with games, intoxication, torture of 
slaves, day-dreaming, gastronomic and emotional orgies, religious exercises, exotic 
experiments, artistic and philosophical discussions, and the like, as the principal 
                                                 
288
 Ibid., p. 193. 
289
 Ibid., p. 180. 
290
 Ibid., p. 188. 
152 
 
occupations.
291
   
 
Zamacona learns that ‘the modern tendency [is] to feel rather than to think; so that men [are] 
now more highly esteemed for inventing new diversions than for preserving old facts or pushing 
back the frontier of cosmic mystery’.292 These diversions are pursued at the expense not only of 
intellectual achievement, but—as suggested by the casual inclusion of ‘torture of slaves’ in the 
above list—at that of any system of ethics.  
 
Increasingly, the life of Tsath is characterised by ‘cruelty and subtlety and revolt’, by 
‘abnormality’, by ‘curious sadism’.293 The gratification of an impulse—in this case, the desire 
for ‘fresh and novel stimuli’—has come to be placed above any moral restriction against causing 
harm, or even taking life.
294
  After their torture and subsequent death in the ‘accursed’ arenas of 
Tsath, the corpses of these slaves are reanimated, and continue to be used for manual labour in 
the fields.
295
 Once again, instinct comes to the fore. And in this case, instinctual gratification and 
progress, though apparently antithetical, are intimately entangled. The technological processes 
by which the need for labour in K’n-yan has been eased—the use of the reanimated slave-
class—is fed by the killing of slaves for entertainment in the arenas. Progress is implicated in 
degeneration. The ‘jaded impulses’ of the people of Tsath, resulting in their craving for what the 
narrator euphemistically terms ‘delicate sensation’,296 seem to echo the urban enervation of 
Morel’s degenerates, their moral backsliding in the permissive environment of the city. Like 
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Morel’s degenerates, the people of Tsath are sterile, no longer reproducing—but, unlike them, 
they are preternaturally long-lived, and so the safety-valve of sterility is rendered ineffective.  
 
As Zamacona comes to realise, the people of Tsath are ‘a lost and dangerous race’ whose ‘frenzy 
of monotony-warfare and novelty-quest [is] leading them rapidly toward a precipice of 
disintegration and utter horror’.297 His growing sense of horror at the direction taken by K’n-yan 
society is described in a passage whose details would not be out of place in Nordau or Morel: 
 
The more Zamacona studied[...]the more apprehensive about the future he became, 
because he saw that the omnipresent moral and intellectual disintegration was a 
tremendously deep-seated and ominously accelerating movement. Even during his 
stay the signs of decay multiplied. Rationalism degenerated more and more into 
fanatical and orgiastic superstition, centring in a lavish adoration of the magnetic 
Tulu-metal, and tolerance steadily dissolved into a series of frenzied hatreds, 
especially toward the outer world of which the scholars were learning so much from 
him. At times he almost feared that the people might someday lose their age-long 
apathy and brokenness and turn like desperate rats against the unknown lands above 
them, sweeping all before them by virtue of their singular and still-remembered 
scientific powers. But for the present they fought their boredom and sense of 
emptiness in other ways, multiplying their hideous emotional outlets and increasing 
the mad grotesqueness and abnormality of their diversions. The arenas of Tsath must 
have been accursed and unthinkable places–Zamacona never went near them. And 
what they would be in another century, or even in another decade, he did not dare to 
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think. The pious Spaniard crossed himself and counted his beads more often than 
usual in those days.
298
 
 
Again, we see the amorality and emotionality of the people of K’n-yan emphasised. Their 
scientific prowess, meanwhile, is merely ‘remembered’. Their quest for knowledge no longer 
progresses; rather, it is hampered both by ‘frenzied hatreds’ of what it might by reveal, and an 
endless, shallow focus on entertainment at all costs. The ‘mad grotesqueness and abnormality of 
their diversions’, meanwhile, once again evokes Nordau’s emphasis on what he viewed as the 
abnormality of much contemporary art. 
 
So far, ‘The Mound’ gives us a fairly textbook narrative of degeneration as sweeping social force, 
exacerbated rather than combated by technology, the conditions for its occurrence brought about 
by the very intellectual currents it now disregards in favour of gratifying emotional and 
instinctual desires.  The tale gains its effectiveness, however, not only from this, but from the 
history of the subterranean realm more generally, as conjectured by the people of Tsath, and 
from the fate that befalls Zamacona and his lover, T’la-yub. Degeneration is shown to be both 
greater than a single society, apparently affecting beings earlier established than the people of 
K’n-yan, and more personal, its effacement of the individual subject providing the tale's 
climactic horror. 
 
From the party that greets him on his arrival in K’n-yan, Zamacona learns the history of the 
wider underground world around Tsath. Although the people of K’n-yan are now concentrated in 
Tsath, in previous eras, they settled the underground world more widely, having ‘conquered and 
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enslaved’ the other races of inhabitants.299 This subterranean world ‘stretched down to 
unfathomable abysses’, and comprised a region called Yoth, previously inhabited by ‘a still older 
and non-human race’, as well as K’n-yan.300 The existence of this prehistoric civilisation is 
indicated by the presence of ‘relics’ found by K’n-yan archaeologists, and by the existence of 
‘certain horned and four-footed animals[…]whose semi-human leanings were very peculiar’.301 
The people of K’n-yan speculate that these animals, though apparently to some degree 
artificially engineered, may in fact be ‘in part the degenerate descendants of those peculiar 
entities who had left the relics’.302 The placing of this observation within the passage in K’n-
yan’s history is striking: it is immediately followed by the comment that, ‘[as] aeons passed, and 
mechanical discoveries made the business of life extremely easy, a concentration of the people 
of Tsath took place; so that all the rest of K’n-yan became relatively deserted’.303 A connection 
between the abandonment of wider K’n-yan and the archaeological evidences ‘left’ by the 
inhabitants of Yoth becomes apparent here, as does one between the ‘mechanical discoveries’ 
that have made K’n-yan idle and the technological advances that may have led the inhabitants of 
Yoth to artificially alter their own physical properties. This history of Yoth is reiterated a few 
pages later, with the additional information that its people left behind ‘Cyclopean ruins’.304 The 
great, disused towers of the Tsath encountered by Zamacona do not appear very different. The 
abilities of the people of Yoth to create life artificially are mentioned, and we learn that they 
made ‘several[...]races of industrial and transportational animals in the course of their history–to 
say nothing of concocting all manner of fantastic living shapes for the sake of amusement and 
                                                 
299
 Ibid., p. 177. 
300
 Ibid., p. 177. 
301
 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
302
 Ibid., p. 178. 
303
 Ibid., p. 178. 
304
 Ibid., p. 183. 
156 
 
new sensations during the long period of decadence’.305 The artificial creation of life recalls the 
reanimation abilities of the inhabitants of K’n-yan, as well as their interbreeding of other races to 
create slaves and beasts of burden. The desire for ‘entertainment and new sensations’, 
meanwhile, echoes the dominant preoccupations of K’n-yan society as encountered by 
Zamacona. It would not seem unreasonable to read the trajectory of Yoth’s civilisation as a 
potential blueprint for that of K’n-yan’s. The degenerate, semi-human beasts found in the region 
after its decadence and ruin may well be the eventual state of K’n-yan’s people. As in ‘The Rats 
in the Walls’, the advances made by a dominant group of humans results in the decay not only of 
those enslaved by them, but of their own descendants. Here, however, this decay effects not a 
single family, but an entire civilisation. 
 
If K’n-yan’s possible future is a descent, then the ‘black abyss’ of N’kai—below both K’n-yan 
and Yoth—constitutes one further, more horrific stage.306 N’kai’s inhabitants show few signs of 
sentient behaviour beyond their adoration of the toad-god Tsathoggua, whose ‘onyx and basalt 
images’ they worship.307 Even among the human inhabitants of K’n-yan, religious devotion is 
presented as a sign of irrationality, and therefore of intellectual backsliding. The creatures of 
N’kai appear to have no more rational form of thought and behaviour than this. There is no 
reference to civilisation or technology; they simply ‘[ooze] along stone channels’ and take 
‘temporary shapes for various [presumably sinister] purposes’.308 Their plasticity is horrifying. 
They are ‘amorphous lumps of viscous black slime’ without individuality or coherent form; 
primordial ooze, like that into which Machen’s Helen Vaughan and Francis Leicester eventually 
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dissolve.
309
 This resemblance would be enough to suggest that they represent the possible 
endpoint of degeneration, but their resemblance to the shoggoths of ‘At the Mountains of 
Madness’ implies that they, like the shoggoths (if that is not in fact what they are) and like the 
beasts of Yoth, may have been artificially created or altered.
310
 On the physical level, they 
represent the fate of the degenerate human body, undifferentiated, ever in flux. As the products 
of technological and scientific advancement, they suggest that human reason, too, ends in horror. 
Civilisation collapses in upon itself; abjection and superstition remain. 
 
The effacement of the individual by degeneration as overwhelming social force is delineated in 
gruesome detail in Zamacona’s eventual fate, and is first hinted at by the state of K’n-yan’s 
reanimated slaves, and by various other allusions to what goes on in the ‘accursed’ arenas of 
Tsath.
311
 What Zamacona first notices about the reanimated slaves is that some are headless—
decapitation having accomplished both the effacement of identity and the ending of rational 
thought—and that others appear to have undergone ‘singular and seemingly capricious 
subtractions, distortions, transpositions, and graftings in various places’.312 Scientific 
advancement has destabilised the human form. Reanimation as a headless slave is the eventual 
fate of T’la-yub, Zamacona’s lover, who assists him in the first of two escape attempts. The 
headless female “ghost” who guards the mound at night-time is, in fact, her resurrected but 
mindless corpse. After their first escape attempt fails, and T’la-yub is captured and executed 
(after what is euphemistically described as ‘picturesque’ treatment in the arenas313), Zamacona is 
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informed that the same fate awaits him should he attempt to leave again. He is warned that ‘he–
or parts of him–[will] be reanimated to guard some inner section of the passage, within sight of 
others, where his abridged person might serve as a permanent symbol of the rewards of 
treason’.314 That these mutilations efface Zamacona’s humanity is made explicit in the text. The 
narrator, visiting the mound after having read Zamacona’s manuscript, encounters his reanimated 
form, to which he refers as ‘it’ and a ‘thing’.315 Now, ‘lacking[…]customary parts of a human 
being’—including, like T’la-yub, a head—he is no longer such.316 Tellingly, the narrator remarks, 
‘it had been a very human being once; and what is more, it had been white’.317 Perhaps the 
narrator is expressing surprise at Zamacona’s whiteness because the people of K’n-yan, for the 
most part, resemble Native Americans—but in any case, here, Zamacona’s privileged racial 
identity and his humanity are conflated and demolished in the same sentence. A message has 
been inscribed on Zamacona’s chest, in ‘an awkward and fumbling Spanish[…]implying a kind 
of ironic use of the language by an alien inscriber familiar neither with the idiom nor the Roman 
letters used to record it’.318 Translated, the message reads, ‘Seized by the will of K’n-yan in the 
headless body of T’la-yub’.319 T’la-yub, her individuality already effaced, becomes a tool of the 
degenerate society; effectively, a depersonalised embodiment of the sweeping social force of 
degeneration in whose path Zamacona is caught up. Neither his whiteness nor his authority and 
linguistic competence as author of the manuscript are enough to save him; he is rendered mute 
and ‘the will of K’n-yan’ now wields his language. His once-human body becomes both a text 
(‘abridged’ by an outside authority) and the subject of a text—and a ‘fumbling and awkward’ 
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one at that. This ‘awkward’ use of language echoes the linguistic oddities identified by Nordau 
as hallmarks of degeneracy. In losing his personhood and becoming parchment for it, Zamacona 
becomes both a degenerate and the subject of a degenerate civilisation’s authority and scrutiny. 
This body, written out of humanity, is both pervaded and surrounded by degeneration. 
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Chapter Three: Hybridities 
 
In this chapter, I’ll be focusing upon those weird tales that concern themselves with “miscegenation” or 
hybridity; with entities that result from the meeting and mating of the human and the nonhuman, 
abhuman or pre-human. One of the stories examined here, Arthur Machen’s ‘The Great God Pan’ (1890, 
revised 1894), has already been touched upon, and there is certainly a degree of interrelatedness 
between the subject matter of this chapter and the last. The figure of the degenerate, as we have already 
seen, was frequently constructed as a threatening Other who might drag the human subject down to his 
or her level, while eugenic discourses in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries focused upon 
the ‘racial decay’1 that might result from the unrestricted reproduction of undesirable individuals. 
Authors of weird fiction during this period undoubtedly drew upon these biological discourses for part 
of their inspiration. David Simmons, in a recent short essay, has argued that ‘Lovecraft’s fears of both 
non-Western peoples and the racial degeneracy that might arise as a result of miscegenation indicate a 
writer who has been influenced, at least partially, by contemporary discourses that presented racial 
integration as a significant taboo’.2 Certainly, we might trace this fear of “miscegenation” to Darwin’s 
suggestion, with respect to non-human animals and plants, that ‘when two distinct races are crossed, it 
is notorious that the tendency in the offspring to revert to one or both parent-forms is strong, and 
endures for many generations’3 (the term ‘revert’ carrying resonances of degeneration). But Lovecraft’s 
narratives, and Machen’s, too, carry other resonances—political, as well as scientific. Darwin, a few 
pages later, explicitly applies his ideas about crossing to human beings, observing that while ‘many 
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excellent and kind-hearted mulattoes have existed’, he has been ‘struck with the fact that, in South 
America, men of complicated descent between Negroes, Indians, and Spaniards, seldom had[…]a good 
expression’, and suggesting that ‘the degraded state of so many half-castes is in part due to reversion to 
a primitive and savage condition, induced by the act of crossing’.4 This distaste for racial ‘crossing’ 
would find resonances in the social and political moment in Britain and the United States. 
 
It is surely not coincidence that the emergence of ideas about the need to preserve racial and national 
purity and strength coincided with the beginning of the end of the British Empire, signified by, among 
other things, the rise to power of Germany, the US, and Japan, the campaign for Irish home rule, 
Canadian independence, and decolonisation elsewhere. At the same time, anti-immigration movements 
in the US gathered force, with the growth of nativism and the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. In this 
chapter, I hope to explore how contemporary biological and political fears come together in those weird 
tales which focus upon the offspring of human-nonhuman couplings. 
 
 
Heredity, Deterioration, and Improvement: The Eugenics Movement 
 
If scientific thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries feared human heredity, 
predicting the deleterious effects of the unchecked breeding of criminal or degenerate undesirables, 
they might also reasonably have held out some hope for progress, predicting the continued 
development of humankind, were the right sorts of people to be encouraged to reproduce. In 1901, 
Francis Galton did exactly that, delivering a lecture entitled ‘The Possible Improvement of the Human 
Breed under the Existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment’ to the Anthropological Institute, in 
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memory of T. H. Huxley.
5
 Drawing upon ideas developed in earlier works such as Hereditary Genius 
(1869) and Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), Galton advocated restrictions 
upon the ability of criminals and the poor—their poverty being attributed to idleness or alcohol 
abuse—to marry and produce children, while suggesting that cleverer and more advanced members of 
the species—those in the upper echelons of society—should be encouraged to marry and have children 
early. Although fully in favour of ‘repressing the productivity of the worst’, Galton considered 
‘increasing the productivity of the best stock’ more important.6 This new scientific creed was intended 
to be the nation’s salvation (indeed, Galton considered it a moral obligation, and made conscious use of 
religious imagery to drive his point home: he considered that ‘an enthusiasm to improve the 
race[…]might well give rise to the sense of a religious obligation’, and that ‘any crusade at all in favour 
of race improvement’ was justified.7) It required tireless promotion in order to inculcate it into the 
British psyche. Galton called it eugenics.
8
 
 
Eugenicists believed that the Darwinian notion of natural selection held the key to improving the health 
and efficiency of society, and warding off the degenerative menace. If natural selection had governed 
the evolution of the human species up until this point, artificial selection would ensure its future. In the 
Origin, Darwin had written that ‘[in] our domestic animals, if any part, or the whole animal be 
neglected and no selection be applied, that part[…]or the whole breed will cease to have a nearly 
uniform character. The breed will then be said to have degenerated’.9 In the Descent, he noted the 
efficacy of ‘methodical selection’ in ‘the well-known case of the Prussian grenadiers’, in which ‘man 
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tall men were reared in the villages inhabited by the grenadiers and their tall wives’, and in Sparta.10 It 
was unfortunate that, while ‘[man] scans with scrupulous care the character and pedigree of his horses, 
cattle, and dogs before he matches them[…]when he comes to his own marriage he rarely, or never, 
takes such care’.11 It is only in the case of human beings that ‘any one is so ignorant as to allow his 
worst animals to breed’.12 Much might be done by selection for the ‘bodily constitution’ of future 
generations, as well as their ‘intellectual and moral qualities’, and those who were ‘in any marked 
degree inferior in body or mind’ should refrain from having children—but Darwin dismissed such ideas 
as ‘Utopian’.13 Eugenicists who considered it desirable to apply the principles of animal breeding to 
human beings, however, thought attention and ‘selection’ necessary to prevent its downfall—and 
achievable. Eugenic scientists, according to this viewpoint, had not only a right but a duty to promote 
their cause. In 1909, Galton’s protégé Karl Pearson wrote: 
 
Are we to assert that this great biological movement[...]is to stop short when it approaches 
the subject of man as a gregarious animal? Is there no science of those vital factors which 
may improve or impair, physically or mentally, the racial qualities of future generations? 
And if there be such a science, is it not the first duty of the universities to discover and 
propound its laws?
14
 
 
Eugenics, then, became not merely a scientific theory, but a social and political movement, self-tasked 
with ‘defending society from the multiplication within it of the residuum of degenerate, unemployable 
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and feckless’.15 Taking as read the ‘inequality of human beings’,16 and the structure of society as an 
unproblematic reflection of this inequality, eugenicists suggested that the eradication of social 
problems such as poverty, alcoholism, crime, mental illness and tuberculosis was simple;
17
 society had 
to be encouraged to ‘recruit itself “from above”, where “above” [had] now to be interpreted not as 
referring to a social class level, but to the group with the higher grade of the nationally desirable 
characteristic’.18 Poverty, criminality, mental and physical illness, and alcohol abuse resulted not from 
social disadvantage, but from innate and ineradicable heredity inferiority, and these inferior specimens 
of humanity had to be prevented from passing on their undesirable characteristics. Some eugenicists 
advocated sterilisation; others favoured institutionalising the poor, the sick, alcoholics and criminals, 
and segregating the sexes to prevent reproduction.
19
 Galton suggested that legal restrictions on 
marriage were necessary and inevitable,
20
 and legislation mandating ‘compulsory breeding’ for those 
found fit to reproduce was held to be a possibility.
21
 Social measures to improve the lot of the poor, 
meanwhile, were held to be actively harmful, as they interfered with the ability of natural selection to 
improve the human ‘breed’.22 The improvement of the nation was to take precedence over the rights of 
the individual.
23
 
 
Of course, for all this talk of improvement, the eugenic doctrine of human inequality, with its desired 
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end of ‘retarding the average age of marriage among the weak’,24 and its suggestion that certain people 
be ‘peremptorily denied opportunities for producing offspring’,25 was highly problematic, and its 
implementation led to numerous cases of social injustice. Darwin had written in the Origin that ‘much 
Extinction of the less improved forms of life’ was a necessary aspect of natural selection,26 and that an 
acceptance of ‘the universal struggle for life’ was necessary to any understanding of ‘the economy of 
nature’.27 Hardship and death inevitably underlie the flourishing of life, as the following passage 
vividly illustrates: 
 
We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of food; 
we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on 
insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these 
songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey; we do 
not always bear in mind, that though food may be now superabundant, it is not so at all 
seasons of each recurring year.
28
 
 
Thinkers who sought to apply evolutionary theory to the organisation of society, like Herbert 
Spencer, wrote of inequality as something natural and inevitable. For Spencer, ‘the struggles for 
supremacy must finally be decided in favour of some one; and the differences once commenced must 
tend to become ever more marked’.29 The ‘destruction’ of the ‘diseased and feeble’ functioned to ‘keep 
up the average fitness to the conditions of life’; if the weak were allowed to ‘propagate’, then ‘the 
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average vigour of any race would be diminished’.30 Eugenicists saw no real problem with subjugating 
the reproductive power of those who had failed to prevail in society. In addition to the ethical issues 
surrounding mandatory sterilisation itself, eugenic sterilisation measures in the United States, applied 
only to those ‘feebleminded’ people in the care of the state, impacted disproportionately upon black 
people, immigrants, and others from low-income backgrounds.
31
 The association of eugenics with 
Nazism has been well documented, and this, alongside growing scientific critique of its methods, has 
frequently been seen to have contributed to the debunking of eugenics as a serious branch of science 
after World War II. Clare Hanson, however, has questioned this narrative, arguing that it ‘remains hard 
to separate the conceptual framework of post-war genetics from eugenic assumptions and beliefs’, and 
that thinkers such as J. B. S. Haldane and Julian Huxley kept up a ‘sustained commitment to both 
positive and negative eugenics’.32 
 
Incidents of class and, especially, racial discrimination were not isolated accidents resulting from 
misinterpretation of the eugenic viewpoint; as Lyndsay Andrew Farrall has pointed out, the writings of 
prominent eugenicists display ‘an ideological commitment[...]to nationalism and racism’.33 This 
certainly had precedent in evolutionary writings. Darwin had asserted the ‘[great] differences between 
the men of distinct races’ in the matter of ‘mental faculties’,34 as well as that of ‘moral disposition’.35 
He further noted that ‘ancient races[…]more frequently present structures which resemble those of the 
lower animals than do the modern’, and suggested that this was because they ‘stand somewhat nearer 
in the long line of descent to their remote and animal-like progenitors’.36 In his Huxley lecture, Galton 
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posited the imperial significance of eugenics, arguing that ‘[to] no nation is a high human breed more 
necessary than our own, for we plant our stock all over the world and lay the foundation for the 
dispositions and the capacities of future millions of the human race’;37 and in the earlier Inquiry into 
Human Faculty and its Development, he had asserted that ‘the very foundation and outcome of the 
human mind is dependent on race, and[…]the qualities of races vary’.38 Ethel Elderton, among other 
researchers at the Eugenics Laboratory in London, emphasised the importance of ‘“race progress”, 
“national efficiency”, and “national fitness”’;39 Pearson expressed concerns about ‘what can make and 
what can mar national life and racial character’;40 and eugenicists asserted that Anglo-Saxon 
superiority to other races was evidenced by Britain’s position as the dominant power on the world 
stage.
41
  
 
Pearson wrote of the importance of increasing the spread of ‘racially valuable’42 and ‘nationally 
desirable’43 attributes, and asserted the undesirability of marriages between members of ‘superior’ 
(white) and ‘inferior’ (black) races.44 The reproduction of Irish Catholics and Jews was warned of as a 
potential cause of ‘national deterioration’.45 (Darwin, in the Descent, ascribed a degenerative effect to 
the Catholic church, due to its imposition of celibacy on many of ‘those given to meditation or culture 
of the mind’, and the Inquisition’s having executed ‘the best men—those who doubted and 
questioned’.46) Eugenic journals published articles warning of the dangers of immigration, one such 
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paper being entitled, ‘The Menace to the English Race and to its Traditions of Present-Day 
Immigration and Emigration’,47 while in the United States, eugenic arguments were put forward in 
support of anti-immigration legislation.
48
 The eugenics movement’s self-positioning as a line of 
defence against menaces both internal (criminals, the poor, and the mentally ill) and external 
(immigrants of “lower” races, from “inferior” nations), as well as the emphasis in eugenic discourse 
upon maintaining the health of the nation and the race, suggest a pervasive national and racial anxiety, 
and upon examining the historical context of the movement, it seems reasonable to suggest that these 
scientific discourses were influenced not just by “objective” statistical data, but by international 
political concerns. 
 
 
The Historical Moment in Britain and the United States 
 
In his history of the eugenics movement in England, Farrall reminds us of the challenges to British 
military might and commercial importance being posed during the period which also saw the rise of 
eugenics. The increasing prominence of Germany and the US called into question Britain’s status as 
the dominant global power, as did defeat in the Boer War in 1909. In Farrall’s words, these events led 
to the rise of ‘a new enthusiasm for nationalism and imperialism in Britain[...]combined with the 
conviction that Britons were representative of a naturally superior race’.49 Pearson actually lectured on 
the implications of British defeat at the hands of the Boers, extending his social Darwinist views to 
international politics, nations taking the place of living beings, and arguing that the country must turn 
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to science—in other words, to eugenics—if it were to survive in an increasingly competitive world.50 
In effect, faced with the disappearance of British military and economic supremacy, eugenicists, and 
supporters of the wider social movement that advocated their views, turned to science to assert the 
racial supremacy of white Britons. 
 
Meanwhile, in the United States, a similarly racially charged eugenics movement was taking off, as 
were popular and political movements that divided racial groups and sought to restrict immigration. IQ 
testing grew in popularity after World War I, and American and Canadian eugenicists believed mental 
deficiency to be disproportionately high among immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. Carl 
Brigham, an Army psychologist, asserted that ‘the Alpine and Mediterranean “races” were 
“intellectually inferior to the representatives of the Nordic race”’.51 Elsewhere, it was argued that 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were more prone to criminality and sexual immorality, 
and more prone to be swayed by their emotions, than Anglo-Saxons.
52
 Black people were also held to 
be intellectually inferior to ‘Nordic’ people, but since they were not seen as significant contributors to 
‘the quality of American civilisation’, eugenicists were less concerned with them than with other ethnic 
minorities.
53
 A further link was drawn between the undesirable characteristics of low intellectual ability 
and even ‘feeblemindedness’, and reproductive capacity. If immigrants from Eastern and Southern 
Europe were mentally deficient in comparison to Anglo-Saxons, and also possessed of a ‘heedless 
fecundity’, therefore liable to reproduce at a greater rate than ‘natives’, then degeneration was 
inevitable.
54
 Ideas associated with degeneration theory aligned themselves with racial prejudice in the 
eugenics movement; outside influences, here represented by racial Others, were necessarily 
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degenerative, and any increased hybridisation of the nation would be its downfall. 
 
The background to this scientific narrative of national and racial anxiety was, certainly, one of 
increased immigration. Immigration to the United States increased steadily between the Civil War and 
the First World War, peaking in 1907, thanks to the development of industry in the States, and a fairly 
unrestricted immigration policy.
55
 And as immigration rose, so did opposition to it. In his history of the 
Populist movement in America, The Age of Reform, Richard Hofstadter details the association between 
popular movements and a racially-charged nationalism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The Populist movement, he argues, was associated with nationalism, nativism and anti-
Semitism, despite the attempts of early leaders to broaden its appeal across ethnic groups.
56
 There were 
a number of reasons for this. The Anglophobia and distrust of the Old World that had existed in 
America at least since the Civil War persisted, and joined with anti-Semitism and a distrust of big 
business to form conspiracy theories, including the fear of ‘a conspiracy of the money power against 
the common people’ directed by foreign interests.57 Immigrants from the Old World—seen as a hive of 
corruption and irrational superstition—were viewed with suspicion. Cities, too, were dangerous; urban 
centres were hotbeds of immorality and crime that threatened to seduce those rural ‘natives’ who 
travelled to them to seek work. Immigrants, too, looked for promised jobs in the cities, and a link 
between the city, the immigrant, and the criminal was formed in the American public consciousness. 
Hofstadter quotes from Thomas E. Watson, writing in 1912: 
 
The scum of creation has been dumped on us. Some of our principal cities are more foreign 
than American. The most dangerous and corrupting hordes of the Old World have invaded 
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us. The vice and crime which they have planted in our midst are sickening and terrifying.
58
 
 
The language of invasion here is telling, and seems to have a corollary in the fears of national decay 
put forward by eugenicists. If Watson feared the overwhelming of Anglo-Saxon American values—
virtuous and law-abiding—by those of the European ‘hordes’, proponents of eugenics feared a 
corrupting influence in the nation’s pool of hereditary characteristics, one that might eventually overrun 
the Anglo-Saxon. A similar view, Hofstadter writes, was expressed by the ‘Populist Progressive’, 
Edward A. Ross. The similarity is even more striking here: 
 
Ross was unsparing with the currently most numerous immigrants from southern and 
Eastern Europe[...]Immigrants were strikebreakers and scabs, who lowered local wage-
levels and reduced living standards toward their ‘pigsty mode of life’, just as they brought 
social standards down to ‘their brawls and their animal pleasures’. They were unhygienic 
and alcoholic, they raised the rate of illiteracy and insanity, they fostered crime and bad 
morals; they lowered the tone of politics by introducing ethnic considerations and of 
journalism by providing readership for the poorest newspapers, the yellow journals; they 
threatened the position of women with their ‘coarse peasant philosophy of sex’, and 
debased the educational system with parochial schools; they spurred the monstrous 
overgrowth of cities, and by selling their votes for protection and favors increased the grip 
of the bosses upon city politics; they bred in such numbers that they were increasingly 
dominant over the native stock and thus threatened to overwhelm ‘American blood’ and 
bastardize American civilization.
59
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This virulent opposition to immigration was by no means restricted to members of the Populist 
movement; while ‘Populism and jingoism grew concurrently in the United States during the 1890s’, 
Hofstadter asserts that ‘[the] rising mood of intolerant nationalism was a nationwide thing, certainly 
not confined to the regions of Populist strength’.60 By the 1920s, the desire to assert Anglo-Saxon 
supremacy would manifest itself in rural America in the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan.
61
 
 
These movements in their particular forms were new, but the sentiments behind them had been a 
powerful strand in American culture since the inception of the Union. Peter N. Carroll and David W. 
Noble, in their history of the United States, suggest that the Constitution and Founding Fathers 
themselves became the basis for an attempt to create a unified, largely Anglo-Saxon, national culture. 
In 1787, John Jay wrote of the ‘one united people’ to whom fate ‘[had] been pleased to give’ the 
nation.
62
 These people were ‘descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, 
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their 
manners and customs’.63 Thomas Jefferson, meanwhile, predicted that American expansion would 
eventually ‘cover the whole northern, if not the southern, continent, with a people speaking the same 
language, governed in similar forms and by similar laws’, and suggested that no ‘blot or mixture on 
that surface’ would be acceptable.64 Peter N. Carroll and David W. Noble argue that the fact these 
assertions could be made in part reflects the virulence of English culture, and the degree to which it 
assimilated others. They also point out, however, that the making of them involved certain omissions, 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
61
 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 
62
 John Jay, ‘The Federalist No. 2’, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist with Letters of 
‘Brutus’, ed. Terence Ball (1787; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 5-8 (p. 6). 
63
 Ibid., p. 6. 
64
 Thomas Jefferson, ‘On Accommodating African Americans’, Encyclopaedia Britannica online 
<http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116904> [1801; accessed 7
th
 August 2013]. 
173 
 
and that the definition of the American as a white Anglo-Saxon both reflected and contributed to ‘a 
profound tension within American society’.65 While Jay, Jefferson, and other commentators ‘did not 
necessarily intend to exclude Africans, Native Americans, unassimilated Europeans, and women from 
American history’, their writings ‘illuminated the implicit assumptions held by the American 
establishment’, for whom ‘the American was a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant male’.66 
 
Nineteenth-century expansionists, too, carried with them this vision of homogeneity, viewing 
Protestantism as the means by which the ‘purity of the continent’ would be protected from ‘heathen 
devils’ and ‘Spanish Jesuits’.67 This concern with preserving a national racial purity manifested itself in 
protests against annexation after the American conquest of Mexico in 1846.  The politician John 
Calhoun put forward the argument that ‘more than half of the Mexicans are Indians, and the other is 
composed chiefly of mixed tribes’; to incorporate these people into America would undermine ‘the 
government of a white race’.68 Immediately after the war, attempts to limit slavery in any lands 
obtained from Mexico hinged partly on opposition to ‘the presence of nonwhite people in the pure 
garden of America’.69 In the 1850s, some northern states banned free black people from entering, for 
reasons both economic (fear of competition from a new source of cheap labour) and racist.
70
 
Emancipated slaves were, furthermore, to be encouraged to ‘return’ to Africa; the colonization 
movement and the founding of Liberia in 1822 were expected to provide solutions to ‘America’s race 
problem’, its heterogeneity.71 Abraham Lincoln supported the emancipation of slaves only on the 
assumption that free black people would eventually leave the United States, and expressed his distaste 
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for “miscegenation”.72 The passing of segregation laws between 1890 and 1910 seems unsurprising in 
the light of this history of antipathy to any mixing of races—socially, culturally, politically, or 
sexually—and the view of many late-nineteenth-century commentators that black Americans were 
incurably ‘deviant’, doomed to become ‘evil and dirty criminals’.73 Anti-Semitism, too, has been an 
issue in the history of white America, according to Carroll and Noble. It rose in response to the 
increasing prosperity of German Jews in the 1880s, many young white American Protestants feeling 
their supremacy threatened.
74
 
 
As is suggested by the promotion of Protestantism as a unifying force, religious difference was another 
factor in the anti-immigration sentiments of nineteenth-century America. WASP Americans avoided 
immigrants from non-Protestant countries, much of their suspicion falling upon Catholics, whose faith 
both ‘symbolized medieval superstition’ and ‘acknowledged the moral supremacy of an extranational 
authority’, the Vatican.75 Although Catholics accounted for only around three per cent of the United 
States population in 1830, restrictions upon immigration were advocated by some conservatives. Irish 
Catholic immigrants, in particular, were disproportionately prone to poverty, a disadvantage which 
‘encouraged crime and alcoholism—two symptoms that merely reinforced prevailing prejudices’.76 
 
Historical narratives from the time of the Civil War had suggested that “progress”, identified with the 
dominance of white Anglo-Saxons and the disappearance or assimilation of other races and religions, 
was inevitable. Other groups—Native Americans, black people, Mediterranean and Eastern Europeans, 
Catholics, and Jews—‘lacked the forcefulness to pioneer in Colonial America’ and would become 
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extinct.
77
 This narrative found an echo in the writings of eugenicists like Galton, who, believing ‘the 
average intellectual standard of the negro race[…]some two grades below our own’,78 suggested that ‘it 
may prove that the Negroes, one and all, will fail as completely under the new conditions as they have 
failed under the old ones, to submit to the needs of a superior civilization to their own; in this case their 
races, numerous and prolific as they are, will in course of time be supplanted and replaced by their 
betters’.79 The continued existence of these groups and arrival of new immigrants contested this 
version of American history, and its vision of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants as a superior group, a 
chosen people of Providence, or of natural selection.  
 
The emphasis of the eugenics movement upon race, then, with its dual focus upon preventing the 
reproduction of racial Others, who might contaminate the purity of the nation, and that of the ill, 
criminal, or learning-disabled, who threatened the overall fitness of the nation to compete on the world 
stage, as well as a degree of slippage between the two (with immigrants being held responsible for 
poverty, disease, and alcoholism, and disproportionately diagnosed as “feebleminded”) seems to have 
its basis in the vision of a white, Anglo-Saxon America that had persisted since the Civil War, and in 
the threats to that vision perceived to be posed by the presence of other ethnic groups. In looking at 
some of the ways in which weird fiction has treated interactions between its human characters and 
nonhuman beings, I hope to explore how Machen and Lovecraft drew on the scientific narratives used 
by the eugenics movement alongside the evolutionary and degenerative narratives I have already 
considered, and how these ideas, as well as more general cultural anxieties about non-Anglo-Saxon 
races and other countries, came to be mapped onto the supernatural and science-fictional conflicts that 
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take place in their work. 
 
Evil Hybridities: ‘The Great God Pan’ and ‘The Dunwich Horror’ 
 
Helen Vaughan, the villainous femme fatale at the centre of ‘The Great God Pan’, descends through 
various stages of evolution before dissolving into primordial slime at the tale’s climax. She evidences 
many of the characteristics held to belong to degenerate humanity, acting as a singular example of the 
frightening potential of human evolution in reverse. She is not, however, entirely human, and the 
breakdown of her human body seems to work in two intertwined, but slightly conflicting, ways. It 
illustrates the degenerative potential at the heart of the “human”; it also dramatises the threat posed to 
“human” identity by the intrusion of an outside force, a sphere of being that is altogether Other. 
 
Tellingly, perhaps, the tale begins with the description of an in-between space, a permeable boundary. 
Doctor Raymond is about to perform the experiment upon his ward, Mary—Helen’s mother—that will 
result in the half-human girl’s birth, and when we first meet him, the sun is hanging ‘above the western 
mountain line’, giving off ‘a dull red glow that [casts] no shadows’. His house is set at a border point in 
the landscape, between a ‘great wood on the hillside above’ and a ‘long lovely valley’ below.80 We 
already know that liminal locations, and early morning and twilight—times when the distinction 
between day and night become blurred—are particularly opportune for fairy sightings; but Mary is 
about to encounter a different kind of interloper. Doctor Raymond extends, and makes explicit, this 
notion of the permeable boundary in the following passage, spoken to his friend Clarke, who is in 
attendance to observe the experiment: 
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You see the mountain, and hill following after hill, as wave on wave, you see the woods 
and orchards, the fields of ripe corn, and the meadows reaching to the reed beds by the river. 
You see me standing here beside you, and hear my voice; but I tell you that all these 
things—yes, from that star that has just shone out in the sky to the solid ground beneath our 
feet—I say that all these are but dreams and shadows; the shadows that hide the real world 
from our eyes. There is a real world, but it is beyond this glamour and this vision, beyond 
these ‘chases in Arras, dreams in a career’, beyond them all as beyond a veil.81 
 
The lack of substance—the fragility—of the world as experienced by humans is brought into play early, 
and with it the notion of a rupture. A veil is easily rent; ‘dreams and shadows’ might quite easily give 
way to unpleasant truths. There is a mystery and a strangeness, however, to what is on the other side. 
Raymond tells Clarke that he ‘may think all this strange nonsense’ and that, in fact, it ‘may be strange’ 
even though it is not nonsense; Clarke, meanwhile, feels that they are ‘standing on the brink of a 
strange world’.82 This image of uncharted territory is a pertinent one, and Raymond takes it up, 
comparing the opening-up of a new sphere of knowledge which he hopes to achieve through his 
experiment to the mapping of ‘a whole world, a sphere unknown; continents and islands, and great 
oceans in which no ship has sailed (to my belief) since Man first lifted up his eyes’; to the crossing of a 
‘gulf[...]between two worlds’; and to the reaching of an ‘unknown shore’.83 The place from which the 
nonhuman comes, then, is figured as both geographically foreign and incomprehensibly alien to the 
human mind, ‘strange’ and ‘unknown’. Interestingly, Raymond also describes the part of the brain used 
in the experiment as a geographical location; it is ‘land to let, a mere waste place for fanciful 
                                                 
81
 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
82
 Ibid., p. 5. 
83
 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
178 
 
theories’—or an unoccupied territory, ripe for invasion.84 
 
During the experiment itself, Clarke finds himself vividly recalling the home of his youth—but a 
defamiliarised version of that home. The memory that springs into his mind is that of a summer’s day 
upon which ‘the heat had dimmed the outlines of all things and all distances with a faint mist’, and the 
weather was ‘abnormal’, even ‘tropical’.85 The familiarity of the scene begins to fade; it takes on the 
qualities of a distant land. Eventually, Clarke becomes cognisant of the ‘strangeness’ of the scene,  and 
that ‘the path from his father’s house had led him into an undiscovered country’.86 On emerging from 
his reverie, he finds that his sense of the distinction between worlds has begun to dissolve, and he feels 
as though he has merely ‘passed from one dream into another’, fearing that Raymond’s house will 
‘melt and disappear’, too.87 The implication is that Clarke’s dream experience mirrors that undergone 
by Mary, whose mind has been opened by Raymond to the realm beyond this one. Mary, of course, 
encounters the titular ‘God’, the entity known to humans as ‘Pan’. Clarke, too, encounters a mysterious 
being in his dream, an alien and incomprehensible ‘presence’ that is ‘neither man nor beast, neither 
living nor dead, but all things mingled, the form of all things but devoid of all form’.88 If we are to take 
this as a parallel to Mary’s encounter, then Helen’s father is not the partly-human deity of tradition, but 
something so far removed from human experience as to be impossible to pin down to a ‘form’. 
 
Certainly, Mary’s condition after the experiment suggests that something particularly bizarre—perhaps 
too thoroughly incomprehensible for the human brain to contemplate and yet survive—has happened 
to her. She initially appears to experience a kind of religious awe, her eyes shining ‘with an awful light’ 
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and her expression showing ‘great wonder’.89 This is almost instantly replaced, however, by a terrible 
transformation of both body and mind. Wonder ‘[gives] place to the most awful terror’, Mary’s face 
becomes ‘hideously convulsed’, and she suffers a shaking fit that threatens to separate body from 
conscious mind, her ‘soul[...]struggling and shuddering within the house of flesh’.90 It soon becomes 
apparent that this apparent removal of the rational, human mind has indeed been effected; when she 
next awakes, Mary is found ‘rolling her head from side to side and grinning vacantly’, now a ‘hopeless 
idiot’.91 Given the weight placed upon “feeblemindedness” by eugenicists, and their emphasis of the 
perceived intellectual inferiority and proneness to mental illness of those who were not Anglo-Saxon, it 
is perhaps significant that this encounter with an Other from an ‘unknown shore’ has a deleterious 
effect upon Mary’s intelligence; anxieties about what might happen to the white population in the face 
of foreign immigration seem to have been mapped onto the encounter between human and nonhuman. 
A similar, and far more widespread, destruction of the “human” will be carried out by Helen Vaughan, 
the child with whom Mary is found to be pregnant after the experiment, the dangerous, hybrid 
offspring of human and Other. 
 
Tellingly, Helen is frequently described in terms which emphasise not only her strangeness, but her 
foreignness; those qualities which are decidedly not Anglo-Saxon. Raymond sends the child away to 
foster parents after her birth and Mary’s subsequent death, and those she encounters find her to be ‘a 
girl of the most wonderful and most strange beauty’.92 Her difference from her foster family and their 
community is noted; she is ‘of a very different type from the inhabitants of the village’, with ‘olive’ 
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skin and ‘strongly marked’ features of ‘a somewhat foreign character’.93 Elsewhere, her ‘olive skin and 
almost Italian appearance’ are noted again.94 There is speculation about her non-Anglo-Saxon origins; 
her first husband, Herbert, initially believes her to be ‘the child of an English father and an Italian 
mother’,95 while Austin, a character who has heard of her marriage to Herbert and subsequent events 
secondhand, speculates that, since ‘nobody seemed to know who or what she was’, any ‘divers after 
her history’ must have ended up ‘in rather strange waters’.96 Later, relating what he has heard about 
Mrs. Beaumont, the next of Helen’s known identities, Austin tells is that she is ‘an oddish sort of 
woman’ who is believed to have come from South America.97  A more generalised strangeness, too, is 
attached to Helen, one which is simultaneously larger than and inextricable from its racialised aspects, 
being associated with her hybridity—her inhuman descent—and bringing the two aspects of her 
Otherness together in her ‘marked’ body. She is described variously as an ‘enigma’, a ‘mystery’, and a 
‘remarkable woman’.98 After she marries Herbert, the couple acquire a reputation as ‘queer’ and are ‘in 
very bad odour’ (the phrase’s intimations of physicality and dirtiness are perhaps significant, touching 
upon stereotypes about non-Anglo-Saxon peoples) in the neighbourhood where they live.
99
 There is, 
however, ‘nothing tangible’ to support their ostracism. Once again, it is incomprehensible.100 Herbert 
asserts her utter alienness, suggesting that while she may go by various aliases, ‘what her real name 
was [he] can’t say. [He doesn’t] think she had a name. No, no, not in that sense. Only human beings 
have names’.101 
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It is Helen’s physical appearance, however, which carries with it the strongest impression of 
strangeness, and which repels viewers the most strongly. We learn that, during her marriage to Herbert, 
a ‘respectable country gentleman’, referred to only as Blank, was found outside their house, apparently 
dead of fright.
102
 During the ensuing police trial, court observers describe her as ‘at once the most 
beautiful woman and the most repulsive they [have] ever set eyes on’, and Austin mentions that one 
man with whom he discussed her ‘positively shuddered as he tried to describe the woman, but he 
couldn’t tell why’.103 There is yet more shuddering when Clarke, on seeing her portrait, experiences a 
strong sense of ‘evil’,104 Austin, seeing her in the flesh, experiences a nebulous sense of strangeness, 
and of being pulled back into the past, giving the following description: 
 
She would be called very handsome, I suppose, and yet there is something about her face 
which I didn’t like. The features are exquisite, but the expression is strange. And all the 
time I was looking at her, and afterwards, when I was going home, I had a curious feeling 
that that very expression was in some way or other familiar to me[...] 
[What] I felt was a kind of dim far-off memory, vague but persistent. The only sensation I 
can compare it to, is that odd feeling one sometimes has in a dream, when fantastic cities 
and wondrous lands and phantom personages appear familiar and accustomed.
105
 
 
There seem to be two related factors at play in this account. Helen’s hybrid nature is hinted at in the 
disquieting coexistence in the same body of physical beauty—an ideal human form—and something 
that inspires instinctive revulsion, usually occasioned by encounters with the abhuman. The fact of 
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Helen’s attractiveness allows her not only to pass for human, but to do so very well, and we might link 
it to contemporary fears of foreign blood ‘passing’, or going under the radar.106 At the same time, the 
change occasioned in the fully “human” (white, Anglo-Saxon) observer that we have seen in the stories 
already considered seems at play in some form here, too. Austin recalls some vague familiarity or 
memory, suggesting again the power of the inhuman to drag the “human” subject back towards its pre-
human roots, but the sudden familiarity of the Other—of a ‘dream’ world of ‘wondrous lands’, rather 
like the ‘unknown shore’ of which Raymond spoke—suggests that the human consciousness itself is 
becoming more inhuman, detaching itself from its native reality and, as Raymond does, recognising the 
land beyond the veil as real. Given the racialising of Helen, we might, perhaps, see national and racial 
anxieties mapped onto the relationship between human and Other here, too; under the influence of this 
‘strange’ woman, the Anglo-Saxon subject is becoming less certain of itself and its sense of belonging, 
and more foreign. 
 
Changes, too, occur in Helen’s victims, those who encounter her, initially becoming captivated as 
friends or lovers, and find themselves driven to madness or even suicide by the things that they 
experience in her presence. The first human to be so altered is a small boy who encounters Helen in the 
woods near her home, playing with a mysterious companion in the form of a ‘“strange naked man”, 
whom he [the child] seemed unable to describe more fully’.107 Later, the boy comes across a curious 
carved image that resembles this creature, described as a ‘stone head of grotesque appearance’, a 
‘curious head’ resembling a ‘faun or satyr’. This, presumably, is the physical incarnation of the god 
Pan.
108
 After coming across Helen in the wood, the boy undergoes a change in personality, growing 
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‘nervous and strange in his manner’, exhibiting a fear of going out alone, and suffering nightmares. On 
sight of the carved head, he suffers a convulsion of horror, appearing ‘senseless[...]his face contorted 
with terror’, suffering ‘violent hysteria’ and ‘paroxysms of fright’.109 Even this indirect encounter with 
the Other is enough to affect him permanently; like Mary the ‘hopeless idiot’, the boy is left afflicted 
with ‘a weakness of intellect which gives but little promise of amending’.110 The intellectual inferiority 
ascribed to non-white and non-Western-European people is here brought in as a result of contact with 
the non-human, layering eugenic racial and national fears onto this encounter with the supernatural. 
Also of significance, perhaps, is the nature of the boy’s nightmares. He frequently disturbs the 
household by ‘waking in the night with cries of “The man in the wood! father! father!”’, and the 
ambiguity of the utterance is interesting;  the boy might be calling to his father for protection from the 
frightening entity he saw in the wood, or calling out to it as a father.
111
 There is here a blurring of the 
boundaries between the two, a threat, perhaps, that the monstrous, corrupting father in the woods will 
usurp the place of the true father, the head of the Anglo-Saxon British household.  
 
Helen’s next victim, a childhood friend known as Rachel M., is similarly altered. After accompanying 
Helen into the woods and, we can only assume, encountering Pan, or other entities from that sphere of 
being, she seems profoundly mentally altered: her mother finds her manner ‘peculiar’; she is ‘languid 
and dreamy’; and, perhaps most significantly, ‘“different from herself”’.112 Again, Rachel’s rational 
mind seems to have been altered, infected with a strangeness, and with a lack of energy and focus—
qualities deemed essential for survival in the harsh arena of natural selection, and attributed to white 
Anglo-Saxons. 
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The most drastic changes, however, take place in Helen’s later victims; her husbands and the 
acquaintances—usually male admirers—whom she initiates into her supernatural practices. The 
conflation of marriage and romantic relationships with the occult and with corruption in the tale carries 
further resonances of heredity and of “miscegenation”. Although no children result from these unions, 
these men are punished for marrying or dallying with the Other, for allowing it the opportunity to 
mingle with the “human”. Helen, meanwhile, is figured as a sexual threat. We never learn what, exactly, 
she shows them, but we might conjecture that she is able to summon entities from Pan’s realm into that 
of the human, a kind of incursion or invasion, or a symbolic birthing of the Other—or that she is, 
perhaps, attempting to effect an actual repeat performance of her own conception, to create another 
horrific hybrid entity like herself, repulsive, because non-human, but dangerously seductive, because 
appearing human and beautiful. Again, perhaps, we see the fear of the Other going unnoticed, creeping 
into the hereditary stream in disguise. 
 
We encounter Herbert, her first husband, through the eyes of Villiers, an old college friend who at first 
fails to recognise the destitute beggar his former classmate has become. Herbert is a diminished man, a 
shadow of his old self; Villiers later refers to him as ‘what was left of an old friend of mine’.113 The 
permanent change wrought in him by his experience with Helen is emphasised; he is a ‘ruined man’, a 
‘haunted man’, living beneath a cloud of ‘indefinite terror which hung about him like a mist’.114 He 
tells Villiers that ‘that woman[...]corrupted my soul’115; the physical body is prey to Helen’s 
depredations, but the rational mind and the moral sense, those qualities apparently so especially human, 
are not immune either. The phrase ‘body and soul’ is used repeatedly, both by Herbert himself and by 
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Villiers in his later relating of the meeting,
116
 and the repeated pairing of these two words seems to 
suggest the vulnerability of the human subject. The conscious, rational mind, traditionally the preserve 
of the “human”, is nonetheless inseparable from the physical body, and may easily be corrupted 
through it. There is an echo of the eugenic, and of immigration-centred fears, here, too.  The supposed 
intellectual superiority of Anglo-Saxon peoples was held to set them apart, to fit them uniquely for 
leadership and to win out in any contest for dominance or survival. And yet this advantage was 
constantly at risk from the reproductive capacity of foreign immigrants and the “feebleminded” (often 
linked by eugenicists), able to be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. 
 
Helen holds a similar psychological power over all her later victims. ‘Blank’, the man found dead 
outside the Herberts’ house, appears to have died ‘of fright, of sheer awful terror’; here, the mental 
suffering inflicted by Helen overwhelms the body, leaving his features ‘hideously contorted’.117 The 
rational mind, and any “desirable” hereditary qualities possessed by a respectable English gentleman, 
are erased, reducing their possessor to the most instinctual, irrational, and uncontrollable level of fear. 
Even those who inhabit the uppermost echelons of society are not safe. In the guise of Mrs. Beaumont, 
Helen occasions the suicides of a number of respectable men, among them Lord Argentine, who kills 
himself for no apparent reason. That they, too, have been ‘corrupted’ by exposure to Helen’s 
otherworldly realm is evidenced, as in the case of Blank, by the expressions on the faces of the bodies. 
The rational mind, the “human” consciousness, is utterly effaced in them, as we can see in the 
description Villiers gives of Argentine’s corpse: 
 
[It] made my blood run cold to see that man’s face. I could never have supposed that such 
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an infernal medley of passions could have glared out of any human eyes; I almost fainted as 
I looked. I knew I had looked into the eyes of a lost soul, Austin, the man’s outward form 
remained, but all hell was within it. Furious lust, and hate that was like fire, and the loss of 
all hope, and horror that seemed to shriek aloud in the night, though his teeth were shut, and 
the utter blackness of despair[...]that man no longer belonged to this world; it was a devil’s 
face that I looked upon.
118
 
 
There is also mention of the ‘black swollen face’ of the dead man.119 It is perhaps not too much of a 
stretch to note that the effacement of the human and the effacement of whiteness are brought together, 
implicitly linked in this description of Helen’s victim. 
 
The hybrid figure of Helen Vaughan, then, brings together the inhuman and the racialised, the ‘marked’ 
non-white body. The fears of immigration, of the potential deterioration of racial or national stock and 
the overrunning of Anglo-Saxon nations by inferior Others are mapped onto the supernatural elements 
of the story, with the human being figured as implicitly white, English, middle-class and male, while 
the threat of hybridity appears in the form of a woman of uncertain origin, described variously as 
Mediterranean and South American in appearance. The coming-together of the two is undesirable, 
eliciting in “civilised” subjects a revulsion similar to that occasioned by encounters with the abhuman 
and the degenerate, but also seductive, fascinating men (with the implication of a sexual and 
reproductive threat) and allowing Helen to “pass” as human in society. From this position, she 
threatens to usurp the human, granting entrance into the human world to entities yet more alien than 
herself, and in the process, leeching away the humanity of those humans who see them. The threat 
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which this poses to the “human” in general is made clear; Herbert claims to have seen ‘such horrors 
that even I myself sometimes stop in the middle of the street, and ask whether it is possible for a man 
to see such things and live’,120 suggesting the unfitness of humans to survive in the face of these 
incursions. Clarke, meanwhile, struggles with even the thought of Helen’s true nature, in a passage in 
which she is conceived as an invader, a usurper of the human body itself: 
 
Clarke tried to conceive the thing again, as he sat by the fire, and again his mind shuddered 
and shrank back, appalled before the sight of such awful, unspeakable elements enthroned, 
as it were, and triumphant in human flesh.
121
 
 
The language of conquest and rule used here is significant, I think, suggesting invasion, and a threat to 
(white, Anglo-Saxon) human supremacy. The biological and political fears of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries are, in this story, joined together. The supernatural elements of the plot draw 
upon contemporary anxieties around the immigration and reproduction of those who were seen as less 
developed, less intelligent, and effectively less human than “normal”, Anglo-Saxon whites, and 
simultaneously feed into them, conflating foreignness with inhumanity, sexual threat, and danger. 
 
Something very similar takes place in H. P. Lovecraft’s 1929 story ‘The Dunwich Horror’, a tale whose 
plot draws heavily upon that of ‘The Great God Pan’.122 Like Machen’s tale, ‘The Dunwich Horror’ 
focuses upon the coupling of a human mother and a non-human father from some indescribable sphere 
of being beyond this world. And, as in ‘The Great God Pan’, the offspring of that pairing pose a great 
threat to humanity, promising to open the doors between the human realm and the non-human, and even 
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to utterly efface the human. The story’s concerns with non-human entities and non-human bodies seem, 
like those of ‘The Great God Pan’, to draw upon anxieties and stereotypes about non-Anglo-Saxon 
people, particularly immigrants. Lovecraft, an ardent Anglophile given to proudly announcing his 
descent from ‘unmixed English gentry’,123 and apparently somewhat distressed to discover that this was 
not the case, was vocal in his racism and his distaste for immigrants, becoming particularly vehement 
after several years spent living in poorer, more multicultural areas of New York.
124
 While he reserved 
most of his vitriol for his private letters, as we will see in later sections, Lovecraft’s racism does rear its 
head in his fiction, in subtle and not-so-subtle ways, and it would be disingenuous to try to deny that his 
disgust for immigrants, and for the mixing of races (socially or otherwise), is partly at play in ‘The 
Dunwich Horror’. There is, however, also a concern with the nature and status of the “human” here, 
albeit one which—as in ‘The Great God Pan’—places some humans as more “human” than others, and 
which ties this problematic position in with concerns about the human and the non-human. It is 
interesting, however, that while Lovecraft presents the usurping of the “human” as a highly undesirable 
outcome, framing his tale in far more simply moralistic terms than was his habit (perhaps with an eye 
to the market), the right of humanity itself to inhabit and dominate the planet is not taken for granted 
here. There is a suggestion that we were not here first; that humans may, in fact, be the usurpers. 
 
The tale proper begins by establishing the overabundance of nature and the depletion of the human 
population in this corner of the world, as well as the degenerate nature of the inhabitants. Dunwich is a 
place where 
 
[the] trees of the frequent forest belts seem too large, and the wild weeds, brambles, and 
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grasses attain a luxuriance not often found in settled regions. At the same time the planted 
fields appear singularly few and barren; while the sparsely scattered houses wear a 
surprisingly uniform aspect of age, squalor, and dilapidation.
125
 
 
The supremacy of the human seems to be in danger here; in comparison to the vigorous vegetation of 
the area, the ‘scattered’ human inhabitants do not appear to be the surviving fittest. And this thriving 
nature does not seem entirely benign. The Dunwich area itself, as well as its flora and fauna, holds a 
vague menace, eliciting instinctive aversion from visitors. There are ‘stretches of marshland that one 
instinctively dislikes, and indeed almost fears’,126 and the countryside is inhabited by 
‘creepily[...]piping bullfrogs’, whippoorwills which are thought to act as psychopomps, foreseeing 
death and carrying off the souls of the dead, and an ‘abnormal profusion’ of fireflies.127 Even the 
mountains around Dunwich, crowned with standing stones of unknown origin, are threatening, with 
‘summits[...]too rounded and symmetrical to give a sense of comfort and naturalness’ and sides which 
‘loom up so darkly and precipitously that one wishes they would keep their distance’.128 The absence of 
‘naturalness’ in the landscape itself stands out, suggesting that human conceptions of the correct order 
of being are being undermined here: nature itself is unnatural. The danger and revulsion that this 
menacing environment holds for the “human” is emphasised in the reactions to it of the human 
inhabitants and their visitors, recalling the instinctive revulsion occasioned in “civilised” human 
subjects by encounters with the abhuman and the degenerate. Cold Spring Glen, later to become the 
hiding-place of the titular horror, is somewhere that people avoid ‘without knowing exactly why’.129 
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One inhabitant describes it as ‘no healthy nor decent place’ and notes the unnatural behaviour of its 
wildlife; the whippoorwills and fireflies in the glen do not act like ‘creaters o’ Gawd’.130  
 
Alongside this overabundant, mysteriously threatening (un)natural environment, the human inhabitants 
of Dunwich are portrayed as singularly unfit to survive. Lovecraft utilises the language of degeneracy, 
playing upon the same fears so often expressed by eugenicists—that a failure to control the fertility of 
social undesirables would result in an inevitable downward spiral in the population as a whole. Spencer 
in fact offered ‘the backwoods of America’ as an example of ‘the Anglo-Saxon race’ having ‘lapsed into 
comparative barbarism: adopting the moral code, and sometimes the habits, of savages’.131 The ‘natives’ 
of Dunwich embody the end result of this, having grown ‘repellently decadent’ and displaying ‘the 
well-defined mental and physical stigmata of degeneracy and inbreeding’.132 Lovecraft is apparently 
aware of the Army tests that were used to identify an apparent decline in the national intelligence in the 
US, and even makes use of the event in his story, reporting that, when the draft for the First World War 
began, the men of Dunwich were found to be so widely unfit for service that medical staff were sent to 
conduct an investigation into this ‘wholesale regional decadence’.133 This decadence is associated with 
religious difference (Dunwich folk ‘curiously observe’ Candlemas ‘under another name’134) and with 
poor hygiene, the narrative remarking that ‘the homes and sheds of Dunwich folk have never been 
remarkable for olfactory immaculateness’.135 These associations, tied to the ‘decadence’ of the local 
population, recall the associations made by eugenicists and political figures between immigrants, non-
Protestant religion, and dirt and disease; Catholics, we may remember, were regarded as unassimilable, 
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while black people were doomed to become ‘dirty criminals’.  When Armitage, the Miskatonic librarian 
who suspects the truth, encounters the Dunwich locals, he exclaims, ‘“Great God, what simpletons! 
Shew them Arthur Machen’s Great God Pan and they’ll think it a common Dunwich scandal!”’136 There 
are resonances here of immorality—sexual indiscretions are ‘common’—and of mental illness, also 
feared by eugenicists. The unchecked breeding of these backwoods people has let the whole ‘sordid 
populace’137 sink down into “feeblemindedness”. Perhaps most tellingly of all, Lovecraft declares that 
these degenerate Dunwich natives ‘have come to form a race by themselves’; they are separated from 
the white Anglo-Saxon American mainstream, having failed to preserve their racial “fitness”.138 They 
are no longer able to resist incursions from threatening outside forces, and it is against this backdrop of 
intertwined racial and “human” vulnerability that the Dunwich horror—or, more accurately, horrors—
appear. 
 
The principal plot focuses upon one particularly degenerate and unsavoury family, the Whateleys. In 
fact, there are several branches of the Whateley family in the neighbourhood, ‘decayed and 
undecayed’,139 but those who form the principal interest of ‘The Dunwich Horror’ are distinctly in the 
former camp. Two generations of the family inhabit a dilapidated farmhouse on the outskirts of 
Dunwich, the locally-feared Old Whateley, with his ‘reputation for black magic’, and his daughter, 
Lavinia, a ‘deformed, unattractive albino woman of thirty-five’.140 (Readers familiar with Darwin 
might have been reminded of the example he uses, in The Variation of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication (1868), of a family who produced a generation of ‘perfect albinoes’ after two marriages 
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of cousins, as an illustration of reversion.
141
) The Whateleys, according to the narrative, are particularly 
egregious offenders in the areas of hygiene and religious unorthodoxy; their home is one ‘from which 
all standards of order and cleanliness [have] long since disappeared’, while Old Whateley is believed to 
practice bizarre occult rites in the hills around Dunwich, and has passed ‘disjointed scraps of ancient 
lore’ on to his otherwise uneducated daughter.142 After the Whateleys have celebrated one such unholy 
rite, Lavinia becomes pregnant, eventually giving birth to a son, Wilbur, of unknown paternity, and who 
grows and develops at a prodigious rate, resembling a teenager by the age of four. At the time of 
Wilbur’s birth, Old Whateley renovates and boards up a hitherto-disused shed in the grounds of the 
Whateley homestead, and begins work on a similar project with the upper story of the house. Outsiders 
can only speculate as to what it is that the Whateleys are keeping in the large locked space (and why 
their pastures never become crowded, although they are continually buying cattle), and the secret—
Wilbur’s twin brother, far more closely resembling their father than he—escapes only after Old 
Whateley, Lavinia, and Wilbur have all met their deaths. 
 
Wilbur, the more human-seeming of Lavinia’s offspring, is described in terms that link him closely to 
the abundant and disturbing natural landscape around Dunwich, and to the animalistic, as well as to 
racial Others. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that the Whateley’s occult practices, used, like Helen 
Vaughan’s, to summon entities from some entirely alien sphere of being, are initially projected onto a 
racial Other, the narrative remarking that ‘old legends’ in the area ‘speak of unhallowed rites and 
conclaves of the Indians, amidst which they called forbidden shapes of shadow out of the great rounded 
hills’.143 Wilbur’s physical appearance, too, is emphasised as being foreign. He is known locally as 
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‘Lavinny’s black brat’,144 and has ‘almost Latin eyes’.145 Lavinia, meanwhile, is ‘strangely proud of the 
dark, goatish-looking infant who formed such a contrast to her own sickly and pink-eyed albinism’.146 
The dominance of Wilbur’s non-human ancestry over the human is brought out in this depiction, which 
also manages to link the ‘dark’ (implicitly the non-Caucasian), the animalistic, and a disquieting health 
and vitality which contrasts with the sickliness of his mother. The goatishness, of course, cannot help 
but put us in mind of Pan, the representative of the wholly-other in Machen’s tale, and physically a 
human-animal hybrid. Later on, Wilbur’s ugliness is emphasised, with the suggestion that there is 
‘something almost goatish or animalistic’ about his face.147 During his infancy, Wilbur is spied bathing 
with his mother, apparently wearing ‘a fringed belt and a pair of dark trunks or trousers’.148 Later in the 
story comes a detailed inventory of Wilbur’s physical abnormalities, but here the image is one of a 
creature animal from the waist down, and perhaps furry. The image calls to mind the titular deity of 
Machen’s story, and perhaps also the parallel T. H. Huxley draws between human-like apes and the 
‘Centaurs and Satyrs’ of myth at the beginning of Man’s Place in Nature (1894).149 Hair is also an adult 
physical characteristic, suggestive of masculinity, and we later learn that Wilbur is beginning to grow a 
beard at the age of four. This adds another layer to the preternatural growth rate mentioned elsewhere, 
adding implications of abnormal virility and coming as close as anything one can find in Lovecraft to a 
suggestion of sexual threat. We might well be reminded of the hypersexual or hypermasculine 
stereotyping of black men, used by US politicians of the late nineteenth century to portray them as a 
threat to white women, in order to divide black and white working-class voters, who might otherwise 
have allied themselves in order to challenge those in power.
150
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This suggestion of abnormally developed masculinity suggests both a sexual and reproductive capacity 
greater than that of Dunwich’s fully human (though degenerate) inhabitants and, in Wilbur’s increased 
growth rate and early development, a greater physical strength and mental ability. At the age of three 
months, Wilbur has ‘attained a size and muscular power not usually found in infants under a full year of 
age’, and by seven months he is able to walk;151 by the time of his death, he is a ‘goatish giant’ almost 
nine feet tall.
152
 Spencer’s assertion of the ‘unusual fertility and vigour’ of hybrids comes to mind.153 
Perhaps more disturbing than his physical precocity, however, is his early mastery of those abilities 
held to be particularly “human”. He is a ‘fluent and incredibly intelligent talker’ before the age of 
two,
154
 and his face gives the impression of ‘quasi-adulthood and well-nigh preternatural 
intelligence’.155 By the age of four, he is a voracious reader; by ten, his ‘mind, voice, stature, and 
bearded face [give] all the impressions of maturity’.156 Herein seems to lie the most disturbing aspect of 
this hybrid figure; this ‘goatish’, ‘gorilla-like’ creature,157 ‘shabby, dirty, bearded, and uncouth of 
dialect’,158 and possessed of alarmingly little regard for conventional morality (having laughed at his 
grandfather’s deathbed, and quite possibly murdered his own mother159) is arguably better at being 
human than humans themselves. Spencer had noted that the predominance of a particular type of life in 
particular conditions did not necessarily mean it was ‘the fittest for them’,160 and Darwin had suggested 
that forms evolved in temperate regions were likely to oust the natives of tropical regions when they 
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invaded, having been better fitted for survival by their harsher conditions of life.
161
 ‘Civilised races’ 
were equipped to ‘resist changes of all kinds far better than savages’ because they had been exposed to 
‘diversified or varying conditions’ to a greater extent, and they would, therefore, eventually 
‘exterminate, and replace, the savage races throughout the word’, wiping out the ‘anthropomorphous 
apes’ at the same time.162 Lovecraft’s story extrapolates from this notion to explore its implications for 
human dominance upon the Earth. For Spencer, it was inevitable that organisms would ‘[intrude] on 
each other’s spheres of existence’.163 In competition with such ‘precocious [monsters]’, what hope for 
the pure “human” strain?164 
 
Even in the hybrid bodies of Wilbur and his brother themselves, the human appears weak, easily 
overpowered by the alien. We already know that Wilbur has rejected human morality; in the depiction 
of his true physical nature, the Other appears far more strikingly than the “human”, too. Throughout the 
story, references are made to the instinctive dislike that dogs have for Wilbur; the local dogs bark 
throughout the night of his birth, and he is soon unable to walk around the countryside without being 
attacked by them, resorting to carrying a gun for safety.
165
 This last fact is mentioned in conjunction 
with the ‘dawning look of evil’ that the locals are beginning to perceive upon his face, and the 
implication appears to be that dogs are more easily able to see beneath the veneer of humanity than 
humans themselves, and react instinctively to the alienness and immorality they sense in him.
166
 It is at 
the jaws of a dog that Wilbur eventually meets his doom: on attempting to break into the library at 
Miskatonic University in order to steal a copy of Lovecraft’s fictional grimoire the Necronomicon, he is 
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attacked by the college watchdog—which has always regarded him with ‘unnatural fury and 
enmity’167—and is on the point of expiring when Armitage, reaches the library. The dog attack has torn 
off much of Wilbur’s clothing, revealing his true physical nature, and here, Lovecraft is able to indulge 
in some truly outrageous biological fantasy. The nature of Wilbur’s body is foreshadowed by his final 
scream, an utterance that ‘could have come from no being born of earth, or wholly of earth’,168 and 
indeed, from here on in Wilbur’s human heredity is entirely effaced in the narrative. He is no longer a 
person, but a ‘thing’, the word repeated six times in the description of his death and subsequent 
decay.
169
 The description of his body, too, takes on part of the nature of scientific observation: the 
careful inventorying of each physical feature suggests that we might be reading a lab report on the 
properties of an unusual specimen, albeit one written in Lovecraft’s habitual descriptive hyperbole. The 
collection of features described emphasises both inhumanity and hybridity, drawing upon a number of 
different types of life-form, mostly non-mammalian. There is fur, but there are also saurian hindlegs, 
‘leathery, reticulated hide’ suggesting the reptilian, and ‘long greenish-grey tentacles with red sucking 
mouths’, vaguely suggesting a hermaphroditism not commonly associated with the “human”, as well as 
the physical properties of some kind of marine life.
170
  
 
There is an indeterminacy to Wilbur’s physical form; an extent to which it seems unfixed. His feet are 
‘neither hooves nor claws’, resisting classification, while the colour of his tail and tentacles changes 
constantly.
171
 There are undeveloped features also; a ‘rudimentary eye’ upon each hip, and what is 
taken to be ‘an undeveloped mouth or throat’ at the end of his tail.172 There is, then, potential for yet 
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more change in this hybrid body, for the human to be further effaced. Indeed, Wilbur himself has 
predicted this, speculating that he may be ‘transfigured’ into a shape more like that of his father once he 
has opened the portal to the alien realm and rid the earth of humans—for this is his ultimate plan—and 
affirming that there is in him ‘much of outside to work on’.173 After his death, Wilbur’s physical body 
dissolves into a ‘sticky whitish mass’, leaving behind no skeleton, no semblance at all of human 
form.
174
 There is also a suggestion that, for all his mastery of human accomplishments—his ability to 
“pass” as human, if you like—Wilbur’s mind, too, is utterly alien. His death throes have been 
accompanied by the accustomed piping of whippoorwills outside the window, the birds traditionally 
being thought to lie in wait for the souls of the dead, keeping up a celebratory chorus all night if they do 
manage to catch the unfortunate souls, and growing quiet with disappointment if they fail. This time, 
however, neither of those things happens. Instead, the birds scatter in a ‘panic-struck whining and 
fluttering[...]frantic at that which they had sought for prey’.175 Wilbur’s soul, too, is apparently 
monstrous—or, perhaps, he does not have one in any recognisable sense. 
 
The titular ‘horror’ of the story, Wilbur’s twin brother, however, has not yet emerged. It is only in 
Wilbur’s absence that it bursts forth from its enclosure in the farmhouse and begins to terrorise 
Dunwich, and it is in this form that the effacement of the human is almost—though not entirely—
completed. The alienness of the creature is such that it is invisible to the naked eye, resisting visual 
classification and human notions of form, and its repulsiveness, animalism, and savagery are far more 
pronounced than Wilbur’s. Throughout the text, there are mentions of a ‘stench’ around the Whateley 
homestead and around the stone circles on the hilltops where ‘horrors’ from beyond can apparently be 
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summoned.
176
 The smell that lingers around the stones is well-established in local folklore,
177
 but that 
around the Whateley farmhouse begins to be noticed only after the birth of Wilbur and the horror. Later, 
after the horror’s escape, its progress can be tracked only by its ‘unwonted stench’ and by the odorous, 
tarry deposits it leaves behind.
178
 The association of smell with the presence of entities from beyond is 
made explicit in the Necronomicon, which declares that, although these beings are invisible to human 
eyes, ‘[by] Their smell can men sometimes know Them[...]They walk unseen and foul in lonely 
places[...]As a foulness shall ye know Them’.179 The associations of smell and slime are various: poor 
hygiene; disease; the animal; and still lower forms of life, like the primordial slime into which 
Machen’s Helen Vaughan eventually dissolves. The associations made between immigrants and disease 
and dirt in the period have already been detailed, as has the notion of other races being less highly-
developed than white Anglo-Saxons. The projection of qualities used to denigrate racial and national 
Others onto a non-human Other appears here, then, as in ‘The Great God Pan’, allowing the story to 
play upon contemporary fears of immigration and overrunning, and simultaneously placing the Other as 
less-than-human. 
 
The effacement of the human threatened implicitly in Wilbur’s body is carried out literally by the 
actions of the horror, which does not differentiate between the cattle in the local farms and their owners, 
treating all as prey. Even its human family members are not exempt. In the creature’s infancy, it is noted 
that ‘[odd] wounds or sores, having something of the aspect of incisions’ are appearing on the 
Whateleys’ cattle; some of the locals claim to have seen similar sores on Old Whateley and Lavinia.180 
The creature has apparently been feeding upon both, reducing its mother and grandfather to the level of 
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livestock. The distinction between human and animal begins to break down; and, when the creature 
escapes and begins to prey upon the villagers of Dunwich, the human is threatened with total 
eradication. 
 
The first farm to be attacked, that of the Elmer Frye family, reports a great disturbance amongst its 
animals when the horror breaks out. (Another house, belonging to a family named Bishop, will also be 
destroyed later.) At night, it passes close to the household, terrifying human and animal inhabitants 
alike: 
 
[The sound of the creature] was quickly followed by a hideous screaming and stamping 
amongst the cattle. The dogs slavered and crouched close to the feet of the fear-numbed 
family[...]The children and the womenfolk whimpered, kept from screaming by some 
obscure, vestigial instinct of defence which told them their lives depended on silence.
181
 
 
Rational thought and “civilised” accomplishments are no help here; it is only ‘instinct’ which saves 
them this time. In a sense, their humanity is already beginning to be siphoned off, fear making them 
reliant upon older, less conscious impulses, the instincts of prey animals. And when the horror does 
attack, it does not merely kill. The Frye farmstead is utterly destroyed, ‘nothing living or dead’ able to 
be found in the ruins. All that remains is ‘a stench and a tarry stickiness’.182 The human beings 
themselves have been destroyed, as have the human institutions of home, agriculture, and family. This 
last, the attack upon human heredity and the continuity of the “human”, is perhaps the most significant. 
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In the creature’s physical form, too, there seems to be very little of the human. We already know that it 
is invisible to the naked eye, and that it is far larger than its brother, having occupied the whole upper 
storey of the farmhouse. Wilbur’s diary, found after his death, throws some light upon the size and the 
alienness of the creature: 
 
That upstairs more ahead of me than I had thought it would be, and is not like to have much 
earth brain[...]They from outside will help, but they cannot take body without human blood. 
That upstairs looks it will have the right cast.
183
 
 
The non-human part of the creature’s ancestry is apparently removed from human notions of ‘body’, 
existing according to some entirely different laws of physics, and presumably this is why it cannot be 
seen. Alienness and lack of intellect are linked here, too, with the creature lacking ‘earth brain’, as are 
alienness and prodigious growth. The creature is already ahead of Wilbur, and Armitage, speaking at 
the end of the story, makes explicit that its otherness is the cause of this: ‘It grew fast and big for the 
same reason the Wilbur grew fast and big’, he tells the assembled locals, ‘but it beat him because it had 
a greater share of the outsideness in it’.184 So far, so alien; but Wilbur has also noted that the creature is 
only able to exist in this world at all because of its human blood, the “human” here essentially 
becoming an accessory to the invading inhuman, a participant in its own demise. The use of human 
blood as a means to an end effectively reduces the “human” to the level of breeding stock or object, no 
longer the protagonist its own story, but a tool to be used for the purposes of Others. And it is this, 
perhaps, that is most deeply to be feared: not the existence of non-human Others, nor the potential 
destruction of human lives, but the persistence of the human as something other than itself, corrupted, 
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altered, and no longer reigning supreme over the earth. 
 
We see this idea embodied when the creature finally becomes visible. Armitage and his compatriots, in 
their attempt to destroy the creature, acquire a powder that will render it temporarily visible, and Curtis 
Whateley—one of the ‘undecayed’ Whateleys in the neighbourhood—is rendered unconscious with 
shock at the sight of it through a telescope.
185
 His description of it to the other watchers initially 
focuses upon its most alien elements: it is ‘all made o’ squirmin’ ropes’, colossal, and covered in eyes, 
trunks and mouths.
186
 The indeterminacy of its form is emphasised, and we learn that there is ‘nothin’ 
solid abaout it’, that it is ‘all like jelly, an’ made o’ sep’rit wrigglin’ ropes pushed clost together’.187 Its 
colour, too, is like nothing found in humans—‘grey, with kinder blue or purple rings’.188 But the 
crowning horror, for Curtis Whateley, as least, is ‘that haff face on top’.189 A slightly unclear 
description, and one which Whateley returns to and clarifies upon waking up. ‘It was a [sic] octopus, 
centipede, spider kind o’ thing’, he informs the waiting locals, ‘but they [sic] was a haff-shaped man’s 
face on top of it, an’ it looked like Wizard Whateley’s’.190 At the same time that Curtis Whateley is 
unconscious with shock at this vision, the watchers are left ‘reeling’ by another disturbing revelation.191 
The creature cries out at the moment of its death, a ‘half-articulate’ sound that is clearly inhuman, ‘for 
the organs of man can yield no such acoustic perversions’.192 It is calling, however, in English. This 
uncanny moment, the climactic one of the story, plays quite clearly upon fears about the dilution or 
overwhelming of the human, and takes them one step further. The vestigial, half-recognisable face and 
the creature’s familiarity with a recognisable language form a kind of trace or remnant of the human in 
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the Other, and the beastly brother becomes here a mirror image of Wilbur. Where Wilbur’s apparent 
humanity was infected by an element of what Armitage calls ‘the outsideness’, the brother’s alien 
nature is infected with a little of humanity. A switch in places is effected here, an alteration in the status 
of humanity, and in this moment it is the human element itself which becomes horrifying. 
 
Armitage’s explanation of the Whateleys’ plan cements the horror: we learn that the Whateleys were in 
conspiracy with the ‘Elder Things’ (as he calls the creatures that form part of Wilbur’s and his brother’s 
ancestry)
193
 and that, having opened the gateway to material existence to them through the introduction 
of human blood, they planned to ‘let [them] in tangibly to wipe out the human race and drag the earth 
off to some nameless place for some nameless purpose’.194 Here again we have the suggestion of 
overwhelming, of invasion and usurpation, but perhaps most telling at all is one other detail that 
Armitage has gleaned from Wilbur’s diary. After his initial reading of it, he falls into a raving delirium, 
and among the claims he makes in this state is that that the earth itself did not originate in this 
dimension. Rather, it originally existed in ‘some other plane or phase of entity’—that of the Elder 
Things—and fell from it ‘vintigillions of aeons ago’.195 Read in conjunction with the story’s epigraph, 
with its claim that ‘they were there before’,196 Armitage’s revelation seems to evidence an even more 
shocking truth: humans have no prior claim of ownership upon the planet. We may, in fact, be the 
usurpers. 
 
Given the early invocation of ‘Indians’ in the story, and the way that racial and eugenic fears are again 
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mapped on to human-inhuman relations, one might, perhaps, wonder whether there is some anxiety 
about the legitimacy of the claim of white Americans to supremacy upon the continent here. There also 
seem to be fears around the issues of immigration and national or racial “fitness” already mentioned: 
the horror of a potentially destructive outside invasion, the fear of an overwhelming fecundity or 
capacity for growth in the Other, the worry that the “human” might not be suitably equipped to 
compete against the Other, and anxieties around the possibility of an alteration in status for the (white, 
Anglo-Saxon) “human” or a challenge to its claim upon supremacy. The blurring of boundaries 
between the “human” and the Other, and Wilbur’s human appearance, might also evidence a fear of 
challenges to previously clearly demarcated racial boundaries, represented, for example, by alliances 
between black and white voters, or the spectre of interracial marriage. The “human” and the Other here 
are not so far removed from one another as to be unable to produce offspring, and those offspring, 
bearing human and ‘outside’ characteristics in varying degrees, seem to represent a gradation or sliding 
scale between the two. Spencer’s remark about unusually vigorous hybrids refers, after all, to crosses 
between different varieties of the same species, not between creatures utterly unlike each other.
197
 
Wilbur’s ability to pass for human might, too, recall fears about foreign or non-white blood ‘passing’ 
unnoticed in society, as suggested by Bohata in reference to ‘The Great God Pan’.198 The ultimate 
difference of other races and nationalities, and thus the supremacy of the white Anglo-Saxon, was 
challenged by immigration and by political and personal alliances between races and nationalities; here, 
the supremacy of the “human” upon the earth is threatened by a horrific alliance between the “human” 
and the invading, racialised Other. 
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The Self as Other: ‘Arthur Jermyn’ and ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ 
 
Lovecraft wrote several times upon this same theme, but—perhaps surprisingly, given his reactionary 
racial views—‘The Dunwich Horror’ is the only one of his major stories in which the hybrid offspring 
of a human-inhuman union appears as the antagonist. His other workings of the idea, ‘Facts 
Concerning the Late Arthur Jermyn and His Family’ (1921) (commonly referred to as ‘Arthur Jermyn’) 
and the novella in which he would later expand his theme, ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ (1936), take 
on the possibility of an awful hybridity within the ostensibly “human” self. 
 
The earlier story, ‘Arthur Jermyn’, focuses upon the eponymous protagonist—a member of the English 
upper class, and a distinguished scholar—and his discovery of his nonhuman ancestry, a revelation that 
will drive him to suicide. Jermyn is introduced to us with his title (he is Sir Arthur Jermyn), and as a 
‘poet and scholar’ who is not much worried by his own physical ugliness and who is therefore 
implicitly above fleshly concerns.
199
 The mention of his title establishes both Jermyn’s Englishness and 
his place in the top tier of the class system, while his reputation as a man of letters confirms his 
intellectual superiority and his level of education; his position, in other words, as the model of a 
“civilised” human subject. Moreover, these factors are explicitly tied to his ancestry. Both Jermyn’s 
title and his scholarly abilities have been passed down from his earliest mentioned progenitor, the 
explorer Sir Wade Jermyn, who ‘possessed an intellectual zeal amounting almost to a mania’.200 This 
last detail, linking the scholarly intelligence of a consummately “civilised” man with the spectre of 
mental instability, is a striking one, and I will return to it later. At the same time that we are introduced 
to Arthur Jermyn, the upper-class intellectual, we also learn of his untimely end by self-immolation, 
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and the attempt that has been made to erase his memory since. ‘No one’, we are told, ‘placed the 
charred fragments [of his body] in an urn or set a memorial to him who had been’, and some have even 
denied that Arthur Jermyn ever existed.
201
 The aftermath of his death contrasts vividly with the 
privileged position he occupied in life; he is not accorded the respect due to a human being, or even a 
well-loved companion animal. 
 
As the narrative sketches out the history of the Jermyn family line, the traces of animalism and of the 
spectre of degeneration—so feared by scientific writers of the late nineteenth century, and by the 
eugenicists who followed them—become clearer. Arthur, we learn, is the last scion of a family 
declining in number, in physical appearance, and in regard: we are told that ‘people were glad there 
were not many of them’.202 The Jermyns born since Sir Wade’s time have all possessed ‘a subtly odd 
and repellent cast’,203 never having looked ‘quite right’.204 Arthur, though, is the worst, and his 
appearance is described as ‘peculiar’,205 a descriptor also applied to more than one of his 
progenitors.
206
 Philip Jermyn, Sir Wade’s son, signals the start of the decay. He is violent, ‘highly 
peculiar’, and ‘densely stupid’, and his physical appearance—though closely resembling that of his 
father—is ‘so coarse that he [is] universally shunned’, forming a kind of degenerate parody of the 
“human”.207 He seems, too, to have preternatural physical abilities, being ‘small, but intensely 
powerful’ and gaining ‘a kind of reputation for feats of strength and climbing’,208 a capacity which 
seems decidedly simian. The ideas of hybridity and boundary-crossing are also raised in the story’s 
recounting of Philip’s life, with reference to class as well as race. Philip himself is downwardly socially 
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mobile, joining the navy as a ‘common sailor’, to ‘general disgust’.209 His marriage, too, crosses class 
and ethnic boundaries: he marries a gamekeeper’s daughter, ‘a person said to be of gypsy extraction’, 
implicitly contaminating his family line.
210
 Eventually, he goes missing off the Congo coast, apparently 
disappearing into the jungle and completing his descent into degeneration, allying himself with a 
continent populated by non-white people, and with the jungle, an area associated by explorers like his 
grandfather with wildlife and with “primitive” humans, instead of with the fully “human”, white people, 
and England. 
 
Philip’s son, Robert, while free from his father’s stupidity, inherits a certain physical strangeness 
associated in the narrative with foreignness; he has ‘a sort of weird Eastern grace despite certain 
oddities of proportion’.211 His intellectual life, too, betrays an interest in the Other, his intensive study 
of Sir Wade’s African relics suggesting a fascination with the continent. And his children revert to 
degenerate type, two of them kept hidden due to physical and mental ‘deformities’, while the second 
son, Arthur’s grandfather and a ‘singularly repellent person’, marries a ‘vulgar dancer’.212 Indeed, 
cross-class marriage is common to all of the atavistic Jermyns: Arthur himself is the son of ‘Sir Alfred 
Jermyn and a music-hall singer of unknown origin’.213  Clare Hanson has suggested that, for 
eugenicists, cross-class reproduction was ‘almost as dangerous as miscegenation’.214 Robert Jermyn 
eventually succumbs to the madness that has haunted the family since Sir Wade’s time, apparently as a 
result of hearing ‘a bit of African folklore’ from an explorer with whom he is discussing Sir Wade’s 
expeditions.
215
 After murdering his three children, and attempting to kill the infant Alfred, he is 
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confined to a madhouse, where he dies a year later, having refused ‘to utter any articulate sound’ in the 
interim.
216
 He neither explains his actions nor participates in that hallmark of human exceptionality, 
verbal communication. Effectively, he refuses his own humanity. 
 
It is Arthur’s father, Alfred, however, in whom atavism is the most readily apparent. He, too, crosses 
class lines, joining a circus as an animal trainer, and it is here that his animalistic nature emerges. He 
develops a strange kinship with a performing gorilla, which he trains with great success, but that the 
two have a relationship closer to that of equals than of animal and human becomes evident in their 
actions. We learn that Alfred and the gorilla ‘eye each other for long periods through the intervening 
bars [of the gorilla’s cage]’, a kind of mirroring between man and gorilla taking place, and they later 
compete in the ring in a boxing match, again implying a rivalry between equals rather than a display 
put on by the trained at the behest of the trainer.
217
 And when the gorilla injures Alfred’s pride by 
hitting rather harder than usual, it is Alfred who reverts to the level of the animal. He ‘[emits] a shrill, 
inhuman scream’ and attacks the gorilla savagely, ‘[biting] fiendishly at its hairy throat’.218  
 
T. H. Huxley noted that biting had been observed to be the principal form of attack in human-like 
apes;
219
 and Alfred’s expressions of rage also recall those offered by Darwin in The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) as evidence of human descent from ‘some ape-like animal’.220 
Darwin notes the similarity in the tantrums of a child and of a young chimpanzee, observing that both 
screamed and ‘bit everything within reach’;221 he comments on the appearance, in anger, ‘as if the teeth 
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were uncovered, ready for seizing or tearing an enemy, though there may be no intention of acting in 
this manner’.222 Alfred, of course, does act in this manner, his primitive instincts overcoming “civilised” 
restraint. For Darwin, ‘some expressions, such as[…]the uncovering of the teeth under[…]furious rage, 
can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animal-like 
condition’.223 Alfred’s fit of rage, then, is proof of his ‘descent from a common progenitor’ with his 
simian charge.
224
  
 
By the time Alfred’s body is recovered from the cage, it has been mauled ‘past recognition’, his human 
face effaced.
225
 This attack upon the human face echoes the death of Arthur Munroe in ‘The Lurking 
Fear’, as well as other instances in which the recognisability or otherwise of the face seems crucial to 
human identity—the inability of Miss Leicester to recognise her changed brother at the window in the 
‘Novel of the White Powder’, or the slippage between the faces of Delapore and Norrys and those of 
the ancient demon swineherd and his beasts in ‘The Rats in the Walls’. The human face seems to 
represent individual identity, in contrast to the undifferentiated mass of the abhuman; attacks upon it, 
then, also attack the boundaries of the human subject. Its obliteration, removing human individuality, 
recalls to us Darwin’s denial of any ‘“special provision”’ for expression in the facial muscles of the 
human form. Calling the reader’s attention back to the animal ancestry of human beings, Darwin 
suggests that such assumptions of uniqueness are absurd, since ‘no one[…]would be inclined to admit 
that monkeys have been endowed with special muscles solely for exhibiting their grimaces’.226 
Spencer’s more general concept of evolution held it to involve ‘the transformation of the homogeneous 
into the heterogeneous’; the differentiated was always more evolved than the undifferentiated, and this 
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could be seen in the form of the ‘civilized individual’.227 The individual whose defining feature is 
obliterated, then, may be seen to have descended the evolutionary scale. Arthur himself reacts with 
similar vehemence to his great-grandfather upon learning the truth of his own origins, letting out a 
‘horrible scream’ and leaving the house ‘frantically[...]as if pursued by some hideous enemy’.228 His 
physical ugliness even seems to increase. The look on his face (which is ‘ghastly enough in repose’) is 
‘beyond description’.229 
 
The recurring atavism of the Jermyn family since Sir Wade’s time is well-established, then, as are hints 
of an undesirable mingling between social classes. The racialising of these ‘[mesalliances]’, too, has 
already been mentioned in the form of Philip’s ‘gypsy’ wife.230 But where did these tendencies initially 
come from? The Jermyns, after all, are an established aristocratic family, and their family portraits 
‘shewed fine faces enough before Sir Wade’s time’.231 The image of the family portrait gallery invokes 
Spencer’s illustration of ‘atavism’. ‘In the picture-galleries of old families’, he writes, ‘[…]are often 
seen types of feature that are still, from time to time, repeated in members of these families’.232 It 
highlights the absence of the features which occur in the current Jermyns: where did these come from? 
The answer to this, again, is tied to racial otherness by the text. We eventually learn that Arthur 
Jermyn’s great-great-great-grandmother, the wife of Sir Wade Jermyn, was not human, but one of a 
species of white apes inhabiting a ruined city deep within the Congo jungle. Sir Wade discovered the 
existence of the place during his explorations, but found his tales dismissed as wild speculation by his 
contemporaries, eventually leading to his incarceration in an asylum. Reference is made several times 
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in the text to the boxed ‘object’233 (the term emphasising inhumanity) which was sent to Arthur Jermyn 
shortly before his suicide; the climactic revelation is that this ‘object’ is the preserved body of Arthur’s 
ancestress, and confirmation of his animal heredity.
234
  
 
Virginia Richter has discussed the importance of the figure of the ape in post-Darwinian literature, 
describing apes as ‘a special case of the uncanny missing link: they denote men’s close biological 
relationship with the animal world, while simultaneously staging the cultural difference which 
separates men from animals’.235 The ape, by representing both the animality of the human and its 
creative aspect—and, in doing so, drawing attention to the derivation of human creativity from the 
ability of higher animals to mimic or ‘ape’—casts doubt upon the privileged nature of human creativity 
even while affirming it. ‘The important point’, Richter writes, ‘is that the ape is not simply the Other of 
culture and of man, but that it is at the same time a representative of the human self’.236 Lovecraft’s 
narrative seems to draw heavily upon T. H. Huxley’s Man’s Place in Nature, in which he collates 
various accounts of hairy but otherwise human-like Congo apes—some in a region inhabited by people 
known as the ‘N’Pongues’, a name immediately drawn to mind by the ‘N’bangus’ of Lovecraft’s 
story.
237
 Huxley further notes that orang-utans have been reported as building huts, a notion which may 
derive from their habit of building nests and covering themselves with leaves while sleeping in them, 
and upon which Lovecraft’s tale of an ape-built city seems to lay its foundations.238 The blurring of the 
line between the apes and humans is emphasised in Huxley’s account. He mentions that the term 
‘gorilla’ was first applied by Hanno to ‘certain savage hairy people, discovered by the Carthaginian 
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voyager in an island on the African coast’ and who are not identical with the apes presently called 
‘gorillas’.239 He notes the similarity between young apes and young humans,240 and that ‘the structural 
differences which separate Man from the Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those which 
separate the Gorilla from the lower apes’.241 The implications of this blurring of boundaries are made 
explicit: ‘[brought] face to face with these blurred copies of himself’, Huxley suggests, 
 
the least thoughtful of men is conscious of a certain shock, due perhaps not so much to 
disgust at the aspect of what looks like an insulting caricature, as to the awakening of a 
sudden and profound mistrust of time-honoured theories and strongly-rooted prejudices 
regarding his own position in nature, and his relations to the under-world of life[…].242 
 
The human resemblance of apes, and the implications of that resemblance for the “human”, are explicit 
in Huxley; and Lovecraft’s story utilises the theme in order to elicit a similar ‘shock’. 
 
Richter also notes the ways in which ‘certain human groups are associated with apes both 
metonymically—on the grounds of geographical proximity—and metaphorically—on the grounds of 
similarity of phenotype’.243 In particular, Africa—the home of Arthur Jermyn’s simian progenitor and 
Hanno’s ‘savage hairy people’—‘is constituted in travel reports as well as in fictional texts as a space 
in which evolution was arrested and whose inhabitants are close to “modern”, i.e. European, man’s 
ancestors and to the other branch of primates, the apes’.244  And indeed, the association that has been 
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built up hitherto in the story is between Arthur’s unknown ancestry and an undesirable foreignness or 
racial otherness. Reference is made to the ‘Oriental seclusion’ in which Sir Wade’s mysterious wife 
lives, and Wade explains it by saying that she ‘[does] not like English ways’.245 Their son’s only carer, 
meanwhile, is ‘a loathsome black woman from Guinea’.246 The only characteristics of this woman 
mentioned are her race, her nationality and her loathsomeness; in the absence of any other explanation, 
it seems we are to understand that she is ‘loathsome’ merely on the basis of her race. Arthur’s artistic 
temperament is explained with reference to his mysterious great-great-great-grandmother: Sir Wade 
had claimed that she was the daughter of a Portuguese trader, and neighbours suggest that Arthur’s 
fondness for the arts, never previously a Jermyn trait, must be due to ‘her Latin blood’.247 That the 
story takes place in a context of colonialism and assumed white supremacy is also made clear. Black 
Africans are assumed to be more credulous and superstitious than whites, Sir Wade assuming that 
‘[surely] the imaginative blacks had made the most of whatever events might lie behind the extravagant 
legendry [of the ape city]’.248 There is reference to European colonial rule, with the narrative noting the 
subservient status of the group of Africans Sir Wade encounters: ‘the once mighty N’bangus’, we are 
told, are now ‘the submissive servants of King Albert’s government’.249 The story simultaneously 
reminds us of the assumed intellectual and military superiority of white Europeans, and associates the 
undesirable, animalistic aspects of Arthur’s ancestry with foreignness and racial Otherness, implicitly 
linking the two as less “human” than white Anglo-Saxons. 
 
Richter points to the trope of the ‘Family of Man’, and details the ways in which it was 
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used to develop a strategy for vindicating the domination of other peoples. The image of the 
Western family with a benevolent but firm father at its head is projected onto mankind and 
linked to the idea of a linear evolution. Within this concept, the so-called ‘primitive races’ 
correspond to the ‘infancy of mankind’, whereas European peoples have reached full 
maturity – i.e. Europeans, especially the British, are seen as grown-ups in the Family of 
Man, and African, Australian and other aboriginal peoples are its children. 
250
 
 
We see a component of the notion expressed in relation to evolution in Spencer’s First Principles, 
where he writes that ‘[the] infant European has sundry marked points of resemblance to the lower 
human races’, and argues that ‘the developmental process by which these traits are turned into those of 
the adult European’ parallels that by which ‘the like traits of the barbarous races have been turned into 
those of the civilised races’.251 In ‘Arthur Jermyn’, where this implied hierarchy is taken for granted, 
the relationship becomes incestuous. 
 
However, the superiority of the original Jermyn line is not unquestionable. There is a suggestion of 
something inherently odd in Sir Wade himself, even before the introduction of ape blood into the 
family line, and Arthur reflects on ‘both of his strange progenitors’.252 Sir Wade’s behaviour is regarded 
as evidence of his madness by friends and neighbours, and although the narrative eventually evidences 
the accuracy of his ‘wild stories’, his behaviour still seems rather erratic.253 He is remembered as a 
collector of ‘trophies and specimens, which were not such as a normal man would accumulate and 
preserve’, and his fondness for telling tales of his experiences in the jungle is judged ‘unwise’ in his 
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‘rational age’, the heart of the Enlightenment.254 Even his enthusiasm for intellectual endeavour is 
compared to a ‘mania’.255 It seems that Sir Wade’s experiences in the jungle have called out a latent 
mental instability, resulting in visibly unpredictable behaviour, rather than simply causing him to be 
judged mad because of their unlikeliness. This resemblance, drawing attention to the ape and the 
abjected human of another race as both self and Other, sharpens the image of familial likeness. 
Startlingly, it is the image of incest which here makes “miscegenation” disturbing. 
 
Read alongside this possibility of a degenerative or undesirable element in the original Jermyn 
bloodline (let us not forget the eugenic fear of “feeblemindedness”, or the disproportionate extent to 
which eugenicists identified it in black and immigrant social groups), it is interesting that the apes in 
the jungle city are themselves referred to as ‘hybrids’.256 Their indeterminate nature is referred to 
repeatedly: they are ‘strange hybrid creatures’,257 ‘half of the jungle and half of the impiously aged 
city’,258 and the stuffed body in the box evidences the existence of a species of ape ‘less hairy than any 
recorded variety, and infinitely nearer mankind—quite shockingly so’.259 Elsewhere, the similarity 
actually seems to render the separation of “human” and ape problematic; ‘only a scientist’, we are 
informed, could tell ‘[whether] it was human or simian’.260  
 
Perhaps significant, too, is the nature of the city that the apes inhabit. It is a ‘lost city’, a ‘ruined 
city’,261 apparently decayed from some previously “civilised” state, and Mwanu, a Congolese elder 
with whom Sir Wade discusses the place, suggests that the apes—or, more likely, their ancestors—may 
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have built it.
262
 Not only their appearance, then, but their behaviour is semi-human, and their quasi-
religious belief in a ‘white god’ (presumably Sir Wade himself), which has made its way into the 
folklore of the local human inhabitants, seems to further illustrate their capacity for “human” 
thought.
263
 The Jermyns, then, are not quite so unassailably sane and rational as we might expect. Their 
(racialised, white, Anglo-Saxon) humanity is undermined by the spectre of a hereditary mental 
instability predating Sir Wade’s marriage to the ‘ape-princess’.264 The apes themselves, meanwhile, are 
not quite so easily separable from humanity as to be comfortably removable into the distinct realm of 
the animal—and so humans may no longer be so exceptional as to belong comfortably in the realm of 
the “human”. A common ancestor may perhaps be at the root of this, or a history of interbreeding. 
Bennett Lovett-Graff, in his essay on the story, links the appearance of this ape-human to contemporary 
speculation about the existence of missing links,
265
 and pinpoints the potentially devastating effect of 
this continuity upon notions of human superiority and free will: 
 
[...]as the inheritors of a simian past, we are the subjects of a determined and determining 
Nature, members of the very animal world to which we human beings have denied any 
vestige of free will. Despite his accomplishments as an explorer and anthropologist, Arthur 
Jermyn discovers himself to be really no better than an ape.
266
 
 
The decayed state of the city, however, might be read to suggest an explanation yet closer to 
home. Lovett-Graff comes close to touching in this possibility, referring to the ‘degenerate ancestry’ of 
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modern humans posited in the tale, but does not go so far as to make the connection which Lovecraft 
seems to be implying.
267
 Sir Wade speculated about the existence of a ‘prehistoric white Congolese 
civilisation’, one of the ‘wild stories’ that he was never able to prove.268 Given Lovecraft’s 
preoccupation with human degeneration, as evidenced in ‘The Lurking Fear’, might we not infer that 
the white apes inhabiting the city are the degenerate descendants of these prehistoric humans? The 
story’s introduction, an oft-quoted and typically Lovecraftian pronouncement of biological disgust, 
questions the existence of any particular “human” specialness, and warns of the effect that the 
revelation of our own animal nature might have upon human minds: 
 
Life is a hideous thing, and from the background behind what we know of it peer 
daemoniacal hints of truth which make it sometimes a thousandfold more hideous. Science, 
already oppressive with its shocking revelations, will perhaps be the ultimate exterminator 
of our human species—if separate species we be—for its reserve of unguessed horrors 
could never be borne by mortal brains if loosed upon the world. If we knew what we are, 
we should do as Sir Arthur Jermyn did; and Arthur Jermyn soaked himself in oil and set fire 
to his clothing one night.
269
 
 
If the apes of the ruined city are, in fact, the degenerate descendants of prehistoric humans, then 
our position as distinct from other animals is lost; the germ of the animal is within us, and time and 
isolation are enough to bring it out. S. T. Joshi has argued that Lovecraft is actually suggesting that the 
ape city is ‘the ultimate source for all white civilisation’,270 and while the literal truth of this assertion 
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as far as the actual events of the story go is not necessarily convincing, the effect is nonetheless the 
same. Our animal origins place even the most ostensibly civilised humans firmly within the animal 
kingdom, with no distinctive specialness, and—more worryingly—posit the possibility of a reversion 
to animal form if we are not careful to preserve our human (and we might hear “racial” or “national” as 
an echo, for this value of the “human” is most definitely white and Anglo-Saxon) ‘fitness’. The 
persistent mesalliances of Arthur’s forefathers take on an additional significance here; while the initial 
indiscretion was Sir Wade’s, his sons have furthered the degeneration of the family line by marrying 
across class and ethnic boundaries. They, too, have failed to see to their hereditary ‘fitness’. 
 
This considered, it might seem that ‘Arthur Jermyn’ would be better placed alongside ‘The Lurking 
Fear’ as a story of degeneration, and the anxieties that inform it are, to a great extent, the same. 
However, if this were the case, then surely the simple fact of the apes’ existence would be enough to 
provide the ultimate horror of the story. The tale’s focus upon breeding and “miscegenation”, though, 
alongside the hinted association of animalism with foreignness and non-Caucasian races, suggests that 
there is something more going on here. Perhaps unexpectedly, alongside the implied association the 
text makes between non-Caucasian, non-Anglo-Saxon humans and the apes runs an emphasis upon the 
apes’ whiteness. Sir Wade specifies that it is a ‘prehistoric white Congolese civilisation’ about which he 
is speculating,
271
 and the descriptor ‘white’ is repeated several times: the city is ‘a grey city of white 
apes ruled by a white god’; 272 the stuffed body of Jermyn’s ancestor is ‘clearly a mummified white 
ape’273; and the story itself was (much to Lovecraft’s chagrin) published as ‘The White Ape’ when it 
appeared in Weird Tales in 1924.
274
 From a writer as virulently racist as Lovecraft was, this seems a 
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little surprising. Lovecraft’s prejudice against non-Anglo-Saxon people is well-documented from his 
personal writings, and also rears its head in much of his published writing. For evidence, one has only 
to think of the ‘loathsome, gorilla-like’ figure of the black boxer in ‘Herbert West—Reanimator’ 
(1922),
275
 or ‘Medusa’s Coil’ (1939), another tale ghostwritten by Lovecraft for Zealia Bishop Reed, 
with its climactic revelation that Marceline, the villainess of the piece, is ‘unmistakably the scion of 
Zimbabwe’s most primal grovellers’,276 while—as if to drive home the point with a sledgehammer—
the poem ‘On the Creation of Niggers’ (1912) is a disturbingly splenetic expression of racial hatred.277 
But in ‘Arthur Jermyn’, humans of non-Anglo-Saxon origin are simultaneously connected with the 
degenerate or non-human, and elided from the narrative. While speculation about Sir Wade’s 
mysterious wife hinges upon her perceived foreignness, this is shown to be merely a cover for the true 
horror, and the black inhabitants of Congo are mentioned only as adjuncts to Sir Wade’s discovery of 
the ape city. 
 
There are, I think, two possible interpretations of this emphasis upon the whiteness of the apes. Some 
similarity seems to be implied between the ‘imaginative blacks’ from whom Sir Wade initially hears 
about the city and the apes who inhabit it, with their superstitious credulity and willingness to believe 
that he is a god.
278
 Similarly, the fact that the ‘loathsome black woman from Guinea’ is the only 
attendant able to deal with Arthur’s half-ape ancestor Philip seems to imply a communication or 
commonality between the two.
279
 The ape descendants of these prehistoric white people have 
degenerated enough to place them on a level with other races, races whom eugenicists of the time, and 
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Lovecraft himself, would undoubtedly have regarded as inferior. The prehistoric whites, presumably, 
failed to preserve their “racial fitness”; now, confined to their ruined jungle city, their descendants are 
unable to compete with other races of humanity. 
 
One might also argue, I think, that the absence of any significant non-Caucasian characters from the 
story, as well as the association of foreignness or racial otherness with the apes, becomes a form of 
projection. With the exception of Philip Jermyn’s ‘gypsy’ wife, humans of non-Anglo-Saxon descent 
are excluded from this narrative of horrific procreation. Instead, the African white apes take on 
connotations of foreignness and racial difference, effectively coming to represent the racial Other. 
From this point of view, the horror the narrative evinces at the closeness or common ancestry of 
humans and apes takes on another layer of meaning—coming, perhaps, to represent a horror of the 
common “humanity” of races, and the challenge it might pose to white Anglo-Saxon supremacy. There 
are echoes here of those exclusionary political movements which sought to remove black people from 
the United States and to prevent them from allying themselves with working-class whites, and which 
opposed the annexation of land predominantly occupied by Mexicans, finding in commonality a threat 
to the perceived natural superiority of white Americans. The horror of ‘Arthur Jermyn’ is, perhaps, at 
bottom a fear of equality. 
 
A longer and more detailed reworking of the theme appears in Lovecraft’s novella, ‘The Shadow Over 
Innsmouth’ (1936), written in several years after the height of the eugenics and anti-immigration 
movements, but clearly illustrating that for Lovecraft, at least, the issues were still pressing.
280
 ‘The 
Shadow Over Innsmouth’ continues the theme of miscegenation, and returns with it to the invasion 
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narrative hinted at in ‘The Dunwich Horror’. The town of Innsmouth, a decaying Massachusetts sea-
port, is visited by Lovecraft’s first-person narrator during a coming-of-age tour—‘sightseeing, 
antiquarian, and genealogical’—of New England.281 Finding the train from Newburyport to Lovecraft’s 
fictional town of Arkham prohibitively expensive, the narrator chooses to take the cheaper bus, which 
runs via Innsmouth. On asking around about the town, which he has never heard of or seen on a map 
before, he discovers the distaste with which Innsmouth and its residents are regarded by inhabitants of 
the neighbouring towns—partly because of their sullenness and secrecy, and partly because of certain 
physical peculiarity common to most Innsmouth people. This ‘Innsmouth Look’,282 which becomes 
more pronounced with age, involves an apparent change in the very shape of the skull, giving 
Innsmouthers ‘queer narrow heads with flat noses’.283 Their eyes bulge; their skin becomes rough and 
scaly; and sides of their necks become creased.
284
 The narrator finds them ‘repellent’, as do normal 
people and animals.
285
 Slowly piecing together pieces of information about the history of Innsmouth, 
the narrator eventually falls into conversation with an elderly local drunk named Zadok Allen, one of 
the few locals without the ‘Innsmouth Look’, who reveals to him the secret of the town. The bizarre 
appearance of the townspeople is not due to a pervasive disease, as the narrator has previously 
suspected, but to a history of interbreeding with a species of frog-like underwater monstrosities known 
as the Deep Ones. These were introduced to the town several generations ago by Captain Obed Marsh, 
owner of the Marsh gold refinery, who first heard of them from Polynesian islanders during his travels, 
and provide Innsmouth with plentiful fishing and gold in exchange for mating with humans. The 
offspring of these interspecies unions initially appear human, but develop the characteristics of the 
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Deep Ones as they age, eventually returning to the undersea city of Y’ha-nthlei, where they will live 
eternally. Allen has noticed a recent change in their behaviour, and suggests that they are planning 
some unspecified atrocity. After being pursued by the amphibious monstrosities, the narrator escapes 
the town and alerts the authorities, who arrest the townsfolk and launch torpedoes at the Deep Ones’ 
nest. The threat is by no means exterminated, however, for there are Deep Ones all over the planet and 
they could, if they so chose, destroy the human race entirely. 
 
Certainly, the fears of immigration and of racial mixing that have marked the other stories considered 
so far are present here, too, and the connection with Lovecraft’s personal views on immigration and on 
race is undeniable. In some ways, the Deep Ones seem to figure as representations of the foreign 
hordes whom Lovecraft so violently loathed, a disastrous stay in New York between the writing of 
‘Arthur Jermyn’ and that of ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ having raised his extant prejudices to fever 
pitch.
286
 Various aspects of the representation of the Deep Ones in the text can be seen to support this 
possibility. Even their amphibious forms and marine origins can be connected to Lovecraft’s dislike of 
immigrants, as Lovett-Graff mentions in his 1997 article, ‘Shadows over Lovecraft’.287 In his letters 
from New York, Lovecraft utilises metaphors of slime, ooze, and the abysses of the deep ocean to give 
voice to his dislike of foreigners. Immigrants, for Lovecraft, cannot ‘by any stretch of the imagination 
be call’d human’; they are ‘monstrous’, ‘amoebal’, and ‘moulded from some stinking viscous slime of 
earth’s corruption’. He sees them ‘slithering and oozing in and on the filthy streets or in and out of 
windows and doorways in a fashion suggestive of nothing but infesting worms or deep-sea 
unnamabilities’.288 As Lovett-Graff has pointed out, a connection with the ‘deep-sea unnamabilities’ of 
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‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ is impossible to avoid.289 The poor hygiene and danger of disease 
associated with immigrants by eugenicists and others are also on display in Innsmouth. The town is 
characterised by an appearance of ‘wormy decay’ and a ‘nauseous fishy odour’,290 and the fishlike 
appearance of the Innsmouth townsfolk is supposed by the narrator and others to be a symptom of 
‘some foreign kind of disease brought from China or somewhere by the shipping’.291 Read in the light 
of Darwin’s comment about inherited peculiarities sometimes ‘ultimately [appearing] in the offspring 
when mature, or even quite old, as in the case of certain diseases’—as the Innsmouth Look indeed 
does—this assumption of disease serves to make a connection between sickness and mixed heredity.292 
 
The linguistic capacity, or incapacity, of the Deep Ones is also cause for concern for Lovecraft, whose 
attitude to foreigners encompassed a dismissive distaste for languages that he could not understand. In 
his letters from New York, he refers to foreigners as ‘jabberers with coarse ways and alien 
emotions’,293 writes with shock of the ‘scraps of old papers with Arabic lettering’ found about the 
lodgings he shared with a number of tenants of varying nationalities, and states that he rarely 
encountered his neighbours face to face, but only ‘heard them loathsomely’.294 The sounds that the 
Deep Ones make fill the narrator with horror, and are described variously as ‘bestial scraping and 
bellowing’,295 ‘shocking guttural murmurs’,296 ‘croaking and jabbering in some hateful guttural patois I 
could not identify’,297 and ‘a bestial babel of croaking, baying and barking without the least suggestion 
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of human speech’.298 Their incomprehensibility to the narrator renders them horrific, as Lovecraft’s 
inability to understand his fellow New York dwellers fed into his loathing for them. 
 
Religious unorthodoxy, too, characterises the inhabitants of Innsmouth. We have already touched upon 
the prevailing anti-Catholic sentiment of the anti-immigration movements, and the promotion of 
Protestantism as a tool for ensuring national purity. Lovecraft, a fervent atheist, took this a step further, 
decrying Christianity itself as a religion of the weak, unfit to be followed by white “Aryans”.299 
Nonetheless, he found room to single out Catholicism as particularly alien. The arrival of Italian, 
Portuguese, French-Canadian and Irish immigrants in New York would, he predicted, lead to the 
formation of ‘a separate Roman Catholic culture hostile to our own’,300 threatening the purity of race 
and culture so important to him.
301
 The Innsmouth cult, known as the Esoteric Order of Dagon, hints 
obliquely at the ritual and opulence of Roman Catholicism; the priest of whom the narrator catches 
sight on his journey into town wears ‘peculiar vestments’ and a ‘tall tiara’ in the distinctive metalwork 
tradition of the Deep Ones,
302
 and the worshippers at the church participate in ‘the queerest kinds of 
ceremonials’.303 Roman Catholics are not the only religious Other gestured at, however. The Innsmouth 
cult incorporates various elements associated with the idea of a primitive pre-Christian religion, as used 
by Machen in his short stories, and considered as a serious possibility by anthropologists like Margaret 
Murray and James Frazer, whose work Lovecraft occasionally cites in his own fiction. Mention is made 
of the religion’s major festivals occurring on April 30th and October 31st, coinciding with Hallowe’en 
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and Beltane.
304
 Obed Marsh, the ship’s captain responsible for bringing the Deep Ones and their 
religion to Innsmouth, is denounced by Zadok Allen as an ‘old limb o’ Satan’305—a telling detail if we 
remember that Murray and others suggested that Christian accounts of witches and devil-worshippers 
were in fact based on recollections or survivals of a pre-Christian pagan cult.
306
 Marsh points out to the 
locals that praying to the Christian god is doing nothing to replenish their depleted fishing-stocks, and 
tells them that ‘they’d orter git better gods like some o’ the folks in the Injies—gods as ud bring ’em 
good fishin’ in return for their sacrifices’.307 The mention of sacrifices, and the fact that the religion is 
imported from overseas, return us again to the primitive and the foreign. The kind of slippage that 
occurs in this account of the Innsmouth cult performs an associative sleight of hand, conflating 
Catholics, foreigners, and the primitive pre-Christian ancestors of Anglo-Saxons. 
 
Perhaps the most disturbing element of Lovecraft’s racial prejudice, however, comes out in the 
methods used to get rid of the Deep Ones. To understand this, we must return to the fear of alien 
culture mentioned in his comments about Roman Catholicism. In a 1933 letter to J. Vernon Shea, 
Lovecraft talks about the importance of cultural continuity, and ties it intimately to biological racial 
purity. It is, in his view, imperative both that a civilisation’s ‘culture-stream remains relatively 
undiluted by alien traditions’, and that its ‘race-stock remains approximately the same as that which 
evolved the culture and institutions now existing’.308 There is an echo here of Spencer’s assertion of 
‘the affinities of men for others like themselves’; he argues in his First Principles that ‘[emigrants] 
usually desire to get back among their own people’, and that ‘[the] feelings characterizing a member of 
a given race, are feelings which get complete satisfaction only among other members of that race—a 
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satisfaction partly derived from sympathy with those having like feelings, but mainly derived from the 
adapted social conditions which grow up where such feelings prevail’.309 Spencer, of course, also 
writes that ‘[the] civilised European departs far more widely from the vertebrate archetype than does 
the savage’,310 and Lovecraft’s letter betrays a similar sense of superiority. Although Lovecraft pretends 
to a detached, unbiased view, asserting that ‘[the] races are equal, but infinitely different’ and that ‘a 
need for a certain rational amount of racial discrimination exists apart from all questions of superiority 
or inferiority’, when these claims come coupled with asides about ‘squat, swarthy [Latins]’ and 
‘basically and structurally primitive’ blacks, his pretensions to egalitarianism are a little hard to 
swallow.
311
 And indeed, the letter takes Lovecraft’s preoccupation with racial purity to its inevitable 
conclusion, ending with an affirmation of the naturalness and ‘sound policy’ of ‘“Hitlerism”’.312 In 
‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’, Lovecraft makes quite clear reference to what he saw as the efficacy of 
Nazism. The neighbours of the Polynesian islanders from whom Marsh hears about the Deep Ones 
eventually find out what has been happening on the island, and Marsh returns only to find the islanders 
wiped out and the Deep Ones gone, a banishment that has been effected by the use of amulets ‘like 
charms—with somethin’ on ’em like what ye call a swastika nowadays’.313 
 
One other characteristic of anti-immigration thought to make it into ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’—
and perhaps the most important—is fear of the reproductive capacity of foreigners and racial Others.  
The overabundance of growth and hints at a horrific virility or sexuality that appear in ‘The Great God 
Pan’ and ‘The Dunwich Horror’ recur here, and in a form less obliquely related to anxieties about the 
fecundity of immigrants. For newspaper readers, the most striking things about the Innsmouth scandal 
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are ‘the prodigious number of arrests’ and ‘the abnormally large force of men used in making them’.314 
The town itself appears to be half-empty of human habitation, but the sheer number of the Deep Ones 
and their offspring is repeatedly brought home. There are ‘hordes of ‘em’, ‘swarms of ‘em’, ‘millions 
of ‘em’;315 Devil Reef, where they meet the Innsmouthers, ‘[bristles] thick with shapes’;316 they are ‘a 
teeming horde’.317 a ‘very large horde’,318 ‘limitless swarms’, a ‘limitless stream’, and a number ‘past 
guessing’.319 Particularly telling is the emphasis upon their numbers in comparison to those of the 
known human inhabitants of the town. Even in the midst of his flight from them, the narrator has cause 
to wonder that ‘the number of [his] pursuers must be strangely large for a town as depopulated as 
Innsmouth’.320 The recognisably human denizens of Innsmouth are overwhelmingly outnumbered by 
the unfamiliar Deep Ones, with their alien physiognomy and incomprehensible language. More 
disturbing still is the existence of a truly ‘limitless’ Deep One civilisation on the ocean bottom, too vast 
to be wiped out by humans. The islanders tell Obed Marsh that the Deep Ones can be contacted in the 
sea all over the world, and Zadok Allen raises the spectre of an invasion force of awesome power, 
telling the narrator that ‘they cud wipe aout the hull brood o’ humans ef they was willin’ to bother’,321 
and suggesting that they may indeed be planning something of the sort, with hints at a nameless 
atrocity that will take place ‘when they git ready’.322 The invasion narrative employed in ‘The Dunwich 
Horror’ here returns in oblique form, the spectre of overrunning made real possibility by the Deep Ones’ 
numerousness. The human will, if they get their way, be replaced by the alien, the “native” by the 
foreign. 
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In part, then, ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ functions as a cautionary tale, against the opening of 
borders, and against miscegenation. Through their indiscriminate mating with these inhuman beings, 
the people of Innsmouth have brought their degenerative fate upon themselves. But, as in ‘Arthur 
Jermyn’, horror at the violation of sexual and racial taboos is not the only element at work here. And, 
as in ‘Arthur Jermyn’, the tale culminates with the protagonist’s (in this case, the first-person narrator’s) 
discovery of his inhuman ancestry. After his Innsmouth ordeal, the narrator returns to his investigations 
into his own family tree. His vanished great-grandmother, he discovers, was herself a Marsh, and he 
balks at the suggestion that he himself has ‘the true Marsh eyes’.323 Slowly, his memories of his great-
grandmother, and of his uncle Douglas, who closely resembled her, take on a new and frightening 
quality. He remembers the ‘staring, unwinking expression of both of them’, and the ‘unaccountable 
uneasiness’ he felt in their presence—and when he is shown his family’s ancestral jewellery and finds it 
identical to the gold-work of the Deep Ones, he is plunged into a ‘nightmare of brooding and 
apprehension’.324  
 
The anxieties around racial purity and similarity that we found in ‘Arthur Jermyn’ resurface here, with 
the narrator’s horror at his own ancestry acting both to warn of the dire consequences of racial mixing 
and of foreign blood passing unnoticed, and to raise the horrific possibility that the races are not really 
so different as a white supremacist like Lovecraft would like to think. This anxiety around 
commonality or kinship is raised quite plainly, in fact, in Zadok Allen’s account, which refers back to 
Darwin’s conclusion that ‘all the members of the vertebrate kingdom are derived from some fish-like 
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animal’.325 The islanders from whom Obed Marsh first heard of the Deep Ones explained how they 
were persuaded to mate with the Deep Ones in this manner: 
 
‘When it came to matin’ with them toad-lookin’ fishes, the Kanakys kind o’ balked, but 
finally they larnt something as put a new face on the matter. Seems that human folks has 
got a kind o’ relation to sech water-beasts—that everything alive came aout o’ the water 
onct, an’ only needs a little change to go back agin’.326 
 
Humans are not so special, or so different from the ‘water-beasts’ that so horrified the narrator; and if 
we read ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ as an allegory for the dangers of immigration, white Anglo-
Saxons may not be so very different from the foreigners who reminded Lovecraft so frighteningly of 
‘deep-sea unnamabilities’. Lovett-Graff has suggested that the revelation of the narrator’s inhuman 
heredity may, in fact, have been partly inspired by Lovecraft’s own consternation at the discovery of 
his Welsh ancestry. Lovecraft had been fond of announcing his descent from ‘unmixed English 
gentry’,327 and Lovett-Graff detects an underlying anxiety in his joking remarks about the ‘Celtick 
taint’.328 After the debunking of Lamarckian theory, Lovett-Graff suggests, accepting evolutionary 
thought necessarily entailed accepting the immutability of inherited traits; a kind of entrapment in the 
biological that could reach out of the past to ensnare even the most ostensibly “civilised” human 
subject.
329
 Certainly, it does not seem implausible that somebody who held Lovecraft’s horror of racial 
mixing might have reacted with revulsion to the revelation of a ‘taint’ in his own heredity, and 
dramatised this horror in his fiction. 
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There is, however, a further dimension to the narrator’s discovery, one which suggests that there is 
more to ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ than a working-through of personal demons, and it is echoed in 
Richter’s assertion, with regard to miscegenation, that in fact ‘the anxiety of assimilation goes hand in 
hand with the desire for dissolution, diffusion, amalgamation’.330  Indeed, Simmons has suggested that 
Lovecraft’s ‘racially prejudiced comments belie a deeper and considerably more multifaceted 
engagement with concepts of the non-Western Other. A stance that is attracted to that which it is 
simultaneously repulsed by’.331 Unlike Arthur Jermyn, the narrator of ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ 
resists the suicidal solution—exclaiming, ‘No, I shall not shoot myself—I cannot be made to shoot 
myself!’—and undergoes a shift in perspective.332 After learning of his ancestry, he begins to suffer 
nightmares in which he sees the city of the Deep Ones, and even converses with his amphibious 
foremother. But as his transformation progresses, the horror of his dreams recedes, and he begins to 
find in them ‘a kind of exaltation instead of terror’.333 Eventually, he decides upon a plan of action: he 
will rescue his cousin, also of Deep One ancestry and at least partially transformed, from the madhouse 
in which he has been confined, and they will swim out to the reef beyond ‘marvel-shadowed 
Innsmouth’ to join their fellows, finally achieving immortality in the undersea city of Y’ha-nthlei.334 
We might read this change in the narrator’s mind as a further horror; a caution, on Lovecraft’s part, 
against the seductive potential of the Other. Perhaps we are seeing from the other side the loss of 
human reason experienced by Mary in ‘The Great God Pan’, or encountering a Delapore whose 
reversion has been permanent. Reason—a hallmark of the “civilised” human—has been defeated, and 
                                                 
330
 Richter, p. 120. (Emphasis in original.) 
331
 David Simmons, ‘“A Certain Resemblance”: Abject Hybridity in H. P. Lovecraft’s Short Fiction’, in New Critical Essays 
on H. P. Lovecraft, ed. by David Simmons (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 13-30 (p. 18). 
332
 Lovecraft, ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’, p. 335. 
333
 Ibid., p. 335. 
334
 Ibid., p. 335. 
230 
 
the narrator has regressed so far into animalism that he can no longer see the boundary that separated 
his human self from his ancestry. 
 
Lovett-Graff, however, has suggested that there is another layer to the story’s conclusion: that 
Lovecraft himself is caught up in the inevitability of reversion and, in effect, seduced in the same way 
as his narrator. Again, he reaches into the author’s personal past for answers, focusing particularly on 
the early death of Lovecraft’s mother, and reading the narrator’s dreamed encounters with his female 
ancestors as a kind of fantasised return to the womb.
335
 But if we look at the narrative from the wider 
perspective of evolutionary anxiety, I think its root is less simply locatable within the author’s 
biography. The great appeal that life as a Deep One holds for the narrator is the promise of immortality, 
of dwelling ‘amidst wonder and glory for ever’.336 It is perhaps the tenacious survival abilities of the 
Deep Ones that sound the most disturbing note in the narrator’s predictions of his future. In Lovecraft’s 
fiction, and in Machen’s, it often seems that “primitive”, pre-human entities, alien Others and 
evolutionary throwbacks possess abilities surpassing those of ordinary humans—abilities which 
humans have lost somewhere along the evolutionary ladder. In many cases, with their physical strength 
and reproductive capacity, they actually seem more fitted for survival than human beings. The Deep 
Ones fall squarely into this pattern: they have an established and sophisticated artistic tradition, 
evidenced in their jewellery; they are able to exert control over their environment, bringing plentiful 
fishing to Innsmouth; they are hinted, in the narrator’s dreams, to be telepathic; they are vastly 
numerous; and they live indefinitely unless killed by violent means. Although Spencer argued that 
‘lower life is that found in the sea’ because ‘it has the simpler environment’,337 the Deep Ones have 
overcome this principle, creating a complex built environment of their own in the deeps. In contrast, 
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the only example we meet of a purely human Innsmouther is old Zadok Allen, who himself exhibits 
some of the stigmata associated with degeneracy, being frail, unkempt, alcoholic, and ‘touched in the 
head’.338 Allen himself disappears after sharing his story with the narrator, apparently having met his 
doom at the Deep Ones’ webbed hands. In terms of the most basic of biological instincts—that of 
ensuring the survival of offspring—the islanders’ and the Innsmouthers’ decision to mate with the 
Deep Ones makes sound reproductive sense. Is it any wonder that they chose to sacrifice the human 
appearance of their bodies, when doing so has allowed them to ‘“[get] aout o’”’ perhaps the most 
fundamental and inescapable aspect of entrapment in the body—the ‘“idee o’ dyin’”’?339 
 
Barton Levi St. Armand has touched upon the intertwining, but differing, strands of horror that run 
through ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ in his study of ‘The Rats in the Walls’, The Roots of Horror in 
the Fiction of H. P. Lovecraft.
340
 He initially divides Lovecraft’s stories into two separate groups—tales 
of cosmic horror at the insignificance of humankind, and tales of evolutionary degeneration—but is 
unable to maintain the distinction, finding that alien forces, working from outer spheres or within the 
biology of the subject, are in all of Lovecraft’s fiction ‘at work to enable a complete take-over of the 
self at a personal level, or the human race at that of the species, or the planet on an ultimate cosmic 
plane’.341 We can certainly identify these elements at work in ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’. We see 
the personal transformation of the narrator; we see the potential for humanity to be overrun by the 
prodigious numbers of the Deep Ones; and, by mentioning the Deep Ones’ subservience to ‘Great 
Cthulhu’, Lovecraft ties the story in with his best-known tale of cosmic horror, and nods to the 
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possibility of earth’s eventual conquest by unknown outer forces.342 But the strands of horror are not so 
mutually reinforcing as St. Armand suggests, and in fact sit rather uneasily together. On the one hand, 
contemporary and personal fears of immigration are figured through the frailty of humanity in the face 
of an overwhelming invasion force surpassing it in numbers and longevity, and possessed of various 
supernatural and intellectual abilities. On the other, the offspring of such inter-species unions as would 
ensure survival for the partly-human children are themselves degenerate, and become objects of horror. 
In order to prevent their utter destruction, perhaps the best chance available to humans is interbreeding 
with the Deep Ones—but in taking it, they must forfeit their humanity, a price unthinkable to the racial 
purist Lovecraft. 
 
Perhaps the true root of horror in ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’, then, is not just immigrants, or just 
the Deep Ones who represent them, but the whole system of biological reproduction and natural 
selection in which all—immigrants and white Anglo-Saxons, Deep Ones and human beings—must 
participate. Biology is indeed a form of entrapment, and perhaps in a manner more comprehensive than 
that suggested by Lovett-Graff; we are ensnared not only by our heredity, the circumstances of our 
birth, but by the biological inevitability of death, and the instinct which compels us to avoid it. Both 
destruction and the kind of survival that circumstances dictate are equally horrific possibilities. Life, it 
would appear, is indeed a hideous thing.
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Chapter Four: Futures 
 
In Lovecraft: A Study in the Fantastic, Maurice Lévy argues against the classification of any of 
Lovecraft’s stories as science fiction. For Lévy, the salient identifying feature of the genre is a 
preoccupation with the future, and where Lovecraft uses the science fictional tropes of interstellar 
travel or extra-terrestrial encounters, he does so in order to explore the past—that of his characters, and 
of the human species as a whole. Lovecraft ‘belongs to that class of dreamers for whom the deep is also 
above’.1 Lévy’s definition of ‘science fiction’ here is dated at the very least—unsurprisingly, since his 
study is based upon a thesis submitted in 1969—if it ever had currency at all. Recent science fiction 
criticism allows more leeway within the genre—if genre it be!—for Lovecraft and his ilk. In particular, 
Carl Freedman’s updating of Darko Suvin’s concept of ‘cognitive estrangement’ is useful here. If for 
Suvin, a science fiction text must dissociate the reader from mainstream literary realism while 
accounting rationally for the different world that it posits, in Freedman’s analysis, what matters is ‘the 
attitude of the text itself to the kind of estrangements being performed’.2 In other words, the rationality 
of the text’s explanation for its ‘estrangements’ is to be determined within, not outside, its fictional 
world; neither the obsolescence of degeneration theory nor the absence of life on Pluto disqualify 
Lovecraft’s stories from the science fiction label. Though Freedman inquires, rather sniffily, whether, 
‘“The Shadow Over Innsmouth” (1936) and “The Dunwich Horror” (1929) earn the title of science 
fiction because their monstrosities have their origin not in the admitted supernatural but in vulgar 
                                                 
1
 Maurice Lévy, Lovecraft: A Study in the Fantastic, trans. S. T. Joshi (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), p. 70. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
2
 Carl Freedman, Critical Theory and Science Fiction (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2000), p. 18. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
234 
 
pseudo-Darwinian notions of degeneration’,3 he is ultimately forced to accept them into the science 
fiction library.
4
 
 
My main concern in this chapter, however, is not the insertion of Lovecraft’s work into some science 
fiction canon. Rather, I wish to read some of Lovecraft’s later works in the light of Utopian texts such 
as H. G. Wells’ Men Like Gods (1923) and Lord Lytton’s The Coming Race (1871), arguing for a 
concern with the imagined future of the “human” based in contemporary scientific narratives. 
Evolutionary theory necessitated imagining a future in which the “human”, if it survived, would be 
altered: Darwin had confidently predicted that ‘not one living species will transmit its unaltered 
likeness to a distant futurity’.5 Freedman, significantly, notes the importance of the science fictional 
text’s accounting for ‘the connections as well as the disconnections of [its imagined world] to our own 
empirical world’.6 Indeed, the ability of the science fiction text to extrapolate from conditions, 
information, or theories extant at the time of writing is one of its most compelling features. Lovecraft’s 
fiction frequently seeks to destabilise the relationship of the human subject with time, collapsing past 
and future together as it does so. The future of the “human”, in Lovecraft and in the weird tale more 
generally, often involves an atavistic return to past states of being; equally, the antediluvian horrors 
uncovered by his characters contain the germ of a human (or transhuman, or perhaps superhuman) 
future. Like the futuristic societies of conventional science fiction, Lovecraft’s imagined civilisations 
are technologically and socially advanced beyond those of humans, while the individuals who make 
them up far outclass us in intellectual capacity and physical toughness, and may possess preternatural 
abilities in other areas. As in Freedman’s science fictional texts, however, the sense of estrangement 
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from the human world that they create is counterbalanced by a connection to it. Despite their radical 
physiological differences from human beings, the Great Race of ‘The Shadow Out of Time’ (1936) and 
the Old Ones of ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ (1936) are in many ways “human” in their goals and 
psychologies. The narrator of ‘At the Mountains of Madness’, toward the novella’s end, actually 
exclaims, ‘Radiates, vegetables, monstrosities, star-spawn—whatever they had been, they were men!’7 
Lovecraft’s science fictional stories explore or expand upon tendencies extant in pre-existing scientific 
thought, rather than making any kind of radical break with it. 
 
One school of thought on which I have previously touched is the eugenics movement. In the preceding 
chapter, I focused mainly upon its concern with preventing the less “desirable” elements of society 
from breeding and thereby contaminating the reproductive pool, the repercussions this project had for 
marginalised members of society, and the ways in which racist and nationalist elements implicit in it 
chimed both with contemporary currents of anti-immigration sentiment and Lovecraft’s own personal 
views. Here, however, I should like to emphasise its more optimistic aspect. (“Optimistic”, that is, 
within the parameters of its own worldview; to characterise its aims of maintaining national or racial 
purity and of preventing the reproduction of disabled people as actually desirable is certainly not my 
object here!) Indeed, its basic tenets—its very existence—imply a belief in the perfectibility of the 
human species. Donald J. Childs discusses ‘the hopes of eugenists for the bodies of the British people’ 
faced with the possibility of degeneration: ‘over time, the body might be remade and redeemed.’8 Karl 
Pearson urged ‘hope of achievement’,9 arguing that the inevitable inheritance of negative traits was 
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‘only one side of the picture […] [if] the iniquity of the fathers be visited upon the children to the third 
and fourth generation—assuredly so is their virtue’.10 Such perceived possibilities perhaps concur more 
readily with the views expressed by Darwin than the dire predictions of backsliding made by the 
theorists of degeneration.  
 
In the Origin, Darwin emphasises the ‘perfection of structure and coadaptation’ of organic beings.11 
There are ‘beautiful adaptations’ everywhere; even ‘the humblest parasite’ has been ‘perfected’, and it 
would be foolish to attribute this to chance.
12
 Although willing to acknowledge that ‘there is no innate 
or necessary tendency in each being to its own advancement’, Darwin offers the comforting counter-
observation that, ‘[seeing] how hereditary evil qualities are, it is fortunate that good health, vigour, and 
longevity are equally inherited’.13 And, since ‘natural selection works solely by and for the good of 
each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection’.14 Even ‘the 
war of nature[…]famine and death’ are redeemed by the end to which they lead, this being ‘the most 
exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals’.15 
The future is ‘secure’.16 In the Descent, Darwin argues that 
 
[to] believe that man was aboriginally civilised and then suffered utter degradation in so 
many regions [as are inhabited by modern ‘savages’], is to take a pitiably low view of 
human nature. It is apparently a truer and more cheerful view that progress has been much 
more general than retrogression; that man has risen, though by slow and interrupted steps, 
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from a lowly condition to the highest standard as yet attained by him in knowledge, morals 
and religion.
17
 
  
A similarly optimistic tack is taken by T. H. Huxley, who acknowledges the ‘shock’ likely to be felt by 
those realising for the first time humanity’s descent from lower primates, but suggests that ultimately, 
we should ‘find in the lowly stock whence Man has sprung, the best evidence of the splendour of his 
capacities; and[…]discern in his long progress through the Past, a reasonable ground of faith in his 
attainment of a nobler Future’.18 Herbert Spencer, meanwhile, though maintaining the possibility of 
oscillating cycles of evolution and dissolution, argued that ‘the occasional production of a somewhat 
higher organism’ was inevitable, and that evolution could ‘end only in the establishment of the greatest 
perfection and the most complete happiness’.19 
 
As Richardson argues, Darwin’s emphasis upon sexual, rather than natural, selection in the Descent 
placed a renewed emphasis upon choice, and ‘tacitly granted humans agency in their own evolutionary 
development’.20 As early as the Origin, Darwin had suggested that the ‘power of man in accumulating 
by his Selection successive slight variations’ was ‘great’ (though it certainly did not compare to the 
results produced by natural selection).
21
 In The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, 
he had explicitly touched upon the importance of human agency in the breeding of domestic varieties: 
although human beings have no power over ‘the absolute conditions of life’—they cannot ‘“[tamper] 
with nature” and [cause] variability’—breeders have nonetheless ‘effected wonderful changes and 
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improvements’.22 Taken together, these emphases imply the possibility of similar ‘improvements’ in 
humanity.  
 
The notion of agency is emphasized by Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin and the founder of the 
eugenics movement, in his 1869 study, Hereditary Genius, where he writes that ‘each generation has 
enormous power over the natural gifts of those that follow, and[…]it is a duty we owe to humanity to 
investigate the range of that power and to exercise it in a way that, without being unwise towards 
ourselves, shall be most advantageous to future inhabitants of the earth’.23 Galton argues that ‘as a new 
race can be obtained in animals and plants[…]so a race of gifted men might be obtained’,24 and 
concludes that ‘the human race has a large control over its future forms of activity,—far more than any 
individual has over his own’.25 We ‘may not be able to originate, but we can guide’—and it is 
imperative that we do so.
26
 Although Galton does acknowledge degeneration as a possibility,
27
 it is far 
from inevitable in his analysis, progress being the dominant narrative. The notion of original sin, for 
Galton, does not connote a fall from some previous state of perfection, but rather ‘that [man] was rising 
in moral culture with more rapidity than the nature of his race could follow’ and that ‘the human race 
were utter savages in the beginning; and that, after myriads of years of barbarism, man has but very 
recently found his way into the paths of morality and civilisation’.28 In Inquiry into Human Faculty and 
its Development (1883), he exhorts his readers to active participation in the evolutionary process as a 
liberating project: ‘man’ ought, he writes 
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to be less diffident than he is usually instructed to be, and to rise to the conception that he 
has a considerable function to perform in the order of events, and that his exertions are 
needed. It seems to me that he should look upon himself more as a freeman, with power of 
shaping the course of future humanity, and that he should look upon himself less as the 
subject of a despotic government, in which case it would be his chief merit to depend 
wholly upon what had been regulated for him, and to render abject obedience.
29
 
 
 We might yet evolve further from the state of our animal ancestors—but whether or not this means that 
we will become more “human” is up for debate. Virginia Richter suggests that eugenics—which she 
calls ‘the internal colonisation of the social body by scientific means’—was an attempt to counter ‘the 
upsetting messiness of evolution’ and to contain the ‘danger of degeneration’; but her description of its 
project as the creation of ‘a civilised, designed organism, eschewing sickness and crime, uniting 
“health, and strength, intellect and virtue”’ illustrates that it went further than mere damage control.30 
 
 
Utopian Impulses and Utopian Texts 
 
In Archaeologies of the Future, Fredric Jameson argues the existence of an ‘obscure yet omnipresent 
Utopian impulse’ existing outside the pages of the Utopian literary text, present in daily life and 
political practice.
31
 Further, the imagined Utopian solution to a social problem ‘must at first be a 
fundamentally negative one, and stand as a clarion call to remove and to extirpate this specific root of 
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all evil from which all the others spring’.32 In the case of the eugenics movement, unregulated human 
reproduction would seem to constitute the ‘root of all evil’ whose removal would allow for a radically 
improved society. Certainly—though we should not forget its harmful misconceptions—the 
movement’s desire to improve the human species, and thus the society built by it, would seem to 
exemplify the Utopian impulse. It is notable that eugenic viewpoints were adopted by many who might 
otherwise be seen as progressives (in the contemporary, left-wing political sense of that loaded word); 
as Childs puts in, ‘Galton’s eugenics made for a church as broad as that of its opponents’.33 Richardson 
notes the ‘oppressive ideas that coexisted with the emancipatory theories of some New Women—ideas 
that were supremely class conscious’, the ‘sustained enthusiasm for biological determinism’ held by 
some prominent New Women writers, and the use ‘eugenic feminists’ made of ideas about the 
importance of rational reproduction to promote female choice.
34
 Richter seems to express surprise that 
‘a genuine concern for the welfare of human beings from all classes is linked to the notion of a 
regulative biopolitics’ and that ‘[the] violence and oppression inherent in the “restriction of undesirable 
marriages” appear to be simply invisible to the early followers of Galton’.35 It would be a mistake, 
however, to expect the Utopian impulses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries necessarily 
to adhere to present-day standards of ethics. To seek to “left-wash” the politics of Lovecraft—as Paul 
Buhle does when he argues for a ‘proposed alliance with revolutionary art’ and a concern with ‘the will 
of millions to overcome the existing order’ in Lovecraft’s fiction36—or of nineteenth- and early 
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twentieth-century Utopianism is not my aim here. Rather, I would hope to illustrate that the cultural 
products of a Utopian impulse may be inextricable from the reactionary discourses within whose 
parameters they took shape—one of the arguments put forward in favour of eugenic measures was that 
‘through the judicious control of human reproduction[…]paradise on earth might be gained, and 
Britain’s supremacy in the world maintained’37—but that they are its products nonetheless. Childs notes 
that the discourse of eugenics ‘apparently circulated in turn-of-the-century Europe and America to 
simultaneously oppressive and emancipatory effect—both in the realm of modern social policy and in 
the realm of the modern literary imagination’,38 and Clare Hanson has argued that this continued well 
into the twentieth century, detailing the eugenic sympathies of William Beveridge, C. P. Blacker, 
Margaret Sanger, and others,
39
 and the ‘biological racism’ inherent in Blacker’s proposals for treatment 
of the ‘mentally defective’.40 The resurgence enjoyed by Utopian fiction in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries might well have been informed by, as well as helping to construct, social 
movements including eugenics.  
 
Galton makes explicit reference to Utopian imaginings when he envisions his work in Hereditary 
Genius leading to a project of ‘gradually raising the present miserably low standard of the human race 
to one in which the Utopias in the dreamland of philanthropists may become practical possibilities’.41 
In the later years of his life (c. 1910), he even worked upon an unpublished fictional Utopia, 
‘Kantsaywhere’, aiming to influence future generations with it in the same way as More or Plato.42 In 
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Galton’s Utopia, his suggestion in his 1901 Huxley lecture that ‘[an] enthusiasm to improve the race 
would probably express itself by granting diplomas to a select class of young men and women’ and 
encouraging them to marry is played out.
43
 A eugenic college issues marks to citizens determining the 
status of their marriages and the number of children they will be allowed to have; those who fail to pass 
are treated in a manner ‘as pleasant as might be, so long as they [propagate] no children. If they [do] so 
kindness [is] changed into sharp severity.’44 The principle of charity is here directed toward the 
improvement of the racial stock: one rich philanthropist states ‘with much emphasis’ in his will that 
‘none of the income of his property was to be spent on the support of the naturally feeble. It was 
intended, on the contrary, to help those who were strong by nature multiply and be well-nourished’.45  
For Galton, imagining Utopia necessitates imagining a eugenic programme. Certainly, other Utopian 
texts of the period depict with some frequency societies and peoples governed—and usually 
improved—by eugenic programmes, or shaped by processes of natural selection that have worked to 
bring about the same ends desired by eugenicists.  
 
The Vril-Ya of Lord Lytton’s The Coming Race, for example, believe themselves to have been exiled 
from the upper world to the vast subterranean caverns where they live ‘in order to perfect [their] 
condition and attain to the purest elimination of [their] species by the severity of the struggles [their] 
forefathers underwent’, and expect eventually to ‘return to the upper world, and supplant all the inferior 
races now existing therein’.46 The human narrator, having fallen into the realm of the Vril-Ya in an 
accident, is calmly informed by his host that, while not a savage, he does not appear ‘to belong to any 
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civilized people’,47 and discovers that the Vril-Ya look upon those races incapable of commanding the 
invisible force called ‘vril’—their principal source of both power and weaponry—‘with more disdain 
than citizens of New York regard the negroes’.48 Natural selection here has, at least initially, eliminated 
the need for artificial selection, but has been embraced by the Vril-Ya having engendered their 
civilisation, their superiority to the ‘barbarous tribes’ on the fringes of their lands and the humans of the 
surface,
49
 and their control over their environment. Their commitment to continuing its work, and 
maintaining their racial pride, is thereby ensured. César Guarde Paz has suggested that, although 
Lovecraft did not mention Lytton’s novel in his correspondence until 1933, it is likely that he had read 
it earlier.
50
 
 
H. G. Wells’ Men Like Gods, meanwhile, quite explicitly lays out the problem of the uncontrolled 
reproduction of the ‘all too common common man’, and the ways in which artificial selection has 
contributed to the perfecting of Utopia.
51
 Wells was an enthusiastic subscriber to the eugenic doctrine,
52
 
and Men Like Gods makes a sustained fictional argument for it. The Utopians have reached a higher 
pinnacle of civilisation than is imaginable to the ‘Earthlings’ who blunder into their world. They are 
uniformly attractive, creative, calm in temperament, and possessed of scientific curiosity.
53
 Their 
control over the natural environment and the animals within it is absolute.
54
 They are able to 
communicate telepathically, and need use speech only with the lower animals.
55
 They look upon the 
period of their history corresponding to Wells’s present as an ‘Age of Confusion’ during which 
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exploitation and injustice were enabled by one ‘fundamental evil out of which all the others that 
afflicted the race arose’ (note the near-identity of Wells’ and Jameson’s phrasing!): overpopulation.56 
The necessity of a eugenic solution is insisted upon repeatedly, in language that invokes both that used 
by the eugenics movement, and the Darwinian theory of natural selection. The Utopians, we are told, 
had to ensure their fitness to survive, and to conquer. The population explosion of the Age of Confusion 
was an ‘overwhelming flood’, made up not of recognisable individual subjects, but ‘great masses of 
population that had blundered into existence’; these people—a ‘festering, excessive mass’—formed  
the ‘natural prey’ of a ‘predatory and acquisitive few’.57 
 
The idyllic Utopian present is a direct result of carefully controlled breeding, both of the animals over 
whom Utopians have absolute control, and of the Utopians themselves. The novel’s protagonist, Mr. 
Barnstaple—one of the ‘Earthlings’ who has blundered into Utopia by accident—considers this to be 
‘the most natural and necessary phase in human history’, accepting immediately the superiority of the 
healthy and beautiful Utopians to his Earth companions, with their ‘carelessly assembled features and 
bodily disproportions’.58 Objections to the Utopian way of life—and, by extension, to the eugenic 
programme—are expressed in the reactionary tirades of Father Amerton, who objects to reproductive 
control on religious grounds, and the politician Rupert Catskill, whose recklessly impassioned rhetoric 
satirizes that of the then politically unsuccessful Churchill. Both are faintly ridiculous figures, and the 
Earthlings’ later doomed attempt at a conquest of Utopia will ultimately result in their destruction. At 
first, however, the Utopians address their concerns with calm rationality, explaining that the qualities 
Catskill extols—‘struggle and competition and conflict’—are not missed in Utopia. To the Utopian 
Urthred, they are no more desirable than ‘[the] gnawing vigour of the rat[…]the craving pursuit of the 
                                                 
56
 Ibid., p. 57. 
57
 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
58
 Wells, Men Like Gods, p. 74. 
245 
 
wolf, the mechanical persistence of wasp and fly and disease germ’. In eradicating them, the Utopians 
have ‘lost nothing worth having’.59 The denizens of Utopia, rather than degenerating, as Catskill 
suggests, are a radically improved strain of humanity whose peaceful but intellectually adventurous 
way of life is beyond the grasp of such undeveloped individuals as Catskill and Amerton. We learn that 
there has been ‘a certain deliberate elimination of ugly, malignant, narrow, stupid and gloomy types’.60 
In the Utopian present, almost every living person 
 
would have ranked as an energetic creative spirit in former days. There are few dull and no 
really defective people in Utopia; the idle strains, the people of lethargic dispositions or 
weak imaginations, have mostly died out; the melancholic type has taken its dismissal and 
gone; spiteful and malignant characters are disappearing. The vast majority of Utopians are 
active, sanguine, inventive, receptive and good-tempered. 
61
 
 
The Age of Confusion seems also to have been characterised by what would have been hallmarks of 
modernity in Wells’ day—unfettered enterprise and industrialisation—corresponding roughly to the 
‘real’ world that Barnstaple inhabits. The interrelatedness of past and future is once again implied. 
Eugenic progress has allowed the population of Utopia to return to a simpler and more peaceful mode 
of being. The Utopian present is imagined as a combination of technologically and eugenically 
perfected future, and idealised rural past. Something similar can be seen in the eponymous nation of 
Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872), whose inhabitants have banned all forms of mechanical contrivance, 
even confiscating the narrator’s wristwatch.62 
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There is, however, something slightly uncanny about the inhabitants of these Utopian texts: a ‘chilly 
inhumanity’ of the kind remarked on by Richter in her discussion of Utopias, unavoidable, since 
‘conquering the passions entails a lack of compassion for lesser humans’.63 Wells’s Utopians, for all 
their beauty, intelligence, and even-temperedness, are slightly disconcerting. The title of the novel 
invokes their difference from earthly humans, and in the first few pages, we find Utopians referred to 
as ‘elfin’64 and compared to a ‘“Greek god—and goddess”’.65 Barnstaple finds himself made uneasy 
by the way a Utopian woman seems to regard him; the narrative notes that ‘though he liked her to 
smile he wished that she had not smiled in the way she did’.66 The differences between Earthlings and 
Utopians are expanded upon later in the novel. Barnstaple becomes aware that their emotions and 
affections differ from those he is used to. They love ‘a little hardly’, and lack ‘pity’ and ‘tenderness’—
unsurprisingly, since they are ‘in no way pitiful’.67 When Barnstaple falls on a staircase and winds 
himself, Crystal, the young Utopian boy he has befriended, is ‘polite rather than sympathetic’; a true 
Utopian, he is ‘as hard as his name’.68 We may be reminded of eugenic opposition to charity as 
expressed by Galton in ‘Kantsaywhere’ and in other eugenic works. The tension between ‘human 
sympathy’ and the disaster that eugenicists saw as an inevitable consequence of the unchecked 
reproduction of the lower classes is summed up in the following passage from Pearson’s 1907 lecture 
on The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics: 
 
We see pain and suffering only to relieve it, without inquiry into the moral character of the 
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sufferer or as to his national or racial value. And this is right—no man is responsible for his 
own being; and nature and nurture, over which he had no control, have made him the being 
he is, good or evil. But here science steps in, crying, ‘Let the reprieve be accepted, but next 
remind the social conscience of its duty to the race. No nation can preserve its efficiency 
unless dominant fertility be associated with the mentally and physically fitter stocks. The 
reprieve is granted, but let there be no heritage if you would build up and preserve a virile 
and efficient people.’69 
 
If there is to be ‘no heritage’ of weakness, there can be no inheritance of the impulse to protect it. 
‘Human sympathy’ is a temporary measure. Galton, in Hereditary Genius, similarly stops short of 
condemning charity outright, but exhorts, ‘let us do what we can to encourage the multiplication of 
the races best fitted to invent and conform to a high and generous civilisation, and not, out of a 
mistaken instinct of giving support to the weak, prevent the incoming of strong and hearty 
individuals’.70 In the later Inquiry into Human Faculty and its Development, he is somewhat more 
strident, asserting that ‘sentiment[…]against the gradual extinction of an inferior race’ is ‘for the most 
part quite unreasonable’, and that while it is natural that  
 
the members of an inferior class should dislike being elbowed out of the way[…]it may be 
somewhat brutally argued that whenever two individuals struggle for a single place, one 
must yield, and that there will be no greater unhappiness on the whole, if the inferior yield 
to the superior than conversely, whereas the world will be permanently enriched by the 
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success of the superior.
71
 
 
By this time, charity is certainly not for the support of the ‘weak’; rather, ‘it is requisite for the 
speedier evolution of a more perfect humanity that it should be so distributed as to favour the best-
adapted races’.72 If Wells’ Utopians are the product of such a system, it is hardly surprising that they 
lack sympathy for those less well ‘adapted’ than themselves.  
 
 Increasingly, Barnstaple becomes aware that he has access only to parts of Utopian thought. He can 
hear only those parts of the Utopians’ telepathic communication that he can understand. Despite his 
enthusiasm for Utopia, he comes to realise that ‘[the] gulfs of misunderstanding might be wider and 
deeper than he was assuming. A totally illiterate Gold Coast negro trying to master thermo-electricity 
would have set himself a far more hopeful task’.73 Although they still resemble the humans of 
Barnstaple’s world, in their assured power, the Utopians are ‘passing beyond man towards a nobler 
humanity. They [are] becoming different in kind’.74 
 
The Vril-Ya of Lytton’s The Coming Race have an even more strongly disconcerting effect upon the 
novel’s human narrator. His first sight of a member of the race inspires ‘awe’ and ‘terror’.75 He 
instantly knows this person to be ‘a type of man distinct from our known extant races’, and compares 
him to a ‘sculptured sphinx’.76 Although it is ‘intellectual’, ‘beauteous’, and ‘tranquil’, he reacts to the 
Vril-Ya’s face with ‘a cold shudder’, sprung from ‘that instinct of danger which the sight of a tiger or 
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serpent arouses’.77 The steadfast belief of the Vril-Ya in their own superiority, combined with the 
awesome power they control in the vril force, actually renders them a threat to humankind. Unlike 
Wells’s peaceful Utopians, who retaliate with violence only when the Earthlings attempt to attack their 
civilisation (and who in any case inhabit an alternate world), the Vril-Ya foresee a colonial project in 
their future. Prophesies among their oldest texts tell that the Vril-Ya ‘are destined to return to the upper 
world, and supplant all the inferior races now existing therein’.78 The narrator considers the likelihood 
of their successfully doing so, and concludes that, given the vastly greater power of the Vril-Ya, and 
the combative nature of humanity, they would undoubtedly be able to destroy human beings and take 
over within a week.
79
 
 
I have chosen here to mention these two texts and the uncanny inhabitants of their Utopias, but more of 
the same can be found in many Utopian or critical Utopian texts of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. One might think of the ‘perversion of thought’ among Samuel Butler’s Erewhonians, who 
regard illness and disease as punishable moral failings while robbery and violence are treated with 
sympathy,
80
 or the affectless relationships and mindless entertainments pursued by the inhabitants of 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), itself a satirical response to the Utopian imaginings of 
Wells.
81
 Both the Utopian impulse to imagine a future of great evolutionary and technological 
advances, and the uncanny underside of such imaginings, are present in some of Lovecraft’s latest 
weird tales, and I will focus here upon three stories featuring advanced extra-terrestrial races and their 
civilisations. Terrifying singular beings such as Cthulhu and Dagon are certainly vastly greater in size 
and power than humankind, but they offer little scope for speculation on a human future (or if they do, 
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it is a very different kind of speculation). Rather, they serve to illustrate the relative insignificance of 
humans in the face of a vast and indifferent cosmos—an important theme in Lovecraft’s work, to be 
sure, but one constantly called into question by its obsession with the nature and status of humanity, 
which is my concern here. In the remainder of this chapter, I will be looking in detail at ‘The 
Whisperer in Darkness’ (1931), ‘The Shadow Out of Time’ (1936), and ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ 
(written in 1931, but not published until 1936). The latter two pieces place their civilisations, though 
extra-terrestrial in origin, in the most distant reaches of Earth’s past. ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’, the 
only story whose aliens make incursions into the lives of contemporary human beings, is the one I 
shall consider first. 
 
 
Horrific Transhumanism: ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’ 
 
Peter Penzoldt, in an excerpt from The Supernatural in Fiction, relates the idea of the pre- or non-
human survival, as used in ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ and ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’, to 
Machen’s use of the Little People. He calls it ‘a highly-evolved and completely renewed form of 
Machen’s primitive idea’.82 The idea, as already discussed, is not Machen’s; it first appears in full in 
David MacRitchie’s The Testimony of Tradition (1890), and recurs in modified form in the work of 
Margaret Murray, Lovecraft’s familiarity with which is clear from his direct allusions to it in his 
stories.
83
 In the phrase ‘highly-evolved’, however, Penzoldt—perhaps inadvertently—touches on the 
important difference here, for Lovecraft and Machen really treat the idea very differently. Machen’s 
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survivals are primitive, where Lovecraft’s are pre-human only in terms of Earth’s chronology. In their 
social, biological, and technological development, they provide post-human models. 
 
The Mi-Go of ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’ are a race of technologically advanced crab-like ‘fungi’ 
whose nearest habitation to Earth is Yuggoth, a small planet on the rim of our solar system  
corresponding to Pluto. They visit remote hilly areas in rural Vermont in order to mine for minerals 
they are unable to obtain on the planets where they live. Local inhabitant Henry Akeley is aware of 
their presence and attempts to document it, bringing himself under attack by them in the process. This 
part of the narrative is related from the point of view of Wilmarth (previously encountered in ‘The 
Dunwich Horror’), with whom Akeley is in close correspondence, and who has previously been 
sceptical of the Mi-Go’s existence, but is persuaded by the ‘specific and logical’ manner in which 
Akeley makes his case.
84
 After a series of increasingly frightening near-encounters, however, Akeley 
changes his tune. In a bizarre letter, he informs Wilmarth that the Mi-Go do not, after all, pose any 
threat to humanity, but merely wish to establish an intellectual rapport and to share their own scientific 
and technical knowledge. He invites Wilmarth to visit him in Vermont, where he, too, will become 
party to the many secrets they wish to share. Wilmarth duly makes the trip, and is startled to find his 
correspondent the victim of a bizarre illness which lends him a ‘damnably abnormal and corpse-like’ 
appearance and gives his voice a curious, buzzing timbre.
85
 Akeley informs him that the Mi-Go intend 
to take him along on their interstellar voyages by removing his brain and transporting it in a metal 
canister while his body remains in suspended animation on Earth. That night, however, Wilmarth 
wakes and overhears a conversation that leads him to suspect that all is not as it seems, Wilmarth flees 
the premises—but not before his suspicions are confirmed. On entering the study, in which Akeley had 
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claimed he planned to sleep, he finds Akeley’s chair empty but for his hands and face, or near-identical 
replicas thereof. The entity with whom Wilmarth has spent the afternoon conversing—the titular 
‘whisperer’—is not his friend at all, but an alien creature in disguise. 
 
Although ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’ deals with an alien race visiting the Earth of Lovecraft’s day, 
the collapsing together of past and future is present here in implication. Initially, Wilmarth is sceptical 
of the Mi-Go’s existence, insisting that the testimonies of rural inhabitants who claim to have seen their 
dead bodies are ‘wild, vague tales which [seem][...]clearly an outgrowth of old rustic superstitions’.86 
The folklore to which Wilmarth refers is ‘primitive’, ‘half-remembered’, ‘ancient’, ‘largely forgotten 
by the present generation’, and ‘obviously [reflects] the influence of still earlier Indian tales’.87 We 
might well be reminded here of the fairylore and Turanian dwarf theory upon which Machen drew for 
his Little People stories, particularly when we learn that ‘[those] with Celtic legendry in their 
heritage[…]linked them vaguely with the malign fairies and “little people” of the bogs and raths’,88 
and indeed, Wilmarth makes the connection explicit a little later, implying that those who believe there 
to be some element of truth behind the stories have simply been reading too much Machen.
89
 Certainly, 
the past here is not the pre-Industrial Revolution idyll imagined in Wells’ Utopia. Rather, it is 
‘atavistical’ and pre-rational, even sinister.90 Towards the end of the story, on his journey to Akeley’s 
farmhouse, Wilmarth speculates—in true Machen style—about the ‘alien and incredible things’, the 
‘armies of elemental spirits’, that the landscape here might harbour. 91 It is ‘a region half-bewitched 
through the piling-up of unbroken time-accumulations; a region where old, strange things have had a 
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chance to grow and linger because they have never been stirred up’.92 At the beginning of the story, 
however, the folklore surrounding the Mi-Go appears to be primitive superstition, the remnant of an 
irrational set of beliefs that ought to be regarded at best with amusement by modern, scientifically-
minded human beings. 
 
And such human beings Wilmarth and Akeley undoubtedly are. These men of science are reluctant to 
jump to conclusions without overwhelming evidence, and admit the existence of the Mi-Go only with 
numerous caveats. Wilmarth, right at the beginning of the story, reminds us that he ‘did not see any 
actual visual horror at the end’, and admits that he ‘cannot prove even now whether [he] was right or 
wrong in [his] hideous inference’. Only his belief that ‘the plainest facts’ support the reality of what he 
saw has induced him to share the story.
93
 Indeed, for the early portions of the story, Wilmarth presents 
himself as an amused sceptic, in sharp contrast to the ‘wonder-loving grandmothers and retrospective 
nonagenarians’ who whisper tales of the Mi-Go’s existence.94 He regards the believers who—like 
certain euhemerist folklorists of the late Victorian period—insist that the existence of the legends ‘must 
argue the real existence of some queer elder earth-race’ as foolish ‘romanticists’, and does not hesitate 
to mock their theories openly.
95
  
 
A debate on the issue in the letters page of a small newspaper, however, brinks Wilmarth and his 
scepticism to the attention of Henry Wentworth Akeley. Wilmarth cautions us that ‘[eccentricity]’ may 
be responsible for Akeley’s ‘strange acts and apprehensions toward the last’, and that his fearful 
attitude to the landscape amid which he grew up does not, in itself, constitute proof of a malign 
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presence in it: ‘thousands’, we are reminded, ‘are subject to just such morbid fears’.96 Akeley, however, 
is not superstitious; neither is he interested in spreading the story for the sake of entertainment or a 
good scare. In fact, he publicly supports Wilmarth in the debate, insisting that ‘it does not do for people 
to know too much about these matters’, and expressing a desire to prevent the curious from delving 
further in search of the legends’ source.97 Wilmarth, furthermore, has nothing but praise for Akeley’s 
character and intellectual rigour. He is, we are told, of ‘a long, locally distinguished line of jurists, 
administrators and gentlemen-agriculturalists’.98 In Lovecraft—for whom heredity is always destiny—
there can be no higher recommendation. He is ‘a notable student of mathematics, astronomy, biology, 
anthropology, and folklore’, and ‘a man of character, education, and intelligence’; he assumes nothing 
without solid evidence, and is ‘amazingly willing to leave his conclusions in a tentative state like a true 
man of science’.99 Again and again, Wilmarth affirms his confidence in Akeley’s ‘sanity’ and in his 
scholarly credentials.
100
 Little wonder, then, that Wilmarth finds himself persuaded that there is 
something to Akeley’s stories. Akeley’s attitude—which is ‘removed as far as imaginable from the 
demented, the fanatical, the hysterical, or even the extravagantly speculative’—and the material 
evidence he provides suggest that the legends must have a source, even if it is not the improbable-
sounding one that Akeley suggests.
101
 Ironically—though perhaps also appropriately—Wilmarth at first 
speculates that the Mi-Go voice captured on a phonograph record by Akeley may belong to ‘some 
hidden, night-haunting human being decayed to a state not much above that of lower animals’.102  
 
At length, however, Wilmarth is convinced of the existence of the creatures by Akeley’s rationalist 
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attitude and ability to provide evidence, and when the Mi-Go, in a letter purportedly from Akeley, 
invite him to visit Akeley’s isolated farmhouse to view the evidence in person, his scientific curiosity 
leaves him unable to resist.
103
 It is to these qualities—the characteristics that make Wilmarth and 
Akeley ‘[men] of science’, consummately advanced and civilised human beings—that the Mi-Go quite 
deliberately appeal, presenting themselves as kindred knowledge-seeking spirits, and offering 
Wilmarth a way beyond the limitations of extant human knowledge. Wilmarth admits his ‘zeal for the 
unknown’, and ponders the exciting possibilities of “Akeley”’s promise, exclaiming: 
 
To shake off the maddening and wearying limitations of time and space and natural law—to 
be linked with the vast outside—to come close to the nighted and abysmal secrets of the 
infinite and the ultimate—surely such a thing was worth the risk of one’s life, soul, and 
sanity!
104
 
 
Wilmarth’s language here is hardly different from that of the Mi-Go masquerading as Akeley: “Akeley” 
enthuses that ‘as much of[…]infinity as any human brain can hold is eventually to be opened up to 
[him]’,105 exclaims that ‘[what he] had thought morbid and shameful and ignominious is in reality 
awesome and mind-expanding and even glorious’,106 and expresses gratitude for the ‘rich boon of 
knowledge and intellectual adventure’ he has been granted.107 As readers, we already suspect that 
Akeley is not the author of the letter at all—but with so close an understanding of human curiosity, we 
might still be tempted to believe that the Mi-Go’s desire for ‘peace’ and ‘intellectual rapport’ is 
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genuine.
108
 We learn, that they ‘like to take away men of learning once in a while, to keep informed on 
the state of things in the human world’,109 and that their ‘curiosity respecting men’ is well-known.110 
They are more highly advanced than any other known species; while Lovecraft’s stories elsewhere use 
alien beings to represent the horrific possibility of human backsliding, the Mi-Go are ‘members of a 
cosmos-wide race of which all other life-forms are merely degenerate variants’.111 Their apparent 
possession of attributes associated with human progress places them as a potential template for the 
future of humankind. 
 
This future, however, is not quite so bright as “Akeley” would have us believe. The Mi-Go, it 
transpires, are sinister after all, their frightening otherness consisting not only in the real physical 
threat they have thus far appeared to pose to Akeley, but in their radical physical alterity, and in the 
effect they have upon humans, including their allies. The narrative is littered with fairly detailed 
physical description of the bodies of the Mi-Go—bodies that, despite some superficial similarities in 
colour and size, are definitely not human. They are repeatedly described as ‘things’ and ‘creatures’;112 
they are ‘bizarre and disturbing objects’ and ‘strange shapes’,113 ‘morbidities’,114 and ‘blasphemies’.115 
They combine apparently disparate physical characteristics, being compared variously to crustaceans 
and bats,
116
 and possessing ‘membraneous wings’, ‘articulated limbs’, and ‘a sort of convoluted 
ellipsoid, covered with multitudes of very short antennae’ in place of a head.117 Their footprints are 
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‘queer’,118 and the substance that makes up their bodies cannot be captured on film; when Akeley finds 
a dead specimen and attempts to photograph it, he finds that it does not show up, remarking in 
bewilderment that ‘[it] was surely made of matter—but what kind of matter?’.119 The Mi-Go have 
abilities far surpassing those of mankind: they can fly, even in interstellar space;
120
 they possess 
‘telepathic and hypnotic powers’;121 and they are able to function without light, having ‘other, subtler 
senses’.122 Their bodies resist classification, overspill the bounds of category and of human knowledge, 
recalling the monstrous hybridity of a Helen Vaughan or a Wilbur Whateley. For all their apparent 
kinship with us when it comes to scientific curiosity, their bodies are indelibly marked with otherness; 
the reader is never allowed to forget their difference. Their use of language, too, reinforces their alien 
nature. Shortly before his disappearance, Akeley receives a letter from them, informing him of the way 
in which they plan to remove his brain and take him to Yuggoth. He is unable, however, to repeat the 
information to Wilmarth, saying only that being locked in an asylum would be ‘better than what the 
other creatures would do’.123 The letter, in order to be intelligible to Akeley, must be written in English 
or another language with which he is familiar—but Akeley himself, although using the same medium 
(the above appears in his correspondence with Wilmarth), is unable to express the same idea. Human 
language is used here for an inhuman purpose. Similarly, the speech of the Mi-Go has an unsettling 
effect upon those who hear it. Native American legends warn that it is ‘not good’ to hear ‘what they 
[whisper] at night in the forest with voices like a bee’s that [try] to be like the voices of men’.124 
Wilmarth’s reaction to hearing the voice on the phonograph record that Akeley sends him is stronger 
still. It is ‘an accursed buzzing which [has] no likeness to humanity despite the human words which it 
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[utters] in good English grammar and a scholarly accent’.125 The importance of mimicry—and 
competent mimicry at that—is unmistakable here. The speaker’s mastery of the tools of human 
communication renders its inhumanity more shocking, more strikingly uncanny. Wilmarth talks at 
length about the alien nature of the voice a couple of pages later: 
 
[Though] that voice is always in my ears, I have not even yet been able to analyse it well 
enough for a graphic description. It was like the drone of some loathsome, gigantic insect 
ponderously shaped into the articulate speech of an alien species, and I am perfectly certain 
that the organs producing it can have no resemblance to the vocal organs of man, or indeed 
to those of any of the mammalia. There were singularities of timbre, range, and overtones 
which placed this phenomenon wholly outside the sphere of humanity and earth-life.
126
 
 
The Mi-Go may inhabit the human sphere and possess human culture while remaining inhuman. We 
might be reminded here of the fears of alien blood “passing” as human that we find in tales like ‘The 
Dunwich Horror’, and, indeed, the anxieties are not unrelated. ‘The Dunwich Horror’ and ‘The 
Shadow Over Innsmouth’ present us with visions of humanity supplanted by an undeveloped but 
overwhelmingly powerful alien horde; the Mi-Go, with their ability both to inhabit the human and to 
exceed its bounds, suggest another kind of displacement—one in which the human, in the very process 
of its development, becomes other. 
 
The gradual becoming-other of the human occurs in a rather more literal fashion here, too, of course. 
The effects apparently produced by the Mi-Go upon their human allies, and the horrific transhuman 
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possibilites of the machines in which they propose to transport Akeley and Wilmarth to Yuggoth, imply 
both progress and dehumanisation. Clare Hanson has noted the coining of the term ‘transhumanism’ by 
Julian Huxley in 1957, and his suggestion that it would involve ‘“man remaining man, but 
transcending himself, by realising new possibilities of and for his human nature”’.127 In ‘The 
Whisperer in Darkness’, however, the capacity of a significantly altered humanity to remain “human” 
is called into question. The story may be said to anticipate the engagement of later science fiction texts 
with ‘the tension between belief in scientific progress and fear of destruction’, the specificity of the 
“human” being the thing here destroyed.128 The ‘telepathic and hypnotic powers’ of the Mi-Go are 
apparently passed on to their human ‘agents’.129 The agent who removes a package from Akeley from 
the train before it reaches Wilmarth appears to have used some kind of hypnosis on the station clerk 
with whom he spoke, leaving the clerk ‘scarcely sure that he could even recognise the strange inquirer 
again’.130 These new abilities, however, come at a steep cost; those who collaborate with the Mi-Go 
undergo ‘a repellent mental change’, and are ‘shunned and whispered about as mortals who [have] sold 
themselves to the strange beings’.131 One agent, who sends a false telegram to Wilmarth under 
Akeley’s name, is described as ‘a strange[…]man with a curiously thick, droning voice’.132 It seems 
significant that the timbre of his voice—the same characteristic used to establish the otherness of the 
Mi-Go themselves—signifies his strangeness; the agent, it seems, has taken on some of the attributes 
of his inhuman masters. Even Akeley, before his replacement by a Mi-Go impostor, appears to be 
feeling their influence to a degree, explaining that, although it would be safest for him to leave 
Vermont and move in with his son in California, he feels that ‘something inside [his] mind holds [him] 
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back’.133 The human, under Mi-Go influence, gains alien abilities, but also becomes subject to alien 
whims. It becomes less human. 
 
Of course, the Mi-Go can also pass themselves off as human, as in the case of the false Akeley with 
whom Wilmarth converses. The letter Wilmarth receives from “Akeley” inviting him to Vermont gives 
the first clue; although it is written in perfect English, and shows the writer to be aware of the details of 
Akeley’s situation, Wilmarth finds it ‘curiously different’ from Akeley’s earlier correspondence.134 He 
remarks upon the altered ‘flavour of the style’135 (although, in fact, both sets of correspondence are 
quite distinctively Lovecraftian), and upon Akeley’s ‘unheralded, lightning-like, and complete’ 
transition from fear to ‘exultation’.136 Indeed, the degree to which Akeley’s attitude and manner have 
changed leads Wilmarth to question his correspondent’s sanity, remarking that 
 
the change in Akeley’s own manner, attitude, and language was so vastly beyond the 
normal or the predictable. The man’s whole personality seemed to have undergone an 
insidious mutation—a mutation so deep that one could scarcely reconcile his two aspects 
with the supposition that both represented equal sanity.
137
 
 
And when Wilmarth finally comes face to face with Akeley in his study in Vermont, he finds this 
strangeness even more pronounced. He finds his affection for his scholarly correspondent waning fast, 
replaced by an instinctive dislike; although he pities Akeley’s apparent illness, he finds ‘ a hateful as 
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well as pitiful quality’ in his hoarse whispers,138 and remarks that Akeley now inspires ‘a distinct 
repulsion’ in him.139 The reasons for his distaste are several: Akeley’s ‘strained, rigid, immobile 
expression and unwinking glassy stare’;140 the nebulously strange timbre of his voice;141 and the ‘faint, 
half-imaginary rhythm or vibration in the air’ inside his study.142 More disturbing still is the 
information that Akeley imparts to him about Yuggoth, and the possibility of their travel there—
particularly his ‘hints of familiarity with this unknown world of fungous life’, which make Wilmarth’s 
‘flesh creep’.143 The bizarre traits Akeley seems to have acquired, of course, are in fact symptomatic of 
his having been replaced by an alien impostor—but the ability of the Mi-Go to mimic and eventually 
supplant the human is cemented by their having successfully replaced Akeley. Once again, through 
their advanced abilities, the human becomes something sinister, providing us with a frightening 
glimpse of what a humanity that had advanced after the fashion of the Mi-Go might be. 
 
Wilmarth’s discovery of the above provides the crowning horror of the text, but equally dramatic—and 
perhaps more interesting—are the changes that the Mi-Go have already, and deliberately, been making 
to human bodies and minds. Their telepathic and hypnotic influence upon their followers, and their 
apparent ability to pass on these powers, are one thing; the alterations hinted at in terror by Akeley 
when he proclaims his readiness to enter a madhouse rather than fall into the power of the Mi-Go are 
another: 
 
They don’t mean to let me get to California now—they want to take me off alive, or what 
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theoretically and mentally amounts to alive—not only to Yuggoth, but beyond that—away 
outside the galaxy and possibly beyond the last curved rim of space. I told them I wouldn’t 
go where they wish, or in the terrible way they propose to take me, but I’m afraid it will be 
no use.
144
 
 
The above appears in Akeley’s last, frantic letter to Wilmarth before his replacement by a Mi-Go 
impostor. Compare the calm, matter-of-fact manner in which the false Akeley describes the process: 
 
With proper aid I expect to go backward and forward in time, and actually see and feel the 
earth of remote past and future epochs. You can’t imagine the degree to which those beings 
have carried science. There is nothing they can’t do with the mind and body of living 
organisms. I expect to visit other planets, and even other stars and galaxies. 
145
 
 
During their conversation, Wilmarth learns about the process in greater detail. It is scientific 
progress—that which marks out Wilmarth and Akeley as supremely human—that has made possible 
this detachment of human mind from human body: the ‘prodigious surgical, biological, chemical, and 
mechanical skill of the Outer Ones [has] found a way to convey human brains without their 
concomitant physical structure’.146 He is assured that undergoing the process will entail little real 
sacrifice. The use of speech-machines and ‘adjustable faculty-instruments’ allows those brains so 
encased to retain ‘a full sensory and articulate life’.147 The skill of the Mi-Go makes the process ‘easy 
and almost normal’, and brain and body can persist in this state indefinitely; the body ‘never ages when 
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the brain is out of it’, while the brain itself, in its metal casing, is ‘virtually immortal’.148  
 
The promise sounds too good to be true, and there are hints even at this stage that while the human 
brain may make the trip intact, aspects of its humanity do not. The sensory life offered is, “Akeley” 
admits, ‘a bodiless and mechanical one’.149 The simile used to convey the convenience of the method 
used, too, is curiously mechanical: attaching an encased brain to the necessary instruments is ‘as 
simple as carrying a phonograph record about and playing it wherever a phonograph of the 
corresponding make exists’.150 A phonograph record, of course, was the method used by the real 
Akeley earlier in the tale to pass on his recording of Mi-Go speech. The imagery here performs a 
conflation of Mi-Go and human, again shifting one into the place of the other. The normality of the 
procedure to the Mi-Go contrasts vividly to the way it appears to Wilmarth: ‘hellish’ and ‘strange’,151 
and ‘like the typical vagaries of crazed inventors and scientists’.152 It is apparently preposterous, and at 
the same time tied to familiar anxieties around scientific progress, the figure of the mad scientist 
invoking already-established Gothic narratives of the overreacher-pioneer. Curiosity and mechanical 
ability are again problematised. What makes Wilmarth and Akeley human, makes the Mi-Go alien. At 
the same time, mechanical progress is placed as a product of evolutionary progress, and as inextricable 
from it. The question of human evolution alongside, and eventual dependence upon, technology is 
thereby opened up, prefiguring later science-fictional preoccupations with the figure of the cyborg.  
 
What Akeley and Wilmarth are offered is a kind of horrific transhumanism, in which the human subject 
attains marvellous new experiences and abilities at the expense of individual identity and agency. The 
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tension evident in T. H. Huxley’s Man’s Place in Nature makes itself felt here. Although, for Huxley, 
the ability to accumulate knowledge is what sets humanity apart from the ‘brutes’ with which we are, 
‘in substance and structure’, united—‘man’ is ‘transfigured from his grosser nature by reflecting, here 
and there, a ray from the infinite source of truth’153—this triumphal statement is haunted by the earlier 
assertion that the ‘intellect, by its very triumphs[…][admonishes] the conqueror that he is but dust’.154 
The trade-off for any knowledge gained by traffic with the Mi-Go is being controlled and shaped by 
them; loss of specificity, and effective demotion to the status of lower animals. 
 
The disappearance of the individual manifests itself audibly—appropriately, since it is the singular 
quality of its whispering that marks out the faux Akeley as an impostor, implying that some 
unmistakable element of humanity may be found in the voice. There is no human element, however, in 
the mechanical voices of the encased brains, as the description of the one to which “Akeley” induces 
Wilmarth to listen shows. ‘The voice’, Wilmarth notes, ‘was loud, metallic, lifeless, and plainly 
mechanical in every detail of its production. It was incapable of inflection or expressiveness, but 
scraped and rattled on with a deadly precision and deliberation’.155 Later, upon hearing the speech-
machine attached to the cylinder containing the brain of the real Akeley, Wilmarth at first assumes that 
the speaker is the same brain with which he spoke previously. However, it soon occurs to him that ‘any 
brain would emit vocal sounds of the same quality if linked to the same mechanical speech-
producer’.156 Individual identity is effaced by this symbiosis between human and machine. Wilmarth’s 
thoughts reflect this; although he becomes aware that the speaker in the cylinder must be Akeley, and 
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sympathises with his predicament enough to exclaim internally, ‘poor devil’,157 he persists in thinking 
of the brain the cylinder as ‘it’ and ‘the thing’.158 When he makes his escape, Wilmarth leaves the 
cylinder containing Akeley’s brain on the table. Where human consciousness and Mi-Go technology 
intersect, the latter wins out. Akeley is no longer human enough for him to rescue. 
 
‘The Whisperer in Darkness’, then, presents us with a horrific vision of humanity’s potential highly 
evolved, transhuman future. Mechanical progress is intrinsically linked to intellectual development. As 
humanity develops, it may gain knowledge and previously unknown abilities, but with its development 
of those faculties, it will become more alien. The Mi-Go are sinister here partly because of their 
striking physiological difference from human beings, their composite forms calling to mind other 
dangerous Lovecraft creations (Cthulhu and Yog-Sothoth, for example). But it is also their relationship 
to and use of human beings that makes them frightening. Akeley’s voice through the speech-machine is 
identical in tone to that of the other brain, but Wilmarth also observes that ‘the mechanical voice, 
notwithstanding its artificial loudness and regularity, seemed to be in a position of subordination and 
pleading’.159 Akeley has no choice and no agency in his dealings with the Mi-Go, having come under 
siege from them and eventually fallen into their power. The ‘repellent mental change’ undergone by 
their human agents, furthermore, implies that they are perhaps under telepathic or hypnotic control.
160
 
Humans, for the Mi-Go, then, form a kind of convenient slave-class as well as a subject for study; we 
are an interesting but inferior race. One might read this element of the story as a reiteration of a 
familiar Lovecraftian theme: the fear of backsliding, played out in the reduction of human to the status 
of specimen or beast of burden, and linked closely to the cosmic horror of our insignificance on the 
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grand scale of the universe. An additional element of uncertainty regarding the future of the “human” 
is provided if we remember that the Mi-Go are horrifying, at least in part, precisely because of the 
danger they pose to humans. What might that imply about the nature and status of a humanity (and let 
us not forget that, for Lovecraft, the “human” is the white, educated and “civilised”) evolved to a 
similar level of power over other, inferior races or species? 
 
 
 
Uncanny Utopias: ‘The Shadow Out of Time’ and ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ 
 
A rather more optimistic vision of advanced society is found in two of Lovecraft’s most acclaimed late 
works, ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ (1936) and ‘The Shadow out of Time’ (1936). We find the germ 
of both stories contained in the earlier ‘The Nameless City’(1921), whose narrator, exploring an 
ancient, ruined desert city of unknown origin, discovers the bodies of its reptilian, pre-human builders, 
and finally learns that their disembodied consciousnesses still haunt the city by night, returning to a 
subterranean abyss beneath it by day.
161
 The creatures were clearly members of an advanced, human-
like civilisation, but their surviving minds or spirits—which manifest themselves in the form of 
rushing air—induce terror in the narrator.162 ‘The Nameless City’ is a relatively short and undeveloped 
tale, but Lovecraft reworks the idea in far greater detail and complexity in both longer works.  
 
Each works on the same basic premise: the major plot-point is the discovery of a vast city of pre-
human age, apparently a bastion of a technologically, socially and intellectually advanced civilisation 
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built by extra-terrestrial creatures long before the evolution of the first humans. ‘At the Mountains of 
Madness’, in particular, emphasises the discovery of unprecedentedly ancient fossils, and we are 
reminded of Spencer’s suggestion that, ‘for aught we know to the contrary, only the last few chapters 
of the earth’s biological history may have come down to us’,163 and that ‘successive Evolutions 
analogous to that which is now going on’ may have filled a vast past.164 The human beings who 
discover this civilisation come to view its alien creators with a degree of sympathy, viewing their 
scientific and intellectual curiosity as essentially “human”. Indeed, since the unexpected age of these 
alien civilisations highlights the relative incompleteness of human knowledge, their inhabitants may 
come to seem possessed of these defining “human” qualities in somewhat greater degree than human 
beings. Lovecraft does, however, make one notable change between ‘The Nameless City’ and the two 
later tales. Where the reptilian creatures of ‘The Nameless City’ have survived in disembodied form to 
the present day, and become a threatening Other to the narrator, the Old Ones of ‘At the Mountains of 
Madness’ are mostly extinct, while the Great Race of ‘The Shadow Out of Time’—being able to 
transfer themselves into the bodies of other species, travelling through space and time in the process—
have long since abandoned their city for other bodies in another time and place. Each city does exist 
atop an inhabited subterranean abyss, but in each case what inhabits it is something far more dangerous 
and further from humanity than the builders of the titanic cities. This allows for a splintering of 
possibilities: where the Mi-Go are advanced, their utter alienness and the threat they pose to human 
beings prevents Wilmarth from identifying with them. In ‘The Shadow Out of Time’ and ‘At the 
Mountains of Madness’, meanwhile, the threatening and utterly alien exists separately from the more 
“human” alien civilisation. There are further layers of complication in the nature of the Old Ones and 
the Great Race’s societies, and I intend to explore some of these in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Without mischaracterising Lovecraft as a progressive, as Buhle does, or arguing for the stories’ 
potential posthuman Utopianism as a revealed secret truth rather than one of several available 
readings,
165
 I would argue that there is, perhaps, more to these stories than eugenic ideas simply 
‘[taking] voice through’ them and ‘[extending] the imperial sway of the scientific discourse of the body 
into[…]the realm of the imagination’, as Childs suggests with respect to eugenics-influenced 
modernist texts.
166
 Rather, I hope to illustrate the ways in which they both continue familiar 
Lovecraftian themes, and adumbrate a posthuman future. 
 
Although the title of his 2009 essay, ‘Lovecraft’s Avatars: Azathoth, Nyarlathotep, Dagon, and 
Lovecraftian Utopias’ makes reference to the concept of Utopia, Brandon Reynolds really does little 
with the idea. Reynolds’ essay focuses primarily on Lovecraft’s treatment of religion, arguing for a 
division of the fiction into two parts: one characterised by a yearning for a Greco-Roman paganism 
that would reach its apotheosis in the resurrection of old gods and their worship; the other by a 
nihilistic atheism that seems to urge the destruction of humankind.
167
 Rather bafflingly, Reynolds’ 
article makes no reference to extant Utopian tradition or to the Lovecraft texts that most strongly 
engage with it. Rather, Reynolds argues for Innsmouth as Lovecraft’s ‘pagan utopia’,168 relying upon a 
naïvely literal reading of the narrator’s final assertion that he is returning to Y’ha-nthlei to ‘dwell 
amidst wonder and glory forever’169 and interpreting the Esoteric Order of Dagon as a desirable 
alternative to Christianity.
170
 The other Utopian possibility that Reynolds finds in Lovecraft is that 
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represented by the mindless Azathoth, and involves ‘total destruction and nothingness’.171 
Disappointingly, Reynolds does not take the opportunity to explore the idea of Utopia as non-place 
(rather than, or in addition to, Eutopian good-place) or to consider the realisability or otherwise of 
ideals—he simply suggests that Lovecraft’s atheism must necessarily entail nihilism. ‘Lovecraft’s 
atheistic ideal for mankind’, he writes, ‘involves one key principle: mankind’s apocalyptic 
destruction’.172 His conclusion is that Lovecraft’s fiction, ultimately pessimistic, can offer as an ideal 
neither the survival nor the further development of humanity. It offers us ‘two choices: physical 
degeneration into Innsmouth’s fishlike people coupled with an eternal undersea existence for the 
rebirth of paganism, or complete and utter destruction of everything for the sake of achieving a 
“blissful” experience of nothingness’.173  In support of this, Reynold quotes a passage from one of 
Lovecraft’s letters to Sonia Haft Greene—one which may be read to contain the seed of its own 
contradiction: ‘“If we were at all sensible we would seek death—the same blissful blank which we 
enjoyed before we existed.”’174 The emphasis here is my own. The italicized text contains the clear 
implication that we do not seek death; we are not sensible. What we do seek, according to the 
evolutionary viewpoint, is progress; and this is the story that the later tales tell. 
 
‘The Shadow Out of Time’ takes the form of an account by one Professor Nathaniel Wingate Peaslee, 
apparently a sufferer of a bizarre form of multiple personality disorder. Having collapsed while giving 
a lecture some years ago, Peaslee woke inexplicably altered and apparently suffering from amnesia. He 
engaged in an intensive programme of research and information-gathering over the next five years. 
Toward the end of this period of time, a strange mechanical contraption was seen at his place of 
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residence, and shortly afterwards, Peaslee’s original personality returned, with no memory of the 
intervening period. On his return, however, Peaslee begins to suffer bizarre dreams and visions of a 
city inhabited by huge, cone-shaped beings, highly intelligent and frequently occupied with reading or 
writing in an enormous archive. Gradually piecing together his dreams with fragments of ancient myth 
and legend, he becomes convinced that the creatures in his dreams are the Great Race of Yith, an 
astoundingly advanced alien species whose telepathic abilities have ensured their survival at the 
expense of countless less developed races. They are able to effect a kind of mental exchange with 
members of other species across time and space, and frequently kidnap highly educated minds for a 
period of time, while a mind of the Great Race inhabits their body and researches their civilisation. 
This is what appears to have happened to Peaslee; the ‘secondary personality’ inhabiting his body is a 
member of the Great Race, and Peaslee spent five years living among them in the distant past of the 
Earth, having had his memories artificially restricted before being returned to his own time and body. 
Among the Great Race’s buildings are blocks of a sinister ‘elder masonry’, feared but rarely discussed, 
connected with a vengeful, utterly alien race of Elder Things that will eventually destroy the Great 
Race’s civilisation. The Great Race will escape the devastation by trading minds en masse with a race 
of beetle-like creatures who inhabit the Earth after humanity, leaving the displaced minds to die in their 
places. Eventually, during an archaeological expedition in the Australian desert, Peaslee uncovers the 
remains of the Great Race’s city, confirming the truth of his suspicions, and also discovering the 
continued existence of the terrifying Elder Things in the abyss beneath the city. 
 
The Great Race, like the Mi-Go, are startlingly alien, their otherness represented in their physical 
appearance, their speech, and their spatial and temporal origins. The interloper who usurps Peaslee’s 
body is immediately seen for what it is not, although—unsurprisingly—human observers fail to note 
271 
 
its inhumanity. His wife reacts to the usurper with ‘extreme horror and loathing’, immediately 
recognising the being as ‘some utter alien usurping the body of her husband’, while Peaslee’s son, 
Wingate, while holding out hope that his real father will reappear, recognises that this is a ‘stranger’. 
175
 Although ensconced in a human body, the creature inspires an instinctive revulsion in others, just as 
the horrific hybrid and degenerate entities we have seen in previous chapters do. Peaslee, reflecting 
upon what he has learned about the period during which he suffered from this apparent amnesia, tells 
us, 
 
[something] in my aspect and speech seemed to excite vague fears and aversions in 
everyone I met, as if I were a being infinitely removed from all that is normal and healthful. 
This idea of a black, hidden horror connected with incalculable gulfs of some sort of 
distance was oddly widespread and persistent.
176
 
 
The creature’s manner of communicating marks it out clearly as Other, as did the speech of the Mi-Go. 
When “Peaslee” awakes, the alteration in his personality first becomes apparent in his speech, which is 
‘barbarously alien’, with ‘a curiously stilted quality, as if I had laboriously learned the English 
language from books’, and littered with ‘scraps of curious archaism and expressions of a wholly 
incomprehensible cast’.177 The being’s mannerisms, too, are off-putting: the doctors lecturing on 
Peaslee’s condition occasionally detect ‘some queer trace of carefully veiled mockery’,178 while 
Peaslee, in his memoir, suggests that the being’s ‘facial expression’ gave away the fact that it was not 
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him.
179
 I have earlier touched on the importance of the human face, attacks upon which erase the 
individuality of the human subject, and that this is what gives away the creature’s alienness is perhaps 
significant. Although it inhabits a human body, the creature is unable to mimic a human self. The 
creature’s writing, too, contains traces of otherness. Reading over the notes it left behind, Peaslee 
notices that those in human languages (‘all of which the writer seemed to know with equal though 
obviously academic facility’) use ‘a script and idiom which somehow [seems] oddly un-human’.180 
More startling, however are those which take the form of ‘curvilinear hieroglyphs[...]following no 
recognisable human pattern’.181 These hieroglyphs are familiar to Peaslee from his dream-visions, in 
which they seem to be invested with a particularly sinister significance: Peaslee feels that they are 
‘mocking’ him, and fears that they might ‘blast [his] soul with their message were [he] not guarded by 
a merciful ignorance’.182 The knowledge they contain is beyond the human sphere, and that the 
creature, despite its ability to write in human language, chooses to make notes in its native script at the 
risk of arousing suspicion suggests that it is capable of expressing thoughts or facts which have no 
equivalent in human language. Spencer argued that language evolves in order to allow precision of 
expression.
183
 Human language, then, lacks the precision required to represent the ideas of the Great 
Race; it is imperfectly evolved, and their alien thought-patterns continue to require expression by alien 
means. 
 
The physical appearance of the Great Race serves to emphasise their difference from humanity. On his 
return, Peaslee finds himself oddly apprehensive at the thought of looking at his own body, either in 
mirrors or simply by glancing downwards. When he does so, he experiences ‘a curious relief’ at the 
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sight of ‘the familiar human shape’.184 And upon discovering the ruined city of the Great Race, he 
remarks that 
 
[one] thing only was unfamiliar, and that was my own size in relation to the monstrous 
masonry. I felt oppressed by a sense of unwonted smallness, as if the sight of these 
towering walls from a mere human body was something wholly new and abnormal. Again 
and again I looked nervously down at myself, vaguely disturbed by the human form I 
possessed.
185
 
 
Even his footprints in the city’s ‘millennially untrodden dust’ cause him discomfort; ‘[never] before’, 
he speculates, ‘had human feet pressed upon those immemorial pavements’.186 An interesting inversion 
takes place in these moments, a layering of human and alien over one another. The potential Otherness 
of the human is invoked in embryo, as is the potential normality of the alien: our ability to recognise 
ourselves in it, and it in ourselves. 
 
Elsewhere, Peaslee describes the bodies of the Great Race in some detail, building up—as with the Mi-
Go—a picture of a race unlike any familiar life-form, incorporating elements of disparate species and 
even inanimate objects. The Great Race take the form of enormous, ‘ridgy’ cones with four extendible 
arms, two terminating in ‘enormous claws or nippers’, one in ‘red, trumpet-like appendages’, and one 
in a yellow, globe-shaped head. They have three eyes, as well as ‘flower-like appendages’ and 
‘antennae or tentacles’, and move ‘through expansion and contraction’ of a rubbery foot-fringe, like 
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slugs.
187
 They speak by ‘clicking and scraping’,188 and, like the Mi-Go, possess a set of senses different 
from those of humans. They share only two human senses, sight and hearing, but ‘of other and 
incomprehensible senses (not, however, well utilisable by alien captive minds inhabiting their bodies) 
they [possess] many’.189 It is suggested that they may, also like the Mi-Go, have telepathic abilities; the 
machines they operate in the great central archive are ‘somehow connected with thought’, although 
Peaslee is unable to understand their workings.
190
 When Peaslee first begins to see them in his dreams, 
he is appropriately horrified; in a moment that will be neatly reversed by the estrangement of his 
human body in the Great Race’s city at the end of the story, he observes them working in their great 
central archive, and is unnerved by the sight of alien bodies carrying out familiar actions: 
 
Their actions, though harmless, horrified me even more than their appearance—for it is not 
wholesome to watch monstrous objects doing what one has known only human beings to 
do. These objects moved intelligently around the great rooms, getting books from the 
shelves and taking them to the great tables, or vice versa, and sometimes writing diligently 
with a peculiar rod gripped in the greenish head-tentacles. The huge nippers were used in 
carrying books and in conversation[...]
191
 
 
His horror, however, is short-lived. After a short time in their company, he recognises that they ‘form 
supremely natural parts of their environment’ and ‘[ceases] to be afraid of them’, even coming to 
recognise them as distinct individuals.
192
 Despite their physical differences from us—and the Great 
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Race differ far more drastically than the Mi-Go—the story begins to emphasise the traits they hold in 
common with humanity, and, in contrast to tales of monstrous hybridity like ‘The Dunwich Horror’, to 
present these not as a source of horror but of identification. This identification, combined with 
Peaslee’s delineation of the Great Race’s abilities, clearly places them as a model for a highly 
advanced human future. 
 
Indeed, many of the abilities evidenced by the Great Race are those associated with advanced, 
“civilised” humanity; the same qualities that lend narrators like Wilmarth and Peaslee their authority. 
Spencer had suggested that the various spheres of knowledge—religion, philosophy, science, and art—
evolved in stages similar to those through which ‘the mind of a child passes on its way to maturity’;193 
and the Great Race appear to have reached a particularly advanced level. Their intellectual capacities 
are immense. During Peaslee’s supposed amnesia, his ‘secondary personality’, really a mind of the 
Great Race, displays a facility for ‘abnormally rapid assimilation’, and an intelligence ‘enormously 
superior to [Peaslee’s] own’.194 The alien mind is able to ‘master every detail of a book merely by 
glancing over it’, and to ‘[interpret] complex figures in an instant’.195 Peaslee’s visions of the Great 
Race’s city bear out this impression; he decides, from ‘their rate of reading, writing, and operating their 
machines[…]that their intelligence [is] enormously greater than man’s’.196 Given this ability to absorb 
and interpret vast quantities of information, their intellectual curiosity should come as no surprise. 
When the mind inhabiting Peaslee’s body realises its attempt to disguise the ‘amnesia’ has failed, it 
abandons it at once, becoming ‘eager for information of all sorts’, and appearing mostly concerned 
with ‘certain points in history, science, art, language, and folklore—some of them tremendously 
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abstruse, and some childishly simple’, rather than with finding out who Peaslee is or recovering his 
memories.
197
 It is, in effect, the mind’s quest for knowledge that betrays its alienness. Doctors inform 
Peaslee after his return that during the ‘amnesia’ he appeared ‘anomalously avid to absorb the speech, 
customs, and perspectives of the age around me; as if I were a studious traveller from a far, foreign 
land’.198 The other, similar cases throughout history discovered by Peaslee in his attempt to understand 
his experience have been marked in the same way: ‘by a wholesale acquisition of scientific, historic, 
artistic, and anthropological knowledge; an acquisition carried on with feverish zest and with a wholly 
abnormal absorptive power’.199  
 
In addition to the intensive researches they carry out in the bodies of other species, the Great Race 
pump the captive minds drawn into their era for information about their civilisations of origin.
200
 Their 
huge central archive holds ‘the whole of earth’s annals—histories and descriptions of every species 
that had ever been or that ever would be, with full records of their arts, their achievements, their 
languages, and their psychologies’.201 It is difficult not to be reminded of T. H. Huxley’s assertion that 
what sets ‘Man’ apart from the ‘brutes’ is the ability to ‘[accumulate] and [organise] the experience 
which is almost wholly lost with the cessation of every individual life in other animals; so that, now, he 
stands raised upon it as on a mountain top, far above the level of his humble fellows’.202 The Great 
Race have carried this out at a further remove, retaining the knowledge that would otherwise have been 
lost with the extinction of other species.  They are able to cherry-pick ideas and discoveries from all of 
time and space to suit their own needs, resulting in their advanced—we might say Utopian—
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civilisation. It is this ability, we are told, that has made the species 
 
the greatest race of all; because it alone had conquered the secret of time. It had learned all 
things that ever were known or ever would be known on the earth, through the power of its 
keener minds to project themselves into the past and the future, even through gulfs of 
millions of years, and study the lore of every age. From the accomplishments of this race 
arose all legends of prophets, including those in human mythology.
203
 
 
The abilities the Great Race have either gained through their researches, or developed of their own 
accord, are manifold, and Lovecraft builds up a picture of an ideal society, technologically advanced 
and intellectually governed, calling to mind aspects of the political thought expressed in his later 
letters.
204
 Their curiosity suggests that they set great store by intellectual achievement and the 
acquisition of knowledge, and this is borne out in the design of their city, with its ‘vast’, space-
dominating central archive, and it walls lined with shelves of ‘immense’ volumes and decorated with 
‘curious[…]mathematical designs’.205 Their technological and architectural achievements are well 
beyond those of humanity, too; alongside the ‘globes of luminous crystal’ that light the archive, Peaslee 
notes ‘inexplicable machines formed of vitreous tubes and metal rods’.206 A similarly ‘unknown 
machine’ is seen at Peaslee’s house shortly before his own mind is returned to his body, suggesting that 
the mechanism has something to do with the mental time-travel effected by the Great Race.
207
 In his 
dreams, Peaslee encounters ‘colossal caverns of intricate machinery whose outlines and purpose were 
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wholly strange to [him]’.208 We do find out one purpose for which the Great Race use their mechanical 
devices: when a captive mind from another time-period speaks a language physically impossible for 
the Great Race, ‘clever machines would be made, on which the alien speech could be played as on a 
musical instrument’.209 It is difficult not to be reminded of the brain-theft and speech-machines of the 
Mi-Go here, and the ethically questionable aspects of the Great Race’s practice will be revisited later. 
 
In their city, meanwhile, ‘the principle of the arch [is] known as fully and used as extensively as by the 
Romans’,210 but on a much grander scale. The size and scope of the buildings created by the Great 
Race is emphasized repeatedly. Peaslee wonders at the ‘Cyclopean corridors’, the ‘monstrous masonry’, 
the buildings whose enormity rivals that of the natural landscape: 
 
There were almost endless leagues of giant buildings, each in its garden, and ranged along 
paved roads fully two hundred feet wide. They differed greatly in aspect, but few were less 
than five hundred feet square or a thousand feet high. Many seemed so limitless that they 
must have had a frontage of several thousand feet, while some shot up to mountainous 
altitudes in the grey, steamy heavens.
211
 
 
If we remember Spencer’s assertion in The Principles of Biology that highly-organised animals tend 
also be larger, then the vast physical size of the Great Race and the highly-evolved skill that has 
allowed them to accommodate themselves are intimately bound up with one another.
212
 Their 
architectural skill is employed to its greatest degree, however, in the protection of knowledge. The 
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central archive, a ‘titan repository [surpassing] all other buildings in the massive, mountain-like 
firmness of its construction’, is designed ‘to last as long as the race, and to withstand the fiercest of 
earth’s convulsions’.213 And the ambition with which Peaslee holds it to have been built increases in 
further descriptions. Later, we are told that 
 
This vast, earth-protected pile, housing the annals of all the solar system, had been built 
with supernal skill and strength to last as long as that system itself. Blocks of stupendous 
size, poised with mathematical genius and bound with cements of incredible toughness, had 
combined to form a mass as firm as the planet’s rocky core.214 
 
Their mastery of nature, too, seems almost complete. The ‘artificial breeding’ of plants is well-
established among them, Peaslee noting that the outlandish blooms in their rooftop gardens evidence 
‘some unknown but well-established horticultural tradition’.215 They appear, through their acquisition 
of knowledge from all ages, and their exceptional intellectual abilities, to have created a near-Utopian 
society. They are no longer reliant upon animals for food, ‘for the Great Race’s mechanised culture 
[has] long since done away with domestic beasts, while food [is] wholly vegetable or synthetic’.216 
This mechanised culture allows ample leisure time, mostly filled with ‘intellectual and aesthetic 
activities’.217 Science has been ‘carried to an unbelievable height of development’, while technology is 
‘enormously stimulated through the constant struggle to survive, and to keep in existence the physical 
fabric of great cities, imposed by the prodigious geologic upheavals of those primal days’.218 Nor have 
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the arts been neglected; they are ‘a vital part of life’.219  
 
The intellectual achievements of the Great Race are equalled only by its social development. Aspects 
of their social organisation—‘a sort of fascistic socialism’—appear related to Lovecraft’s own 
idiosyncratic political beliefs, particularly the concentration of power in the hands of ‘a small 
governing board elected by the votes of all able to pass certain educational and psychological tests’, 
and the fact that ‘[family] organisation [is] not overstressed’.220 Nevertheless, the society’s mechanised 
nature, abundance of leisure time, and preoccupation with intellectual pursuits echo the scientific 
Utopias of Wells and Bulwer-Lytton, as does its generally peaceful equilibrium. Crime, we are told, is 
‘surprisingly scanty’,221 and warfare, though ‘infinitely devastating’, rare.222 As the picture of their 
Utopian society is built up, their alienness fades into the background. Peaslee concentrates upon their 
intellectual curiosity—acknowledged as a common trait of all civilised, ‘keen’ minds—and the 
qualities which they hold in common with humans, albeit developed to a far higher degree. We might 
think of Spencer’s assertion that ‘advancing Language, Science, and Art’ reflect ‘advancing human 
structure, individual and social’ and conclude that their intellectual achievements are inextricably 
linked with their high degree of evolution.
223
 The importance of intellectual curiosity as a principal 
“human” good here also echoes Galton, when he asserts that ‘indifference or insincerity in the search 
after truth is one of the most degrading of sins’.224   
 
Furthermore, the eugenic practices of their society are made explicit, in passages which recall those 
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from Wells’ Men Like Gods discussed above. The Great Race reproduce in small numbers,225 and only 
ever deliberately; they have ‘no sex, but [reproduce] through seeds or spores which [cluster] on their 
bases and [can] be developed only under water’.226  The creation of offspring is independent of basic 
biological drives; they are less bodily than humans and less fecund, and are therefore able to avoid the 
overpopulation of which Wells’ Utopians speak with such distaste. Only those free from obvious 
defects are allowed to reach maturity; ‘[markedly] defective individuals’, we are told, are ‘quietly 
disposed of’.227 This selectiveness, it is implied, has allowed the Great Race to reach the heights which 
they enjoy in the time of Peaslee’s visions. A similar level of achievement might be available to 
humans, were we to follow a similar path. The world of the Great Race seems here to represent a 
possible, highly desirable future for a highly developed humanity. 
 
Their relative humanity is stressed further by the sub-plot which is eventually to provide the story’s 
crowning moment of horror. In stories like ‘The Dunwich Horror’ and ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’, 
human beings are compared and contrasted with horrifying hybrid entities whose combination of 
human attributes and ones radically alien produces revulsion. In ‘The Shadow out of Time’, however, 
the alien is split down the middle. The Great Race have their own incomprehensible Other, functioning 
as a source of horror and vague threat, and throwing their own relative “humanity” into sharp relief. 
The city Peaslee sees in his dreams, though vastly imposing in its own right, is in parts dominated by a 
collection of ‘vast dark windowless ruins from which the Great Race shrank in curious fear’.228 Peaslee 
struggles to determine the source of this fear, since the ruins are ‘the one subject lying altogether under 
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a taboo among the Great Race’.229 The rest of his recollections may be ‘[imperfect] and fragmentary’, 
but this subject is ‘still more bafflingly shrouded’.230 Eventually, he comes to understand that the elder 
ruins are remnants of one of the ‘mighty basalt cities of windowless towers’ built by the species that 
preceded the Great Race in its dominance of Earth.
231
 These ‘Elder Things’ are ‘utterly alien’, having 
come ‘through space from immeasurably distant universes’, and dangerous.232 We learn that they 
‘preyed horribly upon the beings they found’ when they first arrived, and that their occasional forays 
into the cities of the Great Race are marked by ‘irruptions of a particularly hideous character’.233 Their 
Otherness is both physical and psychological. They are ‘only partly material—as we understand 
matter’,234 and possess a ‘type of consciousness and media of perception [differing] wholly from those 
of terrestrial organisms’.235 Incomprehensible even to the Great Race, who have questioned members 
of every other civilisation in the solar system, their minds are ‘of such texture that no exchange with 
them [can] be effected’.236 The qualities of abjected racial Other and of abhuman survivals, found in 
the Deep Ones and Little People of Lovecraft’s earlier stories, and Machen’s tales of pre-human 
survivals, are here attributed to the Elder Things. Their physical bodies can no more be pinned down 
than their minds: they are ‘half-polypous’,237 and their bodies possess a ‘monstrous plasticity’238 that 
calls to mind the fluctuating body of Helen Vaughan at the climax of Machen’s ‘The Great God 
Pan’.239 Peaslee, encountering them at the end of the story, experiences them as ‘viscous, sentient 
darkness’ (the racialised overtones are surely inescapable) and as a ‘pandaemoniac vortex of loathsome 
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sound and utter, materially tangible blackness’.240  
 
The Great Race are able to subdue the Elder Things on their arrival, and they take refuge in ‘those 
caverns of inner earth which they had already joined to their abodes and begun to inhabit’,241 just like 
Machen’s subterranean Little People—who, we should remember, are based upon contemporary 
theories positing the survival of a pre-human race of “Turanian dwarves” who had fled into their 
underground dwellings to escape the invading Celts. Fear of invasion or overrunning by the abject 
Other is here, too; although any attack on the Great Race by the Elder Things would be ‘a matter of 
vengeance rather than an attempt to reoccupy the outer world’,242 the Great Race fear their ‘growing 
strong and numerous in the inner world’.243 Most importantly, however, we are led to believe that it is 
some kind of attack by the Elder Things that will eventually lead the Great Race to abandon its city, 
‘[sending] its keener minds ahead en masse in time’.244 Despite the Great Race’s advance in the fields 
of technology and warfare, the Elder Things will be strong enough to force them to run—and Peaslee, 
after his encounter in the Great Race’s ruined city, speculates that they might yet be ‘a lingering, 
lurking menace’.245  
 
The existence of the Elder Things reinforces the identification of the Great Race with humanity, and 
allows the narrative of invading threat from an abhuman Other to be played out at one remove. We 
might even read ‘The Shadow out of Time’ as offering a reassuring iteration of this narrative, one that 
reinscribes the superiority of the “human”. The Great Race, after all, survive despite being forced to 
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abandon their city; they travel forward in time, taking for themselves the bodies of ‘the hardy 
coleopterous species immediately following mankind’, and leaving their original occupants to die in 
their stead.
246
 Despite the power and numerousness of the Elder Things, the Great Race, by virtue of 
that which makes them most “human”—their knowledge and technological knowhow—are able to 
escape them. The following passage from Galton, in which he predicts the inevitable survival of the 
most “civilised”, comes to mind: 
 
We may reckon upon a time when the advent of civilisation, which is now sparse and feeble 
and far more superficial than it is vaunted to be, shall overspread the globe. Ultimately it is 
sure to do so, because civilisation is the necessary fruit of high intelligence when found in a 
social animal, and there is no plainer lesson to be read off the face of Nature than that the 
result of the operation of her laws is to invoke intelligence in connexion with sociability. 
Intelligence is as much an advantage to an animal as physical strength or any other natural 
gift, and therefore, out of two varieties of any race of animal who are equally endowed in 
other respects, the most intelligent variety is sure to prevail in the battle of life. Similarly, 
among intelligent animals, the most social race is sure to prevail, other qualities being 
equal.
247
 
 
Here, however, lies perhaps the most challenging aspect of the identification the story asks us to make 
with the Great Race—one which invokes Richter’s ‘regulative biopolitics’.248 The ethically 
questionable aspects of mind-casting have been touched upon earlier in Peaslee’s account, where he 
mentions a separate class of captive mind encountered in the city of the Great Race. These, he tells us, 
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are 
 
the dying permanent exiles, whose bodies in the future had been seized by keen-minded 
members of the Great Race who, faced with death, sought to escape mental extinction[...] 
 This fate was least horrible when the captive mind was also of the Great Race—a not 
infrequent occurrence, since in all its periods that race was intensely concerned with its 
own future. The number of dying permanent exiles of the Great Race was very slight—
largely because of the tremendous penalties attached to displacements of future Great Race 
minds by the moribund. 
249
 
 
There is no such sanction, however, attached to the displacement of minds of other species. Indeed, the 
Great Race as a group seize the bodies of other races in order to ensure their own survival as a matter 
of course. Even the forms in which Peaslee encounters them, and in which they have built their great 
city, are not their original bodies; we are given no indication of what they looked like on their planet of 
origin, but are told that the original inhabitants of the cone-shaped bodies ‘were left to die in the horror 
of strange shapes’ on the Great Race’s world.250 The ‘monstrous doom’ brought by the Elder Things 
will be inflicted upon the minds of the beetle-civilisation,
251
 and when the Earth reaches the end of its 
life, the Great Race will seize the bodies of ‘the bulbous vegetable entities of Mercury’, leaving their 
owners to suffer the death throes of a ‘cold planet’ and ‘its horror-filled core’.252 The Great Race, in 
their way, are just as ‘predatory’ as the Elder Things; their ability to survive is contingent not only upon 
their technological and intellectual advances, but their willingness to use other sentient species for their 
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own ends, even killing them in the process. The pitiless hardness that renders Wells’ Utopians uncanny 
is taken to its logical conclusion by Lovecraft. César Guarde Paz has suggested that, in the wake of the 
First World War, Lovecraft’s extant prejudice against non-white races was joined by a strain of anti-
Germanic sentiment based in the perceived brutality and barbarism of the ‘German Teuton’ when too 
far removed from the influence of Latin civilisation.
253
 Although Lovecraft elsewhere celebrated (albeit 
in perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek fashion) the warlike behaviour of his imagined ancestors, Paz’s 
suggestion seems congruent with Lovecraft’s fictional idealisation of apparently settled, peaceful, 
highly cerebral societies, and may help us to account for the unsettling effect of the Great Race’s 
ruthlessness and disregard for other “civilised” life-forms. 
 
Furthermore, the Great Race’s failure in sympathy towards other species exists in direct contradiction 
to some of the more optimistic comments made by Darwin about the moral perfectibility of humankind, 
opening up room for us to think about the contradictions present in the optimism for human 
“improvement” offered by eugenicists and other evolutionary thinkers. Spencer considered charity an 
evolutionary evil, ‘seriously damaging to the health of the nation[…]both misplaced and cruel’.254 For 
Spencer, ‘organisms which die, thereby prove themselves in some respects unfitted for living’: 
attempts to save them, then, are implicitly unnatural.
255
 Darwin argues in the Descent, however, for the 
pivotal significance of morality—it is ‘by far the most important’ difference between ‘man’ and the 
lower animals
256—and for the extension of sympathies ‘to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, 
and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals’ as the marker of highly-
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developed social instincts—the source of the moral sense.257 Indifference to ‘the sufferings of 
strangers’, the failure to extend the social instincts beyond the immediate community, is, rather, a 
marker of savagery.
258
 To ‘check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason’ would cause 
‘deterioration in the noblest part of our nature’.259 Even Pearson, arguing for caution in the matter of 
charity, is unable to call for ‘less human sympathy, for more limited charity, and for sterner treatment 
of the weak’, and acknowledges the ‘developed[…]ethical feelings’ of “civilised” humans as ‘one of 
the chief factors of national fitness’.260  
 
It is possible to argue that this failure on the part of the Great Race is not a mark of backsliding, for 
Darwin suggests that the moral sense developed by other species would differ greatly from those of 
humans, even going so far as to speculate on what the moral imperatives of a society of people who 
existed and reproduced in the same fashion as bees might be.
261
 We might, however, also read it in the 
light of Darwin’s comment, with regard to human selection of animals and plants, that ‘if man goes on 
selecting, and thus augmenting, any peculiarity, he will almost certainly unconsciously modify other 
parts of the structure, owing to the mysterious laws of the correlation of growth’.262 In ‘augmenting’ 
their own intellectual and survival abilities, the Great Race have—perhaps unwittingly—diminished 
their capacity for sympathy. Given the extent to which Lovecraft’s Great Race resemble his ideal form 
of humanity, it is difficult to read this absence of sympathy as fitting entirely comfortably into a vision 
of perfected humankind. It may not quite represent a reversion to the morality of “savages”, but it 
suggests an otherness that questions the humanity of these human-analogues. The members of the 
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Great Race are reliant, too, upon the existence of these other races for them to take over; in a sense, 
they are highly-evolved parasites. Despite their having developed a society that nurtures reason and 
curiosity, they are not free from ruthless instinct, or from the need to compete for survival. Their 
consciousness of their own superiority has done nothing to lift them outside of this cycle; indeed, the 
fact that they punish those who displace other Great Race minds, but not those who steal the bodies of 
other sentient beings, suggests that it is this very sense of superiority that has led them to commit 
repeated genocides. Predatory instinct is still present in the Great Race, albeit in a form modified by 
their technological advances; it is, in fact, perhaps at the very heart of their ability to adapt and survive. 
 
‘The Shadow out of Time’ is perhaps Lovecraft’s most concise and focused evocation of the theme. No 
discussion of his fictional alien civilisations, however, would be complete without a consideration of 
his 1936 novella, ‘At the Mountains of Madness’. More obviously a direct descendent of ‘The 
Nameless City’ than ‘The Shadow out of Time’, it focuses upon the discovery of a vast, abandoned 
prehistoric city by the members of a scientific expedition to Antarctica. Lovecraft had been ‘an ardent 
student of the Antarctic’ since the age of ten, and had followed the Borchgrevink, Scott, Amundsen, 
and Byrd expeditions avidly.
263
 That Lovecraft chose the frozen continent as the setting for his ideal 
alien civilisation, however, perhaps owes as much to the popular imaginary space occupied by 
Antarctica as to personal obsession. On the one hand, the continent was home to important fossil 
discoveries supporting the previous existence of a great southern continent, and was itself a kind of 
surviving fossil.
264
 Tom Griffiths, in Slicing the Silence: Voyaging to Antarctica, writes that ‘[the] 
primitive lurked in the wastes of Antarctica for Edwardian explorers’: for them, it was a remnant of 
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‘[the] world in the deep past of the Pleistocene’.265 Byrd was even reported to believe that the continent 
might ‘harbour[...]new forms of life, perhaps even an undiscovered people’—a surviving prehistoric 
race like those posited in Machen’s work, or a lost civilisation in the mould of Erewhon or The Coming 
Race.
266
  Equally, though, it could represent a ‘bleak future’, a planet ‘spinning cold in space’.267 The 
‘geological sense of time’ felt so acutely in the Antarctic reminded the Australian explorer Douglas 
Mawson ‘of the inevitability of extinctions and of the passing on of the dominance of the Earth, from 
species to species and perhaps from race to race’.268 The frozen landscape encouraged a cognisance of 
the deep past that necessarily entailed an awareness of the far future. It could serve as a warning—
Chris Baldick has pointed to the humbling of ‘[the] exertion of the human will (specifically, of the 
British will)’ in the death of Scott’s Antarctic team, as well as in the sinking of the Titanic, another 
disaster inflicted by ice.
269
 Antarctica’s hardships might also, however, make it an ‘evolutionary 
force’.270 Cold climates were thought to exert an ‘enlivening influence’ upon the races who inhabited 
them, a theory that the white supremacist Lovecraft would almost certainly have embraced.
271
 The 
Antarctic, then, became a proving ground, a ‘brutal test of racial vigour’272 as well as a challenging last 
frontier for declining empires seeking to preserve their preeminence.
273
 Scientific research under these 
circumstances became ‘heroic’, a ‘higher purpose’,274 and the survival of written records was 
paramount, essential for ‘dignity and[...]history’.275 Rather than falling by the wayside in the struggle 
with the elements, these hallmarks of “civilised” humanity took on singular importance. Referring to 
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the rise of astronomy in Antarctica from the mid-twentieth century, Griffiths writes that it ‘became a 
place from which to intellectually encompass the planet and a privileged human window on the 
universe’.276 Substitute “past” for ‘universe’, and explorers and interested amateurs of Lovecraft’s day 
might well have felt the same. Retaining “human” distinctiveness in the hostile environment might be 
rewarded by a “superhuman” view of the world. The “human” might consciously transform itself into 
something more than human. In Antarctica, Griffiths writes, ‘[the] present is always caught in the act, 
always in the process of becoming, sometimes consciously and precipitately so’.277 Certainly, this 
seems to have been true of Lovecraft’s Old Ones, with their acute consciousness of history; it might 
well also be said of their shoggoth slaves, who slowly learn to control their physical transformations. 
The possibility for self-guided transformation, then, may also be available to humans. 
 
Told in the first person by the expedition leader, Professor William Dyer of Miskatonic University, ‘At 
the Mountains of Madness’ recounts their discovery of a group of large, star-headed, barrel-shaped 
fossils—some damaged, others apparently whole—which they find impossible to classify. Shortly after 
the discovery, the group who have discovered the fossils lose touch with the main body of the 
expedition. On investigation, Dyer and his men discover their camp in ruins, most of the men and dogs 
dead, and the damaged fossils buried in what appear to be snow graves. They blame a missing member 
of the party for the murders, concluding that he must have fallen victim to madness. However, when 
Dyer and a graduate student called Danforth make an investigative plane trip over a nearby mountain 
range, they discover a vast, abandoned ancient city whose walls are covered in murals that tell the story 
of its builders. The race who inhabited it, and of which the intact star-headed ‘fossils’, preserved alive 
in the polar ice, are the sole survivors—referred to as the Old Ones—were a vast and advanced 
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civilisation, and are responsible for the creation of all modern life on Earth. Their great feats of 
building and engineering were enabled by their use of artificially created protoplasmic masses known 
as ‘shoggoths’, essentially a slave race bred to do the heavy work required by the Old Ones’ 
civilisation—but one which became increasingly difficult to control. The murals indicate that the Old 
Ones feared another, greater evil, located beyond a range of ‘horrible westward mountains’, and never 
explicitly shown.
278
 Eventually, their influence in the rest of the world waning, they are shown 
retreating to the Antarctic city, and finally to the subterranean caverns below it.  
 
Dyer cannot help but acknowledge the Old Ones’ scientific and intellectual curiosity, and concludes 
that, despite their having killed several of his colleagues, they are not merely monstrosities but 
‘men’.279 The original inhabitants of the city, however, are no more. During the intervening aeons, their 
slaves have rebelled, and the subterranean caverns are home not to any surviving Old Ones, but to the 
vast and destructive shoggoths. There is a suggestion, too, that the further horror beyond the 
mountains—perhaps identifiable with the Elder Things of ‘The Shadow out of Time’; certainly, at any 
rate, something older and more alien than the Old Ones themselves—survives. A glimpse of it caught 
by Danforth as he and Dyer flee the shoggoth-infested city drives him to madness. 
 
It should be noted that, while Lake, the biologist who initially examines the specimens, says that they 
remind him of ‘certain monsters of primal myth, especially fabled Elder Things in Necronomicon’,280 
and briefly refers to them as ‘The Elder Ones’,281 they should not be confused with the Elder Things of 
‘The Shadow out of Time’. The Great Race, we should remember, are unable to effect mind-transfer 
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with the Elder Things; the Old Ones, meanwhile, are referred to separately, in a passage which makes it 
clear that the Great Race are able to transfer their minds. ‘Of earthly minds’ in their city, we are told, 
‘there were some from the winged, star-headed, half-vegetable race of palaeogean Antarctica’.282 For 
this reason, I refer to them solely as the Old Ones; any reference in this chapter to the Elder Things 
should be read as referring to the subterranean horrors of ‘The Shadow out of Time’. 
 
Like ‘The Whisperer in Darkness’ and ‘The Shadow out of Time’, the story establishes the scientific 
curiosity of educated humans, and specifically of its protagonists, early on. They are part of a scientific 
expedition from the fictional Miskatonic University, and the tale begins with a detailed description of 
their intentions, personnel, and equipment.
283
 Dyer asserts again and again the power of ‘scientific zeal 
and adventurousness’,284 describing the ways in which, even after the disaster at Lake’s camp, the 
‘scientific and adventurous souls’ of the party and ‘the lure of the unplumbed’ led them to continue 
their investigations.
285
 Indeed, he gives as his reason for writing the account the fact that ‘human 
curiosity is undying’, recognising the inevitability of other scientists wishing to continue the abortive 
expedition’s work and attempting to warn them of what they may uncover.286 Scientific curiosity, then, 
is immediately established as innately human, although not without its risks. The vastness of the polar 
waste itself, however, as well as that of the time-scale involved, implies something greater than the 
human mind is able to cope with. Early on in Dyer’s account, we are told that ‘Lake[…]spoke of the 
ineffable majesty of the whole scene, and the queer state of his sensations at being in the lee of vast 
silent pinnacles whose ranks shot up like a wall reaching the sky at the world’s rim’.287 There is, 
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certainly, a sense of awe here, Dyer’s ‘lure of the unplumbed’ making itself felt in the strangeness and 
enormity of the Antarctic landscape. The ‘queer state’ of Lake’s sensations, though, tells us that there is 
something disturbing in it, too, and Dyer’s account of his own experiences later on reinforce this sense 
of the uncanny. The flight that leads to his and Danforth’s discovery of the abandoned city is, we learn, 
‘burned into [Dyer’s] recollection because of its crucial position in [his] life. It marked [his] loss, at the 
age of fifty-four, of all that peace and balance which the normal mind possesses through its accustomed 
conception of external Nature and Nature’s laws’.288 Their first glimpse of the mountain range itself is 
even more unsettling: 
 
In the whole spectacle there was a persistent, pervasive hint of stupendous secrecy and 
potential revelation; as if these stark, nightmare spires marked the pylons of a frightful 
gateway into forbidden spheres of dream, and complex gulfs of remote time, space, and 
ultra-dimensionality. I could not help feeling that they were evil things—mountains of 
madness whose farther slopes looked out over some accursed ultimate abyss. That seething, 
half-luminous cloud-background held ineffable suggestions of a vague, ethereal beyondness 
far more than terrestrially spatial; and gave appalling reminders of the utter remoteness, 
separateness, desolation, and aeon-long death of this untrodden and unfathomed austral 
world.
289
 
 
The vagueness of the description, with its allusions to ‘dream’ and to the ‘ethereal’, suggest the 
difficulties Dyer’s mind is experiencing in adjusting to the changes in world-view occasioned by 
Lake’s discovery, and he admits his discomfort with the idea of intelligent life having existed on Earth 
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before humanity. He does not, he tells us, ‘relish the proximity of a world that had ever bred such 
ambiguous and Archaean monstrosities as those Lake had[…]mentioned’.290 The scene found at Lake’s 
camp, meanwhile, may look ‘like madness’,291 but there are indications that some of the disruption 
must have been the work of non-human forces. Dyer notes ‘objects including scientific instruments, 
aëroplanes, and machinery both at the camp and at the boring, whose parts had been loosened, moved, 
or otherwise tampered with by winds that must have harboured singular curiosity and 
investigativeness’,292 effectively admitting to the reader that his explanation is unsatisfactory. Later on 
in the tale, relating the details that suggest to him the Old Ones’ sentience and scientific curiosity, he 
says as much: 
 
The principal things I have been keeping back relate to the bodies, and to certain subtle 
points which may or may not lend a hideous and incredible kind of rationale to the apparent 
chaos. At the time I tried to keep the men’s minds off those points; for it was so much 
simpler—so much more normal—to lay everything to an outbreak of madness on the part 
of some of Lake’s party.293 
 
Just as human scientific curiosity is established and lauded, the question of its limits is raised. Dyer’s 
party, in attempting to explore some of the remotest parts of the globe, exemplify the traits of the 
educated, civilised, fully “human” being. What they discover, however, defies comprehension; their 
failure (or unwillingness) to grasp what is happening illustrates the gaps in human capability, even 
where those traits seen as most representative of humanity are concerned. Dyer and his team are 
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human, then—but there is still room for them to be more so. The very existence of the deficit raises the 
possibility of evolution and development beyond what is currently regarded as human. 
 
This, naturally, is exactly what we see in Lovecraft’s depiction of the Old Ones and their society. Many 
of the features of the Great Race are present here, too. Indeed, Lovecraft never shies away from 
recycling an effective detail, and so some distinctive characteristics of the Great Race’s civilisation 
make their first appearance here. The ‘titanic blocks’ of which the city is built,294 the arches used in its 
construction,
295
 the ‘curious weapons’ with which they are initially able to subdue the shoggoths,296 the 
absence of ‘the family phase of mammal life’ in their society,297 their ‘abnormal historic-
mindedness’298—even their use of hinged books299—are re-used, in various forms, in ‘The Shadow out 
of Time’. It is, however, still worth noting some of the aspects of the Old Ones’ physical, intellectual, 
and social development that impress themselves upon Dyer and his companions. 
 
The initial discovery of the specimens by Lake’s party is marked by comments upon their high level of 
development relative to other life-forms of their period. That they are ‘evolved and specialised’, 
according to Lake’s notes, indicates ‘that earth has seen whole cycle or cycles of organic life before 
known one that begins with Archaeozoic cells’.300 At this point, the party are mainly concerned with 
the prestige and media attention that their discovery is likely to garner; however, as Lake’s 
examination of the specimens continues, their complexity becomes startling in and of itself. References 
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to ‘incredibly advanced evolution’ recur,301 and we learn that the specimen’s ‘nervous system [is] so 
complex and highly developed as to leave Lake aghast’.302 It has a ‘surprisingly advanced’ brain, 
and—like the Great Race—more than five senses, making it ‘a creature of keen sensitiveness and 
delicately differentiated functions’.303 Their history, as discovered by Dyer and Danforth in their city, 
illustrates further their physical nature—one which seems to have made them well-fitted for survival 
and dominance in their era. Their tentacles are ‘infinitely delicate, flexible, strong, and accurate in 
muscular-nervous coördination; ensuring the utmost skill and dexterity in artistic and all other manual 
operations’, and they possess a ‘prodigious toughness and longevity’, maturing quickly, and dying only 
when killed by violent means.
304
 They are able to fly through space, to survive in extreme temperatures, 
and to derive nourishment from almost any kind of matter; during their journey to earth, they even 
managed, by using ‘certain chemicals’, to remove their need for food and respiration.305 They have 
‘excessively vast capacities for speed’ by land, water and air.306 
 
Their physical complexity and durability, then, indicates that they are highly evolved beings—but it is 
their intellectual and social development which foregrounds their similarity to human beings, and to 
the Utopians who surpass them in texts like Wells’s. The Old Ones’ sentience is hinted at in one of the 
earliest comments Lake makes on discovering the fossil cache in which they have been preserved. It is 
not the bodies of the Old Ones themselves that give this clue, but those of the other prehistoric animals 
found with them. ‘[Certain] skeletal fragments of large and marine saurian and primitive mammals’ are 
found featuring ‘singular local wounds or injuries to bony structure not attributable to any known 
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predatory or carnivorous animal of any period’.307 These injuries—‘straight, penetrant bores’ and 
‘hacking incisions’—indicate the use of tools, immediately hinting that the Old Ones are closer to 
humans than to the animals whose remains surround them.
308
 Also found in their vicinity is a puzzling 
artefact made from green soapstone, possessing a ‘curious smoothness and regularity’, and marked 
with ‘tiny dots in regular patterns’.309 Here, again, we see evidence of conscious craftsmanship, and of 
what will later be revealed as the Old Ones’ system of writing.310 These hints tell us that the Old Ones 
are, at least, of a similar level of development to early humans. 
 
What Dyer and his party discover after the massacre at Lake’s camp, however, implies a far higher 
level of development. The bodies of men and dogs left at the camp are ‘incised and subtracted from in 
the most curious, cold-blooded, and inhuman fashion[…]as by a careful butcher’, and there are 
‘carefully though oddly and inexpertly dissected’ remains on the laboratory table.311 Taken from the 
camp are ‘anatomical instruments’, as well as ‘illustrated technical and scientific books, writing 
materials, electric torches and batteries, food and fuel, heating apparatus, spare tents, fur suits, and the 
like’.312 Left behind, Dyer and his men find ‘evidences of curious alien fumbling and experimentation 
around the planes and all other mechanical devices both at the camp and at the boring’.313 The 
scientific curiosity of the Old Ones—and its similarity to that of Dyer’s party, made evident in their use 
of the human explorers’ equipment for experiments of their own—starts to become visible here, and in 
Dyer and Danforth’s exploration of the city, it is developed further. The designs on their walls in places 
anticipate ‘the latest findings of mathematics and astrophysics’; they make use of ‘intricate devices 
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employing unknown principles of energy’; they possess a ‘scientific and mechanical knowledge far 
[surpassing] man’s today’.314 Their artistic and architectural achievements, too, are considerable. The 
first glimpse Dyer and Danforth gain of their city inspires awe at the same time as fear: 
 
For this place could be no ordinary city. It must have formed the primary nucleus and 
centre of some archaic and unbelievable chapter of earth’s history whose outward 
ramifications, recalled only dimly in the most obscure and distorted myths, had vanished 
utterly amidst the chaos of terrene convulsions long before any human race we know had 
shambled out of apedom. Here sprawled a palaeogean megalopolis compared with which 
the fabled Atlantis and Lemuria, Commoriom and Uzuldaroum, and Olathoë in the land of 
Lomar are recent things of today—not even of yesterday; a megalopolis ranking with such 
whispered pre-human blasphemies as Valusia, R’lyeh, Ib in the land of Mnar, and the 
Nameless City of Arabia Deserta.
315
 
 
The technical expertise involved in its construction is emphasised, too: the ‘perfect’ cylinders and 
cubes which make it up, the ‘expert use of the principle of the arch’ made by its builders, and the 
similarities that some of its structures bear to ‘modern fortifications’ all suggest a formidable volume 
of mathematical and practical knowledge.
316
 The wall murals illustrating the Old Ones’ history, 
meanwhile, evidence a technique that is ‘mature, accomplished, and aesthetically evolved to the 
highest degree of civilised mastery’, far surpassing any human sculpture that Dyer has ever seen.317 
Indeed, its complexity—encompassing ‘a profound use of mathematical principles’ and ‘an analytical 
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psychology beyond that of any known race of antiquity’—renders it so far advanced (or at least so 
utterly alien; there is little distinction made here between the two, blurring the boundaries of inhuman 
and ultra-human) that to compare it to human art is, according to Dyer, largely useless.
318
 Moreover, 
Dyer suggests that, while he and Danforth are able to appreciate some of the skill that has gone into the 
production of the murals, they lack the necessary senses to do so fully. He senses that there are other 
‘excellences[…]lurking beyond the reach of [their] perceptions’.319 Nonetheless, the psychology of the 
species that has produced these artworks is not so alien as to render them incomprehensible: Dyer and 
Danforth find themselves profoundly moved by the images.
320
 And—immediately after asserting that 
the style bears no resemblance to that of any human school of art—Dyer does, in fact, suggest an 
‘analogue’: Futurism.321 Their alienness is de-emphasised as it is pointed out; they are held up as a 
potential template for the future development of humanity, rather than as a species so very unlike us 
that to replicate their achievements would be impossible. 
 
The details of their society that Dyer and Danforth are able to pick up add to this impression. It is 
interesting that, despite their scientific expertise, the Old Ones are not overtly reliant upon technology. 
They had, it is suggested, ‘passed through a stage of mechanised life’ before coming to earth, but found 
it to be ‘emotionally unsatisfying’, and abandoned it.322 The dangerous dependency upon technology 
presented in anti-Utopian texts like Brave New World is hereby circumvented; the scenario here is 
much closer to that portrayed in Men Like Gods, with the mechanised stage corresponding to the 
industrial Age of Confusion, and the Utopian society utilising technology only where necessary. Their 
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government is ‘complex and probably socialistic’,323 a characteristic which—given Lovecraft’s 
leanings toward (an admittedly idiosyncratic) socialism at this point in his life—we can probably read 
as having been intended to reinforce the Utopian nature of the Old Ones’ civilisation.324 As with the 
Great Race, their society is not structured around the family unit; rather, they live in large households 
based around ‘comfortable space-utility and[…]congenial mental association’.325 Their society—
egalitarian, scientifically advanced, and promoting intellectual congress—is, then, broadly similar to 
that of Old Ones, and of Wells’ Utopians and Lytton’s Vril-Ya. 
 
Interestingly, there is no mention of eugenic principles being widely used by the Old Ones, and it is 
entirely possible that they reached their incredibly advanced stage of evolution on their home planet, 
before coming to Earth, by means of natural rather than artificial selection. This does not mean, 
however, that they have no means of directing the growth and development of living organisms; indeed, 
it is this capacity that perhaps places them most firmly at the top of the evolutionary ladder. In one of 
Lake’s earliest casual references to the Necronomicon, he compares them to ‘Elder Things [not to be 
confused with the sinister ’Elder Things’ of ‘The Shadow out of Time’]  supposed to have created all 
earth-life as jest or mistake’,326 and the sculptures on their city walls bear out his comment. Later on, 
they are referred to as ‘the makers and enslavers’ of life on Earth,327 and the murals indicate that they 
possessed the ability to create life (‘at first for food and later for other purposes’) long before arriving 
on Earth.
328
 The life-forms currently inhabiting the planet are, in fact, byproducts of the Old Ones’ 
experiments, ‘suffered to develop unchecked because they had not come in conflict with the dominant 
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beings’.329 The distant ancestors of human beings fall into this category, having been permitted to 
survive due to their usefulness as a food source and ‘an amusing buffoon’ to the Old Ones.330 The Old 
Ones’ status as creators—their ability to manipulate both organic life and the natural environment—
renders them godlike, cementing their place one step above humanity. The impression is further 
reinforced when Lake, spotting the cube-shaped structures and surprisingly regular cave-mouths on the 
mountain range that provide the first sign of intelligent habitation, suggests that the natural structures 
seem to have been ‘shaped to greater symmetry by some magic hand’.331 Even after learning of the Old 
Ones’ ability to shape life, however, Dyer’s conviction of their essential similarity to—indeed, their 
identity with—humans does not waver. In perhaps the climactic passage of the text, he exclaims, 
 
Poor devils! After all, they were not evil things of their kind. They were the men of another 
age and another order of being. Nature had played a hellish jest on them—as it will on any 
others that human madness, callousness, or cruelty may hereafter drag up in that hideously 
dead or sleeping polar waste—and this was their tragic homecoming. 
[...]poor Old Ones! Scientists to the last—what had they done that we would not have done 
in their place?[...]Radiates, vegetables, monstrosities, star-spawn—whatever they had been, 
they were men!
332
 
 
This conflation of humanity and godlike status again places the Old Ones as a possible template for the 
eventual evolution of humanity—perhaps an example of the heights to which human beings should 
aspire. 
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This, however, is not the end of the story. Just as, in earlier tales of abhuman survival and degeneration, 
the pursuit of knowledge that characterises civilised humanity eventually leads to its downfall, it is the 
Old Ones’ ability to manipulate nature that finally occasions theirs. The intended product of their 
attempts to create life was a slave class: the shoggoths. They—like the Elder Things—allow the 
anxieties around atavism and degeneration to be played out with the Old Ones standing in for 
“civilised” humanity. Having been created by the Old Ones, just like human beings, however, they also 
offer a possible alternative route for human evolution. Shoggoths are ‘multicellular protoplasmic 
masses capable of moulding their tissues into all sorts of temporary organs under hypnotic influence 
and thereby forming ideal slaves to performs the heavy work of the [Old Ones’] community’.333 
Initially virtually mindless, their appearance plays on fears of the atavistic and abject in ways that are 
by now very familiar. They are ‘shapeless entities composed of a viscous jelly which [looks] like an 
agglutination of bubbles’, with a ‘constantly shifting shape and volume’,334 and may remind the reader 
variously of Yog-Sothoth and his Dunwich descendent, Helen Vaughan, shape-shifting in her dying 
moments, Francis Leicester, dissolving into a shapeless mass, or even half-human Jervase Cradock, 
whose body involuntarily produces tentacles under certain influences. Their form is unfixed and 
unstable; essentially, they are a kind of highly manipulable primordial slime. Indeed, Spencer’s 
description of a ‘Rhizopod’—one of the simplest of organisms, offered as an example of ‘life without 
organization’ might almost be a shoggoth in miniature: 
  
From the outside of this creature, which has not even a limiting membrane, there are 
protruded numerous thread-like processes. Originating from any point of the surface, each 
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of these may contract again and disappear; or it may touch some fragment of nutriment, 
which it draws with it, when contracting, into the general mass—thus serving as hand and 
mouth; or it may come in contact with its fellow-processes at a distance from the body, and 
become confluent with them; or it may attach itself to an adjacent fixed object, and help by 
its contraction to draw the body into a new position. In brief, this structureless speck of 
animated jelly is at once all stomach, all skin, all mouth, all limb, and doubtless, too, all 
lung.
335
 
 
 They are repulsive to the senses, their smell reminding Dyer and Danforth of ‘decaying organisms and 
perhaps unknown subterrene fungi’.336 Corridors through which they have passed are left ‘polished 
and almost glistening’, suggesting that they resemble enormous slugs or snails, other organisms far 
less complex and highly developed than their makers.
337
 They are destructive, removing the heads of 
their victims via ‘some hellish tearing or suction’, and leaving them coated in slime.338 Their very 
existence is horrifying enough that Dyer asserts, ‘shoggoths and their work ought not to be seen by 
human beings or portrayed by any beings’, and wonders at the ‘madness’ that led the Old Ones to 
create them.
339
  
 
More threatening still, however, is their ability to imitate their masters. The pre-human foreshadowings 
of Machen’s Little People, the suggestion of continuity between human and pre- or abhuman suggested 
by degeneration narratives, the half-human nature of beings like Helen Vaughan and Wilbur 
Whateley—these creatures function as a source of horror in part because they suggest a continuity 
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between the human and the abhuman, and therefore the possibility of the Other existing within the 
human self. The shoggoths, born of the Old Ones’ ingenuity, eventually develop the ability to form 
‘organs of sight, hearing, and speech in imitation of their masters’, and to ‘[mimic] their voices’.340 As 
well as these, they form ‘a semi-stable brain’, and a ‘stubborn volition’ which ‘[echoes] the will of the 
Old Ones without always obeying it’.341 It is, we are to believe, this intelligence and ability to mimic 
their creators that eventually leads to their triumph, overwhelming and wiping out the Old Ones’ 
civilisation and surviving until Dyer’s day in the subterranean abyss below the city. By the time of the 
expedition, they have even developed the ability to imitate the Old Ones’ writing and sculpture, albeit 
in uncanny, parodic fashion. The following passage, in which Dyer and Danforth study some bas-
reliefs which context will later reveal to be the work of shoggoths, illustrates this quite clearly: 
 
Upon resuming our direct progress we cast a beam of torchlight over the tunnel walls—and 
stopped short in amazement at the supremely radical change which had come over the 
carvings in this part of the passage. We realised, of course, the great decadence of the Old 
Ones’ sculpture at the time of the tunnelling; and had indeed noticed the inferior 
workmanship of the arabesques in the stretches behind us. But now, in this deeper section 
beyond the cavern, there was a sudden difference wholly transcending explanation—a 
difference in basic nature as well as in mere quality, and involving so profound and 
calamitous a degradation of skill that nothing in the hitherto observed rate of decline could 
have led one to expect it. 
[…]Danforth had the idea that it was a second carving—a sort of palimpsest formed after 
the obliteration of a previous design. In nature it was wholly decorative and conventional; 
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and consisted of crude spirals and angles roughly following the quintile mathematical 
tradition of the Old Ones, yet seeming more like a parody than a perpetuation of that 
tradition. We could not get it out of our minds that some subtly but profoundly alien 
element had been added to the aesthetic feeling behind the technique—an alien element, 
Danforth guessed, that was responsible for the manifestly laborious substitution. It was like, 
yet disturbingly unlike, what we had come to recognise at the Old Ones’ art; and I was 
persistently reminded of such hybrid things as the ungainly Palmyrene sculptures fashioned 
in the Roman manner.
342
 
 
As well as literally rewriting the Old Ones’ history—illustrating the absence of that ‘historic-
mindedness’ that makes the Old Ones singularly comprehensible to Dyer and Danforth—the 
‘difference in nature’ that the sculptures evidence, the ‘alien element’ which our human protagonists 
find so difficult to pinpoint, illustrates the shoggoths’ radical alterity. The bas-reliefs made by the Old 
Ones tell a coherent narrative, and also affect human observers on an emotional level, illustrating the 
substantial degree of similarity between Old Ones and humans and emphasising that—for the purposes 
of the story, and certainly in comparison to their monstrous creations—the Old Ones are, despite their 
alien physiology, ‘men’. That the shoggoths are so different in psychology from their creators also 
illustrates their inhumanity, and links their ability to imitate the Old Ones to the fear of abhuman or 
hybrid beings passing unnoticed so important in stories like ‘The Great God Pan’ and ‘The Dunwich 
Horror’. And here, is it the abject Other that triumphs—perhaps, in part, because of its alien 
psychology and concomitant lack of a moral or intellectual framework. The shoggoths, though 
intelligent enough to resist the Old Ones’ control, seem to lack scientific curiosity or a sense of history, 
destroying the Old Ones outright instead of studying them. Here, once again, fears of “civilised” 
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humanity being overwhelmed by an abject Other, apparently inferior but in fact more appropriately 
fitted for survival, are given vent. In some ways, then, Lovecraft is telling the same story he has always 
done: that of the swallowing-up of civilised humanity by the abhuman, and—more worryingly—that 
of the survival of the abhuman Other within the human. For if the shoggoths, sprung from the same 
source as human beings—the life-creating experiments of the Old Ones—are our distant siblings, then 
perhaps the form of humanity best fitted to survive in a hostile universe would resemble them more 
closely than their (and our) alien progenitors. 
 
Given the context of Lovecraft’s other fiction, his known views, and the identification of shoggoths as 
a slave race, it would be difficult to miss the the reactionary implications of this section of the narrative. 
Effectively, while trying to imagine a human or posthuman future, Lovecraft falls back into familiar 
tropes, asserting the superiority of a particular (educated, scientifically-minded, “civilised”) section of 
humanity and the importance of protecting it from displacement by other, less desirable sectors of 
society. Certainly, the similarities I drew between Lovecraft’s depictions of immigrants in his personal 
correspondence and the Deep Ones in ‘The Shadow Over Innsmouth’ seem also to apply to the 
shoggoths; furthermore, the repeated mention made of the shoggoths’ having been created to perform 
manual labour suggests that a degree of class prejudice is at work here. In attempting to imagine 
beyond the human, ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ is, perhaps, an ambitious intellectual failure. It is, 
however, one of Lovecraft’s most highly-regarded pieces of work,343 and one which begins to gesture 
at a less horrific version of the end of anthropocentrism. Although the shoggoth narrative does revert to 
Lovecraft’s familiar, reactionary narrative of racialised anxiety, it is the passage in which Dyer asserts’ 
the Old Ones’ essential humanity—quoted at some length above—rather than the horrific appearance 
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of the shoggoth or the nebulous final horror hinted at by Danforth as they flee the city that provides the 
novella’s climactic moment. 
 
Chia Yi Lee has argued that Danforth’s vision does in fact function as the tale’s climactic horror, 
reintroducing a sense of ineffable terror into what would otherwise be a straightforward science fiction 
narrative.
344
 This sense of confrontation with radical alterity, Lee suggests, is absent from the 
encounter with the Old Ones and even the shoggoths due to the possibility of their being absorbed 
within a comprehensible scientific narrative. This final horror, on the other hand, ‘lies not only beyond 
the rim of human comprehension, but even beyond the comprehension of all the cosmic others that, 
thrown together, have already been made known’.345 In support of this claim, Yee raises the bizarreness 
of Danforth’s ravings after his glimpse of the final horror, and contrasts them with the earlier 
comparison of the shoggoth to a subway train. The expression of horror elicited by the sight of the 
shoggoth is still comprehensible in human terms; it manifests itself as a list of subway stations. 
Danforth’s exclamations, on the other hand, are ‘fragments[...]revolving around that which is in 
abstentia [sic]’.346 Leaving aside that the shoggoth-train comparison may signal a making-alien of 
technology as easily (or at the same time) as a rendering of the abhuman in human terms, let us 
examine the phrases used by Danforth in a little more detail. While some of these details do, indeed, 
suggest spatial distance and an attempt to render what Lee calls a ‘horror[...]too radical to rationalize 
and explicate’347 (‘the carven rim’, ‘the moon-ladder’, and ‘the colour out of space’, a reference to the 
story that represents perhaps Lovecraft’s most successful attempt to depict the utterly alien), others—
‘the proto-shoggoths’ (inviting a connection with horrors already depicted and explained), ‘the primal 
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white jelly’, and ‘the original, the eternal, the undying’—call to mind an already-familiar notion of the 
pre-human abject. This is not to say that Lovecraft is not attempting, as Lee suggests, to reintroduce a 
horrific Other into his tale, but simply that to depict what Lee calls ‘the horror beyond horrors as an 
Other beyond the other’ is ultimately impossible.348 Lovecraft once more splits the alien down the 
middle, into its super “human” (capable of travelling vast distances and working with ideas beyond the 
ken of human mathematics; preternaturally long-lived) and abhuman (‘primal’, formless, shoggoth-like) 
components. 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of ‘At the Mountains of Madness’—and it is, arguably, an attribute 
that also appears in ‘The Shadow out of Time’—is not what it ends up doing, but what it attempts to do, 
even if it succeeds only partially. The shoggoths remain horrifying all along. The Old Ones, meanwhile, 
start out as alien horrors, monstrous and incomprehensible.
349
 Their physiology, part animal and part 
vegetable, part amphibious and part aerial, appears as chaotically hybrid as that of Wilbur Whateley or 
the Mi-Go.
350
 The awe that Dyer and Danforth experience upon first seeing their city is tempered with 
horror, and even their ability to create life is ‘blasphemous’, rendering their godlike status frightening 
as well as admirable.
351
 Their scientific curiosity, however, their psychological comprehensibility, and 
their commitment to an egalitarian society built on the valuing of intellectual endeavour, are enough to 
make them ‘men’. As well as drawing our attention to the survival of the abhuman within the “human”, 
‘At the Mountains of Madness’ opens up a space for the human within the posthuman. We may never 
be able to escape our abhuman heredity—but our posthuman descendants will be no more able to 
escape us. 
                                                 
348
 Ibid.. p. 23. 
349
 Lovecraft, ‘At the Mountains of Madness’, pp. 261-262, p. 265. 
350
 Ibid., p. 265. 
351
 Ibid., p. 330. 
309 
 
 
Conclusion: Survivals (Redux), or, Apocalypse Never 
 
 
Evolutionary theory implied a new myth of the past: instead of the garden at the beginning, 
there was the sea and the swamp. Instead of man, emptiness—or the empire of molluscs. 
There was no way back to a previous paradise: the primordial was comfortless. Instead of 
fixed and perfect species, it showed forms in flux, and the earth in constant motion, 
drawing continents apart. This consciousness of the fluent, of the physical world as endless 
onward process, extended to an often pained awareness of human beings as slight elements 
within unstoppable motion and transformation. Nostalgia was disallowed, since no 
unrecapturable perfection preceded man’s history. Ascent was also flight—a flight from the 
primitive and the barbaric which could never quite be left behind.
1
 
 
Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots 
 
 
The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the service of the other; the 
other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of domination, 
which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be autonomous, to be 
powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so involved in a dialectic of 
apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, 
insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many.
2
 
 
Donna Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism 
in the 1980s’ 
 
 
 
It has been my project here to show that what is commonly referred to as the “weird tale” has much in 
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common with other literature after evolutionary theory, insofar as it engages consciously and perhaps 
obsessively with the theory of evolution, and particularly with its implications for “human” identity. 
The weird tale has perhaps no exclusively distinguishing characteristic; nonetheless, drawing upon the 
work of Gillian Beer and upon Lovecraft’s critical essays, we may perhaps say that it exists in the 
moment between hypothesis and confirmation. Indeed, it relies upon that moment for its evocation of 
fear—a fear that, like Kristeva’s abjection, throws the “human” subject back into the body and all the 
problematic implications thereof. The “weird moment” that I discussed earlier relies upon the 
possibility of a knowledge of the self as other which may in itself open up new uncertainties. The 
potential extension of human faculties for knowing the world leads to knowledge, but not to a telos of 
complete knowledge; rather, it always necessitates further questions. In Beer’s words, evolutionary 
theory does not ‘allow either interruption or conclusion’.3 
 
Often, the weird tale’s treatment of evolutionary theory has been reactionary. The possibility of pre-
human survivals evokes abhorrence, and the racialising of portrayals of such survivals partakes of a 
colonial discourse that imposes the temporal axis of evolution onto the geographical axis of 
colonisation, so that colonised peoples come to be viewed as “primitives”, anachronisms, or “missing 
links”. Both scientific and fictional narratives of degeneration imply the uneasy proximity of the 
“human” to its animal origins, but also that some humans are closer than others, as the racialising of 
Helen Vaughan in ‘The Great God Pan’ clearly demonstrates. Anxieties around the dwindling of 
colonial power, too, manifest themselves in anxieties around racial or national fitness. The fears 
surrounding “miscegenation” and hybridity, as discussed at some length in my examination of ‘The 
Shadow Over Innsmouth’, are explicitly racialised and tied to anti-immigration sentiment, as well as to 
the principles of the eugenics movement. Even those narratives that most orient themselves toward the 
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future—Lovecraft’s Utopian imaginings in ‘At the Mountains of Madness’ and ‘The Shadow Out of 
Time’—draw heavily upon eugenic principles. In this way, both Machen’s and Lovecraft’s stories are 
embedded in what Richter calls ‘the lethal biopolitics of the twentieth century’: a web of ‘unsavoury 
affinities’ that ‘cannot be simply ignored’.4 Certainly, I do not wish to characterise the conservative 
Machen or the racist Lovecraft as progressives (in the current sense of the term). As I have already 
mentioned with regard to Paul Buhle, such attempts at whitewashing are dishonest, and, in any case, 
exist in direct contradiction to what we read at the most obvious surface level of their texts. I am not, 
however, wedded like Joshi to author-intentionalist criticism, and I would like to suggest, by way of 
conclusion, that the provisional nature of the weird moment encourages—perhaps even requires—
readings that exist in tension with one another. To say that the possibility of progress implies the 
possibility of degeneration and vice versa is not enough. That evolutionary change is non-teleological 
means that neither possibility is only itself. Deteriorating complexity and adaptive change may be the 
same thing: progress may also be degeneration. Their boundaries are permeable, as are those of the 
“human” self. This self is not a unity or a discrete whole; it never has been; it never can be. Ultimately 
(or, rather, at this moment in a process without ultimate endpoint), new ways of inhabiting this self, 
with its shifting boundaries, are required. I would like to touch here upon possible readings of some 
weird texts that allow for these new ways of existing—ways that appear startlingly prefigurative of 
Donna Haraway’s assertions, in her seminal posthumanist essay, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, 
Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’, that ‘a cyborg world might be about lived social and 
bodily realities in which people are not afraid[...]of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints’.5  Haraway’s essay, of course, comes from a rather different position within structures of 
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binary division and domination, as well as within history, to the fictions of Lovecraft and Machen. Its 
explicit concern is the future (or a future) of feminism; it aims to offer the possibility of a politics of 
‘affinity’ between groups who have traditionally been placed on the “other” side of the self/other binary. 
Lovecraft, meanwhile, writes from the position of a privileged identity coming, or failing to come, to 
terms with the other within itself. Machen’s position, as a writer of the Welsh border, is perhaps a little 
more complicated. Nonetheless, when one considers Haraway’s assertion of the untenability of 
wholeness in the face of an otherwise unavoidable ‘dialectic of apocalypse’, it becomes difficult to 
avoid seeing similar concerns in Lovecraft’s and Machen’s fiction. 
 
I went some way towards touching on the possibility of an ambiguous reading of Machen’s ‘The White 
People’ in my essay, ‘“Mixed-Up Creatures”: Identity and its Boundaries in Arthur Machen’s Weird 
Tales’, which draws partly upon material from the first chapter of this thesis. I argue there that, while 
‘framed by a discourse of “evil” that supports the colonial, anthropocentric narrative, [the story] is 
never far from acknowledging an attraction to the racialised, de-“human”-ised Other within’.6 It is 
perhaps more accurate, however, to say that the story acknowledges an attraction to the permeability of 
boundaries, the way in which the self must always contain the other, and vice versa. The other can 
never exist as Other without the self, and the converse is also true. The hidden world of fairies and 
witchcraft explored by the narrator of the story’s Green Book section is figured as a journey, requiring 
a starting point. The threat it poses to the self, embodied in the sexually threatening figure of the ‘black 
man’, implies a self to be transformed. When we learn that the girl has ‘poisoned herself—in time’,7 
are we to infer that absorption into otherness would be a fate worse than death—or that negation of 
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either self or other would necessarily entail the annihilation of its counterpart, in a ‘dialectic of 
apocalypse’ like that described by Haraway? 
 
Even more striking is an element of ‘The Shadow out of Time’, which is in this respect perhaps 
Lovecraft’s most radical fictional work. The Great Race survive by means of technologically-effected 
mind-transfers between their bodies and those of entities living on other planets and in different epochs. 
Indeed, the bodies in which Peaslee encounters them are not their original ones. Effectively, they rely 
on technology and on a kinship with other species close enough to allow for habitation of their 
bodies—something that is not possible with the semi-corporeal Elder Things—for their survival. 
Bodies are accessible to them only via machinery; they are inextricable from it. Since the bodies they 
first evolved in are lost, they, like Haraway’s cyborgs, ‘[have] no origin story’, no ‘myth of original 
unity’; they ‘would not recognize the Garden of Eden’.8 Haraway notes the potential for this 
inextricable union of body and machine to serve as a means for violent domination. ‘From one 
perspective’, she writes, ‘a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, 
about the final abstraction embodied in a Star War apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the 
final appropriation of women’s bodies in a masculinist orgy of war’.9 Certainly, from the point of view 
of those species displaced by them, the actions of the Great Race constitute violent domination of the 
most destructive kind. When disaster threatens a time and place inhabited by the Great Race, they, ‘in 
the name of defence’, impose ‘apocalypse’ upon another species, seizing their bodies and allowing 
their displaced minds to perish in those the Great Race have abandoned. Individual members of the 
Great Race seem to have no compunction about doing this outside of such mass migrations when their 
own bodies begin to die. In Darwinian terms, this absence of sympathy for ‘strangers’ of other sentient 
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species—effectively the Great Race’s ‘lower animals’—denotes savagery.10 To survive, the Great Race 
must partake of primitivism; they cannot inhabit unproblematically “civilised” selves. Beer’s 
suggestion that ascent is ‘also flight—a flight from the primitive and the barbaric which [can] never 
quite be left behind’ appears to be validated here.11 Perhaps even more strikingly, though, the survival 
of the Great Race depends upon its movement in time and its ability to inhabit multiple, shifting, dis-
unified selves, mismatched bodies and minds. Lovecraft’s penchant for immensely detailed physical 
description works for this interpretation. When Peaslee describes the ‘enormous iridescent cones’ in 
which he encounters the Great Race, detailing their various appendages and the uses thereof, their 
approximate size, and the type of matter they appear to be made of, our attention is drawn to the 
specificity of bodies.
12
 The relative difficulty encountered by the transferred minds in working within 
the Great Race’s unfamiliar bodies, and the horror experienced by Peaslee when he realises that he, too, 
inhabits one of them, intensify the attendant sense of dislocation, of fractured wholeness. Peaslee’s 
human body, meanwhile, is inhabited by a mind of the Great Race, and becomes both a self and an 
other. Disconcertingly, Peaslee describes its actions while inhabiting his body in the first person, 
though he retains no memory of them, and his wife rejects the Peaslee-Great Race hybrid as an ‘utter 
alien’.13 The Great Race, it appears, have adapted to existence as both self and other. Their 
technological advances, and the fusion of machines, bodies, and other bodies that they enable, entail 
possibilities for both violent domination and for radical ways of thinking and being of the order 
imagined by Haraway. The Great Race, like Haraway’s cyborgs, always avoid apocalypse, and must do 
so by learning to inhabit flux. 
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The weird tales I have considered here do not, then, deal only with the undermining of 
anthropocentrism, but with the transformation of what it is to be a human self, and with the potential 
for an endless series of such transformations—evolution, after all, abhors stasis. Existing in a moment 
between hypothesis and confirmation that itself implies a future filled with such moments (we will 
never know exactly what it is we do not know), evolutionary theory requires us to acknowledge that 
our survival depends upon a renunciation of the imagined wholeness or oneness of human identity, and 
an adaptation to non-teleological change. To continue existing, the human must give up the hope of 
ever being only human—and perhaps also the fear of its opposite. I hope that this study may go some 
way towards aiding the understanding of Lovecraft’s and Machen’s work by placing the stories in their 
historical and intellectual context, and by suggesting some of the possibilities raised by their 
orientation towards the future. 
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